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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the interaction between the state law and administrative practice in the 
regulation of foreign investment in China since the late imperial time. From the in­
corporation of modern capitalism into China in the mid-nineteenth century, the analysis 
develops along the changing relationships between the state legal modernization and survival 
of traditional law during the process of the end of the old order. Following the explanation of 
the failure of bureaucratic capitalism in the Republican period (1911-49), a discussion on the 
socialist transformation expelling foreign investment (1949-78) is elaborated. Hence, an 
overview of the limits of state law in Chinese political economy can be estim;i:ed, with some 
degree of accuracy.
After 1949 one party-state was established in the People's Republic of China (the 
PRC) and Taiwan. This study explains the interaction between the systems of formal law and 
informal law, and the process of rationalization of legal procedures for the control of foreign 
investment in both regimes. Then, even after the Cultural Revolution in the PRC and the 
impact of industrialization in Taiwan, a continuing tension between traditional Confucian 
ideology and the state in both regimes remains clear in the dual characters of both law and 
bureaucracy.
A close examination of law and administrative practice of foreign investment in the 
PRC and Taiwan shows that the statutory law has its positive and formal existence with the 
limited function. The state law has assumed its role in initial attempting to liberalise the 
economy to foreign investment, which develops the First Wave of the Encouragement of For­
eign Investment. However, the major contradictions in the process of liberalisation come out 
of the administrative and business practices, which require a further opening up the economy 
and the statutory guarantee.
Consequently, the legal mechanism is better equipped in the Second Wave of the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment through the rationalisation of both legislation and
xxx
procedure. Nonetheless, the reaction from both administrative discretions and business 
practices explores the limits of the state law. This study concludes that the over reliance on 
informal relationships predates the party-state system in both the PRC and Taiwan, or the 
party-state structure has not diminished their role but reinforces it.
I
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INTRODUCTION
The theme of this study is to examine the interaction between formal and informal law, or 
state law and administrative practices in the process of constructing a market economy. 
Using Mainland China and Taiwan as research cases, the focus of this study will be 
particularly on explaining the role of law and administration in the process of opening up the 
economy to foreign investment. To a certain degree, this study helps to discover whether the 
authoritarian rule of the party-state can use both foreign capital and technology in national 
development, and how far the national law can assume an effective role in balancing the 
interests between the internationalization of capital and national development.
However, the major contributions of this study could be not only a better 
understanding of the subject-matter itself, i.e., the Chinese law and its practice, but also a 
more manoeuvrable methodology to foreign scholars. The research strategy of this thesis 
will aim at searching for institutional functions while widening the study of Chinese law to 
include Chinese legal culture. Through the whole work, it is thus suggested that both aims 
together are essential to a better approach to Chinese legal study.
The originality of this study lies in the consideration of four fundamental difficulties 
related to the topic. The first difficulty has been a contradiction among legal scholars: while, 
on the one hand, advocating that there is only one China, on the other hand, they ask, 'how 
can we compare the two, geographically, or economically?' It is "comparative law", which 
has been lacking in the previous works on these themes that will be analysed in this work. 
Secondly, the case study here concerns the regulation of foreign investment, within which 
more formality and statutory guarantees are generally deemed necessary, focusing on a novel 
way on the informal practice under the statutory framework. The third difficulty has been the 
long term continuity and change of the law in development in China. Especially, in the field 
of business and economic law, this study questions for the first time: as some people have 
claimed, whether we should forget about the effects of traditional law (in Chinese mod­
ernization)?
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Finally, the fourth difficulty is how to penetrate the reality of ruling Party-State, both 
in the People's Republic of China (the PRC) and in Taiwan, which has relied heavily on in­
formality by nature. How to figure out the role of law under the two Party-States, and their 
similarity and difference, has been missing in the comparative legal studies and in Chinese 
legal research. Given the politics today in the PRC and Taiwan, a price will be paid, sooner 
or later, to touch this "untouchable" stone of the Party-State. This is the long nightmare 
behind this pioneering study.
These major issues of the concept and functions of law in the PRC and Taiwan will be 
posed within the complicated context of the modernization programme, social change and 
cultural attitudes in Chinese society.
Issues o f the Object o f Chinese Legal Study
Up to the date, the major obstacles to Chinese legal study are indeed created by the
object of study itself. In the words of a famous contributor, Professor Stanley Lubman, who
has developed his Chinese legal study more than three decades:
"China does not yet have a legal system-, the continued relationship between law and 
politics remains obvious; law is often treated formalistically. Values derived from a 
Chinese culture that is itself in the course of change continue to shape both the 
outlines and activities of institutions, but are difficult to identify clearly in practice. 
Meanwhile, China itself remains closed to the student of law in practice. [Lubman 
( 1991): 294]".
Indeed, it is from that "law is often treated formalistically" as a basic methodological base, 
this thesis starts to explore why "the continued relationship between law and politics remains 
obvious", and why "values derived from a Chinese culture" continue to "shape both the 
outlines and activities of institutions", in the course of Chinese capitalist and socialist 
transformations.
Moreover, it is also from that "law is often treated formalistically" mentioned, this 
thesis reaches the issues of the relationship between two different categories of Chinese rules, 
in both the PRC and Taiwan: published legislation, and internal (neibu, t*]-fcjl) or restricted 
regulations, which will be discussed in the later chapters. Even when published rules and 
regulations are accessible to foreigners, they form only a part of the legal framework
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governing business transactions in China [Moser (1987): 3]. One of the major difficulties 
facing foreign lawyers and investors in China, as usually emphasized, is the frequent recourse 
by Chinese bureaucrats to these "internal rules" held in strict confidence from outsiders [Leng 
(1990): 751]. The functions of these internal rules have been crucial in Sino-foreign 
economic activities:
"Most of these internal rules consist of directives which must be followed by Chinese 
negotiators in interpreting and implementing statutory law. Some herald the intro­
duction of new policies which may in time find their way into published law. Others 
are simply a formalization of practices which have developed as a product of 
experience gained in similar or related transactions [Moser (1987): 3]".
However, at least up to the end of 1990, through an examination by Professor Shao-chuan
Leng, there has not been any announcements, in the State Council Gazette or any
newspapers, of stopping printing or of publicly distribution of these internal rules [Leng
(1990): 751].
As to our theme of interaction between law and administration in this study, an active
role assumed by the informal law has existed between published legislation and internal
rules. A close examination of this informal regulation is necessary, because:
"Whatever their source, internal rules complicate the elucidation and definition of 
China's legal system and as such pose constant pitfalls in the way of attempts to un­
derstand the nature and operation of the rules regulating commercial transactions 
[Moser (1987): 3]".
Interaction between Formal and Informal Law
Not only Michael J. Moser, who once was a legal sociologist in Southern China, has his 
cautious views above, but also these business lawyers, such as D. Hayden, M.T. Jones III, 
and Dennis Campbell, are practically concerned with legal attitude behind their Chinese 
counter-partners1 [D. Campbell (1991), the PRC: 1]. Indeed, why "the continuous vitality of 
Chinese traditional values which affect the attitudes of those in positions of authority", 
claimed by them, has survived in both the PRC and Taiwan is the major concern of this study 
(cf. Chapter I). Since law does matter in China today [CJ. Lee (1991b)], the interaction
1 From the viewpoint! of practically buaincaa lawyer!, tha foreign buaineaaman will encounter these three factor! in 'all of hia dealing!' 
with China: "(1) economic scarcity caused by a densely populated agrarian nation; (2) the continuous vitality of Chinese traditional 
values which affect the attitudes of those in positions of authorities; and (3) characteristics of a socialist system which will appear 
unfamiliar to the foreigner. D. Campbell (1991), the PRC: 1.
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between formal and informal law should be taken into proper consideration by foreign 
investors. The dialectics of China's two legal traditions, from professors T.T. Chu, Victor H.
Li, S.C. Leng, to James P. Brady, have been commonly recognized. However, it is still 
doubted whether we should follow V. Li’s two "Models" of law (1975, 1977), "external" and 
"internal", or J. Brady's "bureaucratic justice” and "popular justice" (1982: 9).
A third domain will come out from Brady's dialectical convenience: where is the 
"judicial" justice,2 without which one cannot evaluate the bias each from bureaucratic and 
popular justice?3 Furthermore, Li's "Models" have created more confusion in the case when 
two models of law "in a combination of harmony and competition" or in "interaction", as 
claimed by himself: how can one Model retain its particular type with the elements from 
other Model? For his "convenience", the external model of law called by Li is the formal law 
of itself in fact,4 *while the internal one, informal law.3 They could be better named by legal 
"systems", with/without formality, as described Brady* and Li7 himself. This study simply 
call these two systems of law as formal and informal, as commonly used by people.
Whether the living law, customs, convention, or informal law can be named as law is 
concerned with different degree of the coercive measures, forms and rationalization under the 
state law [cf. Cotterrell (1984); Weber (1966); Allott (1980)]. The core is the "form", or 
formality, of law, not the question whether which body of "law" is really law can be 
answered. The discussion of the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals and the limits 
of positivism is out of space here, and the Hart-Fuller debate on the activity theory of law as 
well [cf. Posner (1990): 220-244]. While in the PRC in the early 1980s, before the formal
2 I owe this point here to Picciotto (1979) end Holloway A  Piociotto (1978).
3 However, the fact that judicial independence wee lacking in Chineae legal tradition has been discussed in the works of these 
professors mentioned.
4 Li has described, The first model (for convenience. I will called it the "external model") is based upon the establishment of a formal, 
detailed and usually written set of rules, that is, a legal code which defines permissible and impermissible conduct'. V. Li (1975): 72.
2 Li has noted the second model of law (the "internal model") as, "Proper modes of behaviour are taught not through written laws, but 
rather through a lengthy and continuing educational process whereby a person first learn and then internalizes the socially accepted 
values and norms". V. Li (1975): 73.
** Brady has analysed, "not one but twoiudicial systems, a formal one baaed upon the centralized stale and an informal one rooted in I
community associations". Brady (198z): 12.
7 As part of their cultural heritage, the Communists, analysed by V. Li, possessed some familiarity with a formal legal system and with 
centralized bureaucratic government. V. Li (1975): 73.
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state laws on particular forms of foreign investment were enacted, both administrative and 
judicial authorities had decide even the most difficult cases as best they can, provided the 
cases are real cases and within their jurisdiction [cf. Chapters V and VII]. This implies that 
any consideration relevant to deciding the case, whether drawn from positive law or natural 
law sources, such as customs, convention or business practice, is a legitimate input in the 
manufacture of "law", and that the government's decision - though of course not immune to 
criticism - will have to be pretty crazy before it can fairly be called "lawless" [cf. Posner 
(1990): 232]. There is always a law, formal or informal or, if one prefers positive or natural.
Thus, following the definitions of two systems of Chinese law by V. Li (1975), this 
study avoids his use of "Models" of law. Given the various terminologies used by different 
scholars, the focus of.this study lies in the changing relationship between "formality"8 and its 
counterparts. Unless one follows a Chinese saying - "attempting to pick up a bone inside the 
egg", and asks, can informal law be called law? Instead of going back to Nuremberg and ask 
how the legal principles can be administered by the Court then, we examine the Chinese ef­
fort in improving Chinese legal mechanism to regulate the foreign investment.
Usually the most important thing is to resolve the issue and dispute. Not always; 
sometimes the best resolution, especially when the rules are unclear, is to let the dispute sim­
mer awhile. Many disputes, however, have to be resolved at once, even if the rules are 
unclear or have to made up on the spot; and then the Chinese authorities do the best they can, 
using whatever information and insight that both Chinese and foreign parties give them or 
that they can dredge up out of their own reading and experiences. This untidy, un-rigorous 
process we call "informal law". It may influence, more or less, the development of "business
practice", while in turn, business criticisms of governmental decisions may cause the
«
government to change legal doctrine; so there is a complex interweaving of formal and 
informal law or, if one prefers of state law and administrative practice. This is the evolution 
of two Waves of Encouragement of Foreign Investment in both the PRC and Taiwan.
The word "Formality" refer* to the condition*, in regard to method, order, arrangement, uae of technical expreaaiona, performance of 
apecific acta, etc., which are required by the law in the making of contract* or conveyance*, or in the taking of legal proceedings, to 
insure their validity and regularity. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary (1990).
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All these counterparts of formal law, such as administrative conventions, business 
practice, customs form the traditional influence, constitute a framework of the informal prac­
tice, sector, domains and informal law, for they all are deficient in legal form. This study 
takes the importance of formal law, while arguing that the informal law remains as the key in 
the regulation of foreign investment. It in not necessary for this study to condemn, or judge, 
the over active part of informal law in China [cf. V. Li (1975): 110-111], Given the fact that 
President Chiang Ching-kuo highly used the informal law to promote democratization and 
liberalization in his final years in Taiwan, it seems that Mr. Deng Xiao-ping in 1992 has 
utilized this informal mechanism to further stimulate his reform and open policy in order to 
get rid of the shadows of the disintegration of the former USSR (cf. Ferdinand (1992)].
In short, from the values derived from Chinese culture to the internal rules of the 
institutions, the research strategy suggested by this thesis is to explore the interaction 
between the state law and administrative practices, and to figure out the role of informal law 
under Chinese bureaucratic tradition. Any research by simply reading law texts can not be 
able to reach these aims of a deeper analysis.
From the Foundation o f Understanding Chinese Law to the Methodology
Adopting a "Sinocentric" approach as the best way to explore these issues of the
Chinese law and their environmental context has been highly recommended:
"This means that a Western observer should analyze the Chinese legal system without 
any preconceived notions. The law should be appreciated within the context of 
China's rich and diverse influences and ideas." [Goossen (1989): 94]
However, even precluding these notions, one cannot go through this analyzing process
without any foundation of understanding. In contrast, one, to a great extent, will unavoidably
need some predicative ideas: First of all, the Chinese understanding of the traditional Chinese
law itself, second, the Chinese understanding of modern (including Western) law, and third,
the Chinese resolution in adjusting both the traditional Chinese law and the modem law into
Chinese political-economy. These understandings will be discussed repeatedly within this
thesis. Thus, the "Sinocentric" approach is based upon the Chinese understanding, in both
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the Beijing and Taipei regimes, of both the traditional Chinese and modern legal systems. It 
is believed that on this foundation we can explore these issues in a more detailed framework.
Furthermore, the Chinese understanding of law or the legal system, emphasized in 
this paper, implies that the Chinese legal system since the 19th century is not unique in the 
world, but is a developing system with an interaction of both traditional Chinese and modern 
law, especially the influence of Western law. It thus admits that, on the one hand, it is 
difficult for one to draw out a pure Chinese traditional concept, and that, on the other hand, 
Chinese law today is a mixture product of both the traditional Chinese and modern concepts 
of law. Moreover, this premise accordingly provides a basis for comparative legal studies 
and for examination of legal developments in China.
The Theme o f this Study
Focusing on the legal framework of foreign investment in both the PRC and Taiwan, this 
thesis analyses the role of bureaucracy in state intervention on both domestic and foreign 
business activities, and to examine the use of the administrative discretion by the bureaucracy 
in balancing the group interest, or personal interest, against national interest. Therefore, at 
least two questions shall be the focus in this thesis: Does law, both statutory and 
administrative, in the PRC and Taiwan promote foreign investment? And, is law effective in 
terms of regulating foreign investment in the PRC and Taiwan? Although there exist many 
differences of the political-economy between the PRC and Taiwan, such as the size of the 
economy and administration, the different degrees of international dependence, the different 
degrees of industrialization, and so on, there remain some common interests. Especially, the 
party-state, the historical heritage of Chinese bureaucratic characteristics, and a Confucianist 
cultural context emphasizing the personal connections and the code of behaviour all consist 
with the core issues in this study.
Hence, in light of the changing relation between the state and society, several aspects 
of economic development will be taken into account [cf. Selden (1988)].’ In the views of
0 Whil are ihe general features of aocialist development nines 1949 in the PRC? Do theac features derive from the claaa interests of the
working classes as the dominant classes. Can the general features of socialist development be applied to the sector of foreign in* 
vestment in question, and to the class interests of workers snd peasants in particular? Can these interests provide the benchmark
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Chinese leaders, China is not developing capitalism, but constructing socialism with Chinese 
unique characters. In order to maintain the socialist project, whether these contradictions of 
the socialist transformation before 1978 have been resolved is one of our concerns of the 
functions of law.* 10 However, the reform programme generates new contradictions today that 
will have to be resolved in their turn if the transition to socialism is to be sustained.11 
Interestingly, the relation between economic control and social change in Taiwan provides a 
comparison for our understanding to these questions mentioned.
The thesis will investigate the extent to which the development of the regulation of 
foreign investment has conformed to the class interests, and to the imperatives of socialist 
development generally.12 Initially, we shall analyse the contradictions within the socialist 
development with/without foreign investment and the contradictions of the market system 
under socialism: Is it correct in practice that socialism does not need any market, or any 
foreign investment? Furthermore, can the "deficiencies" in the socialist development before 
1979 be viewed largely as a consequence of the "party-state" cadres and bureaucrats placing 
their own interests and priorities ahead of those of the working classes? Moreover, can this 
be examined in a simple venal sense, or in the sense that their "access to the power and 
resources of the state" gave them "a set of priorities" and "a view of the world" that differed 
from those of the mass classes they purported to represent? More precisely in this thesis, we 
shall discuss the role of foreign investment inside the reform programme, the relationship 
between foreign investment and the class interest of the party-state cadres and bureaucrats, 
and the functions played by both law and administration since then.
against which actual development record can be aaseased? Then, can a discussion of the main features of capitalist and "statist" 
development throw the socialist features into relief? Moreover, what is the part of law and bureaucracy within this discussion?
10 And, as to those contradictions, for example, the overwhelming emphasis on capital accumulation at the expense of higher living 
standards and the leadership's arrogating of the right to define "correct thought" clearly infringe on the rights or the working classes, a 
review is necessary and crucial. Were these contradictions incompatible with the socialist development model? Then, we will 
understand why the transfer of the "specialist” bureaucracy into the "red" bureaucracy did not able to resolve the contradictions before 
1978 in China.
11 For instance, although incomes generally have risen strongly in the reform period, some have risen spectacularly, generating new 
forms of income inequality. Whether or not such newly emerging contradictions will be successfully resolved remains a matter of 
conjecture at this time. Nevertheless, is, or is not, the emergence of contradictions from the reform programme per se sufficient 
grounds for condemnation?
12 But a major question then would be: were there, since 1949 in China, any substantive deviations in the direction of a "statist" model 
present, deviations which if left unoorrected would have brought the socialist project to an end? To a certain content, the reform 
programme, adopted from the end of 1978, has been viewed in part as an attempt to remove the "deficiencies" in socialist 
development revealed in the period of 1949-78.
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To sum up, it is through the Sinocentric approach, based on both historical form of 
development and structure suggested in Section 1.3, that we will examine the law, 
administrative procedure and the forms of foreign investment in the PRC and Taiwan. The 
interaction between both formal and informal law, and that between both law and the 
bureaucracy, help to explain, in the case of Taiwan in Chapters II, IV and VI building-up of 
the party-state and economic control; the planting of the legal system and its localization; the 
first wave of liberalization of economic environment, and the failure of law and policy; the 
impact of both administrative legislation and procedure on the development of foreign 
investment; the second wave of liberalization of economic environment, and the challenges 
of law and policy; and, as a whole, the role of bureaucracy and foreign investment in 
Taiwan's development in the period of 1949-91. In contrast, in the case of the PRC in 
Chapters III, V and VII, this interaction is to analyse: the reform programme and its 
challenge; the role of party-state in both economic and legal constructions; the first wave of 
encouragement of international economic co-operation, and the limits of law and policy; the 
impact of both administrative legislation and procedure on the development of foreign in­
vestment; the second wave of encouragement of foreign investment: the recent legislation 
and policy; and, finally, the role of bureaucracy and foreign investment after 1978.
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CHAPTER I. PERSPECTIVE, APPROACH AND THE COMMON INTERESTS OF 
INFORMAL LAW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The task of this Chapter is to examine the conception of law and its codification in early 
imperial time and to analyse the special characteristics, the genesis and change, of Chinese 
law and administration. It also intends to draw out the main theme of the impact of informal 
law on China's legal modernization since the turn of the century, as discussed in the late 
chapters. The particular focus of this Chapter will be the role of informal regulation, 
especially within the governing by bureaucracy before the collapse of Chinese old order, in 
conjunction with a close examination of the role of law in pre-1911 social development.
Indeed, a comparison based on Chinese legal development, from the tradition towards 
the process of modernization, between Mainland China and Taiwan produces a great interest 
now and in the near future. In this work, a close examination on interaction between law and 
administration, from the points of institution to those of legal attitude, shows that although 
being not the core of Chinese system in fact, Taiwan provides a constructive base for the 
"comparative" studies on Chinese law.
1.2 THE THEME AND THE SETTING
To ignore Honk Kong and Taiwan as the comparative loci for Chinese legal studies is to 
reject the interests of both change and continuity of Chinese legal tradition and customary 
values, and to miss the future legal development among these "liang-an-san-di" (three places 
and two coasts between the Taiwan Straits).
I.2.A. "Chineseness" and Comparative Legal Studies
If Hong Kong provides a good base for those studies on Chinese customary law under 
the influence English law (e.g., H.D.R. Baker (1968); J.M. Potter (1968)), Taiwan shall be 
qualified as a better forum for a comparative study on "both change and continuity" in 
Chinese legal development, not only from the viewpoints of Chinese traditional context and 
bureaucratic succession but also from the process of reception of foreign law. One finds no
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reason to exclude from Chinese legal studies those good works analysing Chinese law in
Taiwan by Western scholars, such as E. Ahern (1972), M.L. Cohen (1976); N. Diamond
(1969); B. Gallin (1966); Michael J. Moser (1982); and B. Pasternak (1972).
'At the outset, it is appropriate that at least a brief word be said about the
"Chineseness" of Taiwanese society [Moser (1982): 2]'. To take both Taiwan and the PRC as
a case study in this work, Michael J. Moser's words remind us of the base of a comparative
study on law and social change in these two Chinese communities:1
"Despite Taiwan's rather turbulent political career, culturally at least it has been and 
continues to be thoroughly Chinese [Moser (1982): 2]."
Thus, in the light of the history, and in order to understand China's legal development from 
the past to the present, Taiwan is qualified as a comparative case better than any other com­
munities or countries in the world. From the views of academic points,
"while one cannot claim that Taiwan (nor any other Chinese province for that matter) 
is capable of representing "Chinese society" as a whole, the study of culture and 
society on Taiwan can yield important insights into Chinese culture and society in 
general [Moser (1982): 2]."
Furthermore, from both the continuity of Chinese law and reception of western law, 
Taiwan has occupied an inoculating part of the history of Chinese law, which shows "four 
clearly distinguished phases"2 which coincide with profound changes in the political systems 
[Cf. Bunger (1981)] From this long continuity, a comparative legal study between the PRC 
and Taiwan not only has a very historical interest, but also provides a better and wider survey 
based on the comparison.
M. Moser has used a long statement to analyse: "The vast majority of the ialand's present-day inhabitants arc descendants of 
immigrants from mainland China who began to arrive in Taiwan during the 1600's. Governed as a part of the Chinese empire (Tint as 
an administrative subdivision of Fujian province and later as a province in its own right) until the end of the nineteenth century, 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Following approximately Fifty years of colonial rule the island 
was restored to Chinese sovereignty and since 1949 has been the seal of the Republic of China, the Nationalist Chinese regime 
expelled from the mainland by the forces of Mao Zedong. Despite Taiwan's rather turbulent political career, culturally at least it has 
been and continues to be thoroughly Chinese (Moser (1982): 2].
(1) Hie period of pre-stale law before the centralized unitary state of the Qin {Ch'in ) in the third century B.C.; (2) The long period |  
of the Empire with its legal positivism, but also with large subject-areas untouched by law, from the third century B.C. until 1911; (3)
The relatively short period of "the reception o f Europeen lew" which began at the turn of the 20th century and ended with the 
foundation of the PRC in 1949, although this era "continues in Taiwan”; and, (4) The period since 1949, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the later sections and chapters and be separated further into several phases.
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I.2.B The Theme: Informal Law and the Administrative Sector in Chinese Culture
As to the impact of traditional law in the political economy and social ideologies in 
Chinese history, the importance of both informal law and administrative sector will be 
particularly under our focus in this work, while several points can be drawn out (cf. Section
I.3.D). First, although law in imperial China was a tool of state control, there was always a 
limit to state intervention. Beyond this border line, state law must always make a concession 
to the other social institutions.
Secondly, the state must in some "relatively private" sectors (, even inside the 
personal connections o f the state administrators,) respect the "informal regulation" of 
Chinese society itself. Law in imperial China helped to define the clear interaction between 
public and private life. Nevertheless, this very fact provided a possibility of the existence of 
the informal or societal form of law in Chinese tradition. In addition to government by the 
state, a social hierarchy enforced socially approved norms and values, which were inculcated 
by political socialization and practised by extra-judicial apparatuses consisting of both 
administrative agencies and social organizations, including family, clan, village, guild, and 
district or neighbour-policing units [Cf, T.T. Chu (1965)]. The co-existence of both the 
formal and the informal systems of law has been a long tradition of Chinese law.
Thirdly, under its traditional conception, law in China is, however, over-emphasized 
by its administrative function and coercive nature which are not the sole characteristics of 
formal law in the western world. Nevertheless, the fourth picture of the role of law in 
traditional China showed that the authority of the state was never "totalitarian" or "absolute", 
although it remained "authoritarian" in nature [Cf. Tsou (1986): xxii-xxiv]. Finally, to a 
great extent, law and its institute-setting in China must cope with Chinese knowledge of 
tradition and social philosophy. In other words, the success of law as an instrument for 
social change depends on the extent of people's tolerance and social ideologies.
The fact of codification of li, or rites, in traditional China (Section I.3.D), retained the 
influence of li, in the form of the informal law, inside the legal attitudes and knowledge of 
Chinese people. So far as bureaucracy, or administration, is concerned in this study, to a 
great extent, the importance of li in governing was emphasized in traditional China with a
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long history of legal privileges of Shift (the upper class, in contrast to the lower class, Shu) 
whose core was bureaucrats [T.T. Chu (1965): 239-241],
Here, Chinese traditional law provided an understanding for us that in addition to the 
formal form of law, li, the informal form of law, plays an important part as a governing in­
strument with no less importance for Chinese government in any period. In Chu's words, 
"[the] so-called 'governing by It is much more than application of abstract ethical and moral 
principles" [Chu (1965): 241], Furthermore,
"Li and law, while separate entities, were supplementary to each other. As the norms 
were simultaneously sustained by both social and legal sanctions, they imposed a 
strong compulsion on the members of the society." [Chu (1965): 279]
This will also be a basis for our understanding of both law and bureaucracy in China and
Taiwan in later Chapters. Moreover, the co-existence of both the formal and informal forms
of law in China has interested legal scholars even in relation to contemporary Chinese legal
studies.3
It is never difficult for one to find out some examples of contradiction and 
cooperation of both formal and informal law. Of course, the formal law has its important 
contribution to the development of Taiwan after 1949. For instance, the Statute for the 
Encouragement of Investment (1960) has proved an effective instrument which circumvented 
those obstacles to investment found in Nationalist laws of the 1920s and 1930s. Law as a 
means to further economic development and social progress also is evident in the 
Nationalist's land reform programme.4 But, their success relied heavily upon the informal 
law, given the process of negotiations and compromises of interest exchange between the 
ruling state and the landlords or entrepreneurs.
Similarly, before 1957 in a mutually-complementary way both the juridical form 
(such as formal laws) and the societal form (such as the mass campaigns) of law 
fundamentally provided the practical instruments for the consolidation of the new regime in 1
1 E g.. V. U  (1970) and (1977); long (1977); and. Body (1982).
4 It in generally agreed by moat echo lari, theae three land lawi in early 1950« have helped not only to initiate the economic growth and
expand landlord«' role in buaineaa but alao to atrengthen social »lability in Taiwan over the past few decades. Cf. Chapter II.
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Mainland China. There were many basic social units in the traditional China, such as family, 
clan, guild, the sworn-brothers society, village, and "bao-jia” (the traditional local-police 
administration). Up to the 1950s, all of the customary social institutions were "replaced or 
restructured" by socialist settings, including the People's Commune, the Trade Union, the 
street-neighbour-committee, the production team, and the Communist branches.* 3 * Within 
these, without the support from informal law incorporated inside the mass movements, for 
example, the 1950 Trade Union Law could not itself complete its functions6 in China's 
economic construction.
1.3 THE PERSPECTIVE OF THIS STUDY AND THE SINOCENTRIC
APPROACH
Although based on a Sinocentric viewpoint, this paper takes into account more different 
historical conditions of legal development than those of ideological or theoretic arguments. 
For instance, to understand the impact of traditional law on the economic modernisation in 
China today, one has to confront the debates about the Chinese traditional conception of law 
and its role in the relationship between the state and society. In the long history of imperial 
China, the vague arguments of political ideologies and philosophies created many difficulties 
in analysing the nature and functions of Chinese traditional law. This paper attempts to avoid 
those commonly-accepted ideological and political views of Chinese legal ideas, and to 
examine the role of law in the changing relation of the state and society in ancient China. 
Then, a picture of the impact of traditional law on economic modernization in China from the 
last century will be drawn out from the changing role of law within the framework of the 
modem state and Chinese society [Cf. Chapters II and III].
In the reconstruction phase (1949-53), in the countryside strictly controlled by the Communist, Land Reforms and masa movements
did effectively abolish the feudal-patriarchal forces of the old claim, landlords, and other social groups. In the cities, a more important |
role than that of the non-Communist groups was played by the maaa organizations, among which was the Trade Union Congress.
'Hie trade union, assisted by the Communist organs inside the enterprise, changed the traditional social structure at the lowest level, in
which the majority of workers were previously dominated by the patriarchal guilds or the secret societies.
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I.3A. Law and Social Change: From the Historical-Structural Survey to Legal
Attitudinal Analysis
In short, the analytical approach in this paper is based on both "legal attitude" behind 
formal/informal duality and a "historical-structural" framework. This paper examines the 
role of Chinese law at those "turning-points" of magnificent political and social changes in 
the history of China. Furthermore, the analysis of the functions of law and its development 
will manoeuvre through an examination of those institute-settings and structural changes of 
Chinese state and society. Accordingly, through this framework there arise several different 
understandings and arguments from those popular views of the works on Chinese law. For 
example, on the development of the relationship between the state and society, this paper 
emphasizes more the importance of informal law and the influence of the bureaucracy and its 
class interest in the political-economy and the legal developments in China.
Indeed, the phrase "Chinese law" as commonly used implies internally that there are 
certain differences (as well as similarities) between the Chinese law and the western ones. 
However, it is specious that this distinction of the word "Chinese" is based on a geographical, 
jurisdictional, jurisprudential, or social attribute. Law inevitably reflects the social relations 
in a certain society, and cannot exist outside its own society. The understanding of Chinese 
law in this paper, both the State law and the living law, or the formal law and the informal 
law, is based on those attributes of social-legal context within the Chinese political- 
economical structure during particular historical periods.
As to contemporary Chinese society, I am convinced that four historical events 
provided a contextual framework for our studies of Chinese legal theory and its practice. 
However, if a crisis means a structural turning-point in history, my perspective of each 
turning-point in this paper means "a period of a changing process", not occurring in any 
particular year. Accordingly, the first turning point is the end of the old order during 1911- 
49, which saw the collapse of both the imperial government and its socio-economic and legal 
structure.7 However, the last dynasty, the Qing (Ch'ing) fell in 1911. The traditional Chinese
7 A* analyzed by ona of Chlaaaa legal echo Ian. the Indilional eocial context of Chineae law was as the follows "China was a society f
that significantly elevated morality above law and fused the two. It was also a society with a highly developed and complex bureau 
cracy and system of administration. The foreigner is likely to grossly underestimate the volume, the antiquity and the systematic 
detail of legislation, codification, legal commentary and legal treatises published under the emperors of China. ... However complex 
and sophisticated these codes were, they created no rights of citizens, no general legal framework independent of the state and no 
body of civil law as distinguished from criminal law. Tliey were instructions to officials”. (Tay (1987): 562-563)
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law (as "instructions of officials” mentioned above) lost its explicit role in Chinese society, 
but with immense implicit influence which shall be always born in mind by the legal 
academics.
The second important event is the period of taking the socialist road in China during 
1949-65. The third one is the failure of Mao's Cultural Revolution (1966-76) which meant 
the return of Chinese traditional culture which still plays an inalienable part in its society 
today (cf. Chapter III).
Finally, the fourth important historical event, after the failure of China's several 
development programmes during the past hundred years, is Deng's Modernization 
programme and his pragmatism which opened Chinese society towards the outside world and 
injected numerous new elements into China since 1979. To attain "the four modernizations" 
(cf. Chapter VII), China must have "rules and regulations" and an orderly political-economic 
environment. At the December, 1978, plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party, 
(which is generally seen as marking Deng's ascension to the position of the top leader,) the 
Party's top leadership clearly accepted this view and its implications for legal development 
(cf. Chapters III and V). From then on, the issue of how to link success in achieving the four 
modernizations to the construction of a "socialist legal system" made an new epoch of legal 
development in China.
In contrast, the development of law and foreign investment has been much simpler in 
Taiwan, where after the Second World War these could be found only one crisis parallel to 
the Chinese Civil War,8 the period of 1945-49 (Cf. Chapter II).
1.3.B. The Flowing Interaction of Legal Development and Its Various
Historical Forms
In the light of the political-economy as the context of law, there exists "Chinese" law 
that geographically and jurisdictionally operates in the China, both Mainland and Taiwan, 
with those social attributes of Chinese tradition, ideological principles, and pragmatism of its 
modernization programme. Within the political-economic and social context, Chinese law
8 Since the Korean War, Taiwan haa been under the umbrella protection of United Stolen of Amcrica'a aecurity defence alongside the 
Hm I Asian countries, it is hard to accept the advocacy of a 'national crisis” by the Nationalist government.
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provides itself, in comparative terms, the distinctively legal contrasts "between tradition and 
modernity", "between socialism and capitalism", "between pragmatism and ideology", and, 
surely, "between Chinese and other cultures".
With those legal contrasts, the studies of Chinese law can, therefore, be achieved 
through two approaches: the self-examination of the evolution, and the comparative legal 
studies. As a result, the word "Chinese" does not exclude the possibilities of any migration 
of foreign legal factors into Chinese law. As a relatively comparative term, the element of 
"Chinese" is on the tide of a flowing interaction of modernity-tradition, capitalism- 
socialism, pragmatism-ideology within the growth of Chinese law. With this nature of a 
flowing interaction, the comparative examination of the growth of Chinese law, accordingly, 
neither denies the criticism from a Western legal perspective.9 In addition, it is also through 
this flowing interaction that we can link the subsequent historical stages together into a long 
term survey.
IJ.C. Informal Regulation Refined under the Structure of the Party-State
Sociologically, Communist China can be described as a Party-State. This is also the 
case of Taiwan. However, this raises a question whether the Party's intervention, "through 
informal mechanism", dominates the government system within the State. Theda Skocpol 
compares State-building in three revolutionary countries.10 The PRC state and society after 
the 1949 revolution exhibited particular features:
As a corollary, the Chinese New Regime (compared to the France or Russian) has 
been less amenable, though by no means immune, to professionalism and a stress on 
formal rules and unitary hierarchies of routinized command. Furthermore, the 
Chinese Communists have uniquely made recurrent attempts to reduce or prevent the 
unchecked growth of inequalities of rank and reward in state and society [Skocpol 
(1979): 163].
Therefore, again I do not agree here what Gooaacn said, "[assessing] the Chineae legal ayatem from a Western perspective may shed 
some benefits of comparative analysis, but may not reflect the merits of the Chinese approach to law" [Gooaaen (1989): 100J.
"Yet, of course there were also important variations in the outcomes of the French, Russian, and Chineae Revolutions..........The
Russian and Chineae Revolutions gave rise to party-led state organizations that asserted control over the entire national economies of 
the two countries and (in one way or another) mobilized the populace to propel further national economic development. ... In contrast 
to France, Soviet Russia and Communist China resembled each other as aevelopment-oriented party-state. ..." [Skocpol (1979): 163]
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As a fact, under both Nationalist and Communist rules there are parallel party and 
state structures at all levels-national, provincial, county, municipal, and district. This 
ensures firm party control. However, it is one of our focuses in the study of the development 
of foreign capital that how far has the interaction between the formal law and informal law 
changed the relation between the party-state and the society. At least, the co-existence of 
both the party-state and the Confucianist bureaucratic context has shortened the social gap 
between Socialist China and Capitalist Taiwan, of which has usually been thought of as being 
very great.
Indeed, informal law has assumed a key part in the transformation of the nature of 
Taiwan's development. For example, even with the President's emergency powers and 
mechanism of the Temporary Provisions (480510), President Chiang Ching-kuo explicitly 
stated, in commemorating the 1985 anniversary11 of the ROC Constitution (461225), the 
political succession in Taiwan would be carried out "according to the Constitution" [Clark
(1989): 138]. This clearly shows, in my view, how the party-state made a compromise with 
its society especially with the gradually strengthening middle-class. President Chiang Ching- 
kuo used the informal law to supplement the formal law, and to support his cumulative 
reform towards political liberalization and democratization since he became Premier in 1972.
And this was the will of a family head, a directive from the state leader, and an order from 
the party chair. In addition, at least two more moves beyond the rigidities of formal law were 
exhibited. First, in order to guarantee democratic progress and competition12 and to set the 
stage for the more far-reaching reforms led by himself, "President Chiang personally 
intervened when the Election Commission seemed ready to press charges against an 
opposition candidate for defaming him" [Clark (1989): 135-136]. Secondly, on 28th 
September 1986, President Chiang again defused charges filed by the Ministry of Legal
11 to that anniversary. President Chiang announced dearly, succeaaion to the prcaidcncy or lop leadership position by a member of the 
Chiang family or a military coup "cannot happen and will not happen," although the law does not prohibit any young Chiang to be a 
preaidency candidate.
*2 Id the 1985 electiona, the GMD won ita usual 70 percent of the popular vole, which the opposition Tangwai (literally, "outside the f
party") won some satisfying victories.
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Affairs against the Democratic Progressive Party13 under the Temporary Provisions, and 
announced that "martial law would be ended and that new political parties could be formed as 
long as they support the ROC Constitution and renounced communism and Taiwan 
Independence" [Clark (1989): 137]. Preciously, the accompanying restrictions from martial 
law and the Temporary Provisions on political activities had been increasingly unenforced by 
political-social norms and democratic values behind the societal part of legal mechanism 
operated by its party-state leader. Facing both law and bureaucracy within an one-party 
authoritarian regime, this party-state leader was well aware of the function of informal law in 
driving a "quiet revolution"14 towards democratization. In fact, these examples explain that 
within the hierarchy of the party-state in Taiwan the political-economy of law retains a major 
field of the discretion of the authority.
Indeed, it is through the interaction of both informal and formal law under the 
structure of the party-state that bureaucracy, both in the PRC and Taiwan, consolidate their 
ruling status. After the liberation, the secret societies were still one of the force resisting the 
Communists until 1954.15 In the reconstruction phase, two major political tasks16 were then 
left for the Trade Union Congress to fulfill. One of the economic impact of the 1950 Trade 
Union Law (500628) was that it provided the legal base for the unions "to protect public 
property, oppose corruption, waste and bureaucracy, and fight against saboteurs in 
enterprises operated by the state or by co-operatives and in institutions and schools" [Article 
9(C)]. However, the period 1949-50 was characterized mainly by the "reorganization of the 
trade-union from the bottom up":
"At this level the trade unions had at first to succeed with the secret societies in which
some of the workers were organized." [Kraus/Holz (1982): 31]
On 28th September 1986, the opposition seemingly threw down the gauntlet to the regime when it declsred the formal formation of 
the Democratic Progreaaive Party (DPP) at a meeting that had been called to slate candidates.
14 "President Chiang continued to push the top party leadership in s more liberal direction, which guaranteed the policy changes. In the 
spring of 1986 there wss a turnover of four members in the CSC which made it slightly younger and almost one-half Taiwanese in 
composition (as opposed to only s quarter five years earlier." (Clark (1989): 140).
15 Even in mid-1950, Mao spoke of more thsn 400,000 "bandits" scattered in remote regions of the liberated area that had not yet been 
wiped out (Teiwes, CHC (1987): 70).
To represent the immediate interests of their members and to aid in the consolidation of the new system in those professional and 
social strata that "were not yet acceaaiblc to the influence of the political parties" (Krsus/Holz (1982): 30-31).
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That is, the mass movements were driving the new regime to abolish the traditional helm­
broking system and to attack the "bao-tuo" (the helm-head, or the helmsman of a group of 
workers) and "luo-bao" (the broker of the transport workers) [Cf. ZJZ Record-A (1989): 6-10, 
14, 18]. For instance, in September 1951, it was reported that in 177 cities the "feudal- 
broking" system was already abolished, and in another 27 cities the movements were 
proceeding [ZJZ Record-A (1989): 22-23]. After these political movements, the social 
stratum of the working class was released from the traditional guilds and secret societies, but 
unavoidably into the coercive guardianship under the Communists. Hence, it was through the 
interaction of formal law and informal law that the authoritarian structure of the party-state 
was created. It has also been within this structure that the law has developed.
1.3.D The Administrative Influence and Informal Sector from Pre-1911 Traditional
Chinese Concepts of Law
The conception of law in early imperial China is a long process within which the political 
authorities made at least two major compromises with society, and those different social and 
intellectual forces made compromises with each other as well. As a result, the Chinese 
imperial governing system was consolidated by a hierarchy based on class differentiation, a 
cosmic ritualism modified by the Confucianists, with an expansion of administration, in 
which the bureaucracy and Legalist quasi-law played the key parts.
(I) Dual Systems of Chinese Traditional Law
In traditional China, the social hierarchy and relations were based on a philosophy o f cosmic 
harmony with "a centripetal orientation towards a central point and a corresponding ordering 
of ranks" [Bunger (1981): 68]. However, the political demands from the pre-state governing 
system, the feudal authorities of the Zhou (Chou) dynasty, led to the first compromise with 
the then society, that is, Chinese ritualism—a set of practices and ritual obligations complying 
with the philosophy of cosmic harmony. Then, people were persuaded to subject themselves 
to rites (li) by the prestige and the imposing forms of the greatest ceremonies, and by the 
ascendancy, and the example, of the highest personages of the social hierarchy [Bunger 
(1981): 74]. However, Chinese ritualism did feel the need for a mechanism of a juridical
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type. This is shown in T.T. Chu's distinctive analysis of the meanings of /t.17 Thus, Chu has 
defined li as rules of behaviour which are different from rites and ceremonies [T.T. Chu 
(1965): 230-231, footnote 11].
Being purely formal norms of conduct, li, described by K. Bunger as one kind of 
"pre-state law",18 19in traditional China, had been supplemented by a system of obligations 
imposing or proscribing certain deeds, a system enforced by the coercion of the state 
apparatus. The fact of codification of rites did not set up any actual positive laws like those 
in the western juridical tradition. Undoubtedly, as has commonly been pointed out by several 
western scholars, East Asian law had no term for subjective right, until it came into contact 
with European law [Bunger (1981): 86-88; Vandermeersch (1985): 13-14]. This co-existence 
of both jural and societal systems of law can be further explored through the social and 
political functions of li as a complex set of "institutions" in Chinese society, which associates 
li with marriage, kinship, government, official system, court audience, archery, chariot-driv­
ing, hunting, military ceremonies, funerals, sacrifice, etc. [T.T. Chu (1965): 231, footnote 
11]. With its institutional effects, li, being a powerful social norm, still relied heavily upon 
persuasion and education rather than force, and upon the use of social pressure rather than 
governmental power [T.T. Chu (1965): 279]; in that respect li has the attribute of informal 
law. Similarly, li stressed the importance of internalizing the rules of conduct and pointed 
out the ineffectiveness of using fear of punishment to make people behave, and so does the 
informal form of law.1’
17 The principles of a ritual order of this kind are altogether different from those of the juridical order, though the former still imposes
» some obligations upon individual liberty, cf. Vandermeersch (1985): 13; also, cf. T.T. Chu (1965): 230-231. footnote 11.
The pre-state law was characterized as followed: 1) ... its norms were the work of man, and therefore certainly not of divine origin; 2) 
... back to the actual writing on li, they arose from 'customs" 3) They stipulated duties and responsibilities, but not rights. ... not an 
individualist ethic 4) They drew their justification and their authority from the fact of tradition; they were good because they were 
old, and 5) Criminal justice is conspicuous for several functioning regulations which for the early period, are very "modern”. See 
Bunger (1981): 74-76.
19 The relation between both the jural and societal systems of law, li and law in China, was obviously close, as Ch 
ancient people frequently mentioned li and law together, and such term as li fa  or li lu (li and law) were comm<
[T.T. Chu (1965): 279). And, "We may say that originally li were enforced by social sanction, later by legal 
(1965): 279)"; both li and law are overlapped in traditional China [T.T. Chu (1963): 279).
u pointed out, "The 
in in their writings” 
sanction [T.T. Chu
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(ii) Special Characteristics of Chinese Law
China had a long history of codification in its imperial time, from the first unitary state, the 
Qin, down to the final dynasty Qirtg (Ch'ing), which promulgated on the one hand the Da 
Qing Lu-li (Statutes and Sub-statutes of the Great Qing) in 1740 (after several editions of the 
statutes); and on the other hand a series of editions of Da Qing Hui-dian (Constitutions of the 
Great Qing) in 1690, 1733, 1763, 1818, and 1899 [Vandermeersch (1985): 13-20], From the 
very beginning, the extraordinary penal apparatus built up in the Qin was designed and 
operated "to force all social activity into channels which served the ends chosen by those in 
power, by which the state was to increase its wealth and expand its empire" [Vandermeersch 
(1985): 14], However, throughout Chinese imperial history, these statutes still remained a set 
of administrative regulations in the field of public order.
Also, they retained "the exclusively penal character inherited from their Qin 
prototype; for the Chinese never in fact established, following the overthrow of the Legalist 
regime, a truly juridical system, which would have been altogether foreign to their traditions" 
[Vandermeersch (1985): 16], Bunger has analysed these questions with different ex­
planations20 from those given by Vandermeersch. Furthermore, Bunger even listed many 
benefits21 for large parts of the population brought by the legal order of the Qin, and pointed 
out that "cruel penalties, as has been reported, were repeatedly enforced before and after the 
Qin, without resulting in a general resistance among the population" [Bunger (1981): 76-77]. 
Because of these facts, Bunger argued:
"It is therefore obvious to perceive the reasons for the resistance against the Ch'in
(Qin) style of government not only in the harsh penalties, but primarily in the
20 Id Hunger's view. "... However, the Hen dynniiy kepi ihe promise |o r  the repeal of a large pan of the Qin (Chin) criminal code) for 
■bout twenty year« only. Then began a considerable increase in legislation, even in the held of criminal law. Its bulk is indicated to 
us by its 26,272 articles, surely a notable number for those days. The hard facts of politics had taught the Han emperors that such a 
widely stretching country as China could not be ruled without a uniform legislation and a uniform system of administration. Down to 
1911, none of the succeeding dynasties could change this." [Bunger (1981): 77]
21 E.g., "for the formers. Ihe statutory recognition of private property in land; for the general citizen activity and especially for wide-
ranging commerce, the standardization of Ihe coinage, measures and weights, and wheel tracks; all significants snd far-reaching 
innovations", in addition, "many public order measures were issued, and surprisingly we lesrn of cleanliness in the streets and the 
decrease of burglary and violent crimes”. See Bunger (1981): 76.
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precipitate introduction of the new statutes in most parts of the Empire and in that 
feeling of uncertainty created by the loss of security in a familiar order."22
Partly because of that "feeling of uncertainty created by the new statutes", and partly because 
of the intolerable nature o f the coercion in the Qin regime [cf. Vandermeersch (1985): 14], a 
compromise was established between Legalism and ritualism, which then symbolized the 
familiar old order; this is the second time that the state made a necessary compromise with 
society based on the philosophy of cosmic harmony. Thereafter, the repressive 
interventionism of the administration was kept to the indispensable minimum, and a major 
scope of social relations was left apart from state intervention to spontaneity educated by 
ritual [Bunger (1981): 16]. Thus,
"This is why the whole sphere of what we call contract law, and all the procedures of 
commercial practices, remained in China entirely the affair of the partners involved, 
except where the administration was able to find a 'public order' pretext for seizing 
hold of this or that sector, which then fell ipso facto into the penal domain." 
[Vandermeersch (1985): 16]
However, after the compromise between legalism and ritualism, the first tendency 
was towards the limitation and simplification of the statutes. The second tendency was for a 
mass of new regulations to spring up alongside the fixed statutes of tradition [Vandermeersch 
(1985): 17], that is, the administration continued to grow more extensive and more com­
plicated. Through those dynasties, Chinese state administration developed, as a fact, in the 
realm of public order as discussed, a multitude of bonds which connected it with its subjects, 
such as the fiscal system, military service, the ordering of the great public services, the 
organization of education, the official examinations, the planning of liturgical celebrations, 
and so on. This is how one can explain that, under the later Qing (Ch'ing), the number of 
provisions of the "statutes" was eventually to fall to 436 articles only,23 while the figure of
22 Bunger himself even noted: Ib is  explanation is consistent with Arnold Gehlen's observations and theory. It would further corroborate 
F.A. Us ye It's legal-historical view (1973, pp. 72 and 162) agreeing with B. Rehfeld, which characterizes the invention of the art of 
legislation as "probably the most momentous ever made - more momentous than (the invention of] fire or gunpowder". Ibid., p. 77.
23 According lo Tay, Da Qing Lu L i was "a code of punishments listing 3987 punishable offences", and was arranged "in 436 statutes 
[far less than 502 articles of the last Tang Code of A.D. 651,] with 1409 supplementary regulations that grew to 1892 by A.D. 1870". 
See Alice E.S. Tay (1987): 562-563. Also cf Vandermeersch (1985): 17.
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codified administrative regulations^ extended [Vandermeersch (1985): 19-20],
Undoubtedly, this procedure represents the most sophisticated development of the 
administrative function, not the legislative function, "to be found in the whole of world 
history before the contemporary period [Vandermeersch (1985): 19],
Thus, Chinese traditional law had several special characteristics. First of all, a major 
area of social order combined with a relatively minimal legal order into a dual system of 
social harmony in traditional China. And the legal order was a public order dominated by 
administration and its regulations, and thus very different from the liberal legal system 
which developed later in western countries. Secondly, the traditional Chinese state law had a 
limited role under the limited authority of the "state", because of the active philosophy of the 
cosmic harmony of society. Therefore, most of private economic life and those commercial 
practices were beyond the scope of the formal law and left in the field of social customs.
Finally, the legitimacy of the government or the state was based upon a traditional 
harmonious order and the consent of society. The success of governmental policies depended 
upon the acceptance o f society and the concessions made by the state. For instance, even 
within the public dominance of administrative rules, the growing number of tenants of the 
landed gentry during the Former Han period, about the first century A.D., "paid neither poll 
tax nor land tax to the government, but a land rent to their landlords" [Hulsewe (1986): 537]. 
It is clear, however, that the relationship between the state and society decided the role and 
functions of law in ancient China. Without surprise, in more westernized and industrialized 
Taiwan in June 1991, several officials and mayors, after the long dry months, still have to 
take the informal duty for the traditional "worship of heaven for rain" (sher-tan chi-yu),* 25 
which has changed litter from the picture of rain ceremony by the Emperor Wan-li of Ming
2* Dm Qing Hui Dimn was a constitutional or administrative code creating e highly complex system of administrative government. With 
regular revisions both Da Qing Lu Li and Da Qing Hui Dion remained the law governing China until the westernizing legal reforms 
which were initiated in the last years of the Qing dynasty and enacted only after the Revolution of 1911. See Tay (1987): 563.
25 Asiaweek (Ya-zhou Zhou-kan, Hong Kong) (Vol. 5:24), (23AM/91): 19.
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dynasty, for example, in 1585.26 This underlines the point that the informal ritual norm and a 
traditional harmonious order are still the foundation of Chinese ruling and administration.
(Hi) Bureaucracy and Informal Regulation in Traditional and Modern China
The expansion of administrative regulation in the interaction between the state and society 
made Chinese bureaucracy the key to the government, especially given the huge size of the 
country. At the same time, both the informal norms and formal law further strengthened the 
bureaucrats' several legal privileges and their great discretion, so that the bureaucracy was an 
administrative mechanism dominating politics, and even the sovereign [Cf. Huang (1981): 
85-86].
In fact, over-emphasis of both moral and normative values, the rules of conduct, and 
informal law has caused an endless tension in Chinese tradition and in the interaction be­
tween the state and society.27 An understanding of this tension of Chinese tradition, between 
ritualism and the legal mechanism and between the Confucian ideology and the power 
structure, is crucial for a full appreciation of the role of bureaucracy, beyond the static views 
given in the Confucian books or law textbooks.
For instance, the contradiction between li and law, has explicated the problems of the 
legal privileges of bureaucracy in traditional China. In feudal times as discussed above, the 
so-called shih-ta-fu, the ruling class, did not fall under the jurisdiction of law which was the 
instrument for ruling the people [T.T. Chu (1965): 170-176], This was based on the class 
nature of the ritualism as “Li is not applicable to the common people, punishment is not 
applicable to the ta-fu (officials) [LiJi]." Hence, both Confucianism and the law [from the 
Wei dynasty (about A.D. 2nd century)] recognized privileged groups over and above the
“ The importance of tradition ceremony for rain can be found: "The emperor waa deeply worried by the knowledge that the daily life of 
the general population waa threatened. He had already ordered local officiate to pray for rain, but with no reaults. The emperor then 
decided to perform the ceremony himaelf in the presence of the entire court. ... For many residents of Peking, this was the one time in 
their lives they ever saw the Son of Heaven in person. ..." For the process of this ceremony: ace R. Huang, '¡387, A Year o f No 
Significance: the Ming Dynasty in Decline', (1981: Yale Un. Press), p. 118.
27 James T.C. Liu is correct in his analysis of relation between the Confucianism and Chinese state: "Confucianism is a morally-oriented 
body of thought, whereas the state is a power structure. The Confucian emphasis on moral qualities is more readily applicable to the 
face-to-face social relationship of primary groups such as the family, the clan, and the small community than it is to the impersonal 
and complex political institutions of the state, which are never predominantly moral, are in many respects amoral, and in some 
respects immoral". (J.T.C. Liu (1939): 181)
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commoners: a privileged class which included those who qualified under the institution of 
"pa-i; eight conditions for consideration",28 and certain other officials not included in the 
above category as well as the family members of the nobles and officials [T.T. Chu (1965): 
177-185].
Furthermore, in most cases neither the investigation nor sentencing of a noble or 
official rested with judicial authorities, but was entirely upon the will of the sovereign [T.T. 
Chu (1965): 177-180]. There is a striking parallel with the position of party officials, and the 
position that the decision made by the Central Committee of the Party carries more practical 
weight than a judicial one within the party-state nowadays in China and Taiwan.29 In the 
1970s in China, the death sentence of "the Gang of Four", the former top officials of the 
party-state, was "suspended" without any limitation. In the 1980s in Taiwan, in the notorious 
business scandals the resignation or departure of the top official, including the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Mayor of Kao-shiung City, Minister of Legal 
Affairs, and Minister of Communication, meant the end of the cases and of any judicial 
procedure.30 Class consciousness of the bureaucracy, of course, plays a significant role in the 
operation of the law in both traditional and modern Chinese societies.
Furthermore, bureaucratic corruption also emerged from the tension of the moral and 
structural mechanisms in China. Ironically, however, the Ching government, tried to use this 
same tension to combat corruption [C. Lau & R.P.L. Lee (1979): 131]. It is interesting that 
three reasons listed in Lau and Lee's report as sources of bureaucratic corruption in 19th 
century China were: the unrealistic salary scale; the dependency of clerks; and, law and 
official power [Lau & Lee (1979): 121-128]. With regards to law, the "discretionary powers"
28 The pa-i 'the eight conditions (or consideration*, which ere found in Zhoa Li, included: 10 Those who were the relstives of the
sovereign; 2) Those who were old acquaintances of the sovereign; 3) Those who were of great virtue; 4) Those who were of great 
ability; 5) Those who were meritorious; 6) Those who were high officials; 7) Those who were exceptionally zealous of government 
duties; and, 8) Those who were the guests of the sovereign (the descendants of the preceding imperial families). According to T.T. 
ChuM hia^stem was^in traduced into the law in the Wei dynasty (220-265) and was then followed by all later dynasties. Cf. Chu
^  Moreover, in traditional China: "No matter whether the official was the plaintiff or the defendant, he was not required to appear
before the court with the opposing party if the latter waa a commoner. Under no circumstances was a commoner permitted to accuse 
an official to his face nor was an olTidal required to defend himself before the court". [T.T. Chu (1965): 184] Obviously, the similar 
judicial practice explains the difference of classes both in China and Taiwan.
30 E.g.. Clark (1989): 208: Gold (1983): 118. M3 (foolnow 138); Aaiawaak (Ya-Zhou Zhou-Km):.(3/May/91): 62; (9/Jum/91): 30.
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were the most contributing factor, while the likelihood of misusing the power by the 
pressures from both within and without the administrative office was the next [Lau & Lee 
(1979): 127], Similarly, the system of collecting fees and surcharges, i.e., lou-kuei [or the 
corrupted routine] was developed into the "organized corruption” which remained prevalent 
through the Empire up to this century. This is a reminder that "structural corruption" is of 
no less importance than the individual "behaviour corruption" in China, as Lau and Lee have 
pointed out, since the "system would force the officials to cover up each other and to recruit 
as many officials as possible into network" [Lau & Lee (1979): 128].
Furthermore, this system of organized corruption was exacerbated by the "dual 
character of bureaucracy" which originated from the internal tension of the Confucian state. 
Since there existed clearly a network of personal ties within the bureaucracy as "a necessary 
evil of the centralized administration", "with little exaggeration one could say that the ad­
ministration was accumulating every sort of ambiguity and anomaly from the bottom up" 
[Huang (1981): 57], Hence, in any political and legal disputes,
'Technically it would be too difficult to investigate more contributing factors and to 
trace responsibility to persons other than the immediately involved officials. 
Understandably, once such "side issues" were admitted to the inquiry, the case could 
be argued endlessly, and the postponement of a settlement could be paralysed the 
operation of the entire bureaucracy'. [Huang (1981): 58]
In fact, this explained that the privileges of bureaucracy in traditional China arose not only 
from the ritualism and law discussed, but also from the centralized administrative structure 
[cf. Huang (1981): 63]. In 1990, Helena Kolenda has titled her article as "One Party, Two 
Systems" on Chinese corruption [Kolenda (1990).
Eventually, both the group interest and the loyalty to Confucian principle produced
I
the dual character of Chinese bureaucracy,31 and placed this group in a privileged position 
between the dual systems of traditional law. Lau and Lee have pointed out that the abuse of 
power by Chinese bureaucrats was "by nature both judicial and executive" without cross­
checking mechanism [Lau & Lee (1979): 126]. From our foregoing analysis, the legal and
31 Lucian Pye hat wed the psycho-political view to analyse China's two culturaa and the dual characters of the mandarin and the cadre 
Pye (1988): Chapter II, M-74.
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social privileges of bureaucracy, however, were based on legislative, executive, and judicial 
preferential treatments.
In my view, the legal privileges not only existed in the over-expansion of 
administrative discretion and overlapped powers, but also covered the exemption from the 
legal control in general. However, the traditional Confucianist-Legalist law and institutions 
on the one hand released bureaucracy from the equal treatment under law, and on the other 
granted officials major discretionary power.
In short, in the light of interaction between the administrative behaviour and the 
formalistic rules, the tension between the Confucianism and the state has explained the 
contradictory character inside both law and administration, and the contradictions of informal 
regulation, in traditional China.32 For instance, under the principle of formalistic impersonal­
ity, no administrative head was allowed to govern the district of his own origin; but this was 
seriously disrupted by the constant pressure of bureaucrat's informal social and personal 
relationship. In the later chapters, we shall discuss the tension between the dual character of 
law and bureaucracy has reproduced this "structural corruption" in the form of economic 
"protectionism" inside the party-state in China and Taiwan.
1.4 CONCLUSIONS
Since the theme in this study is to examine the informal sector in Chinese legal 
development, a crucial issue comes out of the decline of the central administrative authority 
at the end of the old order33 -- the last dynasty, Qing (Ching) or Manchu, in decline; the 
revolutionary movement aimed at destroying the traditional Chinese polity and inaugurating
Professor C.K. Ysng hss analysed, "The need for a standardization in operating a bureaucracy administering a vast empire led to the 
development of an operational framework based on a set of formal rules. But, because ot the functional importance of informal 
norms in a society oriented to the primary group, the svstem of informal moral norms also played a prominent and often a 
contradictory part in bureaucratic conduct”. [C.R. Yang (1959): 163]
33 For the collapse of Ike old order. Cf. Feuerwerkcr (1980): 1-69. especially. 38-69; I.C.Y. Hsu (1980): 70-M i; P.A. Kuho (1978): 301- 
307: Foreign Involvement, C.M Wilbur, (1983): 527-721. To compare the role of warlords before and after the Northern Expedition, 
see J.E. Sheridan (1983): 317-321: Warlordism and Chinese Society; and, L.E. Eastman (1986a): 124-130, and 141-147. For the 
interaction between the GMD. the Communists, and foreign forces. Cf. Eastman (1986a); ibid.; A. Iriye (1986): 519-530. for China 
and Japan in the Second World War, pp. 530-540, and, S. Pepper (1986): The demise of the KMT government and failure o f American 
policy, pp. 782-788, especially, pp. 785-788.
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a new system34 35; the rise of Guo-Ming-Dang (GMD, or Kuomingtang, KMT; the Nationalist 
Party); and its involvement in a complex set of negotiations with the Soviet Union, several 
Russian advisers, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under a "united front" [J. Chen 
(1983): 518-526] and their open break in March 1927 ; the "warlordism" in the new Republic 
[Eastman (1986a): 124-130; 141-147]; the international and the civil wars; and, the 
Communist troops overran the mainland during 1948-49. Has the importance of informal 
law in Chinese ruling disappeared or decreased after the end of Chinese old order?
Historically, in 1911 the Qing dynasty fell under the onslaught of a national and 
democratic revolution. "The crisis that came at the turn of the twentieth century was no 
longer solely a dynastic crisis", argued F. Michael. It was a crisis of "the whole social and 
cultural tradition" [Michael (1962): 132]. The first reception of European law in Chinese 
history started in this uncertain environment.33
Furthermore, in the longer term, and as will be analysed in the later chapters, this 
"great attempt" just mentioned came to naught, and the "complete break" did not occur. At 
least, this work will argue: within the context of foreign investment and the development of 
modem law in Mainland China and Taiwan, there saw the active part played by Chinese 
traditional values, tradition-based societal reactions, and the legal attitudes based on customs. 
In my view, these elements should be taken into account no less than political changes, class 
interests, and business nature within the context of law and foreign investment.
34 Then, Dr. Sun Yat-een, a dominant figure during the movement, provided a philoaophy and ideology that would help to transform 
China--"TT»« TV*« Principle« of the People (San-Mi -Zhu-I)m: "Min-zhu" (or national ism); "Min qung" (or democracy); and "Min-
sheng* (people's livelihood). f
35 The difficult role of the tradition was said, "As the Chinese leaders began to realise the new problems of the modern world, their trust 
in classical education was waning. The great attempt to reform this tradition without losing its essence came to naught, and a 
complete break with the past occurred." (Michael (1962): 132-133)
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CHAPTER II. INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN NA­
TIONALIST CHINA
II.I INTRODUCTION
The reasons for the rise and fall of the Nationalist Party, or the GMD, in China before 1949 
remain highly controversial among detached historians. This chapter will focus on the in­
teraction between law and administration under the Nationalist regime in two historical 
stages: in Mainland before 1949 (Section II.2) and in Taiwan after 1949 (Section 11.3). It first 
intends to draw out the main theme of the impact of traditional law, especially that of 
informal law, on China's modernization programmes, and also on development of foreign in­
vestment, from the turn of the century to the Communist Revolution. Then, the second step 
analyses the role of both law and administration under the party-state in Taiwan's develop­
ment after the Second World War to the present day. Finally, this chapter reviews the 
interaction between the formal and informal law under the Nationalist regime.
II.2 TRADITIONAL LAW, INFORMAL REGULATION AND FOREIGN INVEST­
MENT AT THE END OF THE OLD ORDER DURING 1911-49
During the transition period of 1911-49, the poor economic structure and the dominance of 
the bureaucratic class continued, although the Chinese old order ended. This changing period 
saw a strong alliance between the gentry and the military with varying degrees of tolerance of 
commercial and industrial interests and of social reformers, attempting to preserve Confucian 
traditions and ruling class interests.
I
II.2.A. Bureaucratic Capitalism and Foreign Investment
In terms of the putative ideological goals of the GMD itself, set out in "The Three 
Principles o f  the People" by Sun Yat-sen, the decade of Nationalist government, from the end 
of the Northern Expedition in 1928 to full outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, is
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generally considered a failure. For instance, in addition to both Nationalism1 and 
Democracy,2 in the area of promoting "the people's livelihood", the GMD lacked the populist 
commitment to helping those at the bottom of society, especially the peasants, workers, and 
small merchants to whom their ideology had initially appealed [Cf. Eastman (1986a): 163- 
167]; as analysed in more detail in this section.
(i) The Rise and Fall o f  Bureaucratic Capitalism
On the question of bureaucracy and administration in the Republican period, the 
Nationalists themselves were riven with factionalism. The new Republican government was 
established under the Organic Law o f the National Government o f October 8, 1928.* In 
correspondence with Dr. Sun's outline, the government consisted of a president and five 
formal branches, called "Yuans" (House, Court) - the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, 
Judicial Yuan, Control Yuan, and Examination Yuan, each with its own president [Wilbur 
(1983): 716-717], Resulting from the Northern Expedition and its politics, the holders of all 
these positions, including the Legislators, were appointed by the dominant GMD party. 
However, the serious factional conflicts were exacerbated by the fact there was hardly any 
improvement in the administrative bureaucracy [cf. Eastman (1986a): 116-134].
Secondly, political factionalism thus brought a "court politics" on the one hand, and 
political repression on the other. As to the former, most of the bureaucrats from the warlord 
period kept their jobs, and many of the new ones were chosen by political criteria, and even 
cronyism and bribery [Eastman (1986a): 124-130; 141-147]. Although they made significant 
contributions to the Republic during the 1930s in terms of economic policy, planning and 
financial reform and stabilization, financiers T.V. Soong and H.H. Kung, the brothers-in-law
With regard to nationalism, the first principle, China waa not in reality unified and continued to suffer aerious humiliationa at the 
handa of foreign powers, especially during the 1930a culminating in the occupation of northern and eastern China by the Japanese.
Cf. Iriye (1966;: 519-340. *
The second principle, the goal of democracy failed as well, as the bureaucracy remained through these decades inefficient, imperious, 
and corrupt, with the collapse of administrative reforms. Cf. Eastman (1986a): 123-130, 163-167; Pepper (1986): 737-751.
For the first time in Chinese history, the Organic Law (281008) modelled the party-state into Republican law after the Northern 1
Expedition, and, as Wilbur has pointed out, ^made it quite clear that the [GMD]. through its National Congresses and its Central 
Executive Committee, exercised sovereign power during the period in which the Chinese people were being prepared for democratic 
life. The IGMD's) Political Council would guide and superintend the national government in the execution of important national 
affairs, and the Council might amend and interpret the Organic Law”. Wilbur (1983): 716.
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of Chiang, were accused of massive corruption.4 As L.E. Eastman has pointed out, "The 
growing entrepreneurial role of the National government was actually, therefore, a re­
assertion of a traditional mode of political behaviour" [Eastman (1986a): 160]. On the other 
hand, growing political repression followed the factional conflicts.5
In economic development, the economic strategy of the Republican government was 
based on "bureaucratic capitalism" and on the leading role of "private but quasi-state 
monopolies" controlled by top officials, such as T.V. Soong and H.H. Kung already 
mentioned.6 Part of government was thus engaged in nearly open extortion to extract 
revenues from the business sector [Pepper (1986): 743]. However, extracting revenues and 
the control of inflation could be the explanation of the inefficiency of administration of the 
regime. The Nationalist government had precipitated the inflation through its deficit 
financing of the war,7 only a minuscule portion of which was covered by the sale of bonds or 
other non-inflationary means. The regime was "unwilling or unable" to restructure the tax 
system to finance the war against Japan or against the Communist [Lardy (1987): 149],
As a result, the share of government outlays financed through monetary expansion 
rose steadily, when military expenditures increased in the 1940s. The hyper-inflation was 
such as that,8
The trend was names by M. Bergere as "the return of bureaucracy and decline of bourgeoisie". See Bergere (1983): 822-823.
Other Nationalist leaders such as Hu Han-min and Dr. Sun's son and wife, Sun Fo and Soong Ching-ling, highly criticized the regime 
[E.g., Eastman (1986b): 547-608; 60^607; Eastman (1986a): 129). Also, a number of political murden were linked to fascist groups, 
such as the "Blue Shirts Society” (% $#. Lan-i-sher) and secret societies, such as the ^Green Gang" (w?£ Qing-bang) which was the 
most important criminal organization during 1930s-40s in Shanghai [Eastman (1986a): 116, 131, 133, 143-145).
As S. Pepper has pointed out, "The [GMDI government was vulnerable to the charge that instead of promoting economic 
devejopment it encouraged bureaucratic capitalism, meaning the use of public office for personal enterprise ana profit. Government 
officials and their associates used their connections to obtain foreign exchange, import commoditiea, and gain other advantages not 
readily available to the ordinary entrepreneur". Actually, the hyper-inflation during the period was accelerated by "bureaucratic 
capitalism" as well, since "a scandalous government loan in 1946 to Shanghai rice merchants, who used it. apparently with ofTicial 
connivance, for speculative purposes, causing a further riae in the price of rice". Pepper (1986): 743.
Price, according to Lardy, had began rising as early as 1935 and accelerated after 1938 when the government lost control of the 
industrialized coastal areas to Japanese forces and moved the seat of government to Szechwan Province in the Southwest. Lardy 
(1987): 149. 7
By 1945 in excess of 80 percent of outlays were financed through monetary expansion and, according to official government data of 
the period, the price level bv the end of tne year was 1,632 times the pre-war level. No systematic efforts was made to restructure the 
tax system after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War and, after a brief respite, the deficit rose to 70 snd 80 percent of 
expenditures, respectively, in 1947 and 1948. Lardy (1987): 149.
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"Just prior to the collapse of the domestic currency in August 1948, the wholesale 
price index in Shanghai reached a level 6,600,000 times that of 1937." [Lardy (1987): 
149-150]
Historically, this lesson also explained why both the GMD and the CCP governments 
emphasized both administrative efficiency and inflation control after 1949, respectively, in 
Taiwan (Cf. Sections II.3 & II.4) and in Mainland China (Cf. Sections III.2.B. & III. 3.). 
However, should we remind ourselves that bureaucratic capitalism before 1949 provided the 
urban-based Nationalists an important experience of international economic cooperation, 
while the Communists mainly developed their administration within the rural Soviets located 
in the inner China.
Moreover, from the lessons of factionalism and inefficiency of administration before 
1949,® a party-state was gradually built up later in Taiwan. The National Assembly is elected 
by the people directly for a six-year term; the Assembly in turn elects the chief of State, the 
President, also for a six-year term [Arts. 25-34, the Constitution (1946)]. Since April 1948, 
with the enactment of Temporary Provisions for the Duration o f Mobilization to Suppress the 
Rebellion (cited as the 1948 Temporary Provisions (480510)), the President has been granted 
a wide range of emergency powers.* 10 Basically, there are five branches of the national 
government, as those before 1949.11 The Executive Yuan is the Cabinet, with a range of 
ministers and commissions, which is appointed by the President and whose own head is the 
Premier. Furthermore, its Executive Council formulates policy and decides which laws, bills, 
and other matters are to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for approval.12 After the retreat 
in 1949, the Nationalist co-ordinated these government agencies with a central-controlled 
party mechanism (Section II.3.B. below).
The role of bureaucracy in the pre-1949 economic development haa been summarized by V. Lippit as follows: "... China remained an 
under-developed country in the first half of the twentieth century becauae the clasa structure and relations of production remained 
largely unchanged. As Balazs states. The nationalist bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang [the GMD] equalled the officials of the Celestial 
Empire in corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy, and inefficiency, and it was only to be expected that this national-socialist police state 
should firmly restore Confucianism and inscribe the ancient Confucian virtues upon its flag'.” Lippit (1987): 98.
10 Promulgated on 10 May, 1948; 11 provisions in total; amended on 11 March, 1960; on 19 March. 1966; and on 17 March, 1972.
11 Including: (1) The Executive Yuen [Am. 53-61, the CoaatitutionJ1946)|; (2) The Legialetive Yuen [Am. 62-761: (3) The Judicial 
Yuen [Am. 77-82]; The Examination Yuan |Aita. 83-89], and (5) The Control Yuan [Am. 90-106],
11 Art. 58. the Constitution (1946)-. Kwnng-Hwa Pub. Co., Govsmmsnt System, 0uROC, (Taipei: 1981), p.10.
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(ii) The Development o f Foreign Investment
As far as the role of foreign investment is concerned in this study, a historical analysis 
is necessary. In fact, the spread effects from treaty-port industrialization, especially foreign 
investment and its operation, as discussed below, were limited before 1949. Since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the opium trade and forced concessions and reparation 
had drained Chinese resources, while the provisions for "extra-territorial" areas (mainly the 
"treaty-ports") in which Chinese laws did not apply were viewed as a national humiliation by 
China which considered itself historically the "Zhong-Guo" (the Middle Kingdom). The 
impacts of western imperial-colonial activities on China, directly or indirectly, were mixed 
[Cf. Cao (1991): 1-17].»
The developmental stories of different sectors of economy have been told 
elsewhere,* 14 but taking the whole Republican era (1911-49) into account, China's economy 
was largely "premodern",15 at least before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.16 
This economy was further destroyed by World War II which ended in 1945, more than one 
century after the opening of "treaty-ports", such as Guangzhou, Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou, 
Ningbo, and Shanghai, under the "unequal" Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing (1942).
Historically, a set of similar unequal treaties, in addition to the British, followed with 
the USA, France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Russia, and Prussia.17 However, up 
to the 1860s, these western powers were interested mainly in extending "trade”. After that, 
they were more concerned with obtaining colonial territorial concessions. For instance, the
There are some favourable impact*: The Irealy-porta, for inatance, were aourcea of new technology, cent re a for inveatmenta. 
facilitators of the development of Chineae and foreign enterpriacs, and were aourcea of moderate atimuli through linking relaliona with 
the real of China's economy. On the other hand, many negative impacta included: the fact that the western powers forced opium on 
China (Lippit (1987): 44|, prevented a rational trade policy, damaged some handicraft industries, and diverted resources to defense 
» and later to indemnities.
14 H g . Hergere (1983); Pepper (1986): 737-731; and. Myera (1986): 230-269.
This premodem character of the economy ia confirmed by the composition of output and the allocation of the labour force as analysed 
by N.R. lerdy in the follows: "Almost two-thirds of output originated in agriculture, leas than one-fifth in industry. Moreover, since 
most industrial output waa produced by traditional handicraft methods and moat serious were traditional as well, under 10 percent of 
aggregate output was produced by modem means. Similarly, more than 90 percent of the work force was dependent on traditional 
technology " fl^ardy (1987): 143)
Annual per capita national income in the 1930s ranked near the bottom of the world scale, about 58 yuan or 13 US dollars per capita 
(1933 prices). Cf. Ijirdy (1987): 144.
17 J X  I airhank (1978): Ck. 5. pp 211-261; Ib a  ( 1980); A. I>uerw.rkrr ( 1981b): Ch 1. pp 128 20*
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phrase "German China" was commonly used to refer to Shangdong Province at the tum of 
century [Feuerwerker (1983): 144-145]. It was only after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894- 
85) that Japan won the right to establish manufacturing facilities in the treaty-ports. 
Furthermore, the most favoured-nation clause provided in these treaties from 1843, extended 
this right "automatically" to all the other powers, since this clause stipulated that any right 
China should grant to other nations in the future would automatically be extended to the 
signatory country [Fairbank (1978): 221-222; 225]. Previously, except for missionary 
houses, foreigners were never permitted to own real estate outside the treaty-ports. Infor­
mally, manufacturing by foreigners was the business practice beyond the legal domain. 
Thus, after 1895 direct foreign investment became legal for the first time.18 In fact, up to 
the end of the nineteenth century, the foreign economic impact in China developed primarily 
through trade rather than through direct investment [Cf. Cao (1991): 78-209; Chs. 3 & 4]. On 
the other hand, it was also not until the end of that Sino-Japanese War that the strain of 
foreign borrowing19 by China became steady and severe.20
At the same time, Chinese-owned industry expanded at a rapid rate, although after 
1895 direct foreign investment expanded rapidly21 and took a dominant role in several sectors 
such as exports and imports, banking and finance, transport and communications, real estate 
and public utilities at the treaty-ports [J. Chen (1979): 363]. For instance, by the mid-1930s 
domestic producer goods, especially in the engineering sector, supplied a significant share of 
investment demand [Lardy (1987): 147-148]. Clearly, the evidence has indicated that 
Chinese-owned enterprises were not as a group replaced by foreign ones before 1949, but
18 In a strict sense, according to the historiana, "manufacturing by foreigners was illegal under the treaties; but it existed nevertheless, for 
. the most part in the Shanghai foreign concessions with a smaller number at other treaty ports. Prior to the 1880s the Chinese
government did not interfere with the establishment of these petty foreign factories". A- Feuerwerker (1980): 28-29.
19 Foreign borrowing by the Chinese government, according to Lippit, was limited prior to the Sino-Japanese War. although "indemnity 
payments” resulting from the wars launched bv the foreign powers or imposed by force following attacks on foreigners at times put a 
serious strain on the imperial budget. Later, during 1929-34, loans and indemnity payments accounted for between 31.8 percent and 
40.5 percent of national budget expenditures under the Republic. Cf. Lippit (1987): 45-46.
20 The financial difficulties of the Ch'ing government was getting worse: "The Russian won the gratitude of the Chinese by their
intervention, and by their offer of loans to pay to the Japanese an indemnity amounting to 100 million taels in the first year of |
^ » - l o W H h  an annual revenue of 89 million taels, the Ch'ing court was nardly in a position to pay such an indemnity.” Hsu
21 According lo J. Chen, up lo the 1930., ihe tout foreign inveutmenl in Chinn wna US. S3 3 billion. See 1. Chen (1979): 363.
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grew apace with them.22 As a result, in 1933 Chinese-owned industry accounted for 66.9 
percent of whole industrial output in China as a whole [Lippit (1987): 46], including the 
industry in the most advanced Northeast (or Manchuria, completely occupied by Japanese in 
1931) which was entirely foreign-owned. Nevertheless, prior to the second Sino-Japanese 
War in 1937, the growth of industry (including Manchuria, but excluding handicrafts) had 
been established as 7.5 to 9.4 percent per annum during the major Republican era [Lardy 
(1987): 147],
However, this rapid industrial growth did not lead to sustained growth of national 
output. This was for two main reasons. First, because it was regionally over-concentrated, 
and second because of "sectoral imbalance" of investment. Initially, irrational management 
of foreign investment and capital shortage indeed limited the contributions of foreign capital 
in China before the 1950s from several considerations. Five factors were seriously 
involved.23
Regional fragmentation was the other major problem which confronted China's 
sustained industrialization before 1949. In addition to Manchuria, both Chinese and foreign- 
owned factories, mainly textiles, processed foods, and cigarettes industries, developed only in 
Shanghai, Tienjin, Qingdao, Hankow, and other coastal and riverline treaty-port cities [Lardy 
(1987): 147-148]. The small size and weak linkages of the modern sector meant that it was 
too weak to stimulate aggregate growth.24 Therefore, even with the rapid growth of both
22 '"By 1912, there were 20,749 Chinese factories employing seven or more workers. Even in 1933, after the peak of direct foreign 
investment, Chinese-owned factories in the modem manufacturing sector outnumbered foreign-owned factories by more than ten to 
one" (Dernberger 1975, 41). To evaluate the importance of forcign-owncd factories by their relative number, however, would be 
highly misleading, because the average foreign factory was much larger than its Chinese counterpart. Even allowing for this, the data 
presented ... indicate that Chinese industrial output was produced mainly in Chinese-owned firms in 1933'. Lippit (1987): 46.
23 First of all, behind the impression of growing governmental loans and foreign investment since 1895. China was in fact a capital- 
exporting country and short of funds for further industrialization. This was because of the siphoning off of capital in indemnity and
t loan payments Cf. M. B. Rankin, J.K. Fairbank & A. Feuerwerker (1986): 52.; A. Feuerwerker (1983a): lz l ,  126; Feuerwerker 
(1983b): 179, 206. The second problem was that o f the foreign loans only 6 percent, and only 19.6 percent of foreign direct 
investment went into manufactunng industries (J. Chen (1979): 363]. Thirdly, in spile of the amount of foreign capital, these 
industries themselves failed to attract the domestic funds of Chinese landlords, pawn-brokers and rural money-leaders. One of the 
reasons, according to J. Chen ((1979): 363], was that the profits rates offered by tne manufacturing industries compared unfavourably 
with "the prevailing rates of interest, rent and commercial profits", and this made industrial investment singularly unattractive to 
landlords and money-lenders in villages. Fourthly, even with the emergence of a modem money market (Feuerwerker (1983a): 39;
(1983b): 101) in Republican China, financing for industrialization or manufacturing had never been the major function for either 
foreign or local banka (Feuerwerker (1983b): 1991. The foreign banks were mainly founded to facilitate trade and other international 
operations (such as foreign exchange, land speculation at the treaty-ports, and of course acting as the bankers of Chinese banks and 
money-shops) (Feuerwerker (1983b): ibid.], while Chinese banka accepted deposita from businesaes and wealthy individuals to be 
invested in government bonds, commerce, land and other banks (Feuerwerker (1983a): 101; Bergere (1983): 749-750]. Finally, the •
small amount of capital available and its "misuse for administration, warfare, commerce and excess consumption" further aggravated 
the imbalance of the invested sectors (J. Chen (1979): 367].
24 For instance, under the Japanese embargo, the Northeast, during its most rapid growth in the 1930s, became an enclave "with no 
significant economic linkages" to China proper (Lardy (1987): 148). However, from the historical perspective, these former treaty-
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Chinese and foreign enterprises, the modem sector in China before 1937 was too weak.25 
Unfortunately, international and civil wars, from 1937 to 1949, seriously exacerbated these 
long-term structural problems [Cf. Lardy (1987): 144-150], As a result, China's pre-modern 
economy was near collapse, when the Communist took control of China from the Nationalists 
in 1949.
1I.2.B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW UNDER THE PRE-1949 
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
Legal reform during the period had positive effects on the interactions of formal and informal 
regulation, and accordingly of the state and social relations. Because of the politic-social 
elements previously mentioned, most of the government's energies, however, were to be 
absorbed in the suppression of the warlords in favour of a central administration [cf. Tay 
(1987): 564], even after it was established in Nanjing in 1927. This picture explains the 
difficulty in re-building the Chinese state earlier in this century.
(i) Neglect o f  Chinese Reality in Formal Legislation
It was also the humiliating defeat of the 1895 Sino-Japanese war which awakened 
China's consciousness of her sovereign rights and therefore the necessity of modern law 
reform.26 But at this stage, the newly drafted codes could be deemed to have "unwisely 
neglected the realities" of Chinese practice and therefore were of little value [J. Chen (1979): 
326]. However, before the fall of the dynasty in 1912, the civil code, the criminal code and 
the code of criminal procedure compiled and promulgated still show the strong influence of 
the old Confucian views,27 such as the dignity of the throne and the respect owed to elders by
port cities provided the industrial bases for China's further economic modernization, as discussed in later Chapters, during 1950s and 
* even 1980s. Accordingly, these imbalanced development and regional fragmentation were repeated in modern Chinese economic 
history, and were one of major challenges for economic planning and management.
^  The modern sector in China before 1937, "was only a thin overlay on the traditional economy and a portion of it was also enclavelike, 
with raw materials imported from abroad and finished goods, such as cotton textiles, exported to international market. In short, most 
of China was almost untouched by modern industry" cL Lardy (1987): 148.
26 Externally, Japan's success in cancelling all consular jurisdiction within her territory soon set an example for China. Domestically, 
the waning Ching imperial authority after the Boxer War softened the resistance to law reform. J. Chen discusses how a new Bureau 
of Legal Reform, which later naively copied Japanese laws on corporation, navigation, stocks and bonds, bankruptcy, etc., was I
created during 1901 -02. Cf. J. Chen (1979): 326.
The liberal trend in modern law reform, e.g., before 1907 two ministerial memorials advocating the abolition of torture before trial 
and the extremely cruel penalties, was attack by conservatives, as they argued in defence of the Confucian tradition which they called 
the "special conditions of China". Cf. J. Chen (1979): 327.
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the young and to man by woman [Cf. J. Wang (1988): 23-41]. After the victory of the 
revolution, the codes mentioned remained in force [Cf. Deutsch-Chinesische Rechtszeitung 
(1911-13); Chinesisch-Deutsche Gesetzsammlung (1912-13), only the parts "which obviously 
contradict the republican polity" being deleted [J. Chen (1979): 327], in the period of 
transition from 1912 to 1915. It was only between 1929 and 1935 that the Nationalist 
government brought to fruition the work on various drafts and provisional codes. However, 
the government paid the price for the historical credits of the uncompleted law reform under 
the late Qing dynasty and the warlord-related regimes.
For example, the Civil Code, largely based on the Swiss Code of 1907, won special 
praise from Roscoe Pound when he acted as an adviser to the Nationalist Ministry of Justice 
in Nanjing in 1946 [Tay (1987): 564-565]. However, the neglect of Chinese reality 
mentioned above remained a major legislative problem. Pound himself in fact did not 
promote the direct adoption of Western legal principles in China. In contrast, he argued that 
the Chinese should experiment with Chinese materials for solutions to Chinese problems [X. 
Yu (1989): 34]. Thus, as regards the legal construction during the period, it is clear that the 
government and other revolutionary regimes paid more attention to the power structure o f the 
state than to the structural changes of the society, and more to the ruling and administration 
o f the state than to the relationship between the state and society. The bureaucracy within the 
transition only proposed legislation by taking over existing proposals of the last regime. 
Another example was the repeated changes in the various constitutions before 1937 due to 
different political uncertainties. Thus, the background of the Republican legislation provided 
an uncertain concept of rights and duties of the citizen, as espoused by "nationalism" - the 
laws of GMD government protected "only those individual interests which did not run 
counter to the interests of nation as a whole" [J. Chen (1979): 328]. Therefore the legislative 
techniques used in the earlier century have been criticized as well.28 *
28 J. Own h u  criticized. V hal were the ielereete of the nation aa a whole and who could dartna then? Without a conatitution. the 
proccaa of legialation waa unavoidably anoraaloue. Thia waa the caaa with all the legialalion of the Pelting [Beijing] aa well aa of the
Nanking (Nanjing) governmenta”. (J. Chen (1979): 328)
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(ii) Influence o f Informal Norms o f the Confucian Tradition
On the other hand, the legal practice and judicial independence, although making 
significant achievements, also confronted serious challenges. As J. Chen has explained the 
picture under President Yuan Shih-kai's regime: "the modern courts accepted bribes and bent 
the law, turning judicial independence into a farce" [J. Chen (1979): 329], because of a 
serious shortage of trained personnel29 and of financial resources30 which might help keep the 
personnel above corruption. Another serious and continuing influence since the President 
Yuan period in 1912 was that he attacked the principles of judicial independence on moral 
and pragmatic grounds and hoped to strengthen the control of the leader himself [J. Chen 
(1979): 329]; this thereafter brought back the reign o f virtue o f the Confucian tradition even 
after the revolution.
Since the 1912 Provisional Constitution after the Republican revolution, all Chinese 
citizens, in theory, were equal before the law , but in practice, the Confucian reign of virtue 
and ethics continued to play its role in both legislation and administration of justice. For 
instance,
"During both the Peking and Nanking government periods, people who possessed 
power or social status, like the gentry under the old system of justice, were treated le­
niently by the law; this leniency usually took the form of suspended sentences when 
other people of power and social status were willing to pao [bao] them (a form of bail 
without paying money and guarantee of good conduct in order to secure the release of 
the convicted)." [J. Chen (1979): 330]
Nevertheless, an eye-witness, the jurist F. Michael, made certain positive comments 
on the legal development during the period.31 However, it is still difficult to prove how far 
the reach of these effects were.32
-  Thu would be • eerioue problem in Chineec legal reform for the poet hundred yen re given the huge eize of the country: (According to 
Wang Chung-hui'a autistic*,) China had leaa than 1000 trained judge* by 1926. and (according to the Shanghai Year Book o f 1936,) 
there were only 1174 practising lawyers (including sixty-six foreigners) in that treaty port where most Chinese lawyers were 
concentrated (J. Chen (1979): 3281. Furthermore, many of them educated at institutions other than the law schools, were poorly 
qualified and described as "disorderly" (ibid |
^  E.g., sometimes even a strike by the judicial suff happened. Aa J. Chen pointed out: "Like other government employees, the judges
were not paid regularly, and so in November 1921 they and their colleagues went on strike." See J. Chen (1979): 329.
31 F. Michael has noted, "... Orderly legal administration was growing, and in time the remnants of traditional moral beliefs might have 
been fused with the interpretation of modern law." Cf. Michael (1962): 134.
32 History then left some unanswered questions as to legal development: "Perhaps the most imporUnt accomplishment of the Nationalist 
Government was the creation of a system of modem law codes, codes of procedure, and a system of law courts, which began to
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II.2.C. The Survival of Traditional Legal and Social 
Institutions
Considered overall, judged by most scholars, the reception of European law in China until the 
expulsion of the Nationalist government in 1949 was not a success.33 However, this left a 
good question for examination in relation to the development of the reception of Nationalist 
law in Taiwan after 1945 (Cf. Sections II.3 & II.4). Nevertheless, the new legislation and 
institutions set up in the period still had their impact on the later legal development in China.
In addition to class interest** three basic social and political elements had decisive 
roles in the development of the legal reform before 1949. The first was the factor o f foreign 
policy.35 Historically, a decisive shock was given, as already mentioned, in 1895 by the 
defeat in the war with Japan, a country which had recently adopted a new constitution and a 
legal system based on western models [Bunger (1981): 70]. Because of those influences 
from foreign p o l i c y ,  those in power did not take the nature o f China's society and its social 
structure into account when they proposed any legal reform [Cf. Section II.2.B, also Bunger 
(1981): 70-71],
Secondly, during those warring years before 1949, large parts of China were governed 
by warlords in defiance of the supposedly national authorities and without reference to the 
new laws they had promulgated [Gellhorn (1987): 4], and this criticism is made by the PRC 
scholars today of the legal system during 1911-1949 [E.g., Wu Jianfan (1983): 4-5].
Finally, the third social element of the legal reform during the period was the divorce 
o f the rural areas from the urban areas with more industrial bases, and o f legal implemen­
I _________________________________________________________
function and grew in importance, and, if given time, might well have led to the establiahment of a society based on the rule of law.”
F. Michael (1962): 133.
33 E.g., F. Michael (1962): 132- 134; alao A.E-S. Tay (1987): 564-568; and. K. Bunger (1981): 69-71.
34 China became an under developed country in the late imperial era, "bccauae the internal of the gentry daas waa in preserving the 
status quo, bccauae the economic and social changes associated with economic development would have undermined the social order
that provided everything it wanted” [Lippit (1987): 98). f
33 The idea of reorganizing the political and legal system upon a Western model, during the later years of the Qing dynasty, was
triggered in China solely by its situation in foreign relations, for the military defeats after 1840 combined with the uncontrolled set­
tlement and activity of foreigners in the country had their effects.
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tation from the social reality. On the one hand, the Nationalists unified China only in name 
because of the military reality; and, on the other hand, the rules of the Nationalist modern 
codes were not always accepted by the Chinese people. Though no longer preserved by an 
educational system and an elite brought up in it, practices based on the moral code, or the 
traditional li (rites), before 1911 lingered on even in the cities. In fact, modem legal 
stipulations which ran counter to customary rules were simply not applied because of social 
disapproval. For example, the law of inheritance and other rules,36 especially in the fields of 
traditional family law. This social context is generally accepted by scholars. Thus, during 
this period of Nationalist rule, China did not have a unified legal system, and surely, not an 
effective one, either [E.g., Wu (1983): 5]. Nevertheless, in the background during this 
transformation period, the serious contradictions between the formal and informal systems of 
law, and between the modern law and the traditional legal-social ideologies, were obvious.
These three political-social elements explained the setbacks faced by the authorities 
of government, the inefficiency of its legal reform, and the lack of modem legal conscious­
ness of the people. Thus, from the Opium War (1839-42) to the Liberation in 1949, Chinese 
society and its living conditions were certainly no better.37 Indeed, after the fall of the old 
order, citizens did not become any more aware of citizens' rights under the law of the 1911- 
49 period [Michael (1962): 134], while the social structure and social relations remained in a 
continued uncertainty,38 including the same "feeling o f uncertainty from the new statutes", 
which were the feature of the Qin's Legalist regime (cf. Section I.4.B). In addition to this 
uncertainty, the lack of legal consciousness among the working classes also expressed a 
serious strain, as described—"Justice was a luxury of the well-to-do, and in every sense the 
poor and landless peasants were victims" [Lippit (1987): 49]. Thus, by 1949, China not only
36 Michael analysed this dearly: * linear rv the French jurial. who wrote the heat known book on Chinese law, given examples on the law 
of inheritance and other rules that could not be applied becauae of social diaapproval". F. Michael (1962): 134.
Lippit has noted, "Life for a majority of the peaaants remained marginal, famine remained endemic. Bandits roamed the countryside 
and in some areas were so well organized and powerful as to place a tax on the harvest" Uppit (1987): 49.
M However, up to 1949, China remained as a country with under development characteristics, as analysed by Lippit, "Given a 
succession of weak and corrupt governments, warlords dominated various regions; in such places as Sichuan they collected taxes 
many years in advance (Buck 1968, 328). The central government continued to rely heavily on tax farming for its revenues; in view 
of its weakness, those who obtained the rights would squeeze whatever they could obtain from the peasantry, remitting only a small 
percentage to the government (Chen 1973, 74). In much South China at least tenancy appears to have been increasing." Uppit 
(1987): 49.
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had acquired all of the characteristics associated with under-development, but also was 
confronted with the inefficiencies of the legal modernization and the serious lack of legal 
consciousness.
Unfortunately, from the turn of the century, through the building of the first 
Republican state in Asia in 1912, until 1949, the copying or importing of western law 
hastened ahead of any hopes for modernization of China, without any caution as to whether 
the step was justified or even necessary.3’ Thus, the end of the Chinese old order during the 
1911-1949 period also resulted in the fall of the legal reform established since the later years 
of nineteenth century.
11.3 ECONOMIC CONTROL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND LAW AFTER TRANS­
PLANTING THE PARTY-STATE TO TAIWAN IN 1949
At least two points in post-1949 history of the Nationalist regime in Taiwan have been 
different from that of pre-1949 in Mainland. The need of re-building a strong central 
administration came first of all from the lessons of the defeat in the civil war. Secondly, for 
both coercive control and efficient administration, informal governing through a party-state 
mechanism has played a more active part than ever before 1949.
After the Second World War, Taiwan's economy was roughly restored to the pre-war 
(Japanese colonial) level by 1952. From 1952 to the end of 1990, the economy was 
transformed from predominantly agricultural to manufacturing and services based, while 
keeping its foreign debt very low and improving its distribution of income. Exports have 
been the prime engine of economic growth (thus up to 1988, Taiwan's foreign-exchange 
reserves exceeded $75 billion—the largest after Japan's in the World—and its foreign debt was 
a meagre $2.9 billion).39 40 At the end of 1991, foreign-exchange reserves of Taiwan has
39 A* the historian J. Chen put it: "Without exception, the gantry.military alliance laid bare in its important policy statements a 
dismaying ignorance of the politics and law of China and the Weal. When this intellectual deficiency was linked up with practical in- 
terrata and power, the opposition of the alliance to what it regarded as unacceptably new hardened to become a stumbling block in the 
way of China's progress towards modernity" [J. Chen (1979): 331)
40 See The Economist (London), 5*11 Mar., 1988, 'A Survey of Taiwan*.
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further exceeded beyond $100 billion as the number one in the world, while Taiwan has not 
been a member state of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade.
Furthermore, although the ROC was established as a constitutional democracy [Cf. 
the Constitution (1946)], for the sake of the survival and development of the ROC, the 
Nationalist government in Taiwan has, over the past 45 years, remained both authoritarian 
and flexible in nature. Moreover, it has achieved this development against a background of 
international diplomatic isolation. The prosperity of Taiwan, and the fear of Chinese re­
unification under Communist sovereignty, has assured the Nationalists of a measure of con­
tinued popular support.41 * Especially, in the domain of economic development, the authoritar­
ian administration has still assumed its leading role through the informal regulation behind, 
and beyond, the statutory framework.
II.3.A. Administration and Task of National Survival
The origin of industrialization on the island and the changes in the relationship between the 
different regimes and the society, both before and after the wars, were interesting in 
themselves in explaining Taiwan's economic development. Among these, the high degree of 
"flexibility" in developing these political, social, economic and legal mechanisms plays the 
key part in Taiwan's national development.
(i) The Need o f  Re-building o f  the Central Administration
During the Japanese colonial period, 1895-1945, the foundations were laid for 
Taiwan's rapid economic growth and the relatively smooth structural change of its post-war 
economy [cf. S.F. Lee (1991): 191-198].4* It was also during this period that social, political 
and economic conditions [Gold (1986): 32-46; S.F. Lee (1991)] were created by means of
This popular support for the KMT (Nationalists) has been gradually declining, especially in the past three yean. It is worth 
mentioning that in the December 1986 elections, the fledgling opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), did secure 
almost one quarter of the votes cast, with a significant improvement on the 'tangwais' (literally 'those outside the KMT Party*) 
showing in the last elections in 1983. See FT.L (London), 15 June, 1988, Taiwan wrestles with reform of democracy'; also, Tne 
Economist (London), 5-11 Mar., 1988, 'A Survey of Taiwan'. |
L  Reynolds has asserted, thst the Japanese colonial policies were much more development-oriented compared with those of other 
colonial powers; L. Reynolds, The Spread of Economic Growth of the Third World. 1850-1980', (1983)//. of Economic Literature,
21(3), pp. 941-80.
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which Taiwan was able to pursue an outward-oriented strategy of development in the 1960s 
and 1970s [S.F. Lee (1991): 187-198; also, Li (1976): Chapter 2, pp. 12-19; Li (1990): 3], In 
short, Japan created the basic mechanism [cf. Gold (1986), pp. 43-46] by which the 
Nationalist government was able to take over and manage effectively the agricultural 
development of Taiwan. The rise in productivity during this period also provided a source of 
wealth which could be utilized by the government in its drive to Taiwan's post-war 
industrialization. On the other hand, the Nationalist government took over the then existing 
rural infrastructure and an initial industrial base, but later introduced changes and refinements 
to make the system respond to "Taiwan's own needs" more than, of course, Japan's.
Since 1949, when the Nationalist central government was defeated in China's civil 
war and moved itself to Taiwan, the ROC has been engaged in a continuous struggle for 
survival. Internally, it faces potential resistance from the Taiwanese islanders (80-85% of the 
total population43) whose ancestors migrated from the Mainland to Taiwan about four 
hundred years ago, and a potential military threat from the mainland Communists as well. 
Externally, besides a constant challenge by the Communist regime to its legitimacy, the ROC 
has faced a serious crisis of "international de-recognition",44 particularly after October 1971, 
when the ROC was expelled from the United Nations, of which it was an original member, 
and replaced by the PRC. Subsequently, the ROC (Taiwan) has also lost its seat in 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
One notable exception is the Asian Development Bank, where Taiwan (the ROC) and China 
(the PRC) are both members.45
43 More thin 1.5 million people under General Chiann K'ni-Shek lied in the two Venn period that culminated in the foundation of the 
Communist People's Republic in the autumn of 1949. Then they joined sn existing population of about 6 million Taiwanese. Cf. The 
Economist (London). (5-11 March. 1988): "A Survey of Taiwao"; see also Gold (19ft6): 54-55.
44 Toward the end of July 1991, the ROC only maintained full diplomatic relations with about twenty-nine countries, most of them small 
and uninfluential. except South Africa and South Korea. Cf. Asiaweek (Ya-Zhou Zhou Kan). (28/July/91): 25. Moreover, none of 
those countries can be guaranteed never to switch.
Up to 1988, according to the Nationalista, the ROC still maintains its seat in only ten inter-governmental organizations. See Chinese I
Yearbook o f International Law and Affairs (Tat wan), Vol.6 (1986/87), Taipei, j>. 322. As to the case of the Asian Development Bank.
Taiwan had. since China's accession, boycotted meeting until March 1988, when the government (President Teng-Hui Lee) 
announced ita decision to send representatives to participate in the 1988 Annual Meeting in late April. See 'Official Transcript o f the 
Press Conference o f  President Lee on 22 Feb., 1988', Government Information Office, Taipei.
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In sum, the efficiency of a military-economic running authority is the first task for the 
Nationalists after the civil war. Despite its shortage of diplomatic partners, Taiwan is by no 
means restricted in its economic dealings. On the contrary, the diplomatic setbacks prompted 
the initiation of a "self-reliance" campaign, in which both the government and the private 
sector joined in a concerted effort to promote strength and stability through economic 
development and progress.
(ii) importance o f Informal Regulation
The operation of the economic strategy indicates that the ROC's foreign policy has 
been transformed under the notion of "economic development first",46 this provides a parallel 
contrast to China's strategy since 1976. As a foreign policy instrument, Nationalist China's 
economic strategy has two main types of objective: 'political objectives'47 and 'economic ob­
jectives'48.
Also, benefited from this economic strategy for survival, the importance of informal 
regulation and norms have greatly increased. Internally, this economic strategy was to build 
Taiwan up as 'a model province of China'49 based on Sun Yat-sen's The Principle of 
Livelihood [Cf. Section II.2.A], and externally, to reach the status of a developed country. It 
is only through the understanding of these objectives that one can explain why a military and 
authoritarian regime had to make long term compromises with the unarmed population, given 
the fact that strength of the GMD regime vis-a-vis its own society contrasted greatly with its
46 This economic strategy was not an entirely new device introduced after the UN debacle already mentioned; however it was only as a 
result of the de-recognition crisis that the lull ran^e of this strategy was envisaged. On the contrary, it can be traced back to the 1960s 
when Taiwan, with its increased economic capability, began to launch its 'Overseas Development Assistance' programme, directed at 
the less-developed world. However, the economic strategy of the 1970s envisaged exchanges, not only with the less-developed 
countries but also with the 'developed' ones, having the clear purpose of achieving a dynamic flow of trade inter-dependence.
i
47 The political objectives of the economic strategy are at leaat four in number after 1949: how to safeguard the survival of the ROC as 
well as of the mainland emigrants on Taiwan; and how to safeguard the physical existence of Taiwan island as an independent entity 
free from outside (especially Communist Chinese) influence are two mam objectives for the Nationalists. Then, bow to preserve the 
traditional Chinese way of life, namely, the continuation of Chinese culture and history, and the standard of living that had been built 
up in Taiwan is the ideological issue. Finally, to promote the possibility of any future political contacts (official ties) between Taiwan 
and its trade partners, through the existing (unofficial) trade relations. Obviously, the last objective is a mixture of political and 
economic goals.
48 Closely intertwined with these political aims, the economic objectives of the isolated island were: to promote Taiwan's economic 
strength, stability and growth, and to upgrade its industrial structure, snd to reach economic self-sufficiency, by attracting foreign 
investment and technology in more sophisticated industries.
However, the movement of Tsiwan's Independence' from China has been seriously prohibited by the Nationalist government since 
1940s. Cf. Art. 2 of the 1987 National Security Law.
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weakness and dependency in the international sphere; and why the flexibility of development 
policy and efficiency of its bureaucracy are necessary.
II.3.B. Authoritarian Rule and the Informal Regulation: Re-Building of the Party-State
To the Nationalists, the way to settle the dilemma between the formalization of a strong 
central government and an efficient ruling was to expand informal sector in administrative 
operation beyond the constitutional limits. In the organizational context, the exercise of state 
power takes place through an institutional framework which pervades the society far beyond 
the 'government', the "party-state (dang-guo)", in which both the political and economic 
spheres are under the control of an executive authority.50 The role of the ROC 'government' 
is to give formal legitimacy to its economic legislation, which is lacking in the purely party 
mechanism.
Among the five Yuans of the central government, the posts of both President and the 
Premier are the key parts of the administration of the party-state. Since April 1948, with the 
enactment of the 1948 Temporary Provisions (480510) mentioned earlier, the President has 
been granted a wide range of emergency powers. The Executive Yuan is the Cabinet, with a 
range of ministers and commissions, which is appointed by the President and whose own 
head is the Premier. Furthermore, its Executive Council formulates policy and decides 
which laws, bills, and other matters are to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for 
approval.* 31
The Legislative Yuan is responsible for legislation, approving the budget, supervising 
government officials, and so on. Thus, the Executive Yuan must gain the Legislative Yuan's 
approval for all substantive laws needed to govern the country, according to the Constitution
50 Thun, T. Skocpol'i definition at the Slain cornea done to ihin reality of Taiwan: the »tale ia *a Ml of adminiitralive. policing and I 
military organizationa headed, and more or leaa well coordinated by, an executive authority” that controla a specific territory. See T. 
Skocpol (1979): 29; also cf. Section 1.3 of thia atudy.
31 Art. 38, the Constitution (1946)\ also Cf. Kwang-Hwa Pub. Co., Government System, the ROC, (Taipei: 1981), p.10.
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(Article 57). However, the Executive Yuan, in reality, can gain the Legislative Yuan's 
approval with ease through the "party-state" structure.
Under Nationalist rule there are parallel party and state structures at all levels— 
national, provincial, county, municipal, and district. This ensures firm party control. Thus, 
according to T.B. Gold, in Taiwan all major governmental policy decisions, including 
legislative decisions, are generated or approved by relevant party organizations [Gold (1986): 
59]. The best example of these "party-state" relations is the National Security Conference 
(the NSC), a coordinating body for administrative, policy, military, and security 
organizations, directly under the President of the ROC. In reality,32 and according to the 
law,33 the National Security Conference is the highest government decision-making body. 
Furthermore, in order to harmonize decision-making and policy-execution, the membership 
of the NSC, the five branches (Yuans) and the ministers overlaps extensively.34 The same 
people appear often in more than one of these institutions. Moreover, for the same reasons, 
the incumbents of these offices are also members of the powerful Standing Committee o f the 
Central Committee of the GMD (Nationalists), which plays a key role in the party-state 
structure. After 1949, with their enormous party and state bureaucracies, military machine, 
security network, industrial assets confiscated from the Japanese, and with the American 
government insulating them from external enemies, the Nationalists controlled the situation 
in Taiwan to a degree they never approached on the mainland [Gold (1986): 64]. More 
importantly, there is a high degree of coordination in the different social control functions 
exercised by the different institutions under the central party-state.
Throughout the ROCs history, the Legislative Yuan has generally had the role of 
legitimating the Nationalists rule. It is only by the 1980s that this Yuan began to assume a 
greater importance in monitoring the administrative activities of the executive, and gained
32 E.g., oo 27 February. 1991, the 1992 General Budget of the Central Government proposed by the Executive Yuan waa sent to the
National Security Conference for ita examination and approval, which resulted in four deciaiona made by the Conference. Central 
Daily News (IE, Taipei) (let March, 1991): |.
53 Provision IV, Temporary Provisions (¡948).
34 E.g.. C m lrm lD tilyN iw it 1st March. 1991): 1.
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some limited but increasing law-making rights. However, in most cases, these limited law­
making rights of the Legislative Yuan are no more than those of "approval", or "approval 
with amendment1',53 not "initiation". There are several reasons for this. First, as T.B. Gold 
has argued, the Nationalists have maintained their dominance by freezing the membership of 
three parliament-organs [Gold (1986): 61]. In fact, up to the end of 1990 there have been no 
general elections (only a few partial elections) in Taiwan for four decades. Secondly, the 
party members in the Legislative Yuan, which hold the majority of all seats, have to support 
decisions made by the Standing Committee o f Central Committee. The final reason is that the 
expert drafters are within the party and state legal bureaucracies [Cf. Articles 57, 58, and 63 
of the Constitution (1946)]; while such expertise is lacking in the Legislative Yuan before the 
mid-1980s.5«
IU.C. An Institutional Analysis of the Interaction Between Law and Economic
Administration
Up to the 1990s, the government has succeeded in piloting Taiwan to levels of economic 
development that are almost unparalleled in the region, and certainly beyond the reach of 
even the most advanced of Mainland China's special economic zones. A framework of 
economic laws and institutional settings, from a historical-structural view, have been the 
vehicles of economic development, through five distinct phases since 1945. However, a type 
of economic discretion has been developed emphasising administrative, discretionary, and 
conventional controls, while formal regulation based on explicit legal powers plays a 
relatively little role. 5*
55 One notable example was the Amendment o f the Benktng Lew on 10 May. 1984. In this case, the struggle between 'interest group' sod
'anti-interest group' among KMT (Nationalial) legialative members led to a masa of debating and negotiation on the draft. Finally an f
Amendment came out after this struggle. See Economic Daily News (Taipei), Economic Yearbook o f the Republic o f China (1986)
(in Chinese, cited as Economic Yearbook 1986), pp.7-8.
^  Cf., K.T. Li (1976), Ch.2, 'Law and Economic Development', pp. 12-19; Oold (1986), p. 59; and Economic Yearbook 1986, pp. 7-14.
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(i) Emergency Measures Increasing during Rehabilitation, 1945-52
In the early days of Taiwan's post-war rehabilitation, when agricultural and industrial 
production had not yet been restored, there was a serious shortage of goods, and inflation was 
rampant.57 With the rapid population increase, there was also an extremely serious 
unemployment problem. In the face of this threatening situation, the government shifted its 
priority to price stabilization in order to combat inflation.58
After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Nationalist Government sent forces to take 
over the island of Taiwan, and has since ruled the island as a province [W. Cheng (1991)]. 
Accordingly, all the ROCs statutes and regulations enacted from 1920s to 1940s were 
'suddenly' thrust upon Taiwanese islanders after Japan's fifty-year period of rule had ended. 
These laws imposed from above continued in force after the Nationalist Government 
relocated itself in Taiwan in 1949. A number of laws of an economic nature were thus 
introduced into the island.59
In addition to the imposition of those laws, the other main legal characteristic of this 
phase was the increase o f the state's emergency measures, including both legislative and 
administrative measures, because of the continuing civil war. Special regulations governing 
agriculture, mining, industry and commerce during the period of the civil war were effected 
in order to stabilize the economy. So were several administrative agencies.60 The expansion 
of administrative regulation of business was obvious during the period.
57 Commodity prices sky-rocketed by as high as 33% each year earlier in this phase. ’Inflation' has been regarded as the first enemy in 
the Nationalist development policies, for an uncontrollable and sky-rocketing price was the main reason for ICMTa defeat in China's 
civil war in 1949. Today, Taipei is proud of its control on commodity prices as the head of the world. See Central Daily News (IE), 
(21 May. 1988), p.l.
58 Every effort was made to achieve post-war rehabilitation. Currency issues and government budget were placed under strict control, 
and by 19S2, agricultural and industrial production were already restored to pre-war levels.
59 Including the Civil Cot» (1929) (290523); the foul special laws regarding Civil Maltera -lhe Company Law (1931) (291226). the Law 
of Negotiable Inurumenu (1929) (291030). Maritime Law (1929) (201230). and Imurenca Law (1929) (291230); lha Trademark Law 
(1930) (300506); Ike Patent Law (¡944) (440529); the Banking Law (1931) (310328); the Income Tax Law (¡943) (430217). Other 
regulations governing mines, forestry, water, fishery and land were also introduced [Cf. Appendix B].
Including the Taiwan Production Board (TPB), the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) were 
established in 1948-9 to stabilize the changing programmes of economic development [Clark (1989): 162; Gold (1986): 65-66). For 
the same reason, the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) was established as a macro-economic control body in 1951 on American 
advice (Gold (1986): 68-70).
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(ii) Dominance o f  the Party-State: Land Reform and Import-substitution Policies, 1953-60
A series of land reform measures created a system of small-holder private agriculture 
in the early 1950s. In order to utilize its limited resources efficiently,61 the government 
commenced from 1953 a series of Four-Year Economic Development Plans, of which two 
during this phase boosted agricultural and industrial production. In this phase, the 
government adopted a policy of "import-substitution" since most equipment and raw 
materials required for industrial construction were largely imported.62 The exports in this 
phase were chiefly agricultural products and processed agricultural products. Foreign trade 
was constantly in deficit.
The success of the land reform programme carried out in Taiwan was based on three 
laws.63 Along with this programme in the critical 1950s, the Nationalist regime, guided and 
supported by the USA, institutionalized the structure of the "Party-State" within which 
Taiwan's economy, society, and politics would evolve. The Nationalists penetrated society to 
the level of the residential neighbourhood, village, school, and large work unit [Gold (1987):
59-64]. As a result, the party-state dominated the economy, and also controlled relations 
with the outside world. Accordingly, it selected its "cronies" to become industrialists and 
made sure that they depended on the state for capital, foreign exchange, equipment, raw 
materials, energy, and docile labour (Cf. Sections V.3.B. & V.4.B. below).
Meanwhile, in addition to the land reform programme, the influence of the US aid 
mission through the JCRR programme64 created a favourable climate for private investment 
by liberalizing economic controls and reducing bureaucracy [Clark (1989): 162-163; Gold 
(1986): 65-66]. Subsequently, the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals (the 1954
61 With American financial aid amounting to US $100 million on average each year (1951 to 1965). in conjunction with the financial 
and economic coordinative measures taken by the government, commodity prices gradually stabilized [Clark (1989): 168 and 170- 
171; Gold (1986): 68-70).
62 For a detailed discussion of the background of this policy, see Sho-chieh Tsiang, Lessons from the Economic Development o f Taiwan,
(1985: Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd., Taipei); p.154.
63 Thene were: the S u iu lt far «educriott o f Farm Rant to 37.3 Parcant (¡931) (510607); the LarU-to-tha Tillar Statuta (1933) (530126); t
and the Statute for the Equalization o f Urban Land Rights (1934) (540826).
64 The essence of the two plans of the ESB in this phase wss the linking together of applications for Finance from the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID). AID also gave its advice and backing to the economic institutions established by the government.
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SIFN) (540714), the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese (the 1955 SIOC) (551119) 
and the Statute for Encouragement o f Investment (the 1960 SEI) (600910) were promulgated 
in order to promote this investment climate and economic development. The Nationalist 
Government tried to induce development by enactment of these coveniently-made laws and 
administrative measures, such as a 19-Point Programme for Financial and Economic Reform 
[Clark (1989): 174-175; Gold (1986): 77-78].
fill) Protectionism and Exports, 1961-72
The 3rd (1961-64), 4th (1965-68), and 5th (1969-72) Four-Year Economic 
Development Plans were fulfilled during this period of "self-sustained growth" pursuing 
"stable but rapid" economic development. However, this did not entail abandonment of the 
tight controls of imports. In order to restrict the possible adverse impact of the termination of 
American aid in June, 1965,65 the government took a variety of renovating measures in 
addition to those already implemented in the late 1950s. These administrative measures 
could be seen to have been the origin of the later-criticized "protectionism" [M. Hsing 
(1991): 78-81]. This expressed the contradiction between short-term economic perspective 
resulting from administrative convenience rather than a long-term structural perspective.
Meanwhile, the government encouraged savings, foreign and domestic investment 
and exports.66 The Third Four-Year Economic Plan (1961-4) incorporated the 19-Point 
Programme as well as the I960 SE1, which offered incentives to stimulate private investment. 
The State took other measures to promote the private sector, such as establishing the 
Industrial Development and Investment Centre and the China Development Corporation, 
which also had the GMD's party capital invested in it [Gold (1987): 78]. Furthermore, during
66 According to Profeuor Taiang, the accumulation capital in Taiwan before 1963 relied heavily on foreign aid and foreign capital: 
before 1962 foreign capital was between 30%-50% o f total capital. Tiiang (1985): 165.
66 With rapid economic growth and ample labour supplies, productivity sharply increased and. in turn, labour costs, which provided 
Taiwan an "international comparative advantage4 until the 1980s, dropped. Stability in international commodity prices further 
stabilized the commodity prices in Taiwan. Also, inflation no longer constituted a threat to the island economy, thereby enabling 
industry to plan ahead and make long term investments in accordance with the principles of sound business. This factor has 
contributed significantly to the rapid economic growth Taiwan has experienced in the recent past.
51
II. Law & Administration under the Nationalists
this Phase, those laws of an economic nature already mentioned were amended;67 to 
symbolize the government's implicit acceptance of the fact that "Taiwanization o f the 
Nationalist laws through limited revisions" would be necessary for further economic 
development. A wide range o f  legal reform, in both the civil and commercial fields, had been 
lacking even after two decades since 1949.
In September 1963, to prepare for AID'S impending withdrawal (moved up to 1965), 
the government merged the Council on US Aid (CUSA) into the new Council for 
International Economic Cooperation and Development (C1ECD) under the Premier [Gold
(1986): 78]. The CIECD continuously improved the investment climate as the situation 
demanded. The 1960 SEI, a useful mechanism, had been revised thirteen times by 1985 [cf. 
Chapters IV  and V]. It was supplemented by frequently updated categories and criteria of 
strategic productive enterprises singled out for special encouragement under the executive 
authorities. In addition, the Statute for Technical Cooperation (the 1962 STC) (620808), the 
Securities Exchange Act (1968) (680430) and the new Income Tax Law (1968) (571230) also 
promoted favourable changes for Taiwan’s economic environment during the 1960s.
(iv) Expanding Administration and Industrialization, 1973—1985
During this period, three Economic Development Plans were implemented (1973-76, 
1977-81, and 1982-85). However, the 1973 oil crisis had an extremely adverse impact on the 
exports of Taiwan. Meanwhile, commodity import prices rapidly reached even higher levels. 
Declining exports and decreased interest in private investment seriously threatened economic
growth. As a result, on the one hand, the government commenced the Ten Major
\
Construction Projects in 1974, whereby the investments by the government and government 
corporations considerably increased, partly making up for increasing exports and private 
investment. On the other hand, as commodity prices stabilized, the government took
67 cr. Herbert H P. Me, "General Feature, of the Law and Legal Syalem of the ROC", in M i (ed.). The Logoi ond Economic 
Environment in the Republic o f China, (1985: 2nd Ed.; Academia Si nice, Taipei), pp.1-33; pp. 17-20.
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measures to stimulate the economy [Clark (1989): 192-193; Gold (1986): 100-101]. Still, in 
this phase, state intervention in business played the key part in Taiwan's economic growth.
Compared with the first oil crisis, the government well demonstrated its strengthened 
capacity to deal with energy crises and recession in the second oil crisis triggered by the Iran- 
Iraq war of the late 1970s. In 1984, as the world economy appeared to pick up, Taiwan again 
greatly increased its exports. The substantial economic growth increased to 8.9 per cent and 
commodity prices had remained stable based on inflation which averaged about 6.5% 
between 1953 and 1989 [K.T. Li (1990): 1-2]. An important impact of this phase on the late 
development of Taiwan was the expansion of the reserve of foreign exchange. Being quickly 
accumulated, this reserve caused the increase of domestic currency-issue and high inflation 
after 1985 [Hsing (1991): 79].
Facing the different tasks already discussed, the macro-economic control bodies 
within the bureaucracy had been repeatedly re-structured since 1948-49, such as the Council 
for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) in 1977.68 In fact, the Industrial 
Development Bureau under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MoEA) has detailed power 
over sector planning and execution.
After 1980, the CEPD began shifting the emphasis in industrial restructuring and 
trade liberalization. In 1980 the State established a new type of industrial zone, the Science- 
Based Industrial Park in Hsin-chu, which was designed as Taiwan's 'Silicon Valley', to offer 
the same incentives as the 1960 SEI plus additional sweeteners [Cf. Section IV.4.A. below]. 
To restructure Taiwan's economy and to induce its trade and industrial changes, there are 
frequent legislative amendments of economic laws [Cf. Sections IV.3; V.2], especially in the 
fields of investment, intellectual property, and in 1987 deregulation of foreign exchange
88 In 1973, Ibe then Premier Cluing Ching-Kuo replaced the C1ECD with the Economic Planning Council (EPC). Later, however, the |
real policy making power shifted to a new, five-man Finance and Economy Small Group of the Executive Yuan, headed by the 
Central Bank Governor under the Premier. In 1977, the government terminated the EPC and the five-man small group and 
established the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD). which re-centralized power, taking responsibility for 
macro-planning, setting priorities, coordination, and evaluation.
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control.69 However, up to the end of this period, the continuing of high exports and compe­
tition from other Southeast Asian countries explained the failure of the policy of upgrading 
industries.
(v) Administrative Authority at the Crossroad, 1986-Present
Indeed, the unprecedented international context accelerates Taiwan's changing steps.
Even the issues of labour welfare and trade unions were pushed by American trade 
pressure.70
During this stage the governmental further developed its new capital and technology­
intensive industrial strategy, which has been not deemed so successful since the early 1980s, 
based upon the principles of "zi-you-hua, guo-ji-hua, zhi-du-hua" ("Liberalization, 
Internationalization and Institutionalization"). The requirement of "Institutionalization" has 
shown the contradictions of administrative dominance in the past. The country had 
completed its 9th Development Plan (1986-89), which focused on two major priorities: 
expanding domestic demand and reducing the trade surplus [F.F. Chien (1989): 187]. It was 
reported that in 1988 in correcting both of these macro-economic imbalances Taiwan 
achieved substantial progress. For further development, the 1990 Statute for Upgrading 
Industries (the 1990 SET) (901228) was promulgated to replace the 1960 SEI.
At the beginning of 1991, a Tenth Development Plan (1990-93) was surprisingly and 
quickly replaced by a new Six-Year Development Plan (1990-96), which has set up not only 
economic but also social, cultural and educational goals, including a "comprehensive national
t
health insurance programme, enhancement of social welfare and security programmes, and 
improvement of environment protection, pollution control and ecological conservation"
69 The Investment Centre of MoEA, Menusl of Inveelment by Oversees Chinese end Foreign Nalionels in the ROC (Hum-chmio Wmt- 
kuo-jen Lai-hua-tou-zi Yao-lan), (1989: published by Jin-iih Wen-hus Press, Taipei) (hereinafter cited as 1989 Manual (Taiwan)],
pp. 183-185 and 214-213. f
70 R.g., the open of more than one trade union in one company was one of the labour issues of Taiwanese-American trade negotiation.
Council for Economic Construction & Planning (The Executive Yuan, Taipei), A Study of Legal Issues of Taiwanese-American 
Trade Negotiation (August. 1987; No. (76) 567-92), pp. 336-537.
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[FCJ, (17 January, 1991): 5], It has been pointed out by a top official that "reconstructing 
economic and social order" is an essential part of the plan in the next six years, and that 
promoting Taiwan as a major financial, transit, and high-tech centre in the Western Pacific is 
the first goal [FCJ, ibid.].
II.4 THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL­
ISTS: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
In Taiwan since 1945, law constitutes not only an ideological device for creating legitimacy, 
but also provides the essential channels to induce social changes and institutional 
transformation. An attempt to analyze the role of economic legislation in Taiwan's economic 
development is necessary to explain the basis of legitimacy and the role of law in Taiwan's 
economic development. Indeed, for the past decades after 1949, the Nationalist China has 
expanded the functions of informal regulation to a great degree to support the implementation 
of development strategy. However, the contradictions between formal and informal law have 
also produced many issues in the long term.
II.4.A. Combination of Formal and Informal Mechanisms in Legal
Change
From our analysis (cf. Section II.3), the development of the legal framework of business in 
Taiwan after 1949 has been influenced by three main characteristics: the national develop­
ment strategy; the localisation of the Nationalist laws; and, the influence of American 
commercial law. These three characteristics also explain the general nature of private 
business environment in Taiwan.
\
First, the task of national survival (cf. Section II.3.A) explains the ROC's policy: the 
"economy- and trade-first strategy", has aimed at placing Taiwan deliberately at the centre of 
trade relations between the developed and the less-developed world.71 In this regard, the
71 The reason for this strategy ia to try and cataMish Taiwan's indupmsmbiUty to many oaliona and economies and thus create an 9
economic basis for continued political independence. It is through this strategy that the ROC is slowly setting up its own pattern of 
trade inter-dependence, linking itself and its future with the world economy while, at the same time, searching for a national self- 
sufficiency and an independent identity. President Lee indicated in the President Prcea Conference (22/Feb/88): 'the entire ROC 
economy is supported by foreign trade'. See the document of Government Information Office (1998).
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Nationalist officials hoped that the absence of a diplomatic life for the ROC could be made 
less harmful to Taiwan's national economy and its aim of survival, since these could be 
complemented by the island's intensive "unofficial" contacts overseas.72 Moreover, cross­
investment, i.e., both foreign investment inside the country and overseas investment, are 
accordingly encouraged under Taiwan's diplomatic and economic strategy. The ROCs 
unorthodox methods of diplomacy have indeed served to compensate, to a significant degree, 
for its international isolation after the expulsion from the UN, and hence have ensured its 
survival and economic viability. No one, however, could be sure of what this economic 
strategy of the 1970s will achieve in the 1990s. Nonetheless, both international and domestic 
legal principles have been treated in a flexible and informal manner subject to the overriding 
administrative considerations o f survival o f the regime.
Secondly, the localisation of the Nationalist laws has been the main legal 
development since the end of the war. This was not only due to the change of the size of the 
economy (from the mainland into an island), but also because of the change of social 
structure from an agricultural-industrial mixture into a newly industrialised economy. Hence, 
the basic laws adopted in the late 1920s and the early 1930s under the Nationalist 
government had to be adapted to deal with the issues raised by international transactions, and 
commercial laws had to be adjusted to be more flexible and practical in relation to local 
conditions, especially in the field of foreign investment. This Taiwanisation of the 
Nationalist law has been expanding not only in the civil legal areas, but also in the 
commercial areas including patents, trademarks, copyright, the insurance and trading of 
securities, bankruptcy, land, water, mines fisheries, forests, compulsory execution of judge­
ments, civil matters involving foreign parties, and arbitration.
t
Finally, given the fact that Taiwan depends closely on the U.S.A. in its external 
relationship, the localisation of the old laws has always been influenced by the economic co­
operation and the trade partnership between two countries. Accordingly, the Anglo-
72 For example, even in 1989-90 Taiwan baa ueed Ihia alralcgy lo eel up a cloaer buaineaa tie with many European and Soutb-Eaat Aaian 
countries, in order to search for more foreign markets for Taiwan's goods and technology and to strengthen Taiwan's international 
trade contacts, that is, to diversify Taiwan's foreign markets from the USA. See Asiaweek (Ya-zhou zhou-kan), (28/July/91): 24-26.
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American legal experience has often been referred to in the legislative process, especially, in 
relation to the commercial laws and their amendments. Moreover, as we will discuss later, 
most of the changes of laws, under the influence of the bureaucracy, have been based on 
amendment rather than an overall restructuring o f existing laws; on an omnibus legislation 
accompanied by administrative rules to avoid a wide change o f other related regulations. 
Alternatively, special laws have been passed (such as (the 1960 SEI) (600910)) which 
included "omnibus" provisions covering a wide range of topics (e.g., acquisition and use of 
land; customs, duties and taxation; foreign exchange; intellectual property rights) but without 
changing those related legal areas. These three characteristics discussed also explain the 
general legal environment of foreign investment in Taiwan.
II.4.B. Administrative Authority Assuming the Legislative Role
During the 1950s, the Nationalist government already became aware of the 
importance of the role of law in its development [Cf. Section II.3.C.(ii)]. Because of rapid 
economic growth, the existing laws had become inadequate and out-dated, creating great 
difficulties for business operations. Hence, two approaches to resolve the problems were 
adopted by the Nationalist government. These include a carefully planned programme for an 
overall revision of the general fields based on both civil and criminal law. It also covers the 
drafting of the laws and new regulations, omnibus or not, in specific areas, especially foreign 
investment.
Although ordinary legislation is left to the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan, 
which is the practical administrative centre, is often the drafting body of legislation and may, 
in certain cases, with the approval of the President return a bill passed by the Legislative 
Yuan for re-consideration and revision [cf. Section II.3.B].73 Therefore, in reality the 
Executive Yuan, the administrative centre, plays a crucial part in the process of legislation.
73 Bills returned by lbs Executive Yuan must be re-smnned by s two-thirds majority of tbs Legislative Yuan in order to become law.
57
II. Law & Administration under the Nationalists
In practice, the real legislative power is actually in the hand of the administration under the 
central leadership within the party-state.
A model example of the legislative process in the ROC was the 1985 Amendment o f 
Trademark Law. The Legislative Yuan approved it, although many members criticized the 
Amendment on the ground that it would protect foreigners more than the ROC nationals in 
relation to trademark litigation [Economic Yearbook 1986: 10]. The legislative policy- 
coordination was based on the ROCs economic strategy of that time—Taiwan had to get rid 
itself of the image of 'copycat in the international community, in order to promote its trade.
Hence, as a result of the party-state relations mentioned, the legislative process in the 
ROC is as follows:
1. from the Executive Yuan:
Draft (the ministry or department appointed);
—> Coordination and Examination (Executive Council);
—> Legislative Proposal.
(The role of Party behind-the-scene is to coordinate the national interests and the
party interests in the legislative proposal.)74
2. to the Legislative Yuan:
Examination in Commission (the relevant Committee), three times;
--> Legislative Procedure (the formal Yuan-meeting), three times;
Approval.
(The role of Party is to push the proposal through the Legislative Procedure with least
difficulty.)75
3. to the President:
> Promulgation. *73
74 cr. Central Daily Nawi ( international Edition. Taipei, cited u  CDN(IE)). (01/Jun/ 88). p. 1. The KMT Divinion of the Le(ielativc I
Yuan to push through Five Legislative Proposals'.
73 Ibid..
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Nevertheless, in recent years there have been cases when legislative proposals have been 
amended or blocked by actions organised by the interest groups.76 There have also some 
'self-proposals' by Legislative Committeemen77 within the legislative process. On the whole, 
however, the legislative process in Taiwan essentially consists of 'execution of development 
strategies' decided by the party-state machine of Nationalist China.
Recognizing that legislation has both preventive and promotive functions, the 
Nationalist officials have emphasized that "law is a means to further economic development 
and social progress" [Li (1976): 14]. To these economic officials, every policy they endorse 
they expect to legalize. Every law they propose, they expect to administer, to induce social 
changes towards economic progress. For example, the SEI (1960) [Cf. Chapters IV & V].
However, updating legislation is not an easy matter. The Nationalist government 
deems law revision the best way to induce organized change. Thus, the Committee on 
Economic Law Revision and Unification was set up by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
1965 [K.T. Li (1976): 12]. Its task was to deal with the programme for the overall revision of 
those old economic laws enacted in mainland China and new ones. Consequently, a mass of 
revision of both new and old economic laws occurred in 1960s and 1970s, followed by the 
speedy economic growth of Taiwan.
Because of the "economic-development-first" strategy of foreign policy, and because 
of the close relations between the ROC and the USA, the influence of Anglo-American law 
has gradually increased through the revisions. Notable examples are the commercial laws 
such as Company Law, Law of Negotiable Instrument, Maritime Law and Insurance Law 
[Ma (1985): 17-20]. However these are old laws. These were originally enacted in 1929-31,
t
but later amended in the 1960s and 1970s.
76
77
Es., the Amendment of the Rules Governing Import Tax by the Customs dated 17 Jan., 1986, sec Economic Yearbook 1986, pp.12- 
13. Also, the Amendment of the Banking Law in 1986, ibid., pp.7-8.
Eg.. The Legislative Proposal for Legislative Aasistant System', see CDN(IE), (21/May/88), p.l.
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11.5 CONCLUSIONS
From our examination on the interaction between law and administration under the 
Nationalist ruling in two periods, before and after 1949, the majority of the functions and 
roles of the state law has been replaced by the informal regulation, or administrative 
measures. The impacts o f informal norms of the traditional Chinese law and the political 
reality have weakened the supervision of the state law on administrative measures.
For two reasons, informal law has retained its active role under the Nationalist Party- 
State. For the national survival, administration, with less formality, has assumed the leading 
role in Taiwan's development. For instance, as a consequence of changes in the international 
political environment, Taiwan's foreign policy following the UN expulsion has demonstrated 
flexibility and adjustment. Through a societal-like, or "unofficial", approach of international 
legal mechanism, it was to set up Taiwan's international trade network of interdependence 
with both the developed and developing world, linking Taiwan and its future with other parts 
of the world.
Secondly, for the authoritarian rule of the party-state, the establishment of economic 
control has provided itself with the process of expansion of administration. As we will dis­
cuss in Chapters IV and VI, even in the domain of foreign investment, the authoritarian 
administration has still assumed its leading role through the informal regulation behind and 
beyond, the statutory ffamework.
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CHAPTER III. INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
COMMUNIST CHINA
III.l INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the PRC on 1st October, 1949 was the starting point for a new era of 
China's modernization and legal development. This chapter examines whether the informal 
system of Chinese law, which has been remaining influential in the Nationalist regime since 
1911, has disappeared. It thus discusses the interaction between formal and informal law in 
Communist China during four periods: before 1949; 1949-1965; from the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76) to 1978; and after 1979. The study then develops the analysis 
of their role and functions in the subsequent modernization programme.
Furthermore, an expansion of administrative control, following the building-up of the 
party-state after the unification of the Mainland, will be discussed. Also, the issues and 
contradictions of both foreign and domestic investments in the Communist modernization 
programme will be given analytical treatment in the case studies - nationalisation of western 
investment, compulsory divestment of the Soviet investment and autonomy of the 
enterprises.
Finally, after a review of formal and informal law before 1979, initial attempts to 
regulate foreign investment through legal reform and administrative restructuring, and also 
their contradictions, will be examined.
> II 1.2 FORMAL AND INFORMAL LAW BEFORE 1949
During 1921-27, The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) had actively organized its 
revolutionary movements in some provinces such as Hupei, Hunan, Guangdong 
(Kwangtung), Jianxi (Kiangsi) and Fujian (Fukien) [cf. Wilbur (1983): 673-697], After the 
open break of 1927 with the GMD [cf. Section I.4.C], those Chinese Communist "soviets" 
were set up in these same areas [J. Chen (1986): 174-175; 183-191]. Being the local "rebel"
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governments, these soviets introduced social and economic reforms and suppressed the 
landlord class and "counter-revolutionaries".1 In the administration of law under the 
Communist regime during 1927-37, a significant note has been made on its "judicial 
consideration to the exclusion of personal feelings".2 From the legal-historical perspective, 
while the GMD's Republic was undertaking its most important programme of a codification 
of western-style law from the mid-1920s to mid-1930s, the CCP's soviets were establishing 
and experimenting with their own system of revolutionary justice.
This system combined both the formal and the informal systems of law through 
simple decrees with popular suppression campaigns. The Chinese soviets issued decrees and 
regulations to establish land reforms, to reduce interest rates, to prohibit opium-smoking and 
other anti-socialist activities such as gambling [J. Chen (1986): 179], and to safeguard the 
rights of women,3 4and initiated continuous movements against local bullies, and counter­
revolutionary gentry and landlords. For example, the Marriage Law of December 1931 and 
Labour Laws were obviously designed to protect the masses, while the laws and acts 
controlling the activities of counter-revolutionaries, of 15 October 1933, were to safeguard 
the soviet regime [J. Chen (1986): 179],
With mass mobilization and class struggle in this period, justice could be deemed
unprofessional, informal and popular* although the jural system of law remained to certain 
degree. In reality, the quality of this justice would be a question,5 while the formal law itself 
was never one of the foundations of a settled society within the revolutionary soviets. 
'Education for everyone’ was deemed as the core of policy implementation, through a
The land investigation campaign was launching from June. 1933 [J. Chen (1986V 1941: "When it waa resumed in January 1934, the 
aims of the campaign were no longer principally economic, not even for the food supply to the Red Army, but political. It became a 
campaign against counter-revolutionaries, a red terror against landlords and rich peasants. As such it was pursued till the collapae of 
the central soviet" (Ibid.. 196J.
As J Chen has noted. "However defective it may have been, the soviet judicial system impressed none other than the leading opponent 
of the CCP, General Chen Cheng [of the GMD): 'Its strength lies in its judicial consideration to the exclusion of personal feelings. Its 
beneficial consequence is shown in the scarcity of cases of embezzlement and corruption'”. [J. Chen (1986): 179]
3 Cf. L. Bianco (1986): 273-280. 285-287, 306; also J. Chen (1986): 178-179.
4 As J. Chen has explained: "The hearings were therefore public under mass supervision, educating and warning the public at the same ft
time". See J. Chen (1986): 179. ^
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propagandized and organized network [J. Chen (1986): 178]. Nevertheless, in the similar 
way as the traditional Chinese gentry, clan heads and village elders, the Communist military 
leaders and party cadres assumed an important role in handling those matters requiring 
informal mediation or conciliation among comrades or revolutionary peasants and workers.5 6
Following the experience of the soviet period (1927-37), the Yenan period (1937-45) 
[cf. L. Van Slyke (1986): 683-704] further developed similar judicial and political practice 
and provided indeed several basic characteristics of subsequent post-1949 Communist legal 
administration, as discussed in the later sections. In sum, these legal-administrative 
characteristics included: under a party-state regime the involvement of party cadres and 
governmental personnel with court administration and decisions; the integration of political, 
administrative and judicial interests through judicial committees under the party operating at 
all levels of the court hierarchy; the involvement of the masses in judicial decisions through 
elected assessors in the mass trials; during the political campaigns the use of trials as a form 
of propaganda; the achievement of conciliation under the guidance of the party or its cadres; 
and the emphasis on repentance through self-criticizing and educational reform under the 
traditional Confucian ideology.7 These characteristics represented a combination of 
revolutionary Communist and popular traditional Chinese legal-social attitudes.
However, from this combination arose a fundamental contradiction in the role o f law 
under a revolutionary regime: the extreme politicisation and populism of the informal law 
and its functions, vis-a-vis the concern with formal legality and the professionalization of 
legal administration. The mutual complementarity and contradiction between the dual sys­
tems of law, the formal and the informal ones, could be best explained below in the context 
of the civil war (1946-49).
5 Here the interference should be taken into Account: In the administration of the law inaidc these revolutionary baaea, the maaaca must 
be dearly differentiated from their enemy and the law« made understandable to them. Hierefore. more or leis, "(in) the application of 
the masa line the regime became less concerned that justice be done than that justice be seen to be done". See J. Chen (1986): 179.
6 A transition of dominance of traditional local leaders into the Chinese Communist cadres, and the relations between the peasants, the 
traditional gentry, and the Communists can be understood from the case study of *P'eng P'ai and the peasants o f Hai-Lu fene (1922- 
8 ) \  in Bianco (1986): 307-322.
There remained a permanent trait of Mao Zedong's thinking that was (he importance of self-awareness (tzu-chueh) and individual 
initiative (tzu-iung) inspired from the Confucianist ideology. S. Schram ( 1986): 792-793.
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The Communist conquest of China involved not only, in the socio-political sense of 
law, a wave of violence against the landlord class and counter-revolutionaries in newly 
occupied areas, but also, in the jural sense of law, a Communist assurance that the new 
regime stood for the "rule of law" and welcomed all those ready to join in the new social 
order. With regard to the former, those movements during 1945-49 made full use of popular 
justice, struggle meetings and accusation rallies following the military occupation. On the 
other hand, in order to provide legal order in the liberated areas, regional authorities, 
including the People's Liberation Army, the regional Military Committees, and the local 
People's Governments, issued directives and provincial regulations covering policy, 
organizational matters, public security and judicial work. At least, in 1949 both 
administrative and judicial organs were directed to guide themselves by the Common Pro­
gramme, laws,8 9 orders, regulations and resolutions [Cf. ZJZ Record-A (1989): 3-33]. 
Therefore, during the civil war period, the combination o f both the formal and informal 
mechanisms o f law enabled it to play a major in the victory of the Communist regime.
III-3 FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS IN TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM,
1949-1965
After the victory of the revolution in 1949, following the socialist transformation period, 
1949-56,9 the PRC's First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) ended in 1957, and in that year also the 
last foreign firm left China, and Britain moved away from the American led embargo of 
Chinese trade [Thompson (1979): 60 & 66],
Informal legal mechanisms played the key parts of the nationalization of foreign 
investment in the PRC after the revolution. Two case studies will be discussed in this 
section: "informal nationalization" of the Western investment and "compulsory divestment" 
of the Soviet investment. Even with a policy of nationalization of foreign enterprises, the
8 According to Brady (1982), a number of lawn regulating the oourac of justice in (be Communist controlled zones, such as the 1932
Temporary Regulation» on the Organization and Procedure of Judicial Departments, the 1933 Organic Law of the Local Soviets, the '
1934 Organic Law of the Central Soviet, the 1934 Judicial Procedure Act, the 1931 Organic regulationa of the Political Security 
Bureau, and the 1943 Border Region Regulationa on Conciliation Work. Brady (1982): 72-73.
9 Cf, Lardy (1987): 130-133; Eckstein (19*6): 121; and. Riakin (1987): 74.
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leaders in the People's Government were clear in their mind that economic construction 
during the transformation period needed some external resources.10 In fact, China's foreign 
trade rose steadily in the period of the nationalization policy.
However, after the nationalisation, the abrupt pull-out of Soviet advisers in the 
summer of 1960 was one major element contributing to an industrial collapse in 1961-62, in 
addition to those elements such as "the disorganization associated with the Great Leap 
Forward (GLF, 1958-60), the readiness to sacrifice maintenance activities for the sake of 
immediate output gains, and the collapse of agricultural production" [Cf. Riskin (1987): 130- 
131].
III3.A. Nationalization of Western Foreign Investment
Contrary to what is often believed, nationalization, even by a revolutionary government, is 
not necessarily based on one single decree or legislation, or a prompt political control. In fact 
in the Chinese case, nationalization was accomplished through a long-term legal limitation 
gradually applied in the period 1949-56, and especially through indirect legislation and the 
administrative control of profit-making and marketing.
(i) "New Democratic " Theory: Chinese Way o f  Nationalization
After the civil war, the Communists took over the Nationalist state enterprises, most 
of which had been Japanese-owned before the end of the Second World War. Thus, even 
without widespread nationalization, the new regime immediately acquired a substantial 
portion of China's industrial capacity.11 * Furthermore, many private retailers served as
10 For in ilucc. iomt wcatem «ludiea lugecmrd that China atratayically uaed trad« aa a BMana of "Incrraaing it« lavaabnaat rata* 
during thia period, importing such 'producer goods* as metal-cutting tools, forging-press equipment, and rolled steel in exchange for 
exports of raw and processed agricultural goods, textiles, and minerals. Eckstein (1966V 121; cited in C. Riskin (1967): 74. 
Furthermore, this growing rate of trade was even faster than gross national production (GNP). so that the ratio of two-way trade to 
GNP rose from about 6 percent in 1932 to about 9 percent in 1939; cf. Riskin (1987): ibid.
11 By 1932, the share of state-owned industry rose to 36 percent of the value of grosa industrial output. Also, the share of joint state-
private enterprises, which produced according to state orders, rose to 26.9 percent, and the share of private enterprises working 
independently fell to 17.1 percent. According to Chinese own report M. Xue fed. 1982), "Almanac of Chinas Economy, 1981 (Hong 
Kong: Modern Cultural Co.. Complied by the Stale Council of the PRC), (p. 22). cited in Lippit (1987): 109.
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distributors or commission agents for state wholesale dealers.12 In sum, by the end of the 
recovery period, the state had assumed the leading role in industry and commerce. Land 
reform had essentially been completed, and industrial and agricultural output had been 
restored to the peak levels of the pre-revolution period. Therefore, by 1956 the socialization 
o f industry was essentially completed,13 with 67.5 percent of gross industrial output by value 
coming from state-owned enterprises and 32.5 percent from joint state-private firms.14
Three formidable problems on political and economic administration15 were faced in 
the transformation period. However, there was indeed an uneasy relation between the objec­
tive of socialist transformation, on the one hand, and that of rapid restoration and growth of 
production, on the other. A strategy to complete these immediate tasks was provided by Mao 
Zedong's theory of the New Democracy.16
Accordingly, the essence of economic strategy under the "New Democratic" state was 
not only to permit private capitalism some leeway and motivation to encourage its productive 
potential, but also to harness it to the goals and priorities of the new state. These principles 
were embodied in the "Common Programme o f the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference" (the CPPCC), adopted on 29th September, 1949. Articles 26-31 of this 
temporary constitution (until 1954) spelled out the economic strategy of the new democracy, 
and divided the economy, according to "degree of public ownership", into four sectors [Cf. 
Blaustein (1962)]: (1) the state-owned economy;17 (2) the co-operative economy;18 (3) the
13 The stale also played a dominant role in wholesale trade, accounting for 63.7 percent by volume in 1932 (compared to only 23.9 
percent in 1950), and a rising share of retail trade, rising to 42.6 percent in 1952 (from 14.9 percent in 1950).
Under the FFYP, during 1953-57, state and joint state-private enterprises continued to grow, while the latter enterprises started in 
1956 to pay their former owners fixed dividends of 5 percent which were eliminated only in 1967, during the Cultural Revolution 
[Lippit (1987): 110). Similar to foreign companies, although the former owners were able to retain managenal and technical positions 
within the firms, control of the firms eventually passed into the hands of state officials.
14 Similarly, in the wholesale trade of the same year, both types of enterprise accounted for 97.2 percent of sales and in retail trade 95.2 
percent.
First, national administrative control had to be established and consolidated. Second, a war-tom economy had to be revived, and 
reconstruction and development had to be started. Third, in order to keep in line with Party's ideological beliefs and the expectations 
of its political base, the transition to socialist relations of production had to be developed.
From the political perspective, this strategy was to gain the support of or to neutralize the intermediate groups that were seen as part 
of the alliance of the "people”, in order to isolate the landlords and the representatives of "bureaucratic capitalists”. From the 
economic perspective, tne strategy aimed at fostering production and economic growth through protecting the private property of 
"nationalist capitalists" and small producers, including farmers.
^  ” " (A r t28)^” *** v' ,a* lo ,he economic life of the country and to people's livelihood shall come under unified operation by the state.
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private economy;19 and, (4) the state-capitalist economy.20 The 1954 Constitution o f the PRC 
adopted on 20th September, 1954, retained these four sectors, with the addition of collective 
ownership and individual ownership, in the wording of Article 5. In reality, the clear trend 
mentioned already was that the state and joint state-private enterprises grew at a rapid rate 
during the following years.
(ii) Informal Types o f  Nationalization
As with the similar process of control of domestic companies, the Chinese 
nationalization was accomplished using its domestic legal powers to exert administrative 
control of private business. Although these domestic regulations were not specifically 
directed at nationalization. They still established the conditions for transformation of China's 
economy during 1949-56 and the basis of state control. It was as a result of such 
administrative intervention that foreign owners voluntarily closed their business. The second 
paradoxical feature was that the reverse payment of voluntary compensation was paid by the 
nationalized party. And, the third characteristic of Chinese nationalization was the long 
period covered—seven years long—from 1949 to 1956. During that period, what the PRC 
Government was primarily concerned with were the transformation of economy, the 
employment of workers, and sharing professional experience of technicians and managers by 
making suggestions for operation of commercial and industrial enterprises [Cf. Ecklund 
(1983): 247], Finally, this long process also entailed the fourth characteristic of China's na­
tionalization, that is, a process of centralization, which gradually limited the role of market 
and locality in economy, which will be discussed later.
10 ”... Is of • semi-socialist in nsture ... shall... accord it preferential treatment." (Art.29)
19 ”... shall encourage the active operation of all private economic enlerprisce beneficial to the national welfare and to the people's
livelihood and shall aaaist in their development.” (Art. 34)
"... jointly operated by the aule and private c ap iu l... Whenever neceaaary and posaible, private capital shall be encouraged to develop 
in the direction of sute-capiuliem. in auch ways as processing for suw-owaed enterpriser and exploiting alate owned resources in the 
form of concessi one.' (Art. 31)
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In fact, the Communists, during the transformation era, kept their policy flexible.** 
The 1954 Constitution provided:
The State protects the right of capitalists to own means of production and other capital 
according to law. [Article 10(1)]
The only PRC decree on nationalization was dated 28th December, 1950,* 22 and was a 
turning-point for the different fortunes of American and British property under the PRCs 
nationalization measures. J.C. Hsiung has pointed out that the decree of 1950 avoided all 
references to "confiscation", "expropriation" or "nationalization", and generally gave the 
impression that the United States (U.S.) assets, both public and private, were to be held in 
trust. During the early 1950s, no compensation was paid to the U.S. for the "frozen" assets 
[cf. Hsiung (1972): 137],
The fate of British firms, as the main foreign investors next to American ones after 
the Second World War, under the PRCs nationalization policy had a more complicated and 
longer development. There were at least three non-legal reasons for this different 
development: first, the Korean war;23 24second, a "modus vivendi" hoped for by many British 
firms [Thompson (1979): 13, 46]; and, finally, employment and labour training [Cf. 
Lieberthal (1971): 28-52]. Obviously, this was affected by the ethos expressed by the theory 
of the "New Democratic State“.2* In opposition to the official Chinese view that na­
tionalization of foreign business never happened, Thompson has argued cogently: "they are 
simply being disingenuous" [Thompson (1979): 63]. From the end of the revolution China 
completely controlled the business environment, as the People's Government could 
confidently wait for the firms to request permission for closure and the Chinese could in
2* Despite the Communist ideology of the rulers or the PRC there wes very little public discussion of netionslizetion in the period 1949- 
56, and only one decree which had thia effect. After thia period, there waa one legal article in 1958 publiahed inside the PRC on 
nationalization (but it said nothing on China's policy before 1979. Cf. Hsiung (1972): 143.
22 Issued by Zhou En-lai as head of the Government Administrative Council, it referred to "the 16 December, 1950 announcement by 
the United Stales (US) government, which froze Chinese public and private assets in the US and forbade all ships registered in the US 
to sail into PRC ports." Cf. Hsiung (1972): 137.
2^ The Korean War was the direct cause for the US government freeze of Chinese assets and the decree by the PRC government
mentioned above. I
24 China's leaders evidently realized that the old foreign re la ted firms could play a valuable role in helping to develop Sino-Western 
trade.
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effect orchestrate that closure. Thompson outlined three steps of what he calls "hostage 
capitalism".25
However, some enterprises were nationalized directly and immediately by the 
Communists in China after 1949 [Cf. Lieberthal (1971)]. Also, some foreign enterprises 
were nationalized due to simple abandonment by the owners [Thompson (1979): 63]. Thus, 
it seems to us that there were "direct" and "indirect" nationalized enterprises during the 
Chinese Liberation era, and the closure of British enterprises was mostly of the indirect type.
(iii) Changing Internal Structure o f Enterprises
Although foreign ownership of firms was legally retained, the internal managerial 
structure of those foreign enterprises under a new socialist government was significantly 
different from that before 1949. During the civil war era, private ownership of property by 
foreigners, as well by Chinese was legally retained. Some Communist leaders argued that the 
nationalized sector of the economy should be allowed to expand only very gradually, thereby 
posing no immediate threat to the economic interests of the private sector.26 This originated 
from the needs of the Communists in 1949 to enlist private businessmen in the reconstruction 
of China [Ecklund (1983): 238], and the Communists' limited ability to manage economic 
enterprises efficiently [Ecklund (1983): 239]. Therefore, the aim was gradually to take over 
the ownership of foreign firms, without directly attacking the power of foreign direct invest­
ment [cf. J.K. Fairbank (1987): 1-47, especially 23-38],
In fact, there were no new company laws or investment enactments during 1949-56. 
Nevertheless, the 1954 Constitution forbade capitalists to engage in unlawful activities which 
injure the public interest, disrupt the social-economic order, or undermine the economic plan
25 The« atcpu were: (1) The People's Government refused to permit the cloeure of industry or business of any value to the netion's 
economy; (2) Chinese regulations ensured by wav of various measures, wage and tax policies for example, that the firms would cease 
to be profit-making; andT (3) Until closure applications were approved by the People's Government, at least one of a firm's senior 
European executives was denied an exit permit to leave China. In order to meet obligations, and in order to even have the possibility 
of having a closure application considered, the firms had to remit funds from abroad to China. In effect, during the nationalization 
process a reverse compensation took place. Cf. Thompson (1979): 63.
^  E.g., Liu Shao-chi, see Lieberthal (1980): 46, and Cf. Lieberthal (1971). Liu ranked second only to Mao Ze-dong in the Party
hierarchy before the Culture Revolution.
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of the State [Article 10(3)]. Moreover, the State maintained, in the public interest, the final 
right to buy, requisition or nationalize the properties [Article 13]. In practice, the transfer of 
ownership developed through both external and internal control. Apart from generating 
substantial funds for investment and development through fines and back taxes, the Three- 
Anti and Five-Anti campaigns greatly enhanced state control over private enterprises through 
new "loans" and "governments contracts" which capitalists found necessary in their 
financially weakened state [Teiwes (1987): 91] (cf. Section (iv) below). Then, a key measure 
was that:
"business with heavy fines to pay would meet their obligations by selling stock to the 
state and creating joint public-private enterprises-a process that result in sending 
state cadres to assume leading positions in the concerned firms." [Teiwes (1987): 91]
Although capitalist ownership was allowed by Article 5 of the Constitution, a highly 
significant movement from private to socialist enterprise still occurred in early 1956 
[Ecklund (1983): 243-245; see also Riskin (1987): 95]. Meanwhile, most British firms in 
China received permissions o f closure from the PRC Government [Thompson (1979): 49-57].
However, even where formal legal ownership was unchanged, the state could send its 
cadres to assume leading positions in some companies through loans and contracts. One 
peremptory element of Chinese legal control during the early 1950s was the curtailment of 
management prerogatives of enterprises. In particular, in 1950, the government decreed that 
dividends must not exceed 8 per cent of invested capital. Later, in 1953, all profits-before- 
taxes of private organizations were subject to state control and were divided into four cate­
gories.27 Also, it was declared illegal for an enterprise to raise wages or to withdraw capital 
funds on its own initiative.
Secondly, control was extended also to labour relations. The Marxist perspective 
emphasizes the principle of workers control within the productive enterprise. Before the end 
of 1956, at least four important labour laws and one Decision of the Government
27 Including:(l) Ihc income tax, at a rate of 30 par cant for profile above 10,000 yuan; (2) enterprise reserve funds, to be used only for 
investment in the firm; (3) enterprise reward funds, to be used only for employee welfare; and,(4) the dividends to shareholders, 
limited to 25 per cent of profits-before-taxes. cf. Eckiund (1983): 239.
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Administrative Council concerning labour in the PRC,28 aggravated the decline of 
management authority. Thus, compared with the pre-1950s period, the average monthly ex­
penses for labour insurance and medicine care, required by this legislation, had risen. 
Moreover, some specific industrial relations obligations were imposed on foreign firms.29 
Together with the strengthening of trade unions,30 and the setting up of Party branches in 
many large and medium enterprises, the management of industrial relations was thus severely 
restricted for the private managers [Teiwes (1987): 91-92.].
Thirdly, after the 1949 revolution, the historic shift in relative power allowed the 
Chinese to collect from British firms—the compensation for what they viewed as a historic 
debt for past exploitation. In terms of both law and policy, the Chinese expressed little 
interest in the favourable reports of the foreign firms' own balance sheet's assets and li­
abilities, and government officials decided in what order these firms' holdings would be 
liquidated [Cf. Thompson (1979): 42].
Finally, in order to limit the expansion of the private sector as a whole, the People's 
Government attempted the drain off as much profit as possible through taxation. G.N. 
Ecklund concluded that, even though favoured industries under private operation were 
granted certain tax concessions, their overall profits were restricted by other features of the 
tax legislation.31 * Hence, a British business executive complained, for instance, "[This] 
(income tax for 1952) is too much to a firm that lost a great deal of money last year; there
28 The 1950 Trad* Union Low o f the PRC; The 1951 Labour Insurance Regulations o f the PRC; 1956 Decision o f the State Council 
concerning the Prevention o f  Danger from Silica Dust in Factories and Mining Enterprises-, The 1956 Regulations on Factory Safety 
and Sanitation-, and, The 1956 Regulations governing Safe Working Conditions in Building Construction and Installation Projects. 
See important Labour Laws and Regulations o f  the PRC (hereinafter cited aa ILLR), pp. 1-71. See alao Fundamental Legal 
Documents o f Communist China (1962) (hereafter cited aa FLDCC).
29 First of all. for seasonal employeea transformed into permanent employees; second, the courts ruled that it was illegal for any Chinese 
worker not to receive his wages or for his or her livelihood to be jeopardized in any way (a British executive was locked up for a 
week for this reason); and the third case was the high discharge fee demanded for closure of firms. Cf. Thompson (1979): 26, 35, 40.
According to Art. 6 of tbs 1950 Trade Union Lew, trade unions in private enterprises had the right to represent workers and staff 
members in conducting negotiations and talks with the owners of these private enterprises, in taking part in the labour-capita list 
consultative conferences and in concluding collective agreements with the owners of these privste enterprises. Cf. ILLR  of the PRC. 
See also. FLDCC, p. 472.
31 Such as: (1) taxing intermediate production processes at the same rale as end-products; (2) applying tax rates to state prices rather than 
to manufacturers' cost or sales prices (which were lower than state prices); (3) careful auditing by the Communist tax bureaux, which 
made tax evasion more difficult than in the past; and, (4) arbitrary methods of assessing taxes which sometimes proved to be
confiscatory, cf. Hcklund (1983): 240-41.
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should be no income [tax] on losses" [Thompson (1979): 45]. However, he was obliged to 
accept that fact and still paid the income tax.
(iv) External Legal Intervention in Business Operation
The political economy and its transformation in the PRC during 1949-56 gradually 
eroded the business operation of foreign direct investment. Firstly, both sale and price 
created the most important areas of difficulties.32 The regime tightened its grip on the private 
sector by asking private firms to do business primarily with the government. In fact, the 
prices of many commodities were controlled by the State during this period, and most private 
firms were under contract to produce or sell for the government at fixed prices [Ecklund
(1983): 241]. The government gave orders to private industry for processing jobs and for the 
manufacture of end-items, and signed contracts with private wholesale and retail firms for 
purchase and sale at fixed prices [Ecklund (1983): 239-40, see also Riskin (1987): 95-100], 
The 1954 Constitution set down a gradual limitation of the market.33 Obviously, the 1954 
Constitution provided the People's Government the base of legal control on sale and price to 
transform the economy.
Secondly, the discrimination, e.g., different taxes analysed, between state enterprise 
and private enterprise destroyed competition in marketing. Very low rates of commodity 
taxes and generous deductions from profits taxes applied only to producers and distributors of 
"necessary commodities", such as iron and steel and machinery, whereas producers of non-es­
sential consumer goods were penalized under the tax regulations. G.N. Ecklund has noted 
that these tax differentials (consisting of commodity tax rates ranging from 3 to 120 per cent 
and deductions from profits taxes of up to 40 per cent) would be sufficient to effect some 
relocation of resources [Ecklund (1983): 240].
32 After the civil war, the People'» Government we» not primarily concerned with the profita of foreign firm» but with production and the 
employment of Chinese workers. However, continued production without sales would only mean spoiling and throwing away the 
stock of companies.
33 A r t6 provided that the state sector is the leading force in the national economy and the material basis on which the Stale carries out 
socialist transformation. Also, Art. 10 pointed out that the policy of the State towards capitalist industry and commerce is to use, 
restrict, and transform them.
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Also, state enterprises were exempt from the profits tax and had access to state 
subsidies when necessary, while cooperatives producing light industrial products were taxed 
under a more favourable rate schedule than private industry and often were granted complete 
tax exemption for several years [Ecklund (1983): 241], Obviously, this discrimination weak­
ened the competitive ability of foreign direct investment. Moreover, the Chinese press 
reported "favourable changes" in business operations after private firms were converted to 
public-private enterprises [Ecklund (1983): 242].
Thirdly, political campaigns during the period, affecting Chinese private firms, also 
limited the operation of foreign enterprises. The Communists desired to impress on 
businessmen the comprehensive range of the new government's authority. To achieve this 
they used a number of techniques early in the decade to extend their control over private 
business [Ecklund (1983): 239]. The "Three-Anti (or, San-Fan)" and the "Five-Anti (or, Wu- 
Fan)" campaigns against the private economic sector and corruption in public administration 
in 1951-52 [Cf. MacFarquhar & Fairbank (1987): Chs. 2 and 3] provided good examples.
However, within the process of the Chinese "indirect" nationalization, it seemed that 
political campaigns could both strengthen the State control of private business and enhance 
the "legitimacy" of the nationalization policy. The "people's" demands and the public interest 
created good conditions for negotiations by the government.34 As a result of political 
campaigns, the Communist leaders had achieved a position where planned economic 
development was genuinely feasible.
Fourthly, after 1949, closure of business in China was not permitted without explicit 
permission from the People's Government. Thus, four steps were necessary for foreign firms 
to achieve closure: application, negotiation, permission and execution. Within these steps, 
foreign firms, not under the usual nationalization, faced three main difficulties: first, the
34 As F.C. Teiwes points ont: "Together with the strengthened trade unions, the setting up o( Psrty branches in msny Isrge snd medium 
enterprises, and especially the vast amounts of information gather during the investigation of capitalist "crimes" [during both Three- 
Anti and Five-Anti campaigns], this now gave the authorities a much greater knowledge of the internal working of the private 
economic sphere [Taiwes (1M7): 91-92.]*
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unprofitability of the firms assets; second, the issues of transfer of business [Cf. Thompson 
(1979): 51]; and, third, redundancy payments required by industrial relations law.3 *5
However, these labour discharge requirements, entailed two characteristics in the 
Chinese nationalizing process. One is that it was the basis for the claim by the Communists, 
for reverse compensation in case of Chinese nationalization-the amounts due to the welfare 
were in a sense reverse compensation. The other is that these demands for discharge 
payments showed that the "informal" factors during the indirect nationalization had inspired 
the formation of the "formal" law, and seemed the origins of two then-new laws36 at the end 
of the period of nationalization in China.37 Through the experience of negotiation for the 
labour discharge requirements, Chinese bureaucracy improved the laws of industrial 
relations.
III.3.B. Compulsory Divestment through Formal Settlement: Case of 
Soviet Investment, 1954-55
The fate of the Soviet investment in China was ended as a case of "compulsory divestment" 
during 1954-55. For a number of reasons China became less involved with Western 
countries and more involved with the USSR after 1949. From 1957, a new era for Sino- 
Westem import-export trade started [Cf. Riskin (1987): 77], To China, the western trade 
remained as a source of certain materials, such as rubber, cotton, and chemicals, and 
especially, of foreign exchange. Consequently, since the 1950s Hong Kong has been the 
crucial market for earning foreign exchange, as well as a useful entrepot for hiding banned 
trade with these capitalist countries.
33 v Some demands, which the Chinese Government required to be accepted before serious discussion of closure could even take place, 
included: (1) one and one-third months of regular wages per year of service as severance pay to Chinese workers; (2) six months 
wages for termination of employment; (3) six months salary as discharge fee owing to closure of business; and, (4) a home-leave 
travel allowance to workers equal to ten per cent of the discharge fee. See Thompson (1979): 40.
^  They were: "The 1937 Provisional Regulations o f the State Council concerning the Retirement o f Workers and Staff Members"
(571116), and "The 1957 Provisional Regulations o f the Stale Council concerning the Granting o f Home Leave to Workers and Staff
Members and Wages to Them on such Leave" (571116). See Important Labour Laws and Regulations (ILLR) o f the PRC, pp. 72-82.
37 It was until 1957 that the last British firm, Patons and Baldwins, was not allowed to cease operations and withdraw from China; 
however, both above provisional regulations were approved on 16th November. 1957 and adopted as amended on 6th February, 1958. 
See Thompson (1979): 60.
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Generally speaking, without Soviet aid China's industrialization programme in the 
1950s would have been considerably slower. After 1949, the PRC's industrialization strategy 
paralleled that of the Soviet Union in the 1930s in its preference for very large-scale, capital- 
intensive manufacturing. The core of the industrialization programme consisted of 156 
Soviet assisted projects, which collectively absorbed about half of total industrial investment 
in the FFYP [Riskin (1987): 74], For these 156 projects, the Soviets supplied design and 
technical assistance, advice on construction and installation, as well as machinery and 
equipment. First of all, for the FFYP as a whole, imports of machinery and equipment were 
the equivalent of 30 percent of total investment [Lardy (1987): 177]; and taking into account 
the 1958-61 period, about 45 percent [Riskin (1987): 74],38 Also, almost all the Soviet- 
assisted plants were in the "producer goods" sector [Lardy (1987): 177], Secondly, the 
availability of Soviet loans enabled China to run a trade deficit with the Soviet Union during 
1950-55, tapping Soviet savings to supplement China's investment at a crucial point in time 
[Riskin (1987): 74]. Finally, technical assistance associated with these plants and their 
effects should be taken into account.39
However, with no visible alternative external resources for development under 
western restrictions on trade, western studies suggested that the relation to the Soviet Union 
could hardly be said to be a form of exploitation of China during this decade [Lardy (1987): 
178-79], At least, there was little evidence that the Soviet exploited China's "dependence" 
by manipulating the terms of exchange of this trade to their own advantage.40
Nonetheless, since the Soviets never provided aid in the form of grants, the Chinese 
had to pay for the goods and assistance they receive, except blueprints, licences, and tech­
nical documents [Riskin (1987): 74; Lardy (1987): 179], Also, only a small share of the
38 Most of these imports were paid for by mesas of correal exports, but sbout 27 perceat were fiasaced with Soviet credits. Gurley 
(1976): 163-64; cited ia R¡skia (1967): 74.
39 It was reported that sbout 10,000 Rusaiaa specislists worked ia China during the decade, prospecting sad surveying geological 
conditions, selecting factory sites, supplying technical data, sad training Chinese personnel. During the same period, in addition to 
those participating in the 1S6 Soviet-aaaisled plants. 28,000 PRC technicians and skilled workers went to tne Soviet Union for 
training. Sec Lardy, CHC (1987): 177-78. The number of these technician cited by Riskin were different. Cf., Riskin (1987): 74.
40 Except that the exchange rale over-valued the Soviet currency, some Soviet goods only reflected higher transport costs, compared to 
European countries, rather than price discrimination. Furthermore, western studies pointed out that Chios's treslmcnt. when con­
trasted with the pattern of Soviet exploitation of the Eastern European stales, appeared even more favourable during the decade. 
Lardy. (1987): 178-79.
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Soviet assisted projects were made by credit, with only two small economic development 
loans from 1949 to 1954 under "relatively short terms".41 As a consequence of the early 
repayment provisions, by 1957 Soviet credits ended (and were not renewed), and China's net 
credit position with the Soviet Union was negative, so China had to maintain a surplus in its 
balance of trade with the Soviet Union. From 1956 to 1965, when the debt was fully repaid,
China's exports to the Soviet Union exceeded its imports [Lippit (1987): 160]. Conversely to 
the 1950-55 period discussed, China, as a net capital exporter [Riskin (1987): 76], was in 
effect financing Soviet development during this critical period. During the 1960s, China did 
not receive foreign aid but was a substantial donor of foreign aid [Lippit (1987): 160-161],
Furthermore, from the establishment o f the Sino-Soviet joint-ventures,42 the Chinese 
were sensitive to the Soviet use of the such joint stock companies as a mechanism of 
exploitation in Eastern Europe [Lardy (1987): 179-180]. Thus, although these joint-ventures 
were established to run for thirty years, by 1954 the PRC government requested that they be 
dissolved [Lardy (1987): 179], It was said that, before then, Mao "apparently felt it was no 
longer appropriate for another country to hold a privileged position within China" [Lardy
(1987): 179]. Fortunately for the Sino-Soviet alliance, the joint-ventures were formally' 
dissolved in January 1955,43 but the Soviets insisted on payment for their capital contribu­
tions, valued at about $400 million US dollars.44 Obviously, this provides another example 
of the transformation of the enterprise in the PRC during its first decade of existence. The 
most important point to make here is that the ending of Soviet shares from those Sino-Soviet 
joint-ventures was happening in the same period as the nationalization of western foreign 
businesses before 1957, and the accomplishment of the practice of the New Democracy~the 
transformation of socialism.
i
41 E.g., the 1950 loan, which conaiated of trade credita dispersed at the rate of $60 million per year during 1951-55, waa to be repaid in 
ten annual incrementa, beginning in 1954. Cf. Lardy (1987): 179.
42 The leading examplea in the early 1950a were the Dairm  shipbuilding company, companiea for the mining and exploitation in 
Sinkiang, and an airline operating between two oountriea. Cf. Lardy (1987): 179- 18Ó.
43 Another information said the year 1954. See Riakin (1987): 74. 9
44 It waa reported, in effect, the Sovieta extended a loan by allowing the Chineae to pay for these transferred assets over a ten-year 
period. C(. Lardy (1987): 180.
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Although the period of Soviet economic aid only lasted for some ten years it had an 
important effect. In fact, despite the relatively short repayment terms mentioned, Soviet aid 
can not be deemed ungenerous.43 First, its effort to transfer design capability has been 
characterized as "unprecedented" in the history of technology transfer [Lardy (1987): 178]. 
Secondly, some historical studies suggested that China appeared to have received the most 
advanced technology available from the Soviet Union, and "in some cases this was the best in 
the world". For instance, in the iron and steel industry the best blast furnaces during the 
1950s in the world [Lardy (1987): 178]. Thirdly, the most powerful faction within the PRC's 
bureaucracy in the 1990s consisted of many Chinese students who studied in the Soviet 
Union during the 1950s (lieu-xu-pai, or faction of those who studied in the Soviet), including 
in 1990-92 the Premier Li Peng, and the General Secretary of the Party, Jiang Je-ming.
However, its chief cost to China was the "dependency" it created in the 1950s, 
although this was denied by Mao. The FFYP itself made clear that the Soviet-assisted 
projects were "the core of our industrial construction plans", and during 1953-57, as pointed 
out by historians, many PRC administrators and specialists dealing with the modern sector 
were too hastily adopting the Soviet model [Teiwes (1987): 96-97],
Later, during 1958-60 China attempted to bring about a "Great Leap Forward" in 
economic output aforementioned, as an alternative to the development strategy from the 
Soviet Union, this de facto decreased the authority of the many Soviet advisers and put some 
new strains into Sino-Soviet relations [Lieberthal (1987): 294]. An abrupt withdrawal of 
Soviet advisers in the summer of 1960 followed. Consequently, this cost of dependency 
created by Soviet aid became clear. Accordingly, to the PRC leaders an adjustment of 
pqlicy was necessary. Thus, a new development strategy and the measures taken to restore 
production in the 1961-65 recovery period which were, generally speaking, successful on the 
eve of the Cultural Revolution [Riskin (1987): 149].
43 For inalaace, this aid, soon after the devastation of the World War II, provided gooda and services badly needed by the Soviet itself. 
The importance of Soviet technical aaaistance and capital gooda, it was emphasized, would be difficult to over-estimate.
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III.4 BUREAUCRACY AS THE KEY OF THE INFORMAL REGULATION BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Basically, the Cultural Revolution was seen by Mao Ze-dong and the radicals of the party 
(Lin Biao and those later called "Gang o f Four", Jiang Qing, Zhang Chung-qiao, Yao Wen- 
yuan, and Wang Hong-wen) as a struggle between two roads, one leading to socialism and 
the other to capitalism. The strategy under their vision included emphasizing equality and 
the mass line, eliminating the three major differences between "town and country", 
"industry and agriculture", and "manual and intellectual work", making serving the people 
rather than personal pecuniary gain the basis for individual action, and so on. In fact, the 
capitalists, landlords, and their like had been virtually eliminated as classes during the 
transformation period, 1949-56, while the Gang of Four still placed overwhelming emphasis 
on class struggle46 as the key issue within the transition to socialism. The Cultural 
Revolution not only exploded beyond the constitutional framework, but also exacerbated the 
weak legal system in the PRC.47
III.4A. The Impact of Administrative Intervention on the Autonomy of
Enterprises
The impacts of the Cultural Revolution have explained the fact that decentralization or 
centralization of economic powers under the regime could not prevent the autonomy and 
management of enterprises from administrative intervention. In 1970 a decentralization of 
economic powers occurred [Cf. Lippit (1987): 205], the reform, like that of the later 1950s, 
not only shifted authority from one administrative level to another, but left the enterprises 
subordinate to the bureaucracy and without significant decision-making autonomy, for in­
stance, the experience of the Beijing Television Picture Tube Plant.48
46 For ¡nuance, peasants and cadrea who resisted those anli malenaliat tendencies in the Cultural Revolution found themselves labelled 
as "capitalist-roaders" and were made the object of struggle [Lippit (1987): 118], although capitalists, during the 1950s, were no 
longer a meaningful social force.
47 In my view: First, moat people had no way to express their opposition, although there was widespread opposition in Chinese society 
to the Gang of Four and the restrictions it imposed on people's freedom. Second, those opponents to the Gang of Four within the top 
levels of the party and government also failed to hall the campaign drive by these radicals. Finally, although with some arguments,
the problems arising from the Cultural Revolution were not so much from the "vision” of Gang of Four as the "means" they were pre- *
pared to sanction to attain their aima, means which often contradicted the very aims themselves.
An example of enterprise management was given by Lippit: "The bureaucratization of production even with administrative control at 
the city level is expressed clearly in the experience of the Beijing Television Picture Tube Plant, which was forced to halt production 
for a total of three years and ten months during the seven-year span from 1973 to 1979 inclusive owing to its inability to rectify the
78
III. Law & Administration under the Communists
Also, the external links of enterprises was also created as another serious problem. 
"Self-reliance", as one of the major principles of Mao's development strategy of the Cultural 
Revolution, could still not exempt enterprises from administrative intervention. With the 
decentralization, self-reliance emphasized local industrialization; and then, inside 
enterprises, the "comprehensive" production unit for each enterprise itself, because of the 
need to self-supply materials and intermediate goods. Accordingly, the large and integrated 
enterprise was broken down into several 'specialized production units' through a division of 
labour.49 * Within this restructuring of production, it is unclear to what degree efficiencies of 
specialization were sacrificed in such enterprises. However, as industry developed and 
factories spread through the countryside, greater extensive division of labour among them 
became desirable. Thus, without demand and supply conditions permitting external 
specialization among the enterprises, institutional or administrative consideration from the 
various authorities inevitably intervened [Cf. Riskin (1987): 218].
More importantly, with no market and only skeletal planning, the only possible way 
to organize production would be through "comprehensive enterprises", not specialized ones. 
Because of capricious and undependable suppliers under external limitation, enterprises 
seeking self-reliance or self-sufficiency had to defensively and rationally insulate and protect 
themselves [cf. Riskin (1987): 219]. Therefore, in the 1970s, the result of self-reliance of 
industrial enterprises meant "a defensive posture of survival and growth" in an undependable 
macro-economic environment [Riskin (1987): 220].
Furthermore, the question of participation30 within enterprises also explained the 
failure of the development strategy of the radicals, a gap between the theory31 and practices.
auality deficiencies of its gists casing suppliers. Refused permission by the economic bureaucracy to manufacture the casing itself, 
the plant was forced to rely on outside suppliers, which were repeatedly re-designated, and it was never able to deal witn these 
suppliers directly....” [Lippit (1987): 205]
49 Cf. Riskin (1987): 218-220, 278-281; Lippit (1987): 202-205.
Since the GLF (1958-60), China practised a system of the "two participations", that is, workers participate in management and 
managers in physical labour (Lippit (1987): 146]. The "lhree-in-one committees” mentioned during the Cultural Revolution appeared 
to represent a successful stuck on the hierarchical structures of authority. However, the lack of job mobility in industry and the 
dependence of the worker upon the evaluation of factory cadres for a variety of essential benefits created a major imbalance in power 
within the enterprise.51 Nevertheless, western reports indicated a "markedly small difference" between the wages of top administrative and technical 
personnel and those of ordinary workers [Cf. Riskin (1987): 251], since egaliurianism was a goal of the Maoist leadership.
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Being the eternal mandarin in China, cadres have access to a variety of privileges—such as 
access to special goods or treatments—that lift their "real incomes" above their formal 
salaries.
After the 1968-69 border tension between China and the Soviet Union, the PRC 
leaders started changing both foreign and domestic policies, with the radical diplomatic 
expansion.52 During the same time, the rehabilitated Deng Xiao-ping took over the daily 
responsibilities of running China's government. In January 1975, the Second Plenum of the 
Tenth Central Committee met, immediately followed by the Fourth National People's 
Congress (NPC), which adopted a new national Constitution (1975) [Kraus/Holz (1982): 
222-223, 235-237], giving workers the right to strike (Article 28). Indeed, the overriding 
theme of that Congress was the need and task for unity after the revolutionary turmoil. 
Moreover, it was at this meeting that Zhou Enlai, the Premier for two and half decades, put 
forward his famous call for "Four Modernizations" by two stages.53 While the leadership 
around Zhou and Deng moved to restore foreign trade and provide access for China to 
advanced technology and capital from abroad, this also added the need of the recovery in 
government and bureaucracy.
Taking the 1960s as a whole with political and economic disruptions, China's foreign 
trade stagnated below the peak level of 1959 [Cf. Riskin (1987): 157], Thus, the early 1970s 
period was not only a turningpoint for the political restoration in the central government, but 
also for foreign contacts and trade.54 After the fall of "the Gang of Four" in 1976, 
dramatically again, the reform-minded leadership in Beijing started to criticize its 
predecessor's unwillingness to make greater use of foreign economic relations [Wang &
52 Beijing, in October 1971, repine* Taiwan aa repreaentalive of China in the United Nations Furthermore, American President R. 
Nixon visited the PRC in February 1972, and signed the famous "Shanghai communique" acknowledging the existence of only one 
China "of which Taiwan was a part". In September of the same year, full Sino-Japaneae diplomatic relations were established.
^  According to Zhou, the PRC has, first, to build "an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system by 
1980”, and second, to "accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and 
n987)*0/§9 *>e^ °re **** CIM* cenlufy" *° ^ a t China's economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world. Cf. Riskin
54 During the second half of the Cultural Revolution decade China became mare trade-dependent, since a rapid growth in trade 
followed the diplomatic ties. Imports were especially concentrated in a few industries, notably "fertilizer, petroleum refining, 
petrochemicals, ferrous metallurgy, and electric power," of which the major potential was to break bottlenecks and to introduce 
particular types of productive capacities needed; cf. Riskin (1987): 207 A  209.
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Perry (1985): 5-6]. This was on the eve of a new era of reform. Gone with the wind the 
Cultural Revolution: with the then unfavourable international relationship and the 
xenophobic tendencies of some Beijing leaders, the disorganization of the 1960s decade 
imposed on the PRC a greater degree of "economic isolation" than was either desirable for 
growth or necessary for "self-reliance".
III.4.B. Formal and Informal Law under Communists before 1979: Change and
Continuity
According to most Chinese scholars, the development of the PRCs socialist legal system can 
be periodised into the following five stages55: (1) the period of establishment (1949-53); (2) 
the period of development (1954-56); (3) the period when legal construction was subject to 
Left interference and ceased to develop (1957-65); (4) the period when the system was 
severely undermined (1966-76); and (5) the period of the restoration and further development 
(1977-present).56 Following the périodisation sketched out, the development of the legal 
system in the PRC can be analysed into the inconsistent stages before 1977.
First, during the period of 1949-53, the Common Programme of the CPPCC served as 
a provisional constitution up to 1954. Followed by the regularization of administration, this 
was a period of internal consolidation and reorganization. Then the dual systems of law—the 
formal law diid the informal one; or, traditionally fa (pseudo-positive law) and li (moral code)
[Cf. Section 1.4] - continued to interact in a complimentary but competitive way. As to the 
former, the Revolutionary government abolished all Nationalist laws and judicial organs at 
the very beginning. In their place, a two trial judicial system-the People's Court and the 
Military Court [Cf. Brady (1982): Ch. 5] - along with the procuracy were gradually 
established. Several important pieces of legislation were passed.57 On the other hand, in the
^  This division seems popularized in both PRC sad Wsalcrn legal articles on the PRC's law. A list of publication using Ibis division 
can be found in H. Chiu (1982): 4. note* 2 and 3.
56 Thia fifth period haa been further divided into two stages: The period from 1977-78, and 1979 to the preaent. See S. Liu. On the
Development^of Legal System of New China and its Historical Experience, No. 3 Zhong-guo Fa-xue (China Jurisprudence), 1984 |
Including the 1950 Marriage Law, the 1950 Land Reform Law, the 1950 Trade Union Law; the 1951 Act for the Punishment o f  
Counter revolutionaries; and, the 1952 Act for Punishment o f Corruption.
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informal form of law, ad hoc people's tribunals which conducted mass trials and dispensed 
revolutionary justice were set up for the widespread national mass campaigns, including the 
Land Reform, Three-Anti, Five-Anti, and the Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries 
Movements (1950-52) [Cf. Brady (1982): Ch. 5; Tsou (1986): Ch. 1],
Secondly, the period of 1954-56 started with the similar copying of the new 1954 
Constitution (from the 1936 USSR Constitution), and the PRC closely modelled its projects 
of industrialization on the Soviet economy (cf. Section III.3.B). This was a further process of 
regularization and codification, which completed the central governmental structure and 
functions. Furthermore, the PRC promulgated the organic laws of the People's Courts and 
the People's Procuratorates in September 1954 [Brady (1982): 120-124]. All this underlined 
the new government's genuine attempt at institutionalization, and the Eighth National 
Congress of the Party in 1956 emphasized the need for further codification and observance of 
law [Cf. Tsou (1986): 64]. Unfortunately, this attempt failed at this tumingpoint of the 
improvement of legal development.
Thirdly, the 1957-65 period saw legal construction subject to left interference and it 
ceased to develop. In the autumn of 1957, Chinese Communists launched an "Anti-Rightist 
Campaign" as a counter-attack against those strong criticisms of the Party and government 
evoked by "the Hundred Flowers Blooming and Contending Movement" of 1956-57 [Brady 
(1982): 136-137]. Then, the process towards a stable legal order since 1949 came to an 
abrupt end. This coincided in time with Mao's decision to abandon the Soviet-modelled 
economy in favour of the development of the GLF (1958-60) discussed above. 
Consequently, the impact on the legal field was a decisive shift from the formal system to 
informal social control, through a steady decline of the importance of the former. In addition, 
the previous growth of the legislative activities was obviously reduced, or stopped, in reality. 
Thus, the major enactments included only the 1957 Regulations for Administration o f 
Security and Punishment and the 1963 Regulations for Protection o f Forests [Zheng (1988): 
«]•
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Fourthly, intended to rectify the bureaucratic establishment and to impose a radical 
vision on society, the Cultural Revolution was initiated and severely undermined the legal 
system during the 1966-76 period. With the impacts of this revolution, the formal legal 
structure received a most serious blow during this period, the denunciations such as those of 
Chairman Liu Shao-qi and his fellows were never developed as formal legal trials through the 
procedures of the constitution or any "formal" laws [Cf. Kraus/Holz (1982): 189]. The dis­
mantling of the so-called "bourgeois" law following Mao's instruction to "Zalan Gong-Jian- 
Fa (to smash police, procuracy, and courts)1', was enforced by the mass line of the Red- 
guards and the imposition of military control by the People's Liberation Army [Cf. Leng 
(1977): 356], As a result, the courts survive the Cultural Revolution, but functioned only 
sparingly.
What emerged from the period was the clear ascendency of the "informal" domain of 
law over the formal one and the complete dominance of the Party and the mass organizations 
in the administration [Cf. G. Young (1978): 56-61]. For instance, the new 1975 Constitution 
(750117), adopted by the Fourth NPC, further declared its stress on political mass 
mobilizations and Party supremacy (Articles 14, 16), and expressly confirmed the leading 
role of the Communist Party over the NPC (Article 16). In particular, the 1975 Constitution 
confirmed the consistent decline of the formal system of law since 1957: abolishing the 
procuracy; deleting the procedural protections of the people's congress deputies from the 
1954 Constitution; and reducing the list of citizens' fundamental rights; and, so on [Cf. Brady 
(1982): 233]. Since the informal system of law reached its high point, those extra-judicial 
institutions led by party committees and the party agents played a dominant role in Chinese 
legal life up to the end of the period.
III.5 INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
During the past four decades, the PRC has faithfully followed a "self-reliant" development • 
strategy relying on the mobilization of internal resources and domestic stimuli for national
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growth. Thus, the PRC disassociated itself completely from the world capitalist system and 
achieved a certain measure of success in providing for the basic needs of the great majority of 
its people. It made considerable progress in reconstructing an articular and autocentric socio­
economic structure and building up a solid scientific and technological base for further 
development. However, some major changes towards "selective" association with the world 
market and in international economic reforms have occurred since the late 1970s, especially 
along with both the Sixth Five-Year Plans (6FYP, 1981-1985) and the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan (7FYP, 1986-90) in the whole 1980s.
III.5.A. Role of the Administration in the Reform Programme 
(i) Re-shifting o f Economic Policies
In adopting a policy of opening to the outside world and promoting economic and 
technological intercourse with foreign countries, China has broken with the outmoded 
ideological bonds that closed the nation to the world and promoted old stereotypes. The 
policy of opening to the outside world is now long-term basic state policy, and has been 
solemnly provided for in the nation's Constitution of 1982.
It is remarkable in contemporary China how the abrupt swings in policy occur, when 
the locus of decision-making authority shifts from one set of leaders to another [Cf., R.H. 
Myers (1980): 245-246; and Perry & Wong (1985): 7-9]. In fact, to elaborate a proposal of 
modernizing China, with even more economic and political reasons, could be dated back 
much earlier, even to 1960s. However, the reform programme started only from 1977. The 
outcome of the ambiguous relations, conflict or cooperation, between the then Premier Hua 
Guofeng and Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping was certainly a boost for the spirit of reform 
[Perry & Wong (1985): 8]. Both Hua and Deng championed the Four Modernization by the 
year 2000; then, the origin of the open policy and a "great leap outwards" movement started. 
An attempt of integration into the international system, symbolized by subsequent 
normalization of relations with both Japan and the United States (see Section III.4.A.),
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facilitated a dramatic change in China's economic strategy. Therefore, genuine reform, said 
by Perry and Wong, "began with the demise of Hua Guofeng's ten-year plan" [Perry & Wong
(1985): 9]. In November 1982, the long awaited Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) was 
announced, and it reaffirmed the leadership's commitment to "readjustment, reform and the 
balanced development of the economy" [Ho & Huenemann (1984): 10]. Following the 
successful result of that Plan, China furthered its Seventh Five-Year plan in 1986-90. Indeed, 
the decade of the 1980s witnessed notable advance in the PRCs policies of reform and the 
open policy.
In 1980, China implemented the open policy in the provinces of Guangdong and 
Fujian and set up the four special economic zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and 
Xiamen. In 1984, a succession of fourteen coastal cities were opened including Tianjin, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou and the Island of Hainan, and in 1985, the delta areas of the 
Yangtze River, Pearl River and South Fujian were further opened, so that a preliminary open 
belt exited along China's coast. More flexible policies and measures have been adopted to 
encourage investment from abroad. More than 100 laws and regulations concerning foreign 
economic affairs were promulgated to protect the rights and interests of foreign investors. 
Preferential treatment such as reducing and remitting taxes have been given to foreign 
investors in SEZs and coastal development areas.
With a population of over one billion, China's large demand for imports and foreign 
exchange shortages are a long-existing contradiction. To increase exports and foreign ex­
change earning is a pressing task and is the focus of further reforms of the foreign trade 
system. The nation is doubling its efforts to bring technological innovations to enterprises 
that produce export commodities and improve the quality of export goods. For those 
international trade practices that help China maintain a balance in foreign exchange or 
increase exports and foreign exchange earnings, all kind of favourable conditions are being 
provided, such as allowing the products of China's trading partners into the Chinese market, 
giving priority to imports of advanced technologies from active trading partners and reducing 
or remitting some tariffs.
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(ii) The Need o f Formalization o f Economic Reform
The key to the implementation of the new economic strategy has been the use of both 
economic and legal stimuli, and both internal and external stimuli. Internally, judging by 
what the Chinese leadership has said about "reform", contradiction of those practices in the 
Cultural Revolution era58 and their corrections will play their arguable parts in the interaction 
of law and bureaucracy.39 Chinese political economy traditionally does not provide any 
guarantee of stabilizing abrupt policy-shifts. Through out the Chinese history of three 
thousand years, there are only successful revolutions and failed reforms. Integration into the 
international economic system will not necessarily resolve China's "underdevelopment" 
before the year 2000.
However, the egalitarianism is another concern, and a new "responsible contractual 
system" has been introduced into Chinese individual and enterprise economies recently 
[Selden (1988): 175-179, 183, & 186-187], As to the regulation of economy, market 
mechanisms has been promoted with the tax and enterprise reforms; enterprise autonomy has 
been guaranteed by the several new laws (Cf. Section VII.3.C.). In short, a changing political 
economy has emerged along with the Chinese project of modernizing China since 1978. 
Moreover, the principles governing the reforms and relevant policy measures are 
implemented at the national, provincial, and enterprise levels.
Given the development in the 1980s, all targets for both the Five-Year Plans indeed 
changed the PRCs financial and economic situation. From the beginning, economic reforms, 
especially in terms of a "contract responsibility system" mentioned, were first conducted in 
the rural areas to bring about a reformation of the previous irrational system and to unleash 
people's initiative and creativity. When the reforms proved successful in the rural areas, they *59
38 That is, how lo correct throe practices primarily concerned by the Chinese was concluded as follows: 1) the tendency towards
"absolute egalitarianism”; 2) the over-dependence on directive planning and administrative control; and, 3) the lack of enterprise I
autonomy. Ho & Hucnemann (1984): 10.
59 if»To a great extent, they will interplay in that continuing debate between the radicals and the conservatives of "productive force- 
productive relations, balanced-imbalanced growth, and directive planning-market mechanisms" from 1950s.
8 6
III. Law & Administration under the Communists
were then introduced to the urban areas. In fact, the bureaucracy with the central power 
assumed the leading role in the economic reformation and its co-ordination.
Following the reform of the rural sectors, several key elements were introduced into 
the PRCs urban reforms. Firstly, to invigorate the productive capability of enterprises, 
especially by delegating decision-making power to enterprise management, so that it can 
respond effectively to market situations [Cf. Selden (1988): 173]. Secondly, to establish a 
planned management system that uses market mechanisms, especially to decentralize the 
planning processes, and strengthen indirect macro-economic control. Thirdly, to restructure 
and readjust the irrational pricing system. Accordingly, the fiscal and monetary system needs 
to be overhauled, particularly the relationship between enterprises with the state regarding 
allocation of enterprise earnings. Also, some macro-economic measures, such as taxation 
and subsidies, must be used effectively to regulate the economy in the planned direction. 
Furthermore, to spur creativity in the production within the ownership structure, this 
cornerstone of the production relations of the society must be reformed and readjusted. The 
major shift is towards the multiple ownership by reducing the number of state-owned 
categories in favour of more collectively owned and privately owned enterprises, or by 
combining them in terms of sharing ownership under the joint ventures [Selden (1988): 153- 
180], Basically, these changes will inject vitality and flexibility into the economic system. 
However, all of these reforms and the measures discussed constitute only the internal stimuli.
Externally, the PRCs open policy will complement the overall economic reforms by 
providing external stimuli. The open policy is concretely manifested in the establishment of 
SEZs and the coastal cities as conduits for imports of advanced technology, management and 
knowledge as well as training of personnel and developing export-oriented industries to 
increase foreign exchange earnings. Within these zones, more liberal ownership and 
administrative structures and special privileges are offered to attract foreign capital.
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III.5.B. Dilemma of "Neo-Authoritarianism": The Attempt to Re-build the
Party-State
In order to formalize to economic reform, there has emerged a conflict of roles between the 
Communist Party and the Government since 1979. The issues are not laid on the strong need 
of an efficient administrative authority, but on the locus of the power of this authority 
between Party and State, and between the central and the local [E.g,. Y.P. Chen (1991): 13- 
15].
The 1982 Constitution reflects the Chinese leadership's concern to create a more 
predictable system better equipped to implement the plans for economic 
modernization.60 For instance, to protect both foreign and private businesses. Meanwhile, 
the changes in the relation between the Party and State in the administration and economic 
reform programme is more directly concerned with foreign investors.
(i) Parly-State and its Legal Basis
Sociologically, Communist China can be described as a Party-State as the case of the 
Taiwan [Cf. Chapters I & II]. However, this raises a question as to whether the Party's in­
tervention dominates the government system within the State, although the role of Party 
is hidden in the texts of the 1982 Constitution. In fact, this Party-State of the PRC continued 
to the 1980s. In 1987, at the 13th National Congress of the CPC, Zhao Ziyang, the then 
Premier and deputy General-Secretary of the Party, addressed the problems of the Party-State 
relationship.61 Although in terms of their political impact, the steps towards the 
democratization of the Party may be of fundamental importance, the separation of Party and 
State, which constitutes the first item in Zhao's seven-point programme for political reform, 
is perhaps even more crucial to the transformation and development of the economy. The 
separation of the party from the state is manifestly indispensable in any attempt to 
introduce patterns of management adapted to the exigencies of a "planned socialist market
60 Before the promulgation of the preaent Constitution of the PRC oa 4th December, 1982, there had been four conalitutiona and a draft 
constitution in Communist Chins sfter 1949: 1) 1949 Common Programme of the Chinese People's Politicsl Consultstive Conference; 
2) 1954 Constitution; 3) Drsft 1970 Constitution; 4) 1975 Constitution; snd 5) 1978 Constitution.
61 Beijing Review (913/November/1987): Document (Centrefold, l-VII), pp. III-VI.
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economy", but there has so for been little successs in achieving this. Nonetheless, since Zhao 
lost his power after the 1989 "Tiananmen Square Accident", he himself has been the target - 
the core of "Neo-Authoritarianism" - criticized by some Communist top officials62 [Y.P. 
Chen (1991): 14-15],
The new 1982 Constitution had already reflected the attempt to free the State from the 
grip of the Party. It seemed to revert to the 1954 drafting approach in which the power of the 
Party was hidden in the Constitution. The only statement referring to the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) in the 1982 Constitution is the Preamble.63 Under the present long-term 
Party-State structure, whether the Party will guide the State's activities to its own satisfaction 
without actually dominating the State remains to be seen. On paper, nonetheless, three 
months before the enactment of the Constitution, a new 1982 Party Statute was adopted by 
the twelfth National Congress of the CPC on 6th September, 1982. In 1986, Regulations o f 
the CPC on the Work o f Grass-root Organizations in Industrial Enterprises Owned by the 
Whole People (860204.1) still shows the basic organization and influence of the Party deep- 
rooted in economic system of State.
The nature of State is stipulated by Article 1 of the 1982 Constitution, which refers to 
"a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship." However, although a number of 
specific provisions have been "formally" introduced to strengthen the State apparatus,64 
"promoting the Party's authority, especially collective authority of the central leadership 
(zhong-yang-ling-dao ji-ti-de-quan-wei)" is said very essential to the Chinese Communists in 
economic construction [Y.P. Chen (1991): 11].
62 Chen Yeb-Pin wee the former Heed of Ihe Orgenizelion Deportment of the Chineec Communiet Pony, end e member of the Control 
Consultative Committee of the Party during 1989-1992. His article of 1991 in "QiuStu" (formerly the Party propaganda, ",Hong-Qi") 
was his speech in Party School of Hu-bei Province. See Y.P. Chen (1991).
63 "Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought”, the 
Chinese people will complete their historical tasks.
^  For example, to increase the powers of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (Articles 58-59, 65-74); to resurrect 
the post of the President (Articles 79-84); to establish s Central Military Commission (Articles 93-94); and, to improve the re­
lationship of the central and local government (Articles 95-111, 112-122).
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(ii) The Re-structuring o f  Government
A l The Issues at the Centre
The National People's Congress (the NPC), according to Article 57 of the 1982 
Constitution, is the "highest organ of State power". It is "composed of deputies elected by 
the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government, 
and by the armed forces. In addition to legislative power, the NPC exercises fifteen functions 
and powers, including the power to amend and to supervise the enforcement of the 
Constitution (Articles 58, 62). Also, the NPC has the power to recall or remove the top 
officials in the central government, including the President and the Premier (Article 63).
The permanent body of the NPC, the Standing Committee (SC-NPC) is elected by its 
parent body to reflect its own composition. According to the Constitution, the SC-NPC 
exercises many more of the NPCs functions when the latter is not in session. For instance, 
under Article 67, it has twenty-one functions and powers. It can amend and supplement 
statutes enacted by the NPC and examine and approve partial amendments to national 
economic plans. Also, it alone enacts laws other than basic laws, interprets laws, and 
supervises the work of the State Council, Central Military Commission, Supreme People's 
Court, and Supreme People's Procuracy. The Constitution also gives SC-NPC power to 
annul laws and decisions of the State Council. It seems that the SC-NPC has grown 
considerably in power and prestige, and now has more practical importance than the NPC 
itself.
The President and the Vice-President (not the Chairman and Vice-Chairman as 
before) are the new names of the ceremonial Heads of State in the 1982 Constitution. A real 
personal power of the President seems to be that of recommending the Premiership of the 
State Council to the NPC (Article 62(5)), because all the other powers of the President are to 
be exercised in pursuance of the decisions of the NPC and its SC-NPC (Article 80).
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Established by Articles 93 and 94, the Central Military Commission (CMC) is a new 
independent institution which has never had any equivalent in any previous constitution and 
seems to control the forces is to avoid the fusion of Army, Party and State as was the case in 
the past decades. The Chairman of the CMC is to be elected by the NPC and is to be 
accountable only to the NPC and its SC-NPC.
The State Council, that is, the Central People's Government, of the PRC is the 
executive body of the highest organ of State power; it is the highest organ of State 
administration (Article 85). The Premier has overall responsibility for the State Council, and 
is one of the most important positions of power in the PRC today. Others are the President, 
the Chair of the SC-NPC, the Chair of CMC and the General Secretary of the Party Central 
Committee.
However, the informal paramount of the Communist Party has still suppressed any 
authorities from the individuals or organizations. For instance, the trend of centralization of 
administrative authority to the reformist group led by Zhao Ziyang has been seriously 
criticized as "Neo-Authoritarianism" — "whose advocates became those advocates of 
anarchism in the turmoil in 1989"-- by a speech in the Party School of Hu-bei Province Party 
Commission [Y.P. Chen (1991): 14-15].
B/ Local Government
People's congresses and people's governments are established in provinces, 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities, municipal districts, 
township, nationality townships and towns. The trend has been for a considerable number of 
powers to be devolved from higher to lower State organs. For example, according to Article 
100, significant new legislative powers have been given to the People's Congresses of 
provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Government. Also, under the recent 
Economic Reform programme, in order to facilitate the carrying out of the new functions and 
responsibilities, new Standing Committees have already been established in all but the lowest 
ties of local people's congresses (Article 96).
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Organs o f self-government are established in autonomous regions, autonomous 
prefectures and autonomous counties. Under Articles 116-122 of the Constitution, the organs 
of self-government in the National Autonomous Areas have likewise been given new 
legislative powers, as well as greater powers of independent administration in spheres such 
as finance and economic construction, education, health, and local public security forces.
In short, as regards the power structure, there have been two trends. The trend has 
been for devolution from the higher to the lower state organs for the economic management; 
but at the same time the party-state still plays a key role in China's further national 
development.
III.5.C. Dilemma Between Formal and Informal Regulation: Reshuffling 
Administration in Economic Planning and Management
In order to complete the goals of the open policy since the late 1970s, the Chinese leadership 
has been concentrating especially on at least two issues within the enforcement of the 
economic strategy. The first issue is obviously the institutional guarantee supported by a 
renewal of law (Cf. III.5.A & B), while the second one is how to tame a bureaucracy that has, 
however, deep-rooted and complicated personal ties with these Chinese top leaders 
themselves. Historically, China has impressed the West by the calm semblance of order and 
organization reflected especially in the Chinese bureaucracy: for example, the calmness of 
the official explanation of the recent "Tiananmen Square Massacre" on 4th June, 1989. 
However, behind the 'formal' facade presented to the foreigner, there always have been other 
informal systems and organizations controlling the society. There is always a question for 
each other when western tycoon of multinationals meets Chinese bureaucracy: How far has 
the counter side perfected the art of presenting order on paper; and how little does reality bear 
resemblance to the system the counter side officially promulgates?
In reality, the PRC's open policy in respect of foreign investment may be enhanced or 
weakened by the actions and attitudes of government officials at all levels. Both foreign 
investors and Chinese government officials complain about the bureaucracy in China and
92
III. Law & Administration under the Communists
regard it as one of the major problems foreign investors have to encounter. It is no surprise 
that, when a foreign investor makes a transaction, he has to go through several complicated 
and often repetitive procedures65 6which are the main theme in Chapters V and VII.
Therefore, in addition to improving the efficiency of administration, the re­
organization of governmental structure is necessary, in the view of Chinese leaders 
themselves, especially in the field of economic affairs. Drafted and implemented since April 
of 1988 when the NPC was held, the re-organization of the Chinese government was 
reportedly completed by July in the same year. Twelve former ministries and commissions 
under the State Council were closed or merged at that time into 9 new ministries and 
commissions. This reshuffle of government structure, according to sources from the State 
Council, is one of the major steps of the entire reform programme of China's political 
structure [China Economic News (2918188)].**
China's enthusiasm for reshuffling its ministries and commissions demonstrates the 
government's determination to simplify the administrative structure and to grant greater au­
tonomy to departments at lower administrative levels, particularly in the areas of economic 
affairs. Furthermore, in addition to structural changes, there are also functional changes for 
the branches of the State Council which are to be the essence of the entire programme. The 
decision-makers even disclosed that "the success of the ongoing reform will depend on how 
well and smoothly the governmental functions are transformed".
Another notable feature of this structural reform is the separation o f commercial 
functions from the government departments [China Economic News (15/8/88)]. Under the 
official planning system the administrative intervention in investment, projects, materials
65 Eve« if the project in question is to be located ia Ike capital city of a province, the foreign inventor concerned muet first seek approvsl 
from the city government and then the provincial government, and sometime« back and forth. Cf. Section VI.4.
66 Of the 12 ministries and commissions which were deleted, 10 dealt with the State's economic afTairs, planning and management.
They were: 1. the State Plantains Commission (SPC); 2. State Economic Planning Commission; 3. Ministry of Coal Industry; 4.
Ministry of Petroleum Industry; 5. Ministry of Nuclear Industry; 6. Ministry of Aeronautics Industry; 7. Ministry of Astronautics; 8.
Ministry of Water Resources Sl Electric Power. 9. Sute Commission for Machine-building Industry; and, 10. Ministry of Electronics 
Industry. In turn, 8 out the 9 newly esublished government departments take over the administrative functions of the 12 previous |
ministries and commissions in respect of economic aspecu. These 8 economic agencies, in line with the unchanged three, are: 1.
Sute Planning Conunission (new); 2. Ministry of Materials; 3. Ministry of Energy; 4. Ministry of Construction; 5. Ministry of 
Aeronautics Industries; 6. Ministry of Astronautics Industries; 7. Ministry of Machine-building; and, 8. Ministry of Electronics 
Industries. Cf. China Economic News (29/08/88).
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supply and enterprises will "be modified or even minimized". The reform of government 
functions, it is also emphasized, is not only designed for new ministries and commissions but 
also for existing ones. Even lower to the level of the counties and villages, "both economic 
and technical units" are proposed to separate from the administrative domain, and to transfer 
into purely economic entities. A reform programme in Chang-yi County in Shandong 
Province from 1984 has been reported as a successful case and praised by Premier Li Peng in 
February 1992 [JJRB (Economic Daily) (11/2/92): 1]. However, what this administrative 
structural reshuffling will achieve remains to be seen.
III.6 CONCLUSIONS
Similar to that under the Nationalist regime, law under the Communist regime has not served 
the function of an autonomous force for shaping the social order. Especially, the part of 
informal law in most cases translates the guiding principles of both governing Parties into the 
administrative framework through inter-related practices between Party leaders and State 
officials, and plays a more active role than formal law in political and economic reality.
In the 1950s, in addition to the difference between 'frozen' American assets and 
British informally-nationalized concerns, China seemed to adopted a discriminatory policy of 
nationalization, because some joint-venture enterprises under 'formal' agreements with the 
Soviet Union were expanding their operations;67 and later the transfer of the Soviet shares of 
these joint-ventures to Chinese hands were through a governmental 'formal settlement' much 
different from those with British businesses [Lardy (1987): 179-180]. However, in Chinese 
view, this would not be discrimination in the application of nationalization, since the 
nationalization of British firms rose from hostility to Imperialism [Cf. Nakajima (1987)]. 
Moreover, it would be a successful and flexible strategy of socialist transformation with a 
combination of both informal and formal political-economic and legal techniques. *1980
67 Cf. T.O. kawiki (1980), "Choice of Technology end Technological Innovation in China'a Economic Development", in Dernberger
(1980) (ed ), pp. 191-229. eepccially "Soviet Aaanied Projecta", pp. 200-204.
94
III. Law & Administration under the Communists
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, although a formalization of economic 
institutions has been developed, the importance of informal law has not accordingly declined. 
Any "neo" authoritarianism cannot exist within the executive institutions in government, 
either the State Council or the positive statutory framework, once it challenges the 
Communist Party as the "informal but final" locus of powers of decision-makings. Recent 
developments since 1979 in the interaction between law and administration, between State 
and Party, and between the formal law and informal norms, can be understood in Professor 
H. von Senger's analysis:
"A substantial change in the paramount importance of the Party norms is not apparent 
at present, since the contemplated withdrawal of the Party from the domain of execu­
tive work, especially in the governmental sphere, is, after all, coupled with renewed 
stress on the task of the supervision and implementation of Party norms which has 
recently been regarded as the Party's essential task, [von Senger (1985): 207]."
Thus, even giving up the stipulation - "Citizens must support the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China" -- in Article 56 of the 1978 Constitution, Preamble of the 1982 
Constitution has set up the informal paramountcy for all laws, administrations, and activities 
for the four modernizations. That is, "under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China", which is the very code of conduct for economic reform in the PRC, both the starting 
point and the end.
I
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CHAPTER IV. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE 
REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN: PROTECTIONISM 
UNDER ADMINISTRATION
IV.l INTRODUCTION
TAIWAN is at a turning point in its unique path of development. It was only in 1987 that the 
severely criticized martial law1 was replaced by a new 1987 National Security Law (870623). 
By then, the ROC on Taiwan has already scored well on all the usual tests of development: 
sustained growth and industrialization in the economic realm since the 1950s; "growth and 
equity", i.e., an improved standard of living and decreased income inequality over the 1960s 
and the 1970s; the emergence of a middle-class in the social sphere in the early 1980s; and 
gradual democratization and effective political liberalization during the 1980s. The year of 
1992 has been termed as "a year of amendment of the Constitution", which will be the main 
task for the Nationalist government.
The main theme of this chapter - protectionism under administrative pragmatism - 
will be based on the case of control of foreign investment in Taiwan. In this focus, we shall 
analyse the contradictions caused by the actively informal regulation between the statutory 
framework, administrative measures, and business practice. For the four decades since 1949, 
the regulation of foreign investment in Taiwan can be examined through the following 
stages: the formal regulatory framework and the informal domains of foreign investment at 
the initial stage; the expansion of informal sector by using the formal statutes to encourage, 
and to control as well, both domestic and foreign investments; and, further expansion of 
informal sector that has, after liberalizing the rigid statutory framework of foreign 
investment, produced certain rigidities from overgrown administrative interventions. As a 
fact, from the external to the internal economic relation, with its flexibility the informal 
regulation penetrates the whole system of the Nationalist political-economy. Accordingly,
1 The Nationalist (Guo-Ming-Dang. GMD, or KMT Patty mentioned in the earlier chaptera) government's rule waa for many year» 
legitimated by 1934 martial law (341129), which had been re-promulgated during the Chinese civil war (1946-49) to modify the 1946 
Constitution ((461225); enacted on 25 Dec., 1946; promulgated on 1 Jan., 1947; and effective on 25 Dec., 1947). To date, because of 
legitimacy of the Nationalist government, the 1946 Constitution has never been amended. However, from 10 May, 1948 on, its 
effectiveness was limited by Temporary Provisions for the Duration o f Mobilization to Suppress the Rebellion (more detail below) for 
more than four decades.
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the formal regulatory framework has been in nature flexible in the interaction between law, 
administration and business practices.
IV.2 FORMAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND THE INFORMAL DOMAINS
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
As a whole, the political-economy and the legal environment of business in Taiwan can be
termed as "Party-State Capitalism"2 under the informal dominance of the Nationalists. An
essential technique to extend Party's control is through those "unofficial" and "semi-official"
channels within any existing gaps between formal and informal regulation. Thus, this study
will analyse the reasons why the protectionism behind administration has been the major
obstacle to foreign investment, and why informal sector in "Party-State Capitalism" has
obstructed the formal mechanisms to promote and protect foreign investment in Taiwan.
IV.2.A. "Party-State Capitalism": Penetration of Informal Sector in Formal Regulatory
Framework
Indeed, behind all formal frameworks, the GMD's Party-State Capitalism can be analysed 
from four mechanistic levels3 [Cf. S.M.S. Chen el al (1991): 23-24]. Through the process of 
legalization and the propaganda of "Party-State Unity (Dang-guo-yi-ti)'\ the majority of 
benefits and profits from economic development in Taiwan have been transferred from the 
State into the Party [S.M.S. Chen et al (1991): 24]. Under the Party-State structure, public 
enterprise provides the first and legal channel for the GMD to control and dominate the 
economy. Secondly, in the field of private economy, two channels have been used by the 
GMD: those "hiding" public enterprises under the covers of private ownership (yin-chang-xin
gong-ying-shih-yeh); and the Party-owned enterprises (Guo-min-dang dang-yin-shih-yeh)
\
[S.M.S. Chen et al (1991): 27-86; Chs. I and II]. Shih-Meng S. Chen and other five
^ According to several professors in Taiwan, the "Three-People Principle" economic system under the Nationalism (the KMT)
is never purely "capitalism”, "planned economy", or "mixed economy". Hie best way to describe it. in their views, is the "KMT-State 
Capitalism". S.M.S. Chen e ta l(  1991): 22-25.
Including: (1) the overcoat is "free economy” which permits market operations snd private economic activities, and covers those 
selective interventions under governmental control; (2) the underwear is "capitalism", by which the OMD has allied itaelf with both *
domestic and foreign capitalists to suppress the weaker groups; (3) the body is "statists” which makes the State to assume the role of 
economic giant not only to control the private economy but also to develop the major economic activities through the public 
enterprises; and (4) the heart is the "totalitarianism" under one-party dictatorship, which takes both market privileges, baaed on 
monopolies by legal mechanisms, and business organizations, based on special economic excuses, as the venides of Party-State 
ruling.
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professors have called these two enterprises as "^Mast-public" enterprises, because of their 
political-economic privileged status in reality.
In addition, three informal channels of those "hiding" public enterprises have been 
used by the GMD to control the lion's share of the whole economy of Taiwan under the 
covers of "false private-ownership, true State-ownership" (jia-min-yin, jen-guo-yin) [S.M.S. 
Chen el al (1991): 64-73]:
(1) Companies that are invested and controlled by the governmental agencies at 
different levels, although the official share-holding remains less than 50%: such as 
Chinese Paper-pulp (Taipei) Co. (44.38%); He-Di Chemical Co. (45%); Overseas 
(Hai-wai) Forestry Industry Co. (47.62 %); Taiwan Television Co. (TTC) (48.95%); 
and, Taiwan Mi-Han-Na Co. (49%) [Cf. S.M.S. Chen et al (1991): 77];
(2) Companies that are "re-invested" by the State enterprises and agencies, the official 
share-holding has thus reached more than 50%: such as Ju-Bai-Ear Fertilizer Co. 
(88.34%); United-Lands (Lian-he-da-di) Construction Consultancy Co. (62.5%); 
Chinese Stocks & Financial Co. (58.02%); and Jiao-yun-tung (Communication) Hire 
Co. (50%) [Ibid. (1991): 78]; and,
(3) Companies that are invested by State Departments, the financial corporate bodies 
and the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, the total share-holding has 
reached more than 50%: such as Chinese Television Station Co. (CTS) (66.32%); 
Chung-Mei-He Co. (66.03%); International Information & Communication Co. 
(owned by two official-based television companies (TTC and CTS) and the 
Nationalists-owned television company- China Television Co. (CTC); China Carbide 
Chemical Co. (70%); China Steel Framework Co. (73.56%); United-Asian Electrical 
Manufacturing Co. (54.41%); Taiwan Petro-chemical Co. (56.82%); Ta-tung 
Construction Management Co. (83.3%); Tao-Yuan Air-Service Co. (100%); and, 
International Trade Building of World Trade Centre (100%) [Ibid. (1991): 79].
What is the size of both public and quasi-public enterprises in Taiwan's economy? 
Answering this question will provide people a better understanding of interaction between 
formal and informal sectors of law, economy, and political structure in Taiwan. According to 
the formal law,4 only these enterprises in which one "individual" public entity controls more 
than 50% shares can be deemed as "public enterprises". Thus, in 1988 the total production of 
26 State enterprises and 34 Provincial enterprises, listed under this strict and narrow 
definition, occupied already 15% of Gross National Production (GNP); and 25%, if their *19
I
Article 2(iv) of the 1933 Statute for Privatisation o f Public Enterprises (of the ROC); a Chinese text of both the 1953 Statute and
1991 Proposal of Amendment of Statute can be found in S.M.S. Chen el al (1991): 258-264.
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value of assets and expenditure included5 * [Chen et al (1991): 89]. However, a more 
experimental data shows that if the business "indirectly controlled" by the Party-State and 
"quasi-public enterprises" were included, the production under "official" control shall be 
beyond 30% of GNP of Taiwan [Chen et al (1991): 90]. Moreover, after a careful 
comparison with public sectors of most countries, six professors of the liberal "Taipei Society 
(Chen-Sher)" have concluded that:
"The economic structure of Taiwan, among the free-market-economy countries, has
its own unique characteristic, that is, it is far different from the free-market-economy!
[Chen et al (1991): 94-95]"
Unavoidably, foreign investment can only channelled into Taiwan where informal 
sector has been playing a rather active role from internal to external economic relation. 
Being analysed in Chapter II, as a consequence of changes in the international political 
environment, the ROC's foreign policy following the UN expulsion has demonstrated 
flexibility and adjustment. Instead of relying on the United States totally for national security 
and survival, the ROC has developed its own foreign policy strategy: a strategy of "economy- 
and trade-first diplomacy". This method placed emphasis on Taiwan’s international 
economic, trade and other "unofficial" contacts rather than on the traditional diplomacy of 
political and/or official interactions.5 Taiwan set up an informal international trade network 
of interdependence with both the developed and developing world, to compensate for its lack 
of formal legal status in the international community.7
However, alongside this flexibility there runs a continued unremitting ideological 
opposition to the Chinese Communists.8 In order to resist a communist takeover and consoli­
Al the same time, the lands controlled by governments at the various levels occupied 68.4% of total lands in Taiwan; the formation of 
capital, beyond 40%. In 1989, the government and its agencies employed 940,000 people, occupied 11.4% of total labour power, 
lv.3% of tne total employees in Taiwan.
The motive behind the economic strategy is to use economic power and trade to make friends in order to back up the ROCs 
international and diplomatic position. In this regard, the economic strategy is a useful foreign policy instrument for the ROC.
Consequently, the ROC's international trade and economic exchanges became the essential features of its external relations, replacing, 
to a substantial degree, the traditional form of diplomacy. Cf., Financial Timas (London, cited as FTX) (21 Jan., 88), Taiwan to 
allow direct trade with E. Europe'; Daily Telegraph (London, cited as DT.L) (02, Mar., 88), Taiwan eases ban on trade with Peking'; 
FT.L, (12 Mar., 88V Taiwan to allow imports from mainland China'. Helped by the emergence of growing international interdepen­
dence since mid-1960s, Taiwan's economic strategy has proved to be meritorious.
In operating an 'economic development first' foreign policy strategy, the prime motivation is to maximize Taiwan's external contacts 
and to further the survival of a non-communist Taiwan. However, the 'Three-Nos' policy of no contact, no negotiation, no comprise 
will continue to be ROC's basic policy towards the PRC. President LEE expressed the firm intention of the Taiwan government not 
to be officially involved in any type of contact with the mainland. See President Press Conference (22/Feb/88).
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date the Nationalists' legitimacy, the ROC tried, in addition to an internal programme of 
political reform9 and cabinet change,10 to demonstrate to the world its vitality through its 
economic performance both at home and abroad, and so launched a vigorous campaign to 
compete with the mainland in international markets. The idea was to widen the economic 
gap between the two entities so that incorporation would be less beneficial for Beijing. The 
latter would either have to maintain Taiwan's tie with the world economy-meaning the 
acceptance of capitalism—or engineer the destruction of Taiwan's economic progress and 
relocate a sizable portion of the population.11 Another related reason for the adoption of the 
economic strategy was that, according to the Nationalists, economic relations would be more 
difficult for the PRC to interfere with. Being private in orientation, the economic strategy 
would be less vulnerable to official Communist Chinese intervention.
To facilitate the implementation of its economic strategy, the Nationalist government 
has set up several semi-official institutes, such as the China External Trade Development 
Council (CETDC); the Far East Trade Service, Inc.-,12 and the Euro-Asia Trade Organization 
(EATO).li All these trade institutions, combining official administration and private orien­
tation, work hand in hand with those of foreign affairs.
That is, to increase the level of political participation by the local Taiwanese in the political system. This process of "Taiwanization 
(localization)" was adopted by the late president Chiang Ching-Kuo. See Gold (1986): 111-121.
^  This was intended to absorb intelligent, well-educated and relatively young experts into top party and governmental positions 
formerly dominated by very old KMT members. Ibid..
Moreover, the Nationalist leaders believed that a totally different economic system, with emphasis on advanced technology and 
sophisticated industry, would make the Communist rivals'plan to integrate Taiwan more difficult.
^  The ROC established, in Julv 1970, the China External Trade Development Council (CETDC), and later in 1971, a supplementary 
institution, the Far East Trade Service, Inc. (FETS). Nominally, the CETDC is said to be a non-profit-making private organization 
which has the purpose of promoting sales or commodities made in Taiwan and of developing the two-way trade of the ROC. The 
Chirm Yearbook (i960) (Taipei): 332.
Similarly, to promote Taiwan's substantive trade relations with European countries, another non-profit-making private organization, 
the Euro-Asia Trade Organization (EATO), was set up in November 1975. Its purpose is to provide a wide range of free services for 
the development of Taiwan's trade with Europe. Cf. EACD ed., Euro-Asia Trade Organization (1981: Taipei), p.2. In addition to the 
organization, unofficial trade consultations between Taiwan and the EEC have been held three times during 1982-87. Sec Board of 
Foreign Trade (of Ministry of Economic Affairs (MoEA)) ed.. Taiwan Eyas Europe: A Trading Partner o f  Growing Important in the 
Next Decode (Nov., 1987).
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IV.2.B THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND INFORMAL DOMAINS OF 
THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
As we will discuss below, an argument of the sector-directing policy in stimulating 
foreign investment in Taiwan (Cf. Sections IV.3. and IV.4.) has failed to explain how far 
foreign investment was adequately integrated with the overall economy and why Taiwan, 
despite the famous "Taiwan Miracle", is still lacking a powerful position in terms of global 
technological and marketing dominance. Also, more importantly, it is indeed difficult for 
one to establish the real price Taiwan has paid and/or will pay for its past successful "control" 
of the foreign investment. For instance, the problem of efficiency in many public enterprises 
was the origin of the developing privatisation programme. Furthermore, infant industries, 
such as automobile assembly and insurance, have not developed soundly after the four 
decades of protectionism. Comparatively, the regulation of foreign investment has provided 
not only "promotive" but also "limitative" effects within the interaction among the Nationalist 
regime, domestic and foreign enterprises.
(i) The Legal Framework o f  Foreign Investment
The corporation law in Taiwan permits foreign investors to wholly-own a Taiwanese 
company. Hence, this opens a question that foreign investors can highly use the technology 
without any obligation to transfer it into local economy. Both forming a new entity14 and 
purchasing an existing one are permitted. The 1929 Company Law o f the ROC  (291226) is a 
comprehensive piece of legislation originally modelled on Continental commercial codes 
before the war and gradually revised to follow Anglo-American ones within Taiwanese local
context [Ma (1985): 17]. The Law recognises four types of business organisations [Article
\
2], including: (a) companies-limited-by-shares;15 (b) unlimited companies;16 (c) limited
** Capitalisation of technology only by an incorporator may be one of the major reason! for forming a new entity rather than acquiring 
an existing one. Cf. Article 156 of the 1929 Company Law, and "Measures for tha Use o f Patent Rights and Technical Know-how as 
Equity Investment" (680603).
15 The company must have at least seven incorporators, more than half of whom must be domiciled in the ROC; see Articles 128-356, 
the 1929 Company Law.
16 The companies which resemble partnerships in that their shareholders have unlimited joint and several liability for the debts of what 
are however separate legal entities. Cf. Articles 40-97, the 1929 C o m p ly  Lew.
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companies;17 and, (d) companies with shareholders of unlimited and limited liability (or, the 
mixed companies).18 In the legal view, any form could be taken by foreign investors. 
However, none of these forms except companies-limited-by-shares have attracted significant 
interest from foreign investors [F.S.L. Wang (1985): 522], primarily because they do not fall 
within the definition of a 'Productive Enterprise' under the 1960 SE1 (Article 3), as detailed 
below.
In fact, in order to benefit from the status of 'foreign investment approved under the 
relevant statutes, foreign investors must apply to the Investment Commission (IC) for ap­
proval prior to acquiring shares of the existing companies.19 This administration of approval 
explains the importance of policy in the interaction between law and administration of 
foreign investment. There is no special legislation governing foreign investment in existing 
enterprises, except some restriction of sectors, such as inland transportation, public 
utilities and certain defense-related industries.20 With regards to the requirement of "at 
least seven" incorporators who may be nominal only in the company-limited-by-shares, this 
flexibility could be favoured by foreign investors in case of business control (despite that 
several restrictions waived by authorities).
These restrictions under the 1929 Company Law are: (a) domicile of the 
incorporators;21 (b) shares transfer;22 (c) citizenship and domicile of management;23 (d)
17 The comp*me* which are akin to amall cloacly-held corporation*. Cf. Article* 98-113, the 1929 Company Lam.
18 Cf. Article* 114-127, the 1929 Company Law. The companies readable limited partnerships.
19 Cf. Articles 4(2) and 8. The 19U SIFN, Articles 4(2) and 7. the 19SS SIOC.
\
However, restrictions on foreign investments in 'inland transportation' are found in law, while the other sectoral restrictions are not 
officially published, but the policy under the Investment Commission. Cf. Article 35, Hie 1971 Public Highways Law (710201), 
, amended on 23rd January, 1984.
^  That is, not fewer than half of the incorporators of a company-limited-by-shares should be domiciled within Taiwan (Article 128,
1929 Company Law).
22 Under the Law, for at least one year following incorporation, the incorporators may not transfer their shares (Article 163, 1929 I
Company Law).
23 That is, both the chairman and the vice-chairman must be Chinese citizens who must, as well as at least half of managing directors of 
the company, be domiciled within Taiwan (Article 208, 1929 Company Law).
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domicile of auditing-supervisore;24 and, (e) shareholder diversifications and financial 
reporting.25 However, these requirements may be waived by the Investment Commission, in 
case that an application for waiver is made pursuant to the provisions of the Statutes for 
foreign investments. For instance, most foreign invested companies are legally permitted 
[P.S.P. Hsu (1985): 277-278], and accordingly the wholly foreign-owned here. These are 
major difference26 between the investment through the Company Law and through the special 
Statutes relevant, i.e., the 1954 SIFN, the 1955 SIOC, and the 1960 SEI.
(ii) The Forms of Foreign Investment, Their Legal Status and Informal Domains
A very flexible framework of forms of foreign investment has been provided by the 
Nationalist government. Thus, foreign investors are permitted to acquire shares in an 
existing domestic company, or to form a new company in Taiwan, or to register a branch 
office of their foreign corporation.
(i).(a) Jo in t Ventures and the Dominance o f Informal Practice
In practice, most foreign investment in Taiwan prefers the form of joint venture 
between foreign and domestic participants, because the government clearly encourages 
investment involving local partners. However, this preference is not expressed in legislation 
but rather is apparent from the pattern of the Investment Commission (IC) approvals of 
foreign investment applications: nearly three quarters of Foreign-Investment-Approved 
enterprises on Taiwan are joint ventures having local participation.27 In contrast to the PRC, 
in Taiwan there is no specific legislation to deal with joint ventures. Thus, joint ventures not
24 The Lew require« thel el leeet one of the elected euditinu-eupcrvieon (or, independent nuditon iniide compeny) must be domiciled 
within Taiwan (Article 216, 1929 Company Law).
25 Under the Company Law, a company with paid-in capital of New Taiwan Dollar* $200 (N.T.S) million or more must apply to offer its 
shares to the public and comply with certain requirements regarding shareholder diversifications and financial reporting prescribed by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (Article 156, 1929 Company Law). Also see, Articles 22-1, 28-1 and 36 of the 1968 Law of 
Securities Transfer (680430), amended on 29 January, 1988.
In addition, without the application through administration under these Statutes, foreign investors cannot enjoy the visa of multiple 
entrances, and overseas Chinese cannot benefit from the exemption of tax of heritage on the investment. Cf. 1989 Manual (Taiwan)-. 
190-191.
27 P S P. Hsu, K. Li, and F.S.L. Wang. Joint Ventures in the ROC: A Study in International Business Cooperation, in Ma (1985): 551*
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only can adopt any of the four types of corporate-structure recognized by the 1929 Company 
Law, but also take the form of a contractual joint venture or simple partnership. Even 
without contributing capital, capitalization of technology by foreign partners is permitted 
accordingly.
Due to the encouragement based on the forms of business, it is likely that joint 
ventures involving foreign investment are frequently organized as "companies-limited-by- 
shares (yuo-shieng gu-feng kong-si)"28 in order to make the enterprise eligible for incentives 
under the 1960 SEI or the Science-based Industrial Park Statute (790727) (the 1979 SIP 
Statute). Accordingly, the exemption from the shareholder and director nationality and 
domicile requirements available to a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary is also available to a 
joint venture in which 45 percent or more of the enterprise is owned by foreign investors, 
subject to approval by the Investment Commission of an application made under the 1954 
SIFN (540714). The particular considerations of influencing foreign investors to make use of 
a "company-limited-by-shares" to foreign investors will be analysed as below.
With regards to "companies-limited-by-shares", the 1929 Company Law requires "at 
least seven" incorporators and the company must maintain at least that number of 
shareholders. In fact, the social practice may be benefited from this legal text: because there 
is no individual minimum shareholding required, six of the seven shareholders may be 
nominal only.29 For instance, when Tainan Textile Corporation was set up, as the first 
company-limited-by-shares of the Tainan Corporate Group, in March 1955, 40% of shares 
was owned by Huo Yu-li personally, while his sons, sons-in-law and himself assumed 5 of 13 
directors of the company [K. Hsieh (1991): 278]. This flexibility could be favoured by 
foreign investors, although several restrictions on foreign involvement can be found but be 
waived by authorities in charge of approval.
28 Cf, An 3(l) of the 1960SEI, and A/t.3 of the ¡990 SUt.
*9 1>e popular form of "family microns* ' can be explained here: to have the nominee iharcholdcre, the member! of family or local
kinship, in a family-formed or local-kinship-formed company. For instance, several companies of the Tainan corporate group (Tainan 
Gang); cf. K. Hsieh (1991): 278-292. Similarly, foreign investors can ask the nominee shareholders sign declarations of trust 
assigning their shares back to their foreign nominators. Although this could cause legal uncertainties, but other economic and 
technical powers can guarantee this widespread practice for the foreign investors.
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Informal Domain I: The Significance o f 'Contractual' Joint Ventures in 
Business Practice
The form of contractual joint venture contract itself provides a good example for 
discussing the interaction between law and administration of business. First, under the 
formal law, where a foreign corporation is a party to any contract signed within Taiwan, it 
must comply with the 1929 Company Law provisions requiring registration of foreign 
companies in administration of the MoEA. However, registration is not necessary, when the 
foreign company is not itself engaging in business in Taiwan.30
. Secondly, with the Company Law as a general base for private businesses in Taiwan, 
contract can be developed in a flexible framework. Accordingly, entrance of a 'package' for­
eign investment into comprehensive joint venture contracts can be a business practice. 
Furthermore, contracts may be written in a foreign language and be subject to a choice of 
foreign governing law.31
Another business practice carried out through contract suggests the prevalence of the 
informal law. Formally, the inclusion of restrictions on share-transfers in the articles o f 
incorporation of a Taiwanese company is prohibited by the 1929 Company Law (Article 
163). However, 'shareholder agreements', including such restrictions, are permissible in busi­
ness practice.32 Finally, the selection of a joint venture partner is left to the foreign 
participant from the formal law. Since several governmental agencies can assist in match­
making, the interest o f the key administrative officials assumes its importance. For instance, 
in the case of "McDonnell Douglas—Taiwan Aerospace Corporation" joint venture, the role 
of the top officials of MoEA have been repeatedly questioned in 1991-92.33 * As pointed out
30 Under the Article 40 of (be 1933 Civil Procedure Law (350201) (Amended on 25 April, 19S6), even an unrecognised foreign 
corporation may litigate to enforce a contract.
** Generally, these contracts will be enforceable in the local courts first, while certain clauses thereof, such as those dealing with share-
transfer and non-competition, may be controversial under private international law. I
32 Even under the 1929 Civil Law (290523) (amended on 1 July, 1982), these agreements are not capable of specific performance, and 
the only remedy for breach is to seek damages, since Article z27 provides that only in certain cases is it possible to compel a seller to 
perform a contract of sale.
33 In the disputes of "McDonnell Doglas - Taiwan Aerospace Corporation” case, the Minister of Economic Affairs has been questioned
and forced to withdraw the sharea of governmental investment in the joint venture; see Independent Weekly (Taipei, 06/12/91): 2;
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by S.M.S. Chen and other five professors, Taiwan Aerospace Corporation is invested and 
controlled by the Nationalist Party [Chen et al (1991): 80], Therefore, both in law** and in 
practice, a small local partner has difficulties to participate in a major project.
Informal Domain II: Company Control through Private Economic Practice
The Nationalist government influences the policies of joint venture companies mainly 
through policy-guidance rather than law, through local participation rather than administra­
tive intervention. First, in addition that control follows ownership on a one-share one-vote 
basis, the Company Law provides an exception of the existence of 'preferred-shares' and 
'differentiation in voting power' (Articles 157 and 179). From the view of business, in order 
to maintain control of a joint venture, foreign participants have normally taken a majority 
equity position, not through the issue of preferred-shares.15 In this regard, not only the 
formal law remains silent, the administrative authorities yield to conditions of private 
arrangements by participants.
Secondly, both law and administrative practice allow foreign investors to appoint of 
the chairman, who has decisive powers as the statutory representative* 36 of the company. 
Thus, in business practice, the use of the 'private contracts' even allows the foreign 
participants to designate the initial chairman in the articles of association of the company. 
Eventually, this provides the channels of the hidden dominance of Japanese and American 
multinationals in the top personnel management in Taiwanese companies. Thirdly, this use 
of private economic practice also extends to the set-up of a 'preparatory office for the 
negotiation' without a legal personality and legality of juristic acts, as permitted by the
Independent Evening Poet (Taipei; 06/01^2): 3; United Evening Newt (Taipei; 06/01^)2): 3; and, "Taiwan: Asia Newest Banker",
Time (USA) (January 13, 1992): 15.
A company in Taiwan, except an investment or venture capital company, is prohibited from investing an amount in excess of 40 
percent of its paid-in capital in another company (Article 13 of the Company Law). |
Because of the uncertainties about how 'preferred-shares' would be treated by the courts, and the general concerns by the Investment 
Commission in case that control may be shifted by use of these shares, these shsres in practice are rare.
36 Being a statutory representative, the powerful chairman may commit his duty despite internal agreements to the contrary (Article 192* 
215 of the Company Law), which agreements however msy not be invoked against bonm fid* third parties (Article 36).
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Enforcement Rules o f 1960 S E I  (610111) (Rule 66). This preparatory office is essentially 
used to prepare the main contents of the joint venture contract in detail.
Informal Domain III: Tolerance o f Formal Law in Management
Another important question for foreign investors in Taiwan is the use or abuse of 
quorum and voting requirements for management decisions of the joint ventures. The 1929 
Company Law specifies37 clear and strict quorum the requirements for several 'important 
actions', among which are transfers of all or a substantial portion of a company's property and 
significant acquisitions of property that may substantially affect a company's business. 
Furthermore, at shareholders' meetings, the Company Law requires a three-quarters of issued 
and outstanding (for instance 'preferred-shares'), shares in cases of decisions of dissolution or 
merger (Article 316). However, the Law is flexible and permits participants to set up higher 
quorums under the articles of association for shareholders meetings in regards to important 
decisions or dissolution (Articles 185, 277, and 316).
(ii).(b) The Wholly Foreign-owned Company and Its Active Informality
None of the other forms except companies-limited-by-shares, as analysed, have 
attracted significant interest from foreign investors, primarily because they do not fall within 
the definition of a 'Productive Enterprise' (Article 3, the 1960 SEI), although the corporation 
law in Taiwan permits foreign investors to wholly-own a Taiwanese company by both form­
ing a new entity and purchasing an existing one are permitted.
%
Although the 1929 Company Law provides simply in itself a whole ownership of a 
company by foreigners in Taiwan, three other considerations should be paid more attentions 
including financial, managerial, and labour requirements.38
37 A company may cany out certain 'important actiona' only where (a) the action haa been proponed in a resolution peaaed by the board 
of directora at a meeting attended by two-thirda or more of the members of the board or tneir proxies; and, (b) a majority of the shares 
voted at a shareholders meeting attended by shareholders or their proxies holding at leaat two-thirds of the total number of issued and 
outstanding shares approve a resolution to carry out the action. Cf. Articles 185 and 277, the Company Law.
38 Also Cf. 1989 Manual (Taiwan), pp. 190-191.
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In matters of finance, a foreign wholly-owned company in Taiwan may have different 
considerations of capitalisation and fund-reserve from those of domestic companies. For 
instance, if a wholly foreign-owned company wants to qualify as a "venture capital 
company1,39 under the 1960 SEI, a much higher standard of capitalisation than that under the 
Company Law will be applied.39 40 In a usual case, unless the built-up legal reserve is equal to 
the total capital of the company, 10 percent of the annual net income of the company should 
be set aside as a 'legal reserve1 under the Company Law (Article 237). On the other hand, a 
foreign parent corporation may extend its investing-loan to its subsidiary in Taiwan, subject 
to approval by the Investment Commission and certain administrative policy restrictions.41 
These restrictions have been imposed by the policy of currency and administration of the 
Central Bank of China (in Taiwan). However, given the fact that Taiwan suffered much from 
the "Hot-Money" influx in the late 1980s [Cf. Clark (1989): 208], these administrative mea­
sures limiting the lending by parent corporation from the abroad were not effective.
Furthermore, as mentioned already, a period of one year following the incorporation 
of a company-limited-by-shares is a restriction on share transfer by the Company Law 
(Article 163). The administration of the Investment Commission regulates this more closely: 
any transfer of shares in a 'company with foreign-investment-approved' is subject to 
administrative approval,42 under which the IC will scrutinize any possible damage of the 
invested project. Another administrative regulation is under the tax authorities which focuses 
on a 'securities-transaction-tax' of 0.3 percent of the value of the shares transferred.43
39 The minimum cnpiuliulion in N T S200 million, with the entire amount paid in cash upon re gi at ration See Article 8 of the I960 SEI: 
see also Article i  (definition of a venture capital enterprise), Article 7 (requirements of capitalisation) of Regulations Governing the 
Administration o f Venture Capital Investment Enterprisas (831124); amended on 26th January. 1987.
40 The 1929 Company Law requires that a company-limited by-shares muat have a minimum capital base of N.T.Sl million, with at least 
that amount plua 25% of any authorized capital in exceaa of N.T.Sl million to be paid-in upon registration (Article 156). AJao Cf. 
Minimum Capitalisation Standards for Limited Companies and Componias-Limitod-By-Shares (690531), amended on 15th October. 
1980.
41 These restrictions include: (a) the loan, absent special approval from the Central Bank of China, must 'not exceed an amount equal 
three times' the parent's equity investment in the subsidiary; (b) the loan may be used for offshore procurement only and may not be 
converted into ROC currency. i.e., N.T. Dollars; snd, (c) the loan shall be for a period of 'not leas than two years', although the rate of 
interest msy be fixed or floating. East Asian Executive Reporters, December 1987, p. 18.
42 The approval requires a submission of a joint application by both the transferor and its transferee.
4^ Article 2 of the 1946 Statute for Securities Transfer Tax (781127), amended on 27 November, 1978.
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Also, the management of foreign wholly-owned company shall be considered. A 
special requirement for the local residency or domicile of managers, under Article 29 of the 
1929 Company Law: must before them registered as officers of the company in Taiwan. 
Even for a company with foreign investment approved, there is no exemption from this 
requirement, despite certain exemptions for directors and shareholders by waiver mentioned 
earlier. On the other hand, the flexible framework of the Company Law requires only a 
'minimum of three directors' (Article 192), not maximum. Legally, the indemnification of the 
directors by the company for liabilities incurred by virtue of their service as directors is 
permitted. For a foreign wholly-owned company in Taiwan, law does not require board 
meetings be held necessarily in Taiwan. Furthermore, although a director may not act as 
proxy for more than one absent director', and the appointment of a shareholder requires 
'registration' with the Commercial Registrar in the MoEA, directors not resident in Taiwan 
may appoint shareholders or other directors as proxies to attend meetings of board (Article 
205).
Finally, the industrial relation is also important for a foreign wholly-owned company. 
The 1929 Company Law, in case that new shares issued by a company-limited-by-shares, 
stipulates employees' pre-emptive rights to purchase at least 10 to 15 pjercent of new 
shares. However, in case that new shares are issued to existing shareholders by capitalising 
reserves or capital surplus arising as a result of 'asset re-valuation', the rule does not apply; 
neither in case of the insurance of shares pursuant to 'a merger or the conversion of existing 
debt into equity' (Article 267). The formal law also does not prohibits a common business 
practice that a company in Taiwan can make new employees 'waive' their pre-emptive rights 
to purchase shares 'at the time of commencing employment'. Furthermore, another business 
custom in Taiwan is that a company may pjay employees a year-end bonus, p»id out of 'pre­
tax profit' and deductible as a business expanse. Nonetheless, the articles of association of a 
company must, as required by the 1929 Company Law, specify an amount to be allocated out 
of 'after-tax profits' to an employee bonus fund, such allocation to occur at the outset of
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operations and on a monthly basis thereafter (Article 235). The relevant labour legislation44 
also stipulates formally the reserve of employee bonus and the withholding portions for 
contribution of fund. Pursuant to rules promulgated by the Ministry of the Interior,45 the fund 
mentioned are to be administered by committees formed by both employees and management 
within each enterprise.
(ii).(c) Branches o f  Foreign Corporation and Their Quasi-forms as "Company-limited-by- 
shares "
In Taiwan, foreign corporations have to file applications to establish their branch 
offices with the MoEA, which examines that applicants are duly constituted and authorized to 
do business in the country of incorporation.46 The only restrictions may lie on, (as referred in 
the 1929 Company Law (Article 373)), the fact that corporations organized in countries that 
do not grant recognition to companies organized in Taiwan may not be permitted to establish 
branches there. However, once legally recognized, a branch office is, with minor 
exceptions,47 entitled to the same treatment of companies incorporated in Taiwan. Since a 
branch is not a separate legal entity, the presence of a branch on Taiwan will accordingly 
subject 'the head-office and all other branch offices of the foreign corporation' to the 
jurisdiction of the local courts and government authorities.
Being recognized by the MoEA, a branch must have an "operating-fund placed at the 
exclusive disposal" of the branch, the amount of which is prescribed by the regulations that 
differentiate according to the nature of the company and its line of business.48 This
Each enterprise must allocate to this fund 1 to 5 percent of total capital at the time of establishment of the enterprise, and 0.0S to 0.15 
percent of monthly revenues thereafter. Also, the enterprise is required to withhold 0.5 percent of each employee's monthly wsges for 
contribution to the fund ss well as allocation thereto of 20 to 40 percent of the proceeds when the enterprise sells its waste materials. 
See, Article 2 of the 1943 Statute on Employee Welfare Funds (430126), amended on 16th December, 1948.
45 Article 5 or the 1943 Slatuta on Employee Walfart Fundi (430126).
46 Cf. Article 371, the 1929 Company Law (Amended on 7th. December. 1983).
47 Article 373. the 1929 Company Law.
48 Article 372. the 1929 Company Law.
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operating-fund will be regarded as "paid-in capital" for the purposes of computing incentives 
available under the 1960 SEI (Article 3).
To establish branches by foreign corporations is further encouraged by the Nationalist 
government, given the fact that the definition of a Productive Enterprise was revised with an 
inclusion of branches; and on fact that additional provisions has permitted a tax-free 
exchange when a wholly-owned subsidiary is transformed into a branch having an 
organizational form similar to that of a 'company-limited-by-shares'. Nonetheless, the 
government even allows the new branch to enjoy any income-tax deferrals accrued by the 
subsidiary.49
IV.3 THE EXPANSION O F INFORMAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT
The discussion of the macro legal framework for foreign investment will be based on not 
only the statutory but also administrative mechanisms in connection with the regulating for­
eign investment. The best way to develop this analysis lies on a process from each major 
statute relevant then into the administrative networks under that law. A clear macro valua­
tion of the role of the administration will be given a more cautious treatment in the later 
sections.
IV J .A . Initial Release of Administration Discretion from the Formal Law: The Statutes 
for Foreign and Overseas Chinese Investment
As mentioned, both the 1954 Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals (the 1954 SIFN) 
and the 1955 Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese (the 1955 SIOC) built up the 
foundation of the legal frameworks for foreign investment in Taiwan. Accordingly, the laws 
provide guarantees and incentives for projects with foreign investment that are approved by 
the Investment Commission (IC) mentioned under the MoEA. However, the 'coverage and
49 Articles 38 end 38-1, the 1960 SEI.
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criteria of the projects' stipulated within both statutes are rather vague,50 and shall be 
refreshed out from time to time by "directives from the Executive Yuan" as to the particular 
kinds of projects then in demand. In such a legislative framework, government policy can be 
channelled into the administrative guidance of foreign investment. For instance, the 
encouragement of electronics, high-technology sectors, and large-scale heavy industries has 
been the policy of the 1990s. However, this legislative mechanism can not explain the failure 
of the proposed joint venture of automobile industry, in contrast to the popular existence of 
western investment on soft-drinking manufacturing in Taiwan.
As discussed already, the forms of foreign investment eligible under the law are 
within a flexible context,51 for instance, even a simple lending to existing enterprises or the 
simple purchase of stocks or bonds of domestic companies [Section IV.2.B]. Furthermore, in 
addition to the 'national treatment' in all respects, certain privileges unavailable to purely 
domestic investing activities have provided by the statutes to an 'approved-investment- 
project' (Article 20, of the SIFN and the SIOC respectively). Especially, within the economic 
legal regime, the Nationalist government provides many legal frameworks to guarantee these 
privileges. For instance, before 13 July , 1987 the date of relaxation of foreign exchange 
control in Taiwan, the privileged access to foreign exchange for companies with 'foreign- 
investment-approved' status, under the 1948 Statute for Foreign Exchange Control (481231) 
by the Central Bank of China, was the sine qua non of most foreign investment.
Nonetheless, several other privileges offered shall be taken into account here. First of 
all, the foreign investors have the right to apply for "immediate repatriation" of their shares of 
net profits or interests accrued from the foreign-investment-approved, and the right to apply 
for repatriation of the "total amount of foreign invested capital", one year following
50 Widely, the project» can be approved by Ibe Investment Commission am that: (a) «rill produce good» or aervicea that am needed 
within the country; (b) hive an export market; (c) will contribute to the development of important induatrial, mining, or 
communicationa enterprises within Taiwan; (d) are engaged in scientific research and development; or, (a) are beneficial to national 
social and economic development Cf., Article 5 of the 1934 SIFN and Article 5 of the 1933 SlOC.
Under Taiwanese law, the forms of permissible capital contribution to an enterprise with foreign investment include (a) foreign 
exchange cash; (b) domestically-needed machinery and equipment or raw materials, imported for use by the project; (c) domestically- 
needed goods or materials, imported for domestic sale to raise working capital; (d) proprietary technology and patent righto; and, fe) 
capital gains on other investment in Taiwan (other than those accruing from re-appraisal or disposition of land) which are eligible for 
remittance abroad. Cf.. Article 3 of the 1934 SIFN and Article 3 of the 1933 SIOC.
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commencement of business by the enterprise concerned (Cf., Article 13, the SIFN; and 
Article 12, the SIOC). Secondly, in case that 45 percent or more of the foreign-investment- 
approved enterprise is owned by foreign investors,52 both the statutes guarantee its freedom 
from expropriation for twenty years following the establishment of business (Article 16, the 
SIFN; Article 15, the SIOC).
A third interesting privilege enjoyed by the foreign-investment-approved enterprise is 
the "exemptions" from the several requirements of the Company Law. For example, again in 
case of '45 percent or more of the foreign ownership', the enterprise with foreign-investment- 
approved may exempt from the requirement that companies with paid-in capital of 200 
million N.T. dollars or more (at the end of the effectiveness of both the statutes in December 
1990, approximately U.S. $ 7.4 million) shall publicly issue their shares. Also, requirements 
within the Company Law regarding the 'nationality and domicile' of the shareholders, 
directors, and supervisors, all enterprises with foreign-investment-approved are exempted by 
both the SIFN (Article 18) and the SIOC (Article 18). Moreover, the formal law itself 
provide the further possibility of administrative grants of exemptions. For instance, 
certain requirements for the "acquisition of land and mining rights" can be exempted in 
favour of qualified enterprises through their application to the Executive Yuan. The 
requirements of registration are applied to ships or aircrafts owned by Chinese nationals, that 
is, a set number of shareholders and directors of the company. However, while foreigners 
can be exempted from these requirements, the Overseas Chinese are not. It therefore means 
that this privilege is only accorded to approved-foreign-investment enterprises by foreign 
nationals under Taiwanese laws (Article 19, the SIFN), and this makes the difference 
between the two statutes in fact.53
52 Is c u x  of other enterprises loot exceed 45 percent of foreign ownerahip). n reaeoneble compensation for the expropriated assets will 
be paid. Cf. Article 15. the SIFN: Article 14. the SIOC.
53 A further distinction between “Overseas Chinese* and ‘Foraign Nationals' includes the following points: (1) Foreign nationals 
include both the legal persons and the physical persons, but Overseas Chinese covers the later only: (2) Protection and the encourage­
ments are equal under the law: (3) Only Overseas Chinese can invest in the industries beyond Article 5 of the I9SS SIOC if the 
investor gives up the privilege of foreign exchange by Article 19 therain; and. (4) In the lights of the “dual nationalities* admitted. 
Overseas Chinese can apply for the 19U  SIFN. 19*9 Manual (Taiwan): 189.
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IV J.B . Towards the First Wave of Liberalization: The 1960 Statute for the 
Encouragement of Investment
The first law in Taiwan providing comprehensive schemes, for instance, including tax 
incentives as an integral part, for the promotion of foreign investment has been the 1960 SEI 
(600910). Based on the Company Law as the main regulating mechanism for private 
economic entities, the statute is drafted following practical considerations to avoid many ob­
structive provisions for administration to promote both domestic and foreign investment. I 
will call this newly legal setting the "First Wave o f Liberalization" of economic and com­
mercial environment in Taiwan. But, a contradiction inside this wave has been the over­
expansion of administrative intervention and economic inequality set up by both law 
and administrative provisions.
First, the convenient nature of the law explains why the duration of this law extends 
until the end of 1990, three times of its originally scheduled-term [CEI (Taipei) (1988): 1; 
also CEPD (1987b)]. Following the drafting technique of "foreign investment approved" in 
both the 1954 SIFN and the 1955 SIOC, the 1960 SEI provides incentives to an entity located 
in Taiwan qualified as a "Productive Enterprise" through an administrative examination. 
Similarly, from time to time the precise package o f incentives available under the 1960 SEI 
has been altered. Secondly, the flexibility within the statute make the many uses of the 
discretion of executive authorities such as the Executive Yuan, the MoEA, and the MoF, as 
analysed below. Finally, the definition of a Productive Enterprise is wide enough [cf. CEPD 
(1987b): 1-12],M but was limited originally only for domestic companies-limited-by-shares. 
In practice, this of course does not exclude the application of foreign investment incorporated 
into this organisational form. On 26th January 1987 [CEPD (1987b); 10-12], the definition 
was further extended to 'branch offices of foreign corporations' and 'venture capital 
enterprises' that conform to MoF regulations for such entities, despite of their corporate form
» *
A Productive Enterprise hue been defined ss one entity Ihel 'is engnged in the production of foods or the rendering of services through 
manufacturing, handicraft, mining, agriculture, foreatry, fishery, animal husbandry, transportation, warehousing, public utilities, 
public facility construction and development, public housing construction, technical services, hotels, or heavy machinery 
construction'.
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(Article 3). In my view, this release of business forms has explained a more emphasis on 
operation functions o f investment.
As mentioned earlier, a Productive Enterprise which engages in an 'encouraged line of 
business', as specified from time to time by the Executive Yuan,35 may either (a) enjoy a 
five-year exemption from the Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax (PSEIT), with the 
commencement of the exemption period in some cases deferrable for up to four years 
following the establishment of the enterprise, or (b) accelerate depreciation of its machinery 
and equipment (Article 6). With certain limitations under the same provision,56 the same 
alternatives mentioned are available in connection with the 'expansion' of an existing 
Productive Enterprise. Furthermore, another case of corporate income tax reduction also 
depends on the administrative regulations. A Productive Enterprise engaged in a line of 
business singled out for "special encouragement" by regulations, issued from time to time 
by the Executive Yuan,57 can be qualified as a "big trading company"58 or a "venture capital 
enterprise"59 and assumes a 20 percent for its maximum PSEIT, which in cases of other 
Productive Enterprises is 25 percent (Article 15).
More preferences for foreign investment are granted through the administration and 
discretion. By decree, the Executive Yuan may permit Productive Enterprises to credit 
against PSEIT liability 5 to 20 percent of the amount invested by them in production 
equipment during the tax year,60 subject to a maximum credit of 50 percent of any PSEIT 5*
55 Cf., Categories and Criteria o f Productive Enterprises Eligible for Encouragement (711111), promulgated on 11 November, 1971 
and amended on 26 November, 1986.
^  In such a case, the exemption from PSEIT will be limited to the income derived from the expansion, or the accelerated depreciation 
will be limited to new machinery and equipment acquired in connection with such an expansion depending on the situations.
^  That is, Categories and Criteria for Special Encouragement o f  Important Productive Enterprises (761006), promulgated on 6 
October, 1976; amend on 27 October, 1981.
For the reference of a *bi«jtrading company', which is tied to the value of its transactions, amount of paid-in capital, corporate form 
and number of branch offices, see Article 2 of Criteria for Big Trading Company by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Nationals 
(840419), promulgated on 19 April, 1984 and amended on 17 October, 1986.
^  P°r *1»« reference of a Venture capital enterprise', see Article 3 of Regulations Governing the Administration o f Venture Capital 
Investment Enterprises (831124), promulgated on 24 November. 1983 and amended on 26 January. 1987.
^  Furthermore, any credit 'in excess of the maximum' may be carried over for application in the ensuing five tax years, although the 
same 50 percent ceiling will apply in each tax year.
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payable (Article 10).61 Similarly, the 'research and development expenses' of a Productive 
Enterprise may be deducted from income in the year of expenditure, and 'equipment' relevant 
to 'research and development' and 'quality control' having a useful life more than two years 
may be eligible for accelerated depreciation (Article 34). In case the total expenditure on 
research and development in a single tax year exceeds the 'highest research and development 
expenses' incurred by the same Productive Enterprise during the preceding five-year period, 
then it may take 'an am ount equal to 20 percent of the excess' as a credit against income tax 
liability for the current year, provided that the amount credited may not exceed 50 percent of 
the PSEIT otherwise payable in that tax year. For five years these surplus credits may be 
carried over (Article 34-1).62
A Productive Enterprise operating in a strategic industry, as again determined by the 
Executive Yuan,63 may 'retain earnings' up to a ceiling of twice64 its paid-in capital (or its 
working capital, in the case of a branch office). Where these limits are exceeded, the excess 
amount will be subject to PSEIT at a rate of 10 percent (Article 41, the 1960 SEI), but not the 
more stringent rules of the Income Tax Law (420217) (Article 76-1) governing taxation of 
retained earnings. Later, if a Productive Enterprise invests 'retained earnings' in an expansion 
project,65 or if a 'venture capital company' uses 'undistributed earnings' to increase capital 
base of the company, stock dividends issued to shareholders, as a result of the capital 
increase, may be deferred from inclusion in their 'personal income' for tax purposes until the 
dates on which the shares are transferred by each shareholder. In the case of an expansion 
project, this income tax deferral is also applied for foreign branch offices, until such time as
61 See aleo Measures Governing the Deduction for Investment in Procurement o f Machinery end Equipment by Private Productive 
Enterprises (850629), promulgated on 29 June, 1985 and amended 29 June 1986.
^  Alao Cf., Measures Governing the Deduction for Investment in Research and Development Expenses by Productive Enterprises 
(850918), promulgated on 18 September, 1985.
63 Cf., Applicable Scope o f Strategic Industry (820821), promulgated on 21 August, 1982 and amended 23 December, 1987.
6* An ordinary Productive Enterprise may retain earnings in an amount equal to its paid-in capital only.
63 Including the purchase or renovation of production machinery and equipment or transportation facilities used for the production of 
goods, rendering of services, research and development, quality control, pollution control, conservation of energy, or improvement of 
safety. Article 13, the SEI.
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the working capital is reduced or the branch is closed by the foreign company or the 
government (Article 13, the 1960 SEI).
In similar cases of the deferral of customs duties, administrative approval by the 
Investment Commission is the key point (Article 21). With this approval, payment of 
customs duties on machinery or equipment imported for use by a Productive Enterprise may 
be paid in instalments, with the first payment deferred 'until one year after the machinery or 
equipment is put into use'.66 Furthermore, after this approval, machinery or equipment not 
manufactured within Taiwan imported for use by 'an industrial or mining enterprise'67 may be 
exempted from customs duties. Moreover, the administration is allowed by the 1960 SEI to 
re-assess such duties, if the machinery is transferred or if the enterprise reduced its capital 
within five years following importation of the machinery or equipment. Finally, for the 
purposes of research and development of new products, improvement of quality standards, 
conservation of energy, or environmental protection, the importation of 'quality control 
inspection equipment' not produced within Taiwan is duty-free.
The 1960 SEI extends its preference to foreign personnel in terms of income tax. 
Inside a Productive Enterprise with foreign-investment-approved in which the foreign entity 
is an investor, when this foreign investor assigns personnel to work in Taiwan "on a non­
permanent basis", salaries and other remuneration paid to such personnel by their foreign
employer outside of Taiwan shall not be considered as Taiwanese-source income subject to
local income tax, provided that such persons are not physically present within the country for 
more than 183 days, i.e., six months, in a tax year (Article 18). Secondly, a non-resident 
shareholder in a Productive Enterprise with foreign-investment-approved will be entitled to a 
20 percent rate of'withholding on dividend income remitted abroad' (Article 16).68 If that the 
tax paid in Taiwan will not be creditable against the tax of the payer's home country can be
Cf., Enforcement Measures Governing Payment in Installments and Exemption from Duties and Dues Chargeable in respect of 
M achine^ and Equipment Imported by Productive Enterprises (711105), promulgated on 5 November, 1971, and amended on 2v
^  Cf., Criteria for Encouragement o f Establishment or Expansion o f Industrial and Mining Enterprises (750312), promulgated on 12 
March, 1975 and amended on 30 November. 1987.
^  In oontraat, the rate applicable to dividende of a Productive Enterpriae without foreign-inveatment-approved ia 35 percent.
I
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approved by the foreign investor, an application may thus be made to further reduce 
withholding to 15 percent. To dividend income received by a non-resident individual who is 
involved in the management of a Productive Enterprise with foreign-investment-approved, 
the rate of 20 percent will also be applied, even if the individual is physically present within 
Taiwan for that purpose for more than 183 days in a taxable year. The Amendment of the 
1960 SEI (Article 16) in January 1987 grants a '20 percent of withholding on profits remitted 
to its head office overseas' to a branch office of a foreign corporation.
In short, a t the administrative levels, the coverage of the preferential treatments 
and incentives provided by the 1960 SEI can be better realised within its flexible and 
encompassing administrative frameworks. For instance, a huge number of other 
incentives in connection with business practice, such as simplified import procedures, the 
public listing of shares of an enterprise, acquisition and sale of land, allocation of foreign 
exchange reserves and etc., depend upon application made by foreign investors themselves.69
IV.4 FURTHER EXPANSION OF INFORMAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT
Although the 1960 SEI was the major vehicle to lift the statutory rigidity for investment in
Taiwan before 1960, the later tendency was a radical expansion of administrative measures.
These administrative measures gradually built up a network of administrative intervention,
which themselves became the new rigidity for foreign investment in Taiwan.
IV.4.A. Expansion of Administrative Discretion under Other Relevant Regulations of
Foreign Investment
%
Three sets of regulations of foreign investment shall be taken into account with the further 
expansion of administration regulation of foreign investment. The 1962 Statute for Technical 
Co-operation (620808) (amended on 29 May, 1964; the 1962 STC) was an example of 
expansion of administration through functional mechanism, while both the 1965 Statute for
69 E g .  Key Points o f the Simplified Procedure for ike Imports non o f Mec htnery end Equipment by Overtone Chinese end Foreign 
Ntunnels in Productive Enterprises (820819), promulgated oa 19 Augual. 1982.
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the Establishment and Management of Export Processing Zones (650130) (the 1965 EPZ 
Statute) and the 1979 Statute for Establishment of Science-Based Industrial Park (790727)
(the 1979 SIP Statute), through both functional and locational mechanisms.
(i) The 1962 Statute fo r  Technical Co-operation
As analysed in Section IV.2.B.(ii).(a) already, without contributing capital, foreign 
companies have access to the domestic market of Taiwan simply by capitalization of technol­
ogy. In accordance with international business practice, foreign investors may contribute 
technology as a component of their equity investment, and/or license their propriety tech­
nology to the enterprises in Taiwan. Under both the 1954 SIFN and the 1955 SIOC, 
capitalization of technology in a local company is permitted, but subject to rather reserve 
restrictions. The major rules are found in regulations issued by the MoEA, although the 1979 
SIP Statute also contains provisions concerning capitalization of technology in companies 
within the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park (SIP). Generally speaking, patent rights 
and technical know-how may be contributed to capital only when such technology can be 
used "for production of goods not yet produced in Taiwan" or when the technology can be 
used "to reduce production costs or improve the quality of goods already being produced".70 71
The definition of patent rights thereof extends only to rights granted under the 1944 Patent 
Law (440529), while technical know-how is defined as "newly-developed technology, having 
economic value, required by the enterprise and not previously in use" in Taiwan.7*
Pursuant to the two foreign investment statutes mentioned, the 1962 STC was enacted 
to provide a basic legal mechanism for direct transfer of technology, in addition to the 
capitalization of technology mentioned. The term "technology co-operation" refers to the 
furnishing of rights to use patental technology or non-patental technical know-how by a 
foreign party (as "Technician") to a party located in Taiwan ("Co-operator" referred) in 
exchange for payment of royalties (Articles 3 and 5). While the detailed framework under *
70 Argot» 4 of 'Maaturas for the Uta of Patent Rights an4 Technical Know-How a t Equity Investm ent(published by MoEA O B  J  June.
71 Ibid.. Articles 2 and 1.
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the 1962 STC may be out of space here, two issues shall be discussed especially for our main 
theme. Similarly, the 1962 STC not only provides another example that the simple text of a 
law have been connected with several complicated sets of administrative regulations and 
administrative measures, but also explains the fact that administrative means may overtake 
the application of law. For instance, the 1962 STC does not stipulate the licensing of 
trademarks at all. However, MoEA promulgated in 1970 a set of special regulations, 
"Criteria for the Handling o f Trademark Licensing by Foreign Enterprises" (700616) 
(amended on 3 June, 1985), to permit licensing of a trademark owned by a foreign enterprise 
and registered in Taiwan in four situations.72 73
However, in the light of functions of the 1962 STC, the relation between law and 
bureaucracy provides a negative lesson in understanding the economic development of 
Taiwan. Although the Nationalist government had established a legal regime for protection 
of intellectual property before the Second World War, before the mid-1980s Taiwan had a 
bad reputation in the world for protection of foreign intellectual property, that is, two decades 
after the enactment of the 1962 STC. After their awakening since 1985, the bureaucrats have 
been busy on the amendment of old legislation;72 for instance, the 1944 Patent Law 
(440529), was amended on 24 December, 1986. At the same time, Article 317 of the 1935 
Criminal Code (350101; amended on 26 December, 1969), which provides fines or 
imprisonment of not more than one year as sanctions for "disclosure of confidential industrial 
or commercial information", has been more invoked and reminded by the administration.
There may exist three reasons for this delayed legislative action for protection of intellectual 
property by the bureaucracy. The amendment of the relevant regulations is a heavy task; 
expanding export without costs of intellectual property; and, Taiwan has been long staying 
outside international legal regime for intellectual property protection. Nevertheless, it
72 Thtu* tour situations include: (1) in connection with goods manufactured by an foreign-investment-approved (FIA) enterprise in
which the trademark owner haa contributed 20% or more of invented capital (A rt 2 of the Criteria); (2) in connection with goods 
manufactured by an FIA enterprise in which the parent or subsidiary of the trademark owner has contributed 20% or more of invested 
capital (Art. 3); (3) where the trademark relates to goods produced in connection with an approved technical co-operation contract •
provided the term of the trademark license contract does not extend beyond that of the technical co-operation contract (Art 4); and.
(4) where the goods are of superior quality and have an export market, provided the licensor exercises quality control (Art. 5).
73 Such as the 1928 Copyright Law (280514) was amended on 10 July, 1985; the 1928 Enforcement Rules for the Copyright Law 
(280514), on 16 June. 1986; the 1930 Trademark Law (300506) was amended on 29 November, 1985; the 1930 Enforcement Rules 
for the Trademark Law (301230). on 19 October. 1987; the 1944 Patent Lew (440529). on 24 December. 1986; the 1947 Enforcement 
Rules for the Patent Lew (470924), on 10 July, 1987.
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remains to see the effects of the recent reform without further institutional setting and 
improvement, because the amendment o f law may be an excuse used by the bureaucracy. 
However, the social-economic cost of bad reputation under the huge reserve of foreign 
exchange makes the "Taiwan Miracle" cheap.
(ii) The 1965 Statute fo r  the Establishment and Management o f Export Processing Zones
The law governing three Export Processing Zones (EPZs)74 in Taiwan is another 
example of a simple statute supported by a complex set of administrative measures regulating 
a special domain of activities of foreign investment. Under the 1965 EPZ Statute mentioned, 
the EPZs were built up as combinations of free ports and industrial parks. The first character 
of these Zones is that ownership of land is vested in each EPZ authority, which can lease the 
land to enterprises operating there, with different arrangements of standard factory build­
ings.75
In addition to the mechanism of encouragement constituted by the acquisition of land 
and factory buildings for industrial use, several special tax benefits have been offered under 
the authorities of the EPZs; for example, a duty free for import machinery and raw materials 
for export processing. Similar to many examples already discussed, a basic qualification by 
the administrative authorities for further tax benefits has been the application of a set of 
administrative measures, in this case, the "Categories and Criteria o f Productive Enterprises 
Eligible for Encouragement" (711111) (amended, on 26 November, 1986) published by
MoEA. For an enterprise with a best treatment, that is, foreign-investment-approved (FIA
%
mentioned) status combined operation in line of business encouraged, will enjoy exemption
--------------------------------------  I
74 Kao hnung EPZ waa esubliahed al ihc cad of 1966; Tan-eta EPZ (ia Taichung) and Nan tic EPZ (alao in Kao hniung). ia 1971.
75 According lo Critaria for Allocation o f LanJ for Lamsa in the Export Procatring Zonae (700925). promulgated on 25 September, 1970 
and amended on 23 November, 1972, an option ia available for the enterpriaea lo leaae or purchase 'standard factory buildings' con­
structed and maintained by the EPZ authority.
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from PSEIT; repatriation preference; exemption from commodity tax; and business tax 
assessed on export products at a zero rate.76 7
According to the original purpose of the legislation, an enterprise within an Export 
Processing Zones is to export all of the goods it produces. However, upon approval by the 
MoEA, an access to the domestic market is permitted,11 being liable, of course, for payment 
of customs duties on goods sold domestically. Compared with the enterprises outside these 
zones, the business within the EPZs are under a high degree of administrative control, and 
less statutory regulation, directed by the authorities therein.
(iii) The 1979 Statute fo r  the Establishment o f  the Science-Based Industrial Park
The Hsinchu SIP established in 1980 provided another case of further expansion of 
administrative sector in the regulation of both foreign and domestic investment. The 
functional encouragement focuses on attracting high-technology enterprises into a special 
administrative location, the SIP, within a boundary set up by a statute (the 1979 SIP Statute 
(790727)), and offers investors a package of incentives78 in addition to those otherwise 
available under the 1960 SEI. As to the lease of land as an incentive, in special cases with 
the contribution of very advanced technology, the payment of land rental can be exempted 
for up to five years (Article 19).
As a fact, the administrative sector expands to degree that SIP authorities are 
empowered to issue "import and export licenses" directly to enterprises located therein 
(Article 17), in other words, the Park is also a customs-bonded area. Similar to that in the 
EPZs a special approval is needed for the access to domestic market, while there is no
76 Cf. Article 13 of the 1963 EPZ Statute (amended on 24 December. 1979): and Article 7 of 1931 Burnt*» Tex Lew (310613) 
(amended on 15 November 1985).
77 The ceiling on domestic sales by these enterprises is 20% of total amount. Cf. Articles 5 and 14 of the 1963 EPZ Statute. f
78 These include (1) duty-free importation of raw materials, machinery and equipment (Art. 17 of the 1979 SIP Statute); (2) exemption 
from PSEIT for a period of five years, the commencement of which can be deferred for up to four years following the establishment 
of the enterprise; (3) a maximum PSEIT rate of 22%; (4) an investment tax credit of 15% of the cost of new equipment obtained as 
part of an expansion project (Art. 15); and, (5) an option to lease or purchase standard factory buildings constructed and maintained 
by the SIP administration or authorization to construct a factory building (Art. 13).
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ceiling on domestic sale applicable to enterprises inside the Park (Article 18), being unlike 
those in EPZs which may sell no more than 20 % of their total products as discussed.
In accordance with the high benefits of incentives, the degree of administrative 
discretion and screen procedure increases as well. Accordingly, before an enterprise can be 
established, investors must meet several strict requirements, such as demonstration of 
feasibility studies and a viable plan of business; standard of advanced technology and 
research and development contributed; a training of local personnel; and, a significant 
contribution to economic development. Furthermore, certain restrictive requirements are 
applicable to enterprises within the Park only, such as investment in equipment used for 
research and development; quotas for employment of local technical personnel; and, payment 
of an administration fee tied to gross sales (Articles 3, 27 and 29). However, Article 2 of the 
1979 SIP Statute is a "best treatment" provision by which an applicant wishing to invest in 
the Park may request "the most favourable treatment available" under either the 1960 SEI or 
the 1979 SIP Statute itself. Nonetheless, for foreign investors, the 1979 SIP Statute, unlike 
the 1960 SEI, limits eligibility for incentives only to a company-limited-by-shares which 
shall be organized in Taiwan (Article 3), excluding the branches of foreign enterprises.
1V.4.B. The Contradictions of the First Wave of Liberalization: Protectionism under
Bureaucracy?
To sum up, the First Wave of Liberalization of business and economic environment in 
Taiwan, from 1960 to 1990, in itself was a practice of Pragmatism. As we have analysed,
the 1960 SEI provided an approach to understand the first wave of liberalizing investment
*
environment in Taiwan, through both newly omnibus legislation and an expansion of 
administrative legislation and discretion. Then, a contradiction between these policy 
mechanisms dominated by administration, for instance, an incomplete market under a great 
interference, has been a serious crisis for Taiwan's further development.
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Moreover, a sub-product of this administrative pragmatism has been the 
"protectionism" for more than three decades in Taiwan to promote the exporting while 
limiting the importing to an extreme degree. Accordingly, law and administrative procedure 
set up for both promotion and regulation of foreign direct investment has been eroded by two 
mainstreams of this pragmatism, that is, both the strict control o f importation and a sector- 
limited market, which have originated from the policy of protectionism.
For example, from the 'coverage and criteria of the projects' stipulated within the 
1954 SIFN, the 1955 SIOC, and the 1960 SEI, to the general provisions thereof for the 
encouragement of investment, a framework based on 'positive' treatments of preference for 
both domestic and foreign investors. However, a 'negative' unequal treatment can be found in 
the administration. The IC uses an administrative discretion to prohibit and to limit Overseas 
Chinese and foreign nationals to invest in several sectors by a "Negative List of Investment 
by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Nationals: Items of Industries Prohibited and Limited 
from Investment by Oversea Chinese and Foreign Nationals".79 A recent amendment of 
the List was in May 1990, of which 53 items of industries were prohibited, including those of 
chemical, petrochemical, petroleum, transportation, construction, and real estates, and 55 
items were limited for investment under the special approvals, including those of pharmacy, 
communication, transportation, banking, securities, insurance, medical service.80 The List 
and its amendment was ratified by the Executive Yuan on 11th July, 1990;81 and has 
remained as effective up to August 1991, when the Investment Centre under MoEA formally 
published it again. Hence, within this wave of liberalization of economic circumstances, the 
major beneficiaries in Taiwan are the domestic entrepreneurs under the governmental
I
sponsorship.
^  See Investment Centre of the MOEA, ",Hua-chiao Wai-kuo-jen Lai-hua-tou-zi Yao-lan* (1989 Manual (Taiwan)), pp. 163-164. f
Investment Centre of MOEA, "Industrial Investment News' (Kong-Ye Tou-Zi Jan-Shun), No. 101, (31 Msy, 1990), p.l.
81 Bv the Executive Yuan Letter o f (79) J inZ i No. 18641. (Hsien-Zeng Yuan (79) JinZi Di-18641-Hau Han); See Investment Centra of 
MOEA, "IndustrialInvestment News", No. 102 (30 June, 1990), pp. 2-7. A new copy has been published in August 1991 by the same 
department.
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To the pragmatic authorities. Who have been concerned with practical results of 
immediate exporting surge and the expansion of foreign exchange, technology transfer and 
upgrading industrial structure are secondary to the protectionism. To foreign investors, in 
contrast, the investment m arket in Taiwan has been lacking a fair competition under 
administrative intervention, and an incomplete market limited by both the sector­
directing policy and the discriminatory legal framework. Moreover, this failure of 
incentive policies has been accorded with the recent empirical study [E.g., Tsai (1991)], 
despite we will discuss these issues within a social-legal context in this Chapter later.
IV.S CONCLUSIONS
In short, this Chapter has examined the active role of informal law in the formal regulatory 
framework of foreign investment in Taiwan. Inside the Party-State Capitalism as a general 
environment, the informal domains, existing along the growing statutes for foreign 
investment since 1949, have been providing channels for administrative intervention on busi­
ness.
Indeed, several points on the role of administrative intervention and the development 
of foreign investment have been analysed in this Chapter as reasons behind the so-called 
"Taiwan Experience". However, since the policy of foreign investment in Taiwan has been 
controversial, and accordingly cannot be deemed as a fully successful experience, some ques­
tions left shall be envisaged within the legal framework of foreign investment. First, what 
has the legal mechanism been used by the domestic enterprises as a tool for counter-foreign- 
capital in Taiwan? Second, what are the administrative measures for the executive 
authorities to construct the protectionisms in Taiwan, or to avoid the denationalization by 
foreign MNCs?
While the protectionism may exist in the administrative framework, another 
contradiction comes from the business practice within the legal context. To a great degree, 
foreign investors in Taiwan benefit from the stipulation of contract written in foreign
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language and subject to foreign law [as analysed in IV.2.B.(ii).(a).I]. Furthermore, 
capitalization of technology permitted in a foreign wholly-owned company opens the access 
to domestic market without requirement of capital contribution [analysed in IV.2.B.(ii).(a) 
already]. Hence, for a foreign investor it is neither necessary to contribute any huge capital 
into Taiwan, nor to transfer technology. Hence, in case that the private companies are 
wholly-owned by foreigners, law in itself leaves a question for the regime to intervene in 
business operations, especially these with advanced technology.
However, although law cannot exist on its own, this Chapter has explained at least 
that formal law has limited but key role in the relation between foreign aid, trade, and foreign 
investment. As analysed earlier, this limitation of formal law has come from the effects of an 
active informal sector under the Party-State Capitalism, of which the interaction between two 
shall be discussed more in Chapter VI.
I
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CHAPTER V. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE REGU­
LATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PRC: BUSINESS PRACTICE AND 
ADMINISTRATION UNDER LEGALIZATION
V.l INTRODUCTION
Compared with Chapter IV on Taiwanese legal framework of foreign investment, and given 
the huge size of the economy and the administration in the PRC, we will analyse the 
difference and similarity of the statutory framework, administrative practice, and the role of 
informal sector under the Party-State. Thus, in this chapter we can take into account the huge 
size of administration and the wide legislative framework of foreign investment in the PRC 
as the first major difference in the characteristics of Taiwan and the PRC. The second focus 
on which attention shall be paid is the relationship between the central and local 
administration. Since Taiwan is only a small island economy and the central government 
takes charge of all the external relations, the legal framework of foreign investment has been 
simply based "more" upon the central administration. In contrast, the relationship between 
the local and central governments in the PRC remains an interesting, or sometimes 
conflictive, issue in the regulation of foreign economic activities.
Furthermore, since the late 1970s, the legal framework of foreign investment in the 
PRC has been in the state of flux [cf. Moser (1987a); C.T.J. Lee (1987)]. As we will show 
here and in Chapter VII, special legislation, for either particular form of foreign investment 
or particular economic locus, always comes into the scene first, then a general law with na­
tionwide co-ordination follows.1 Later, under the requirements of local special
circumstances, new administrative regulations and measures are allowed to retain the 
flexibilities and specialities within the local administration of foreign economic activities. 
The interaction between and the importance of both special and general, and both central and 
local, laws and administrative regulations provide the third salient character of the PRC.
1 This legialative movement bee been eimilar to the legialative movement for tbe control of technology tranafer which the nationwide 
general atatule came after thoae indirect and local regttlaliona before 24th May. 1983. Cf. C .TJ. Lee (19*7): Chapter II.
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Since Communist China was established in 1949, the legal, administrative and 
political history of the post-revolutionary period has indeed been as complex as its prehistory 
(Cf. Chapter III). If there was a New China established in 1949, obviously, another was 
established in the decade of 1976-85 with the death of Mao Ze-dong and the sequent fall of 
the Gang of Four in 1976. However, the Leninist structure and the role of the Communist 
Party and its social control have not been abandoned. Thus, the role of Party-State and its 
informal sector provide a common base for our comparative legal studies. As it has been 
mentioned from the very beginning of this study, to ignore Hong Kong and Taiwan as the 
comparative loci for Chinese legal studies is to reject the interests of both change and 
continuity of Chinese legal tradition and customary values, and to miss the future legal 
development among these "liang-an-san-di" (three places and two coasts between the Taiwan 
Straits).
V.2 THE FORMAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND THE INFORMAL 
DOMAINS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The implication of China's open policy (kai-fang zhengce)2 3in the past decade are best 
understood in the context of China's development strategy since 1976 and of the problems 
that led the Chinese to believe that the recent policy-shifts were necessary. In 1976, a new 
policy-open policy-was emerging as a result of considerable controversy [cf. Section III.5]. 
As the Chinese themselves put it, the "historic turning point” for this open policy came in 
December 1978, at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC).1 Accordingly, China would be "actively expanding 
economic co-operation on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other countries" and 
would be "striving to adopt the world's advanced technologies and equipment".4 Indeed, the
2 The Chinese "kei-fang zhengce" cannot be translated as the open-door policy, not only because there is no word of "door" in the 
phrase, but also because the "open-door" is often to remind Chinese people ot the memory of this early century that western powers 
exploited China through the policy.
I
3 The policy-shifts can be summed up in the conclusions pointed in its communique. On the one hand, the state intended to give top 
priority to modernization of China-the Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, defense, and science-technology, and terminate 
the large-scale nationwide mass movement "to expose and criticize Lin Biao and the Gang of Four". See The Communique of the 
Third Plmery Session o f the 11th CPC Centrel Comnuttee on 22 Dec.. 1978, in Beijing Review (BR). 29/12/78. Vol. 52. No. 6. p. 16.
4 Ibid..
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open policy started to open a gateway to newly emerging economic and legal institutions in 
China from the late 1970s. However, similar to the structure of Taiwan, the Party-State in 
the PRC has been still dominating the major economic activities. We shall analyse the con­
tradictions of the informal sector within the Chinese Party-State Socialism.
V.2.A "PARTY-STATE SOCIALISM": PENETRATION OF INFORMAL DOMAINS
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A common factor within the political structure between Taiwan and the PRC is the 
mechanism of the Party-State. Accordingly, several domains of informal sector has been 
existing actively under the ruling systems, the Party-State Capitalism in Taiwan, and the 
"Party-State Socialism" in the PRC. Only through this analysis that we can further 
understand the interaction between both formal and informal regulatory mechanism of for­
eign investment in a more explicit picture.
The institutional settings of the reform programme can be understood as expanding 
formal regulation from the development after 1978, including settings for political 
stabilization, for consolidation of the economy,5 and for cooperation with the west. These 
three dimensions of China's modernization explain the importance of both the institutional 
settings and the new legal system~as a political weapon to break with Maoist radical 
tradition, and as an economic vehicle to upgrade Chinese economic performance. However, 
the ceiling for both institutional and legal development is the informal ruling by the Party- 
State itself.
The phrase of "liang-tiao-tui-zou-lu" (walking on two legs) not only can describe the 
current interrelation between the socialism and the capitalism in China, the interaction 
between the state law and the Party norms ("zhengce"), between the formal law and informal 
sector, but also the role of foreign investment under the present Party zhengce. I
5 In lb* field of economic performance, two iicpe are baeic for the better arrangement of alructural changee: the reatructure of 
production itself which includes problems of bnlsnce relsting to inter-sectoral changes and intra-sec torsi changes; and the 
restructuring of administration. The restructuring of administration includes the re-organization of administration, the re-distribution 
of decision-malung, and the re-arrangement of the ownership system.
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Two famous Chinese legal scholars, Wang Shuwen and the late Zhang Youyu have 
analysed how two legs - the Party norms and the state law - can walk together:
"The written law of our state is a vehicle for putting into practice the political norms 
("z h e n g c e The written law of our state is promulgated on the basis of the Party
political norms........As far as the enforcement of statutory law is concerned, one can
comprehend the spirit and nature of the statutory law and use this instrument 
("gongju'') correctly only if one understands and has a command of the Party political 
norms.... [Zhang & Wang (1980): 74-75]"
Thus, "the spirit of the statutory law and political norms is identical", although the formal law
is "not the only gongju (tool)" [Zhang & Wang, ibid.]:
"... Not only statutory law, but also "jueding" (resolutions) and "zhishi" (directives) by 
the Party, or "shelun" (editorials) in the Party press can express Party political norms 
[Zhang & Wang, ibid.]"
Unavoidably, the PRC's enacted laws of foreign investment only play the role of a vehicle for 
putting into practice Party norms, or Party policy, "zhengce”.
However, which Party line being prevailing will decide the future of these laws and 
foreign investment thereunder, because there have been always a duality of the Party line it­
self in the PRC's history [cf. Chapter III]. For instance, since 1979 there has been a duality 
norm under the open policy in the transformation of "Socialism with Chinese unique char­
acteristics", surnamed "zi" (capitalist) or surnamed "sher" (socialist) [xin-zi huo xin-sher]:
"The proportion of state planning or market is not the essential distinction between 
the socialism and the capitalism. Planning economy is not equal to the socialism, 
while the capitalism has state planning as well; nor is market economy equal to the
capitalism.......... In short, in order to make the socialism relatively superior to the
capitalism, we must absorb and utilize all civilized achievements in the human 
societies •• absorb and utilize every advanced managerial method and productive 
approach, which can reflect the productive rule in the modern societies, from all 
countries of the world, including those capitalist developed countries. [Zhong-fa 
(1992) No. 2 Document: 43-44]''«
These words above from Deng Xiao-ping in the Spring of 1992 have focused on the 
contradictions of duality of the Party zhengce: socialist (sher) or capitalist (zhi)7 Facing the 
strong "Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization" and "Anti-Western Peaceful Transformation" *
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, "Zhong-fa (¡992) No. 2 Document -- Summary of the Speeches by Comrade 
Deng Xiao-ping in Wuhan, Shengzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai (18th January-21st February, 1992)" fated as Zhong-fa (1$92) No. 2 
Document] has been delivered down to all Chinese organs at the county level on 28th February, 1992, in order to promote further 
holding the lines of open policy. A copy of the document was published in The Nineties (April, 1992), Hong Kong, pp. 42-47.
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movements from those conservatives in the Party after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, Deng 
has to call for holding the open policy by himself again. Cannot the environment of foreign 
investment in the PRC guaranteed by the statutory law only? Or, can this be guaranteed by a 
common Communist member, Deng, who holds no post in both Party and government in 
1992?
In short, all these contradictions of the duality between zhengce and law, between 
zhengce itself - "fang" (let bloom) or "shou" (rein in), and between the State and Party have 
come from "walking on two legs" - utilization of capitalism under the Party-State socialism 
[cf. Beijing Review (23-29/3/92): 17], Once this "utilization" changes, some words from 
Professors Zhang Youyu and Wang Shuwen may remind people of the consequent changes of 
formal law:
"If contradictions between statutory law and political norms arise, then the state shall 
repeal or revise statutory laws, or promulgate new statutory law [Zhang & Wang 
(1980): 75]."
Unless admitting the existence of penetration of informal ruling in the PRC today, we cannot 
seriously consider the question: on what do both China's development and foreign investment 
depend - the state law, or the Party politic norms?
V.2.B. The Legal Framework and Informal Domains of Different Forms of Foreign
Investment
Generally speaking, the regulation of foreign investment in the PRC since 1979 has been 
"walking on two legs", one is the business practice under the guidelines the open zhengce, the 
other is the growing state law. One after the other, they walk towards a better development 
of Sino-foreign cooperation. Although the state law chooses its favoured forms of foreign 
investment, it remains silent, to a great content, to several active business practice of foreign 
investors.
Similar to the case of Taiwan, the legal framework of common businesses provides a 
wider circumstance of economic activities, while the particular mechanism of foreign invest­
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ment can explain the degree to which the PRC government permits the international 
economic co-operation. However, in the PRC the difference between statutory and 
administrative regulations on the issue of foreign investment can also provide an 
understanding of the interaction between the central and local governments.
Under the "selective" approach for international co-operation, for example, the SEZs 
set up, and according to the nature of the laws relevant to business operations, the PRCs 
legislation may be characterized into: domestic and foreign-related.7 And either set can be 
further separated into general laws and special legislation.8 Contract law in China now is 
the best example of this distinction of domestic and foreign-related law.9 However, the 
general laws indirectly governing foreign investments include the 1982 Constitution, the 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC (860412), the Civil Procedure Law of the 
PRC (910409), Criminal Law of the PRC (790702), etc. Nonetheless, a general code of 
company law has been lacking to date.
In contrast, foreign-related legislation on foreign investments includes general laws 
dealing with such matters as registration of business, labour and management, taxation, ex­
change control, financial matters, customs duties, etc. These general laws have been, similar 
to the domestic set, supported by a complex framework of special delegated legislation. 
However, this set has existed at the levels of both national and local legislation which will be 
analysed in detail below. In short, foreign-related legislation constitutes a relatively special, 
or exceptional, domain of the domestic legal system, while administrative legislation 
provides a further special enforcement structure for the general foreign-related laws. This 
basic legal inequity must always be taken into account.
As to the foreign-related set, the PRC has adopted a number of statutes applicable exclusively to Sino-foreign joint ventures, Sino- 
foreign co-operative ventures (or contractual joint ventures, contractual co-operative enterprises), foreign enterprises or other forms of 
Sino-foreign economic co-operation.
Another category of special regulations with local effect is enacted by the local governments, such as the Shanghai Municipality, the 
Special Economic Zones, etc
On the one hand, the [Domestic) Economic Contract Law of the PRC (SI 1213) regulates contracts between domestic enterprises; 
and on the other. The Foreign Economic Contract Law of the PRC (8S0321) governs contracts between Chinese and foreign 
enterprises, and individuals as well.
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(i) Legalization o f Foreign Investment: The First Wave o f Encouragement
To provide a background against which to assess significant aspects of foreign 
investment in China, it is important to consider the statutory framework. An analysis based 
on a chronicle of legislation on foreign investment can explain the evolution of 
improvements in the legal framework, as well as the expansion of administrative regulation 
of foreign investment thereunder.
This process of 'legalization' of business practice has been supported with the 
encouragement of foreign investment, through a qualification based on "both forms and 
functions" of business operation, similar to the long wave in Taiwan during 1960-90. Thus, I 
refer to this legalization process before the enactment of the 22 Articles in October 1986, as 
"the First Wave of Encouragement of Foreign Investment" in the PRC. Along with this 
process, the formal law has been expanding its role, even as the guidelines for the informal 
conciliation. For example, in German G.S. Ltd. Co. v. X  City Foreign Trade Co. 
(28/September/84), the Court protected the foreign investor, and decided that if the negotia­
tion outside the Court is obviously unjust and against the spirits of law, the Court will not 
support this negotiation [Din et al (1988): 268-273].
(i).(a) The Need o f Formality and the Constitutional Guarantee
The latest Constitution of the PRC (1982) (821204) provides the legal basis for the
open policy, foreign investment and Sino-foreign economic cooperation [Cf. Section III.5].
Rooted in an amendment to the Constitution of 1978, Article 18>° was a breakthrough in
modem Chinese history because it sanctioned foreign investment in China. Article 18
intends to allay the fears of foreign entrepreneurs who believe that without such 
_________________________ » 10
10 Article 18 of the Constitution eiipulalce that China permila foreign entcrpriaca. other economic inatiniliooa aa well aa individuate to 
engage in economic cooperation with Chineae enterprise« and other economic institutions in varioua forma in accordance with the law 
of China. The legal rights and interests of those foreign enterprises, institutions and individuals are protected by the law of the PRC 
and the economic activities which they carry out in Chinese territory are governed by the PRC law.
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constitutional protection, foreign investment could be constitutionally outlawed. Thus, the 
PRC is one of the few countries to declare such legal protection in its supreme law. Article 
18 reflects the PRC's attitude and confidence towards foreign investment. However, there is 
no procedure for enforcing this right and there is not yet any precedent for such a 
constitutional case.
(i).(b) The Equity Joint Venture Law
The 1979 Equity JV Law (790701) provides the first law governing the operation of 
foreign investment after the Cultural Revolution. The law stipulates that the PRC permits 
foreign companies, enterprises and other economic entities or individuals to incorporate 
themselves in establishing joint ventures with the Chinese corporations, enterprises, or other 
economic organizations within the territory of the PRC.11
Four years later in September 1983, the State Council, in order to define issues 
relevant to joint ventures, enacted 1983 JV  Implementation Regulations (830920). During 
the same period, the administrative authorities in charge have formulated a series of 
administrative regulations and measures concerning various aspects of joint ventures such as 
registration, labour, taxation, financing, and foreign exchange control. Both laws and 
administrative legislation provide a basic legal framework for the establishment and 
operation of Sino-foreign joint ventures and to improve the environment for foreign 
investment.
Secondly, for other forms of foreign investment apart from joint ventures, the Joint 
Venture Law has itself provided guidelines for State control and business regulation. For ex­
ample, before the law of contractual joint venture was enacted, a case of "Developing Black- 
Clay Contract" on 21 January 1980 was settled by the way of "elaborate explanation of the 
legal system of the PRC (xiang-xi-xuan-cuang-jei-shi guo-jia-fa-lu-zhi-du)" by the Court
11 The purpose has been accomplished in accordance with the principles of 'eouality and mutual benefit' and subject to the authorization 
of the PRC government. Accordingly, by the legislation in force, the PRC government protecta the investment made by a foreign 
participants in a joint venture, including profits due pursuant to the agreements, contracts, and articles of association approved by the 
government agencies, and other lawful rights and interests as well.
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[.JJF-400-ALX (1988): 387-390], Another case happened before the enactment of law of 
foreign-related contract, the disputes of a "lai-liao-jia-gong he-tung (Contract for Importing 
Materials for Processing and Assembling of Products)", signed on 5th December 1981, 
between companies of Shengzhen and Hong Kong, were settled by the Court "according to 
the relevant law and zhengce (policy) of the PRC (yi-ju wuo-guo-you-guang falu-he- 
zhengce)" [People's Courts Press (1990): 250-251],
The further amendment of the 1979 law in April 1990 (1990 EJVL Amendment) has 
again brought it into line with business practice during the 1980s. Thus, the PRCs legal 
experiment within the regulation of foreign economic activities has benefited much from this 
legal framework.
(i).(c) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law
The 1986 WFOEL (860412) clarified within a statutory framework that the PRC 
permits foreign enterprises and other economic organizations or individuals to set up an 
enterprise exclusively with foreign investment. As long as this sort of enterprise abides by 
the PRC laws and regulations and does not harm the social and public interests of the PRC, 
its lawful rights and interests accordingly will be protected by the laws of PRC. For instance, 
Xin-Nan Dyeing Co., a wholly foreign-owned enterprise set up in June 1980 in Shengzhen, 
was deemed as a Chinese legal person by the Court and protected by Chinese law [Zhang et 
al (1990): 280-283].
(i).(d) Contractual Joint Venture Law
\
The form of the contractual co-operative enterprises has provided the best example 
that a business practice, o f which the contract and negotiations play the major parts, may 
become a base for a legal framework regulating a set o f particular business activities. On 
13th April, 1988, the 1st session of the 7th NPC promulgated the long-awaited law governing *
contractual joint ventures, the 1988 Contractual JVL. The product of eight years of
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discussion and a number of drafts, the contractual joint venture law with 28 articles provides 
a basic regulatory guidelines for the development of contractual joint ventures in the PRC.
Emerging from foreign-related business practices, before and after the publications of 
1979 Equity JV Law and 1986 WFOEL, the 1988 Contractual JVL has been adopted with 
more flexibility, while many legislative inspirations can be traced back to the previous laws. 
Especially, when compared with the regulations of equity joint ventures, the 1988 
Contractual JVL summarizes business practice and experience, while the former ones were 
based on models derived from foreign legislation. Being a statute, the 1988 Contractual JVL 
provides investors with greater legal certainty, while the nature of this type of foreign 
investment requires an 'informal' domain within the formal law to maintain the flexibilities of 
business practice, as discussed below. Therefore, this law also provides a better 
understanding of the interaction between the state law and social practice.
In short, from a chronological examination, it is unfair to say that there was no any 
elaborated efforts by both legislative and administrative branches in the regulation of foreign 
investment. However, there has co-existed an expansion of administrative control of foreign 
investment. (i)
(ii) The Forms o f Foreign Investment, Their Legal Status and Informal Domains
Since the late 1970s, the tendency of foreign investment in the PRC has shown that 
the forms of business and their operation in practice may extend beyond the existing legal 
framework, as the cases discussed in the last sections. However, the PRC government has 
developed a rapid legislative programme to improve its control and regulatory framework. 
Foreign corporations, in order to invest in China, should be aware that there are several major 
commercial structure designed to attract foreign capital and advantageous technology, on the 
one hand, and to provide many preferential treatments, on the other. Generally speaking, 
foreign investment may take one of the following forms.
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(ii).(a) Equity Joint Ventures and Business Benefits
Like most developing countries, and also the Eastern European countries, the PRC 
favours the 'equity joint venture' as one of the major vehicles for absorbing direct foreign in­
vestment, because the form permits local capital to participate more fully in the benefits of 
economic development [Cf. UNCTAD (1990); UNCTNC (1988a) and (1988b)]. For 
instance, the equity joint venture promotes the transfer of technical, managerial and business 
know-how more rapidly and effectively than other forms of ventures. The production of 
Zhongguo-Xunda Elevator Co., a Sino-Swiss joint venture, was increased at a double rate 
after the joint operation [JJF-400-ALX (1988): 376].
According to Chinese resource, Beijing Air Catering Ltd. Co.n  was the first Sino- 
foreign joint venture set up under the formal law [JJF-400-ALX (1988): 375]. Under the 
1979 Equity JV Law (790701), an equity joint venture takes the form of a 'limited liability 
company' in which Chinese and foreign partners jointly invest and manage operations.13 
Since a joint venture under the PRC law is a 'limited liability company', each participant is 
liable to the joint venture only up to the limit of the subscribed capital. However, the joint 
venture is a legally independent entity, with legal status as a Chinese 'legal person' and 
accordingly subject to the jurisdiction and protection of PRC law.
(ii).(b) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises and their Informal Origin
The emergence and existence of wholly foreign-owned enterprises before the 
enactment of their regulating law shows that the equity joint venture is not the sole form of 
foreign investment favoured by foreign investors in the PRC [Cf. G. Wang (1988): 19]. 
Foreign investors may establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the PRC, using their
12 The joint venture w u  beet up by Beijing Administration of Civil Aviation and Hong Kong Air Catering Co. cf. JJF-400-ALX (1988): I
According to the proportion of investment contributed by each party, profits, risks and losses am shared. Property rights and land-use 
rights can be taken as part of the assets invested. Foreign parties should own no leas than 25 per cent of the equity, but the maximum 
amount of foreign ownership is not stipulated in the law. Finally, neither party is allowed to withdraw its investment during the 
agreed period of ihe joint venture.
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own capital and independent accounting.14 All or most of their products must be produced 
for export. Moreover, they are not permitted to conduct business operations in the areas of 
domestic commerce, foreign trade, and banking, except in special economic zones or areas 
permitted by the PRC government [B. Chu (1986): 13].
As mentioned above, the wholly foreign-owned 'enterprise' refers to an enterprise 
established in the PRC, it thus exclude branches and residential offices set up in the PRC 
by foreign enterprises and other economic entities. According to the 1986 WFOEL, a wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise is qualified as a 'Chinese legal person' (Article 8) if it meets the re­
quirements for a legal person under the General Principles of the Civil Law. Without such 
status, the enterprise will find it difficult to engage in general economic and civil activities.
(ii).(c) Business Practice and Contractual Joint Ventures
The final part of the so-called "trinity of foreign investment" in the PRC is the 
contractual joint ventures. In a contractual joint venture, sometimes called a co-operative 
joint venture, the liabilities, rights and obligations of the two parties are specified in a joint 
venture 'contract' after consultation and negotiation. This kind of arrangement is 'more 
flexible' than an equity joint venture. Unlike the equity joint venture, a contractual joint 
venture needs not be formed as an independent economic entity. This allows Chinese and 
foreign parties to co-operate as separate legal persons. Generally speaking, foreign 
participants provide capital, advanced technology, equipment and materials, while the 
Chinese parties provide contributions in kind, such as land, real estate, natural resources, 
labour and services. In practice, however, some contractual joint ventures have taken the 
form of limited liability companies [Cf. H.R. Zheng (1988): 236]. In addition, profits and 
losses are shared according to the provisions of the contract rather than in proportion to their 
contribution of assets.
14 A i Chiaeae legal peraoaa. wholly foreiga-owaed calerpriaaa arc realriclad to Ihoae buaiaeaaea which lha PRC government coaaidera 
beneficial to the development of the national economy and which uae advanced technology and equipment (Article 3 of the 1986 
WFOEL (860412)).
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For example, the greatest Sino-foreign joint venture, Ping-Shuo An-Tai-Bao Coal Co., 
has taken the form of a contractual joint venture [Zhang el al (1990): 273-277]. Under the 
thirty-year contract, China Coal Development Co. contributes 42%, American West Oil Co. 
58%, of the US $0.6 Billion. Before making profits, products are shared by both parties 
equally, and after making profits, Chinese side has 60% of products, American side, 40% 
[Zhang et al, ibid.].
More flexibility exists within both the form and the legal status of a contractual co­
operative enterprise, compared with those of an equity joint venture, and provide legally 
many qualifications15 of a contractual co-operative enterprise to be a PRC legal person. 
Therefore, a possibility exists whenever a contractual joint venture without creating a new 
economic entity is not qualified as a PRC legal person, because the 1988 Contractual JVL 
(880413) itself does not require a specific form for the contractual joint venture.
Therefore, with or without creating a new economic entity, the participants may 
determine the forms of operation through negotiation. For instance, they can operate in the 
form of an 'economic association' as mentioned under the PRC Civil Law.16 In the view of 
business practice, the participants normally bear only 'limited liability within their con­
tributions' rather than unlimited joint liability.
(ii).(d) Compensation Trade and its Informality
From the Chinese point of view, compensation trade is a form taken by direct foreign 
investment through which the Chinese party purchases equipment and technology from 
foreign investors on credit, and pays back the principal and interest of the purchase price by 
instalments or on deferred terms using the products produced [cf. Zhang, Wang & Sun
(1990): 208-209]. Usually, the products used for compensation should be those produced
15 A legal penon, according to the Genera/Principle o f /he Civil Low (860412), must poeaeaa: (a) the citabliahmcnl in accordance with 
the law; (b) the necessary property of funds; (c) its own name, organization, and premises; ana, (d) the ability to independently bear 
civil liability.
Article 52 of the General Principles o f the Civil Law (860412) reads: "If the enterprises or an enterprise and an institution that engage 
in economic association conduct joint operation but do not have the qualification of a legal person, each party to the association shall, 
in proportion to its respective contribution to the investment or according to the agreement made, bear civil liability with the property 
each party owns or manages. If joint liability is specified by law or by agreement, the parties assume joint liability .
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directly with the imported technology and equipment, but other products may be used if the 
parties agree and the relevant Chinese authorities approve.
(ii).(e) Other Forms o f Foreign Investment
In addition to the forms of direct investment aforementioned, foreigners may take 
advantage of other forms of investment, such as technology licensing; representative office; 
processing and assembly; and lease financing [Cf. Zhang, Wang & Sun (1990): 209-218]. 
First, technology licensing can be another popular way for foreign investment, given the fact 
that technology is one of core concerns of the open policy and China enacted Trademark Law 
in 1982 and Patent Law in 1984. However, technology transfer contracts in excess of 10 
years are prohibited under two pieces of relevant legislation.17 After expiration of the 
contract period, the licensor cannot prohibit the licensee's use of the technology.
The simplest way for foreign investment can be through the representative offices', 
which, once registered18 in the PRC, can import cars and office equipment and hire staff 
(employed through the Foreign Enterprises Service Corporation).19
Processing and assembling of products' using materials and parts from foreign 
suppliers is by far the most popular form of economic exchange taking place in the SEZs. In 
this type of arrangement, foreign investors supply raw materials, the components or parts to 
be processed or assembled in accordance with their design and specifications, as the case of 
"lai-liao-jia-gong he-tung" (5 December 1981) mentioned in Section V.2.B.(i). The Chinese 
enterprises charge fees for the processing and assembly.
In recent years, 'lease financing' has grown rapidly in the PRC, particularly through 
joint ventures with foreign banks and leasing corporations. One of the major forms of leasing
*7 Th< 1987 Regulations o f the PRC on the Administration o f Technology Acquisition Contracts (870623); and the 1987 Procedures for
Examination and Approval o f Technology Import Contracts (880120).
18 Cf. Ihc 1980 Interim Provisions o f the PRC Concerning the Control o f Rasidmt Offices o f Foreign Enterprises (801030); and. Ibe 
1983 Provisional Regulations for the Establishment o f Representative Offices in China by Overseas Chinese end Foreign Financial 
Institutions (830201) (promulgated by SAIC).
19 Aoooidinsly, representative offices are taxed under both the 1982 Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law and the 1958 Consolidated 
Industrial and Commercial Tax Law (payment of 5.05% of taxable income).
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in the PRC is 'financial leasing' of equipment, although 'operational leasing' also exists. 
Financial leasing may be integrated with equity investment, compensation trade, or 
processing and assembly with materials and parts supplied by foreign firms. The leasing 
business generates certain advantages for Chinese enterprises. It decreases the need for 
foreign exchange, reduces import approval, and eliminates problems with equipment 
obsolescence and technology development. The leasing market in the PRC may provide 
numerous opportunities for foreign investors.
V.3 STATE LAW AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
Although the administrative procedure presents a different picture, the PRC government has 
so far provided an extensive legislative framework to regulate and protect the operations of 
foreign investment. At least, the regime has been attempting to provide every form of 
business, especially in foreign investment, with an appropriate legal base, in order to make 
"two legs"- both business under the open policy and legal mechanism - walk.
Some prevailing business practices and considerations have been simply favoured by 
both foreign investors and the Chinese authorities. Learning from doing, the PRCs legal 
regime has been improving its regulatory mechanism through a long process of interaction 
between new state law, administration and business practice.
VJ.A. "Qualification for Encouragements"
No special qualification of the foreign participants has been mentioned in the 1979 Equity JV  
Law: companies, enterprises, other economic entities, or individuals are permitted. While on 
the Chinese side, Chinese individuals have been not mentioned, that is, only after 198820 
Chinese private enterprises were 'legally' able to be participants in any Sino-foreign joint
20 Prior to two lagialalivc proviaiom. the Chi area participant* ware only lha atata and collactiva anlerpriaea: lha Amendment o f Article I I  
of the 1982 Constitution (880412); and, the Provisional Regulations o f tha PRC on the Private Operated Enterprises (Private 
Enterprises Regulations) (880625).
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ventures.21 Thus, private enterprises22 have been allowed to operate joint ventures with 
foreign participants in accordance with stipulations of the laws and regulations of the PRC.
Secondly, based on the form of enterprises, the 1986 WFOEL has emphasized more 
the operational functions of foreign investment. In accordance with the open policy, the 1986 
WFOEL stipulates that the establishment of this kind of enterprise must benefit the 
development of the PRCs national economy (Article 3). Hence, the first of two types of 
enterprises allowed to operate has been enterprises using advanced technology and 
equipment, which are permitted 'if they manufacture products that are important in the PRCs 
national economy and products that the PRC cannot produce at that time.' Secondly, export 
enterprises 'exporting all or a large portion of their products to help settle the enterprise's 
problems of foreign exchange' also permitted. The obvious advantages behind these two 
types of enterprises explains the PRC's interests in foreign investment, and also later 
developed into the cornerstone of the improved legal framework for the encouragement of 
foreign investment since late 1986 [Cf Section VII.2.A.].
Finally, compared with the equity joint venture,23 an extra-preferential treatment 
exists within the practice of the contractual joint venture. As agreed upon by both the PRC 
and foreign participants in the contract, if ownership of all the 'fixed assets of the contractual 
joint venture' remains with the PRC participant on expiration of the term of co-operation, the 
foreign participants may recover their share of the investment during the term of co­
operation. To a more precise degree, the participants may, in practice, contractually limit 
their respective liability for the debts of the contractual joint venture in accordance with the 
relevant laws.
21 The importance of the 1988 Amendment of 1982 Conetitution wan to legalize the rigfata and internet of the prívale economy. 
Furthermore, the importance of the Private Enterpriaes Regulations (880625) lay in enabling the PRC to be a more open market
Three kinds of private enterprises have been stipulated by the Private Enterprises Regulations: (a) sole proprietorship enterprises; (b) 
partnership enterprises; and (c) limited liability companies.
23 In an equity joint venture, the investors may not recover their share of the investment before expiration of the term on the joint 
venture except 'by aaaigning their investment to the other party or to a third party' according to the law.
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VJ.B. Capitalization and its Business Considerations
According to Chinese resource, there was a case of capitalisation of an old ship, fixed at US 
$200,000, by foreign investor in a joint venture. However, the ship could not operate, so did 
the joint venture later [Zhang et al (1990): 233-237],
The PRC law requires that when the joint venture is registered with the administrative 
authorities the 'registered capital' shall be declared in the 'total amount of investment', 
including both capital construction funds and circulating capital. The legal form of the joint 
venture embodies general principle of the registered capital' which includes the total amount 
of capital subscribed by the participants to the joint venture, and cannot be reduced during the 
term of the joint venture. In practice, this leaves the unknown questions to loans of the joint 
venture.
The major concern of the administrative authorities as to the registered capital can be 
explained from the 'schedule o f proportion' to be strictly followed by enterprises, required by 
the administrative legislation, for instance, the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce's (SAICs) 1987 SAIC Capital Regulations (870301)24, which will be analysed in 
detail in the parts on Administrative Procedure in Sections VII.3.A and VII.3.B below.
Furthermore, the 1979 Equity JV  Law required that foreign investment in a joint 
venture should not be less than 25 percent of the 'registered capital', but not of the total 
amount of investment. Therefore, in business practice, the proportion of the investment 
between the Chinese and foreign participants is, usually, fifty-one and forty-nine percent 
respectively. The investment contributed by each side to a joint venture includes cash, 
capital goods, industrial property, etc. The Chinese party also may include the right of the 
land-use, while foreign party, the technology or equipment qualified as truly advanced and 
appropriate to the PRCs use. However, the business practice has been more flexible than the 
requirements of the formal law. For instance, Fu-Ri Television Ltd. Co., a Sino-Japanesc
24 Provisional Regulationstor the Proportion o f  Registered Capitol lo Total Amount o f Investment o f Joint Ventures Using Chinese anti 
Foreign Investment (01/03/87, by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce); hereinafter cited as SAIC Cepitel Regulations.
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Joint Venture, was set up in June 1981 [Zhang el al (1990): 237-241]. Under the contract, 
the products will be for domestic selling for the first three, after then, for exporting. Also, 
50% of investment by Chinese party is through capitalisation of "factory, equipment, and 
welfare facilities", while other 50% by Japanese through capitalisation of "equipment and 
technology". Moreover, both Chairman of the Board of Directors and General Manager are 
Chinese [Zhang et al, ibid.].
Secondly, in contrast, since the wholly foreign-owned enterprise by its nature is 
owned entirely by the foreign investors, the 1986 WFOEL does not stipulate the form of 
capital invested or its proportion or amount. The law only requires that unless foreign 
investors make their contribution 'within the time limit approved' by the authorities in charge, 
the business licenses of the enterprises will be revoked. Finally, with its flexible nature, the 
1988 Contractual JVL does not require a fixed proportion of investment.25 Accordingly, the 
proportion of investment and the kinds of contribution depend upon negotiation between the 
participants.26
VJ.C. Autonomy and Structure of Enterprise, Labour Issues, and Profit
Operation
Forms of business also involve different degrees of autonomy, power of management, and 
profit operation of foreign investment in the PRC. First of all, in the case of equity joint 
ventures, the board of directors is the highest authority of the joint venture, which decides all 
major issues concerning the operation. The chair of the board, who shall be appointed by the 
Chinese participant, is the 'legal representative' of the joint venture. It is only after the 1990 
Amendment of the Equity JV Law, that a foreigner can be appointed as the chair. On the 
other hand, a joint venture has the right to operate 'independently and autonomously', 
although the influence of Chinese authorities remains in reality inside the joint venture
-------------------------------------- I
25 A> analysed earlier. Ike 1979 Equity JV  Law requires Ihel no leas thin 23 percent of Ike registered capital should be contributed by Ike
foreign side.
^  In practice, the investment, or conditions for cooperation, contributed by participants may be provided in cash or in kind, or may 
include the rights of the use of land, intellectual property rights, non-palenl technical expertise, or other property rights.
1 4 4
V. The PRC: Informal Sector and Legalization
through the local participant. For example, changes of Chinese-side managers happened. At 
least, administrative authorities cannot issue 'directive plans' to a joint venture. A joint 
venture also has the right to export its products and may set up affiliated agencies outside the 
PRC in case of necessity. This autonomy o f enterprise has improved since the era of the 
Cultural Revolution. Even the managerial power to dismiss unqualified or misbehavioured 
workers is guaranteed by the law in the first joint venture in Shanxi Province, Hua-Jie 
Electronic Co. [JJF-400-ALX (1988): 384], In 1988, this has been followed by the case of 
Fan (Mr.) v. X  Air-Condition Equipment Ltd. Co. (16/Mayl88) [People's Court Press (1990): 
58-61].
Indeed, the labour issue is also essential for the operation of foreign investment. For 
instance, Beijing Jeep Ltd. Co., on 8 October 1986, decided to take 10% of yearly profits 
(based upon US $9,000,000 invested) as the funds of labour welfare in this Sino-American 
joint venture, in addition to adoption of 213 of 306 suggestions by the workers [JJF-400-ALX
(1988): 383-384]. It is also Beijing Jeep Ltd. Co. that explained the difficulties of balance of 
foreign exchange. Because of these difficulties, Beijing Jeep stopped operation for two 
months in 1986, until Beijing Administration o f Foreign Exchange transferred US $2,500,000 
from Chang-Cheng (the Great Wall) Hotel to Beijing Jeep on 18 November, 1986 [Zhang et 
al (1990): 250-253]. In this case, the administrative practice assumed the role as a bridge 
between the state law and business operation.
After a payment of the ten percent income-tax levied on the remitted amount,27 all 
profit shared by the foreign participant in a joint venture may be remitted abroad. 
Furthermore, all net assets or remaining property shared by the foreign investors may be 
remitted upon the winding-up of the enterprises. The portion that 'exceeds the registered 
capital'28 may also be remitted abroad after paying the income tax. Finally, after the payment 
of 'individual Chinese income-taxes' and after the 'deduction of expenses in the PRC, foreign
27 Article 4 of the 1981 Income Tex Lew of the PRC on Joint Venhiree Using Chinese end Foreign Investment.
28 Article 10 of the 1979 Equity JV  Law. end Article 106 of the 1983 Equity JV  Implements on Regulations
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personnel and employees of the joint venture, including citizens of Hong Kong and Macao, 
may remit their remaining portion abroad.29
Secondly, the 1986 WFOEL is the first law in which the PRC has announced publicly 
that it shall 'neither nationalize nor expropriate' a wholly foreign-owned enterprise set up 
within the territory of the PRC.30 Nevertheless, in special cases, based upon 'the need of the 
social public interest', the enterprises may be expropriated, but still with a commensurate 
compensation in accordance with legal procedures, as emphasised by the present Chinese 
leadership.
Profits constitute another focus for foreign investors in addition to their rights.31 A 
foreign investor of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, remitting its share of profit outside the 
PRC, does not owe income-tax on the remitted share of profits, being different from the ten 
percent of an income-tax levied on the remitted amount by the 'foreign participant within a 
joint venture'.
Finally, while the new law has imposed many coercive measures on the long-time 
business practice of contractual joint ventures, it also protects the management autonomy of 
the joint venture from administrative interference.32 Different from the form of a joint 
venture, a contractual joint venture will be run by a board of directors only if a new 
independent economic entity is created. Flexibly, the contractual joint venture can operate by 
a 'joint management organ' arranged by both participants under the contract and relevant 
regulations. Either the board of directors or the joint management organ, of which the chair
29 Article 79 of the 1983 Equity JVImplementation Regulation! (amended 1986).
30 This legal guarantee applies even where there doce not exaat a bilateral agreement for the protection of inveatmenta between the 
foreign investor's stale and the PRC.
The Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Foreign Enterprises (1981 Foreign Income Tax Law) (811213) had before July 1991 
governed the taxation of a foreign-owned enterprise. Accordingly, this enterprise enjoys preferential tax treatment of 'exemption and 
reduction' under the relevant laws, regulations, and provisions. Furthermore, the enterprise may apply, in the cue of re-investment of 
the taxed profit within the territory o f  the PRC, for a refund of the portion of the income tax already paid on the re-invested portion.
32 In order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of psrties to joint ventures, the Stale Council in 1987 approved the Provisions on 
the Contribution o f Capital by Parties to Joint Ventures Using Chinese end Foreign Investment (880101), which was promulgated by 
the MOFERT and The State Administration of Industry and Commerce on 1 January, 1988. Article 10 of the Provisions states that 
matters concerning the contribution of capital by parties to 'Chinese-foreign co-operative joint ventures' shall be handled with 
reference to the present Provisions.
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is not necessarily appointed by the PRC side,33 is responsible for making major decisions of 
the joint venture.
Furthermore, the autonomy of the contractual joint venture also lies in the distribution 
of earnings or products, the sharing of risks and losses, and the ownership of the assets at the 
time of the termination of the enterprise depend upon the agreements negotiated by the 
participants and prescribed in the contract. Within the legal text, the 1988 Contractual JVL, 
widely different from the regulations on equity joint ventures,34 provides no requirements 
with regard to these issues.
V_J.D. The Duration, Governing Law, Relevant Business Considerations and
Environmental Disputes
First, whether business operations will continue for the duration of an equity joint venture, 
which is normally within ten to thirty years, depends on the actual conditions of the particular 
projects. However, a joint venture may be extended, on a case-by-case base, to fifty years on 
projects requiring large amounts of investment, long construction periods, and low interest 
rates or funds, which either 'produce highly sophisticated products with advanced or key 
technology supplied by the foreign partner1 or 'produce competitive products for the world 
market' (Article 100 of the 1983 EJVL Implementation Regulations). Since 1986, in order to 
promote these two operational "functions" mentioned, the PRC has change regulations to 
encourage long-term economic co-operation. The duration thus may be extended to more 
than fifty years35 upon special approval by the State Council. An Amendment for further 
extension of the duration has been permitted in 1990 [Cf. Section VII.2.B].
» The business practice of the contractual joint ventures suggests that the chair of the board ia appointed by one of the partners and vice­
chair by the other.
^  In the joint ventures, the profits, risks and losses shall be shared by the parties, according to proportion to their contributions to the 
registered capital.
^  The amendment of Article 100 of the 1983 Equity JV  Implementation Regulation (860115), on 15 January, 1986, by the State 
Council, which extended the duration of a joint venture from 30 years to 50 years.
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For the duration of the joint venture, the settlement of disputes arising from the 
contract, according to the Foreign Economic Contract Law, must be governed by the laws 
of the PRC because it is performed within the PRC. Where the laws of the PRC do not have 
a relevant provision, then international practice will apply.
In contrast, based upon the nature and requirements of the business, the duration of 
operation of the wholly foreign-owned enterprise can be decided by the foreign investors. 
However, it must be declared in both the 'feasibility study report' and the 'application' for 
establishing the enterprise. The authorities will determine whether the duration is appro­
priate, when these documents are filed for examination and approval. Based on the practical 
needs, the operation may be extended by 'filing an application with the examination and 
approval authority' 180 days, prior to expiration.
Furthermore, in contrast, the term of co-operative joint venture, under the principle of 
the 1988 Contractual JVL, depends on agreement by the Chinese and foreign participants. 
Accordingly, the law permits both parties to extend the duration if an agreement for 
extension has been reached between them, and hence provides maximum flexibility.
Finally, a famous environmental dispute of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, Hong 
Kong Kai-Da Co. (14/July/84) was decided by the Court as against the PRCs Environmental 
Protection Law (790913) (Articles 6, 16, and 32) [Din el al (1988): 262-266; also Zhang el al 
(1990): 277-280].
V.4 THE ROLE OF INFORMAL SECTOR UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE VEIL 
IN THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
With no exception to Taiwan's case, a reaction of administrative intervention comes after the 
legalization of business practices through the formal law. To a great degree, the statutory 
framework of foreign investment in the PRC is supported by the coercive measures, from 
both the delegated legislation and administrative discretion, of the administrative authorities 
at all levels. Both administrative legislation and procedure provide close control by the
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central government over the foreign investments that have been developing in different areas 
within the PRC.
V.4.A. The Expansion of Administrative Sectors
From a practical viewpoint, categories of statutes and regulations of the PRC have, to a great 
degree, confused not only foreign investors but also Chinese legal scholars. Also, the 
existence of administrative legislation opens an interesting question about the interaction 
between foreign investment and bureaucracy, between private economic activity and the state 
authorities. As a fact, the contradictions of administrative veil have been far beyond the 
purpose of the liberalization of investment conditions through the formal law in the PRC, this 
has been the exact case of Taiwanese law of foreign investment.
(i) The Function o f Administrative Legislation on Foreign Investment
It is the function of administrative legislation that produces the contradictions of 
administrative intervention on foreign investment. The duality of both "fang" (let bloom) and 
"shou" (rein in) - "walking on two legs" - has existed within the "delegated legislation".
In some cases, the Notice (tong-zhi) issued by the administrative authorities has 
directly implemented the national policy (zhengce), and has more effects on the foreign 
economic activities. For instance, in Zhongguo-Wujin-Kuangchian Co. (China Metallic 
Mining Co.) v. Hog Kong S.F. Shipping Co. (9/April/84), the MOFERTs "Notice on Re­
announcing No Trading with South Korea, Israel and South Africa"*6 was the key. The steel 
materials were shipped, not from Mozambique under the contract, but from the Elizabeth 
Harbour in South Africa, which was accordingly illegal under the PRCs policy. 34
34 "Guanyu ChangiMang Bulong Nan cMn a  man,  Y ita r-M u  ka Nan f t  Jmnn maoy, ¡Mi Tong-du’ , ci. Din. L i *  Xu (1988): 251-255.
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(i).(a) The Legal Base o f Administrative Legislation and the Rise o f Local Legislation
Basically, administrative regulations37 adopted by the State Council, ministries and by 
local governments are for the implementation of the Constitution and the laws and policies 
adopted by the NPC. Generally speaking, most of the laws adopted by the NPC are general 
in nature and are therefore usually 'supplemented' by more detailed rules and regulations 
promulgated by the State Council or relevant ministries thereunder. According to Article 6 
of the Organic Law on Local Congress and Local Government o f the PRC (790701) (July 1,
1979; amended December 10, 1982), local congresses and governments at various levels are 
permitted to enact laws 'suitable to local conditions', provided that such laws and regulations 
do not contravene the Constitution, or the laws or policies adopted by the central government.
The best example is the so-called "22 A r t i c l e s as soon as they were passed in October,
1986, many provincial and local governments promulgated similar regulations to give foreign 
investors more incentives.38
The decentralization of legislative, following the expansion of administrative power, 
was further empowered by a "Decision of the 3rd Session of the 6th NPC of the PRC on the 
Authorization of the State Council in the Formulation of Interim Provisions or Regulation 
Concerning the Economic Structural Reform and Economic Opening to the External World 
(850410.1)". Nonetheless, given the rise of the local legislation, this implies that the State 
Council has more power to harmonize its interim provisions, ministerial provisions and local 
regulations. Thus, the administrative office of the State Council published a Notice (tong- 
zhi) on 7 March 1987, which requires both local governments and ministerial departments to 
report their new "administrative regulations", with twenty-five copies of one form, within 30 
days after ratification [Law Yearbook o f China (1988): 137-138]. Furthermore, both 
administrative offices of the Standing Committee of the NPC and the State Council, issued a
37 Fran the turvry of the document», Chinese legislation can be subdivided into three categories, namely. (1) laws Um-U) and |
regulations (tiao-li); (2) ministerial provisions (gue-din) and administrative rules (hsin-zhen fa-gut); and (3 ) local regulations (di- 
fang hnn fa-gut). Laws are superior to administrative rulea and local regulatioM.
^  F°r ®*ample, a set of regulations have been published since then, including "Provisions o f the Shanghai Municipality for the 
Encouragement o f Foreign Investment* (861011), adopted on 11 October. 1986. promulgated on 23 October. 1986. Shanghai OIU 
Manual (1988).
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Notice on 25 May 1987, with the same requirements on the "local legislation" for fifteen 
copies of one form [Law Yearbook o f China (1988): 137], In short, the PRC government 
makes major efforts in rationalization of the legalization process and legislation of economic 
activities.
(i).(b) The Relationship between Administrative Regulations and Statutes
Indeed, under the laws adopted by both the NPC and the State Council there exist in 
reality two branches of administrative regulations: ministerial provisions and local legisla­
tion. The fact that these two branches are not combined into one single legislation also 
shows that there exist both practical needs and the possibilities of conflicts, as analysed 
below.
Ministerial provisions, within the category of administrative regulations, are more 
limited in nature and their application is generally within the sphere of the "function" of the 
ministry in question. Basically, the ministerial provisions are intended to supplement and 
implement regulations adopted by the State Council. These ministerial regulations have a 
nationwide application and may be supplemented by 'local legislation' which takes into 
account the conditions and circumstances in the local areas. After the "22 Articles" were 
promulgated in October, 1986, for instance, the MOFERT, the People's Bank of China, and 
the MOF etc. subsequently issued implementing rules covering such areas as examination 
and confirmation of export-oriented enterprises and technologically-advanced enterprises 
with foreign investment, import and export licences, loans in Chinese currency and taxation. 
Also the Ministry of Labour and Personnel issued labour and wage rules39 for the 
implementation of the "22 Articles".
Nevertheless, there were some ministerial provisions or administrative regulations 
promoted later, by virtue of their importance in practice, towards the higher grade as laws
» "Provisions o f the Ministry of, 
ths Hiring o f Personnel and < 
Manual (1988). 257-260
Labour and Personnel o f the PRC on the Rights o f Autonomy o f Enterprises with Foreign Investment ii 
on Wages, Insurance and Welfare Expenses o f Staff and Workers', an English taxi in Shanghai OIU
I
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and regulations by the State Council. This flexibility explains how the administration has its 
important part to play in the practical modelling of foreign investments. Furthermore, in the 
light of interaction between the legislative and administrative powers, to what degree the 
Standing Committee of the NPC, especially its Working Committees, to cooperate with the 
State Council and various ministries to research and draft legislation for the implementation 
of the economic policies of the PRC remains interesting. However, the rapidly increasing 
amount of administrative legislation reflects that the State Council's delegated-legislative 
power has been increased.
As to the conflicts of both ministerial provisions and local legislation, a Notice was 
issued by the Supreme People's Court, on 9 December 1985, with some guidance to lower 
courts that if local legislation conflicts with either the Constitution, national laws (by the 
NPC and its Standing Committee) or administrative regulations (by the State Council), the 
courts should ''report” the conflicts to the local People's Congress and its standing 
committee.*0 Both the Notice and the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC 
(890404) have not specified how the courts should act or what the result might be reached. 
The only reference of the November 1988 draft of the 1989 Law above provided that in such 
case the national law would be of precedence [Finder (1989): 26]. Thus, in practice, the State 
Council's coordinating function shall settle the disputes.
However, the recent trend following the rise of local legislation has shown that 
several administrative and judicial problems are getting serious, such as contradictions from 
legislative "bei-erh-bu-shen" (recording without checking) [G.X. Xu (1990): 39], "di-fang- 
bao-hu-zhu-yi" (local protectionism) in economic litigations [Lian (1991)]. In his report to 
the NPC on 29 March, 1990, Ren Jian-xin, the Head of the Supreme People's Court, pointed 
out that the major obstacles in economic dispute settlement have come out of the "local 
protectionism" and "ben-wei-zhu-yi” (selfishness), which should be stopped.40 1
40 "Ouaayu Jiaqiang Jiaaji Shcnpan Ooagzuo da Tonpki’ (9/12/1983). reprinted ia Yia Songnian (ad.) 'Xiaazhaa Xueong Zkiaki 
Skouce" (1988) (Handbook of knowledge of Adminiatralivc Litigation), pp. 206 and 209; ciled ifl S. Finder (1989): 25.
41 Report oa Ike Work of ika Supreme People'a Court (29/Marck/1990). ky Rea Jiaa-aia. publiaked oa People's Daily (Beijing) 
( 10/4^0): 2. reprinted ia Faeaa (D41), 1990 No 3. pp 47-56; pp 34-33.
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(ii) Authorities in Charge o f  Foreign Investment
From the structure of the administrative system regulating foreign investment, we can 
see that before the 'formal' establishment of a foreign-invested enterprise there existed two 
procedures under a same set of authorities at all levels [cf. Zhang, Wang & Sun (1990): 231- 
233; Wang, Xu & Zhou (1984): 325-333]. Normally, within the first procedure, foreign 
participants, or with their Chinese participants together, have to receive a certificate of 
approval. Secondly, the authorities, especially the MOFERT, retain the final discretion and 
powers of intervention between the registration and the final report for the record.
(ii).(a) Authorities in charge o f  Registration
Although mainly procedural, the Administration o f Enterprise Legal Person 
Registration Regulations Implementing Rules*2 (881103) (hereafter cited as the 
"Registration Rules") provide many instances of substantive corporate law which is lacking 
in the PRC today. For example, Rule 31 requires that the registered capital of an enterprise 
shall, in general, be equal to the amount of funds possessed by the enterprise at the time of 
registration. Basically, the Registration Rules apply to two broad types of 'non-government 
entity': "legal person entities" and "enterprises without legal status".42 3 Rule 73 requires that 
"the administration of the registration of enterprises from foreign countries (regions) which 
engaged in operations in the PRC shall be handled in accordance with special regulations. 
This, then, suggests that the Registration Rules do not apply to representative offices.
42 Promulgated by the State Admioiatratioa for Industry and Commerce on 3rd November, 1968, and effective from let December, t
1988; and enacted pursuant to Administration of Enterpriae Legal Person Registration Regulationa (880513) ("Registration 
Regulations').
43 The first type covers legal person entitias. such as enterpriaes with foreign investment, stale, collective and private enterprises (Rule 
2). The second type includes "enterprises which do not qualify for legal status", including branches and oftices of enterprises with 
foreign inveetment (Rule 3).
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The Registration Rules provide that the Administration for Industry and Commerce 
authorities led by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC, included) are 
the authorities in charge of registration44 [cf. Section VII.3].
(ii).(b) Authorities in charge o f  Approval
State intervention in the foreign investment approval process can be understood 
within the context of the PRC's economic development programme. To prevent the 
implementation of unauthorized investment projects, and to confirm that authorized projects 
will be carried out within the scope originally set by the State planning, all projects must be 
approved by the relevant government authorities before the contracts and agreements may be 
considered legally binding. In practice, what level of approval, local or central, is required 
for different types of projects has been the source of much confusion for foreign investors 
[Wang, Xu & Zhou (1984): 332-333].
The reason for this uncertainty lies in the fact that there is so far no national 
legislation regulating the approval procedures for foreign investment projects. The only 
existing relevant legislation is the 1979 Joint Venture Law which requires, in Article 3, that 
equity joint ventures be approved by the Foreign Investment Commission, now a merged part 
of the MOFERT, functioning under the new similar Foreign Investment Bureau. In 1983, 
however, this provision has been amended by the 1983 EJVL Implementing Regulations. 
Article 8 of the Regulations provides the MOFERT may in certain circumstance entrust its 
approval powers to other authorities, but the Regulations do not specify who these entrusted 
authorities may be. Nor do these regulations address approval matters relating to forms of 
investment other than equity joint ventures [also cf. Section VII.2.B],
A« to enterprises with foreign investment, these sdntinistrstive regulstions hsve required "regionsl Administration for Industry sod 
Commerce authorized by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce” which shad be responsible for administering the 
registration (Rule 12). First, therefore, the registration of enterprises with foreign investment which are approved by "the People's 
Government of a province, Autonomous Region or Centrally Governed Municipality or an authority authorized by the government* 
and those which are approved by "the examination and approval authority at a higher level to which such People's Government or 
authority submitted for approval", shall be administered by the Administration for Industry and Commerce of "the relevant province, 
Autonomous Region or Centrally Governed Municipality" authorized by the SAIC. Secondly, the registration of enterprises with 
foreign investment which are approved by "the People's Government of a municipality or an authorized by the government", and 
those approved by "the examination and approval authority at a higher level to which such People's Government or agency submitted 
for approval”, shall be administered by the Administration for Industry and Commerce of the relevant municipality" authorized by the
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Therefore, for information concerning the current status of Chinese policy regarding 
foreign investment approvals, evidence gleaned from Chinese practice and the advice from 
Chinese counterparts are relatively important. So far, some basic criteria developed from the 
administration, such as the amount ceiling of the investment, national importance of the 
project, and the special regulations, have been used by the authorities in determining the 
approval of foreign investment.
On the other hand, the scope of authority granted to local organs for the independent 
approval of investment projects has widened considerably in recent years [cf. NBDC-II,45 in 
The Nineties (May 1992): 55-56; Shambaugh (1992): 31]. This is permitted under the 1983 
EJVL Implementing Regulations aforementioned, while contracts approved by the local 
agencies pursuant to a valid exercise of authority must still sent to the MOFERT in Beijing 
"for the record (bei an)" (Article 8). However, the result of the local approval has been re­
ported as "chong-fu-yin-jin" (over-repetition of attraction of foreign invested items) in 
different areas [NBDC-II, ibid.].
This trend of the "decentralization of approval authority" in recent years has been 
towards the development at the local level of rules regarding the approval procedures for in­
vestment projects. Many of these are classified as "nei-bu" (internal) rules, for use only by 
Chinese organizations, while others have been made public. A best example of the public 
ones is the 1984 Procedures (for Trial Implementation) o f the Shanghai Municipality 
Concerning the Negotiation and Procedures for Application and Examination for 
Establishing Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures and Accepting Foreign Investment in Self-Run 
Enterprises (840701.1). Later, an omnibus legislation* 44 for the application and approval of 
foreign investment was enacted in Shanghai in 1986.
45 ’Uei-Bu-Diao-Ce’ (Internal Investigation on the Development of the PRC) by China Aaaociation of Management Adminietmtion 
\dhongguo qiyeh■ guangh xueihueiy China Aaaociation of Foreign Invested Enlerpriaea [Zhongguouiaishang tousi qtyeh ruaa/uiei). 
and laatitule tor Economic Inatitutton and Adminiatration under Committee of Inalitutional Reform of the PRC [Zhongguo-tiganvei 
Jmgji tssht yu guanh yen-jio-shuo\. Part I (cited aa NBDC f) published in The Nineties (April. 1992. Hong Kong): JO-39; Part II |
(cited aa NBDC ID. The Moaner (May. 1992. Hong Kong): 33-57.
44 "Provision* o f Shanghai Municipality on Application and Approval o f Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Vanturas, Chinese-Foreign
Cooperative Ventures and Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital’ , adopted by the 22nd Seaaion of the Standing 
Committee of the Eighth People's Congress of Shanghai on 20 June. 1986. An English teat in Shanghai OIU Manuel (2988). pp 335
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V.4.B THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INFORMAL SECTOR
With a formal statutory structure, there are still some key legal and extra-legal issues that 
continue to affect the process of negotiating and operating foreign investments. For instance, 
in addition to the problems of the approval process of foreign investment, other difficulties 
include the management of labour, balancing of foreign exchange and operating costs, 
administrative control both from the officials and regulations, and all these legal- 
administrative problems remain a crucial issue for foreign investment in China [cf. Wang, Xu 
& Zhou (1984): 340-343].
(i) Bureaucracy as the Gatekeeper fo r  Foreign Investment: Legal Vs. Extra-Legal
The administrative veil under the law remains crucial to foreign investors, although 
law has assumed a more important role since 1979. In those provisions of the earlier legisla­
tion, almost everything—even the tax rate to be applied to a joint venture—was left to later 
negotiations and decisions,47
However, the most important aspect to be considered in examining the legal regime 
governing foreign investment is the Chinese attitude, especially that of the Communist old 
leaders, towards law itself. When the renaissance of the PRC's modem legal system was 
initiated in 1978, the Chinese leadership viewed law,48 rather than administrative orders, as 
an effective instrument for regulating social and economic affairs [Cf. Sections V.2.A]. This 
view was reiterated at a recent conference of the NPC in April, 1991.49 To create satisfactory 
investment conditions in China, including the availability of 'fair and equitable treatment1
To bo lure, the PRC hao not produced legillllioo on every point of concern in the negotiation of foreign invoatment, nonethcleas, the 
•Ututes catalogued above in the earlier sections, other laws that specifically govern joint ventures, and numeroua pieces of general 
legislation that affect joint ventures as well as other types of foreign business projects, constitute a rich body of law to which foreign 
investors may refer in planning and negotiating foreign investment projects in China.
48 Although the quality of legislation and administrative measures remain questionable, the PRC has made subsuntial progress in its 
modern legal system since 1979, especially following the 1982 constitutional legislation. The National People's Congreaa, the Suie 
Council and other prominent legislative bodies have promulgated about 100 laws and regulations relating to foreign economic 
relations. Cf. Section VU.2.B.
49 Beijing Review (15-21 /Apri 1/91): centrefold, p. XIV.
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and legal protection for foreign investment, the PRC government has attached great impor­
tance to the establishment of a comprehensive and sophisticated legal framework for foreign 
investment.
For instance, in the case of Nio-tuo-zi-cung v. Ta-zhong Co. (3011011986),50 the 
Appeal Court of the PRC decided that the Nio-tuo-zi-cung Village Residence Committee 
must complete the obligations under the contract of leasing land with the Sino-Japanese joint 
venture [Din, Li & Xu (1988): 266-268; JJF-400-ALX (1988): 382-383], However, although 
the joint venture was protected under the law and could start its business operation, three 
further problems shall be taken into account here: the disputes came from the Chinese local 
authorities unexpectedly, the cost and troubles caused by the administrative intervention, and 
the difficulties of the long-term neighbourhood.
However, with regard to the implementation of the economic strategy, the
enforcement o f law remains uncertain. The problems of administrative intervention in
business has been one o f long-historical issues in Chinese domestic and foreign economic
activities. Even in the late 1980s unreasonable administrative intervention in business by
officials without regard to the law was criticized by the PRC government itself.31 The extra-
legal effects from the Chinese administrative system has been pointed out in a Chinese book:
"Our country develops the planning economy, one enterprise transfers itself from the 
state enterprise into a Sino-foreign enterprise, or sets up a Sino-foreign equity joint 
venture, must have a series of arrangements, and the consistent opinions on every 
question between the upper authorities and the lower units... [Wang, Xu & Zhou
(1984): 340]"
Furthermore, the problem of the efficiency of the bureaucracy has been the second 
question. These problems arose because government officials have little understanding of *51
A contract of leasing land between Tm-zhong (a Sino Japanese pharmacy equity joint venture) end Nio-hto-ti Village Residence 
Community, near Tianjin City, waa signed on 10th October. 1981, for the company to construct the factory. However, after the 
building-up on 21st March, 1984, the Village Residence Committee immediately asked the company to restore the land for 
agricultural use. However, on 30 October, 1986, the Appeal Court dismissed with the causes of the Nio-tuo-xi to change the contract. 
The case waa reported in Ren-min Ri-bao (People's Daily) on 20th November, 1986; analysed by two books referred above.
51 E.g., when an article in the Asian Wall Street Journal (20/01/87) pointed this question out. a PRC Stats Councillor Ou Mu commented
that 'there are many departments responsible for the enterprises with foreign participation but no one can solve their problems.' Ou 
also said that in some places officials either do not follow the law or simply regard their own words as law. Cited in O. Wang (1988):
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international economic relations, foreign investment and the attitudes of foreign
businessmen.52 The structural impact on efficiency has been obvious:
"At this moment, so many units are related with the Sino-foreign enterprises. Some 
Chinese participants need the ratifications from more than ten authorities, ... foreign 
investors accordingly complain this repeatedly... [Wang, Xu & Zhou (1984): 332- 
333]"
Also, corruption presents another problem [Riskin (1987): 336]. It is reported that the 
lack of a sound supervision and control system of bureaucracy created one of the major diffi­
culties of the economic reform.53 The State Council, as G. Wang has pointed out, has 
prohibited presentation or acceptance of gifts in the course of foreign trade or other economic 
relations.54 Nevertheless, economic crimes are still committed by government officials 
involved in foreign economic activities and this is detrimental to foreign investment in China 
[Riskin (1987): 336]. Such behaviour by government officials as well as managerial staff 
members is harmful to the improvement and development of Sino-foreign economic relations 
and increases the general feeling of uncertainty and the expense which foreign investors have 
to bear. Although they are not strictly part of bureaucratic or administrative interference in 
foreign investment, they are bureaucracy-related and destructive to foreign investment. But, 
it is the powers given to the bureaucrats that put them in a position to make such demands. 
Finally, the increasing tension between the local and central administrative, along with 
economic development, has caused other uncertainties for the foreign investors.
(ii) Issues o f Legislation and Legality
The growth of legislation on foreign-related economic law since the late 1970s 
explains the increasingly important role of law in Chinese economic development. This is
2 'In fact, in aomc places, government officials understand neither international business transactions nor China's opeo policy. They 
may interrupt the normal business operations of enterprises involving foreign participation and, in particular, look disapprovingly on 
successful ventures. As a result, even those who are satisfied with China* investment climate are afraid of telling the true story, 
because by doing so they may fall prey to the jealousies of local authorities, provoke allegations of profileering, or encourage appeals 
for 'donations” or sufTer price rises by suppliers'. O. Wang ( 1968): 35. |
53 Asiaweek (Ym-Zhou Zhou Kan) (19/May/91): 1213.
54 'The prohibition extended to all kinds of gifts except articles of educational value, such as books and scientific data, commercial 
samples and non-conaumer-type souvenirs exchanged during friendly activities. Some Chinese officials involved in foreign invest­
ment favour a foreign partner who sponsors overseas trips, frequently under the guise of ”study” or "training” tours. Some of them 
even solicit bribes from foreign counterparts'. O. Wang (1988): J6-37.
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also true of the issues of legitimacy and legality. The foreign-related statutes, rules, and legal 
documents in the PRC are sometimes called "laws", "regulations" at the statutory level, and 
other times labelled "regulations", "measures", "announcements", "rules" and "circulars" at 
the administrative-legislative level.53 The legislative process for these statutes and rules 
exists at different levels within the Party-State administrative and legislative organs.
(ii).(a) The Requirement o f  Legality in the Administrative Legislation
The supreme level of the formal legislative process in the PRC is legislation by the 
NPC and its Standing Committee [cf. Sections III.5.A and III.5.B]. Hence, the Constitution 
of the PRC is the supreme legal instrument, and according to Article 5(2) of the Constitution, 
"no laws or administrative or local rules and regulations may contravene the Constitution". 
The "laws", or "basic statutes", rank second in the levels of legislation, and they can be 
enacted and amended by the NPC, under Article 62(3) thereof. Next are statutes enacted by 
the SC-NPC according to Article 67(2) of the Constitution.
The second level of the legislative process is through the functions of the State 
Council. The State Council, according to Article 89(1), exercises the power "to adopt admin­
istrative measures, enact administrative rules and issue decisions and orders in accordance 
with the Constitution and statute". Although under Article 67(7) of the Constitution, the SC- 
NPC can exercise the power "to annul those administrative rules and regulations, decisions or 
orders of the State Council which contravene the Constitution and the law", in reality the 
Party-State mechanism coordinates and smooths the legislative process by the State Council. 
So far, no annulment case has ever arisen.
There has been a trend of the rise of local legislations since 1982 [cf. Sections V.2.B 
and V.4.A.(i)]. Below the State Council there is a lower legislative level. The provincial and 
municipal people's congresses directly under the Central Government also have the power, as *
ss For eum plc. ih» legal documenta listed in Skangha, Ovanamt l a w M M  Univano* Marnimi (Shanghai Tratmlstioa Press. Shanghai: 
March, 198Ä; ISBN: 7-SOS 14*11S-S/D. 11); hereinafter ciled at Shanghai OIU Manual (IMS)
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mentioned earlier (Article 100 of the Constitution), to adopt "local regulations, so long as 
these do not contravene the Constitution, the law, and administrative rules and regulations, 
and they shall report them to the SC-NPC for the record". However, under Article 67(8) of 
the Constitution, the SC-NPC has the power to annul those regulations if they contravene the 
Constitution, statutes, or the administrative rules and regulations. Since 1982, Article 116 of 
the Constitution provides the organs of self-government of national autonomous areas greater 
legislative authority.56
These three legislative levels within the governmental system complete the legislative 
process in the PRC today. To sum up, under the 1982 Constitution the legal system is better 
equipped with both legitimacy and legality, in contrast to the pre-1979 legal situation. 
Therefore, we shall be more concerned with enforcement of the law.
(ii).(b) The Role o f Party-State and the Contradiction o f Both Legitimacy and Legality
Nonetheless, in the early 1980s, some works and publications have pointed out that in 
China, "the power to make law principally rests with two authorities: the SC-NPC and the 
Standing Committee of the CPC". This further reminds us of these political norms of 
zhengce, jieding, zhishi, shelun, referred by Zhang Youyu and Wang Shuwen, at the 
beginning of this Chapter. A serial collection of the PRC laws includes decisions or decrees 
of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC, because "decisions or 
decrees of that organ sometimes have the power of law".17 The editor of the collection 
explains that these decisions and decrees often appear "as broad principles or policy 
guidelines that the State Council would follow for fabricating regulations for their im­
plementation".
56 .Article 116 of the 1982 Constitution reads, "People's congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact autonomy 
regulations and specific regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities »
in the areas concerned. The autonomous regions shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for 
approval before they go Into effect. Those of autonomous prefectures aod counties shall be submitted to the standing committees of 
the people's congresses of provinces or autonomous regions for approval before they go Into effect, and they shall be reported to the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record."
37 T.i Dm  (H.K.. 1983): Prate*, p. V.
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Indeed, for instance, the 1984 Decision o f the Central Committee o f Communist Party 
of China on the Reform o f the Economic Structure (841020) is believed to be one of guide­
lines for the State Council's economic administration, and was collected in another 
publication of PRC statutes. Another good example is the 1986 Provisions o f the Central 
Committee o f Communist Party o f China and the State Council on Further Checking the 
Party and Administrative Organs and the Cadres Therein from Engaging in Business and 
Running Enterprises (860204.1) enacted jointly by both the Party and the State Council. 
Therefore, although the Party-State mechanism can coordinate and smooth the legislative 
process within the government system, the PRC still faces the dilemma of how to justify the 
legitimacy of the State and the Party and their relationship.
These two examples of regulations passed by the CPC demonstrate a fundamental 
paradox. Their intention clearly seems to be to reduce bureaucracy and encourage the rule of 
law by emphasizing legality and legitimacy. However, the regulations themselves are an 
emanation and embodiment of bureaucracy.
V.5 CONCLUSIONS
Since 1979, China has been moving, "walking on two legs”, towards a mixed economy where 
planning and market co-exist, with the bulk of the state enterprises and the more important 
industrial sectors managed by planning and with the remaining parts of economy regulated 
by the market. The Party-State mechanism, like the equivalent in Taiwan, has itself provided 
many structuring flexibilities, and informal sector accordingly, in this long transformation 
period o f integrating both domestic and international markets. This Chapter has discussed 
the role o f duality of Chinese state law and it informal domains under the open policy.
It has shown, following the elaboration of improvements of legal frameworks of 
foreign investment, there has been an expansion of control of business practice by both 
administrative and legislative authorities. During the First Wave of Encouragement of
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Foreign Investment, these actions, reactions, and interactions between "state law", 
"administrative measures", and "business practice" have been actively progressing. With a 
comparison of these interactions in Taiwan during 1960-1990, the Party political norms, 
zhengce, has first come to urge private investment to national development, the state law has 
then assumed the role of a vehicle for putting these Party political norms into practice. 
Furthermore, the administration has played the part as a bridge between the state law and 
business practice, which has been in nature moving faster than the changes of the formal law. 
Then, the changing elements of zhengce, administration and business practice again lead the 
direction of legal changes and the later legislation. Thus, a clear picture has co-existed in 
both Taiwan and the PRC, that is, the formal law remains as gongju (instrument) of zhengce 
(policy), on the one hand; and faces the challenges from informal sector within both 
administrative discretion and business practice, on the other hand.
Nonetheless, during the First Wave discussed, state law still has its positive but 
limited role to play. At least, up to the enactment of the 1988 Contractual JV Law, a process 
of "legalization" of foreign-related business practice has developed. However, this plethora 
of legislation has itself created both legal and extra-legal problems within the general 
environment of foreign investment regulation, which will be further discussed in Chapter VII.
For the legal problems concerned, due to the differences which exist between national 
laws and local regulations, foreign investors may be confused as to which law should prevail 
when local regulations conflict with the national laws. Generally, relationship between the 
general laws and the administrative legislation remains uncertain through the co-ordination of 
the State Council [Section V.4.A.(i).(a)]. This is especially so, given the importance of the 
various forms of foreign investments and local circumstances.
Indeed, in contrast to the period before 1979, the PRC's economic policy now gives 
the first priority to economic construction, while the socialist transformation of productive 
relations decreases its importance. The price to be paid for this policy-shifting has been 
economic disorder, such as inflation, an increasing unemployment, unbalanced distribution of
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materials and resources, and economic injustices, which are the major reasons behind the 
1989 Tiananmen demonstration [cf. Zhong-fa (1992) No. 2 Document], Furthermore, the 
change of development strategy has focused on the "selective" approach to vigour the 
economy, such as using both foreign technology and capital, opening the SEZs and other 
open coastal ares, and, in law and business regulating various forms of business with 
individual legislation and administrative regulations.
Indeed, behind China's rich body of law, administrative practice still plays an 
important and semi-concealed role. While the emergence of this increasingly complete legal 
system has eliminated the need to muddle away on numerous basic issues, it has by no means 
made both the negotiation and the operation of foreign investment a smooth or routine 
process. Nor has it necessarily shortened the average time required to bring a project from 
the initial letter of intent or other preliminary document, over to the final contract, then 
through to practical operation. Thus, we shall develop our analysis of the interaction between 
law and administration, between the statutory framework, administrative procedure, and 
business practice of foreign investment during the Second Wave of Encouragement in 
Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VI. FURTHER PROMOTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
TAIWAN THROUGH FORMAL LAW
VI.l INTRODUCTION
After the 30-year enforcement of the 1960 SEI, the recent legislation of the 1990 Statute for 
Upgrading Industries (SUI) has explained the fact that the bureaucracy of the Nationalists is 
highly flexible and efficient in administration of business regulation, but conservative and 
inefficient in the legislative activities and liberalizing general economic structure of Taiwan.
In October 1988, a report by the Chinese Economic Institute (Taipei) for the Industrial 
Department under MoEA put five suggestions* on the review of the 1960 SEI for the 
directions of the proposed SUI. The most crucial point thereof has been the changes of 
encouraging policies have been put in the hands of "administrative manipulation" [xin-zhen- 
bu-men zi-yuo-cao-zhong] through legal empowering technically [CEI (Taipei) (1988): 18]
Indeed, only through the cautious examination of the 1990 SUI, can we understand 
that the problems of upgrading industries in Taiwan and other relevant social issues, such as 
inflation and high price of land, were caused by the mistakes of policy-making of 
bureaucracy during the 1950s-1970s, by the conservative attitude of the economic 
bureaucrats, and by the unreasonable relationship between domestic entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats. Thus, when we envisage the relationship between law, administration and 
foreign investment, the so-called "Taiwan Miracle" praised by the bureaucrats themselves 
needs a reckoning.
Taiwan faces both internal and external challenges in its development towards greater
I
prosperity. For instance, in spring of 1988, a succession of farmers' demonstrations and 
labour strikes occurred for the first time in Taiwan since 1949. The economic growth rate 
since then was higher than expected, so was the desperate demand for economic rights to de­
velopment from the farmers and labour. Furthermore, despite Taiwan's internal tensions, the »
* ( 1 ) the I960 SEI h u  over empowered adminietrative authorities; (2) both tax and financial encouragements have been loo excessive;
(3) the tax encouragement have got exactly the opposite effects of competition; (4) the tax encouragement has been over complicated; 
and. (3) the serious problems of tax avoidance and erosion have been long existed under the I960 SEI [cf. CEI (Taipei) (1988): 18
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United States has expressed dissatisfaction over her trade deficit with Taiwan. The Tai­
wanese side has tried hard, but largely unsuccessfully to explain to the US delegation the 
political, economic, and social effects of the US demands on its internal situation. In this 
Chapter we shall develop our analysis of law, administration and foreign investment from the 
comparison between the 1960 SEI and the 1990 SUI within the context of development of 
Taiwan.
VI.2 PROTECTIONISM VS. LIBERALIZATION WITHIN THE FORMAL LAW: 
THE 1990 STATUTE FOR UPGRADING INDUSTRIES AS THE SECOND WAVE
From 1st January, 1991 on, the 1990 SUI has replaced the 1960 SEI as the major legislation 
of both domestic and foreign investment in Taiwan [cf. Taiwan Industrial Panorama (IDIC) 
(January 1991): 1], However, only after one year the Director of Industrial Department of 
MoEA has announced that,
"It seems necessary that in order to prevent foreign high-tech enterprises losing their 
confidence in the investment environment of Taiwan, we must review in all the 1990 
SUI. [CDN (IE) (10/4/92): 7]"
The 1960 SEI was an omnibus legislation which came out of the economic 
circumstance of Taiwan during the 1940s and the 1950s [cf. Chapters II and IV]. The old 
economic circumstance included the problems of the lack of a sound system of taxation; 
overlap of taxation; difficulties of purchasing land for industrial use; and difficulties for 
amendment of a huge number of relevant laws and their measures. Then, the temporary 
special legislation was proposed for a duration of ten years only, which actually had been 
postponed for 30 years in total. However, the legislative background of the 1990 SUI has 
been cumbered by these same problems mentioned for the investment, and the Statute has 
been proposed to overcome these problems as obstacles for upgrading industries. At least, 
the bureaucracy of the Nationalists did not improve the relevant economic legislation to 
resolve those problems for three decades. Thus, this section will analyse the 1990 SUI, 
compared with the 1954 SIFN, the 1955 SIOC and the 1960 SEI, from the following points.
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VI.1A. Discriminatory Base of Qualification under the Statute
The legislative purpose of the 1960 SEI was for "encouraging investment and 
accelerating economic development", while that of the 1990 SUI has been for "furtherance of 
industrial upgrading and betterment of economic development" (Article 1, respectively). The 
former was clearer than that in the 1990 SUI of which the controversy of "industrial up­
grading" has been existed long. Thus, some functional indications, such as promotion of 
research and development, improving technology transfer, upgrading productive efficiency, 
improving quality and image of products, and control of environmental pollution, lacked a 
clear claim under the cover of betterment of economic development. Accordingly, the 
ambiguity of the legislative purpose opens the discretion of administration and more 
questions left for further administrative legislation. Behind this, three possible reasons may 
exist: a legislative pragmatism followed by bureaucracy since the 1950s; a lack o f awareness 
of social-environmental considerations of "development" by the bureaucrats; and a 
continuing legal base needed to succeed the 1960 SEI. The existence of any reasons 
mentioned explains the fact that the administration under the Nationalists are not ready for 
the programme of upgrading industries. For example, the Six-Year Development Plan (1990- 
96) analysed already, which covers six of seven and half years of the enforcement of the 1990 
SUI (Article 44), has only passed until March 1991 to provide a macro guidance for national 
development.
Also, the structure of law also opens some issues.2 The omission of'co-operation of 
public enterprises' has been replaced by 'establishment and utilization of development fund', 
because of the uncertain status of public enterprises during the recent transition of the 
privatisation programme. But there is only one article with a rather general wording stipu­
lating the establishment and utilization of development fund, while further regulation "shall 
be prescribed by the Executive Yuan" (Article 21).
The main body of Ibe 1960 SEI covered three of five section!, including 'lax benefits', 'acquisition of land for induatrial use', and 'co­
operation of public cnletprisea'. However, the main body of the 1990 SUI haa been lying on four of nix sections: tax benefits (Chapter 
II): establishment and utilization of development fund (ill): lechnicel aaaistance (IV): end eataHishmcnl of indualriel districts (V).
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Furthermore, other imbalances of the structure of law exists in the fact that only one 
article regulates 'technical assistance' (Article 22), and twenty articles deal with 
establishment of industrial districts' (Articles 23-42), among forty-four articles in total. 
Whether there exists a direct relation between the problem of industrial use of land and 
upgrading industries in reality remains a question. However, the overemphasis of 
'establishment of industrial districts' has explained that a separate administrative legislation of 
'Regulations for Establishment of Industrial Districts' is needed and the imbalanced drafting 
of the 1990 SUI by the bureaucracy.
Finally, the structure of the 1990 SUI provides a discriminatory base for the 
qualification of encouragement and application for law. Basically, the qualification of 
encouragement under the 1990 SUI is an interference of the state on market and competition 
of enterprises. Enterprises, based on profit-making, will choose the most 'appropriate' forms 
of management and business organisation, such as exclusive ownership (du-zi), partnership, 
and various forms of companies. However, the 1990 SUI, in Article 3, only applies for "any 
company which is incorporated in the form of a company limited by shares under the 
Company Law". Accordingly, this provision excludes the majority o f  small and medium 
enterprises taking the forms o f either 'exclusive ownership' or partnership' which has 
occupied beyond 60 % of the total work force and 50% of GNP (gross national product), are 
the most assistance-needed group for upgrading industries in Taiwan at this stage.3
Theoretically, the small and medium enterprises should be benefited from the policy 
of upgrading industries, once their operation accords with the items of encouragement 
functionally, such as promotion of research and development, environmental protection, and 
energy saving etc. [Cf. Taiwan Industrial Panorama (IDIC) (January 1991): 1]. But, the 
limitation of 'the form of business', that is, the company-limited-by-shares under the 1990 
SUI, not only deprives the opportunities for upgrading industries of small and medium
3 The import«nee of email and medium enterpriaee (SMEa) haa been reported aa: "Theee nearly 780,000 entrepreneurial eauMiahraenta
COnafinite a great reaervoir of bunineea navvy, and their pioneer spirit remaina vital to Taiwan'« future economic growth .. In the paal 
decade, they have accounted for 63 percent of total export*. The companies and their employees have also paid 69 percent of the total 
taxes in Taiwan”. Free China Jl. (21 /January/91): 5 "SME* face New Challenge*". For the decline of SMEs in Taiwan, aee Asiaweek 
(Ya Zhou Zhou Kan) (214)1/90): 46.
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enterprises, but also distort the basically functional qualifications provided by the Statute 
itself. Given the popularity of family-enterprise' in Taiwan, it may not be difficult to find 
other six persons to organize a company-limited-by-shares; but the limitation of family- 
enterprise and the past criticism of its economic disputes could jam upgrading industries for 
the relevant companies.
VI.2.B. Informal Domains within the Mechanism o f Encouragement 
(i) The Major Mechanism o f  Encouragement and its Contrary Practice
With regard to the mechanism of encouragement, the 1990 SUI provides only a 
modification of old stipulations. The 1990 SUI emphasizes 'acceleration of assets 
depreciation' (Article 5), 'investment credit against tax' (Articles 6-9), 'relaxation of limits of 
retained earnings' (Articles 15-16), and 'utilization of development fund' (Article 21) as the 
main mechanism of encouragement for upgrading industries. In fact, the 1990 SUI has 
abolished several methods of encouragement under the 1960 SEI before.4 This simplification 
of both the mechanism and regulations of encouragement has been a major improvement of 
the new law. Especially, the abolishment of "Categories and Criteria o f Productive 
Enterprises Eligible for Encouragement (amended on 26 November, 1986)" under Article 3 
of the 1960 SEI has been a great step towards the simplification and transparency of 
administration on business regulation. Generally speaking, those major methods of en­
couragement mentioned under the 1990 SUI has been positively limited in the 'functions' of 
upgrading industries, such as research and development; energy saving or alternative energy 
sources; adjustment of industrial structure and improvement of scale of operations and 
methods of production under the benefits of "acceleration of assets depreciation" (Article 5).3 *1960
Such m  'tax holidays (exemption for five or four year»)' (Article» 6 and 7, the 1960 SEI). deduction of tax payment' (Article 10, the
1960 SEI), 'exemption or instalments of import duties' (Article 21, the 1960 SEI), and 'the reserve for loss of export or foreign 
exchange* (Article 31. the 1960 SEI).
Paragraph I of Article 5 of the 1990 SUI reads: "Service life of fixed assets of a company may be accelerated in accordance with 
either of the following criteria provided, however, that if there is any under depreciated value during the accelerated service life, 
assets depreciation may continue in one year or several years within the service life of such assets as specified in the Income Tax Law 
until permissible depreciation is fully made: 1. Service life of instruments and equipment for exclusive use in research and 
development purposes and/or inspection of pilot products, or machinery and equipment used for energy saving purpose or as 
alternative energy sources may be accelerated by two years; 2. Based on the requirements for adjustment of industrial structure and 
improvement of scnle of operations and methods of production, depredation of the machinery and equipment of specifically
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Also, the funds used for automation of production or production technology, for pollution 
control equipment or technology, and for research and development, professional personnel 
training and creation of internationally acceptable brands of products will be beneficial by 
'investment credit against tax’ (Article 6).6 Thus, through these 'functional requirements’, the 
major mechanism of encouragement in the 1990 SU1 is a progress of the legislation. But, 
several definitions and requirements of the functions remain some issues. For instance, since 
'automation of production’ is not necessarily equal to 'upgrading industries', can an 
automatized production without any improvement of technology apply for the benefits men­
tioned? Also, benefits for pollution control equipment could promote more polluted 
production under a sort of'subsidies', from a contrary viewpoint in practice.
Nonetheless, these preferences can be used by foreign investor to enlarge their profits. 
Foreign companies, on the one hand, can capitalize their technology without contributing 
capital, on the other hand, can use the technology as the key to widen their profits from tax 
benefits and those preferences discussed above, such as loan credits, plus the payments of 
intellectual rights and technician fees.
(it) Vague Interrelation between other Methods o f  Encouragement
Investment credit against tax is also provided by the 1990 SUI for promotion of the 
investment in "an area with scanty natural resources or with slow development" (Article 7) 
and of intellectual property "provided or sold to a company for use in the Republic of China" 
(Article 9). The former could be less applicable in practice, since the enterprises can find 
other tax benefits under the Statute and not necessarily to invest in those areas where have 
been considered as not suitable for production. In case that other tax benefits were abolished, 
this provision could be more meaningful for the balance of regional development in Taiwan.
designated industries may be accelerated by one half of the number of years of the service life of fixed assets as prescribed in the 
Income tax Law; and if the residual period after depreciation is le u  than one year, then such residual period shall not be counted."
Paragraph I of Article 6 of the 1990 SUI reads: "To meet the requirement of industrial upgrading, a company may credit five to 
twenty per cent of the amount of fund disbursed for any of the following purposes against the amount of pront-seeking enterprise 
income tax payable for the current year. In case the amount of profit-seeking enterprise income tax payable for the current year is leu 
than the deductible amount, the balance of such deductible amount may be used to deductible the profit-seeking enterprise income tax 
payable within the ensuing four years. 1. The fund invested in equipment for automation of production or production technology; 2. 
The fund u u d  in purchasing pollution control equipment or technology within five years from the effective date of this Statute; and. 
3. The uud  in research and development, proccuional personnel training and creation of internationally acceptable brand(s) of 
produces).
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As to the royalty payment paid by the said company mentioned in Article 9, this provision 
may open a way for some enterprises to avoid tax, given the reality that there exists a 
possibility of price setting.
On the other hand, in response to the "government policy", for the "outwards 
investment" made by a company with the approval of the authority in charge of the end 
enterprise concerned, an amount up to twenty per cent of the total amount of such outwards 
investment may be set aside as the reserve for loss in outwards investment so as to cover the 
investment loss upon its occurrence (Article 10(1)). Again the "government policy" remain 
unclear in text, and the requirement of the "outwards investment" creates another 
discriminatory base for financially powerful enterprises. Accordingly, for the risks of 
investment, the outwards investment can receive the distribution of risks and loss of 
investment, while the domestic investment cannot be beneficial even with projects of high 
technology and high risks concerned. Thus, discriminatory encouragement based on 
functions has been distorted by the discriminatory distribution of risks under the 1990 SUI 
itself.
Many other tax benefits are out of space here to be paragraphed out; but, these tax 
benefits eventually create both discrimination of tax base and unsuitable encouragement or 
intervention. For instance, in business practice the enterprises use the merger of companies 
only under the profit-making consideration. But the 1990 SUI adds some exemptions and 
deductions of income tax, stamp tax, deed tax, and the land-value increment tax (Article 13). 
This provides another argument that the 1990 SUI is more beneficial for big enterprises with
strong economic power.
\
Also, following the 1960 SEI, the 1990 SUI provides a major tax benefit for the 
"venture capital investment enterprise" (Article 20). For a company making investment in 
such an enterprise, there shall be 80% of the income derived from its investment excluded 
from its taxable profit-seeking enterprise income in the then current year.
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With respect to foreign investment, two tax benefits shall be taken into further 
account. Where a non-resident individual or a non-resident profit-seeking enterprise, having 
been approved to make investment in Taiwan under the 1955 SIOC and the 1954 SIFN, 
receives dividend distributed by a company located in Taiwan or profit distributed by a 
partnership in Taiwan, the income tax payable thereon by such individual or enterprise shall 
be withheld at the time of payment thereof by the tax withholder as specified in the Income 
Tax Law at the rate of 20% of such distribution, and the provisions provided in the Income 
Tax Law for filing final income tax return shall not apply (Article 11(1)). Furthermore, 
where a non-resident individual, having been approved to make investment in Taiwan under 
both Statutes mentioned, holds the position of director, supervisor, managerial officer of the 
enterprise in which he invests, the provisions stipulated above shall apply to the dividend 
distributed to him by the said invested enterprise, if he has resided in Taiwan for managing or 
administering the enterprise in which he invests for more than 183 days in a taxable year as 
prescribed in Article 7:2(2) of the Income Tax Law (Article 11(2), the 1990 SUI).
Equally, where a foreign profit-seeking enterprise mentioned has dispatched its 
directors, managerial officers or technical personnel to Taiwan for performing temporary 
work such as investment making, plant construction or market survey, and has had them to 
reside in Taiwan for a period of less than 183 days "in aggregate" in a taxable year, their 
salaries paid outside Taiwan by the said foreign profit-seeking enterprise shall not be 
considered the income in Taiwan (Article 12). Nevertheless, although with these benefits, 
foreign investment still has to face the protectionist mechanisms within administration and 
policy of the government.
VI.2.C. Limiting or Expanding Administrative Intervention?
With a less public assistance than that in the 1960 SEI, the 1990 SUI provides three 
scopes of co-operative actions from the public sector: technical assistance; establishment of 
industrial districts; and establishment and utilization of development fund mentioned.
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Similar to Article 84 of the 1960 SEI, a "development fund"7 shall be established by the 
Executive Yuan under the 1990 SUI (Article 21). The development fund can be used for six 
purposes,8 of which several definition of terms remain unclear in the provisions, including "in 
line with the government industrial policy", "to take co-ordinate action", and "other purposes 
as specifically approved by the Executive Yuan". These issues may be defined after the fur­
ther practice and Regulations governing the management and use of the development fund 
prescribed by the Executive Yuan in the future (Article 21(3)). Secondly, the 1990 SUI 
stipulates that technical assistance organizations formed "with the contribution of 
Government" shall provide appropriate technical assistance as required. Similarly, the 
further regulations relevant will be enacted by the Executive Yuan (Article 22).
Finally, the establishment of industrial districts is the third public co-operative action 
with over detailed provisions, in Articles 23-42, which can actually constitute a separate 
legislation. For the furtherance of industrial upgrading, the central authority in charge of 
industries may, according to the requirements of industrial development and taking into 
consideration of the social, economic and actual conditions of various areas, work together 
with the authorities in charge of consolidated development plan and regional plan to 
formulate a programme for the establishment of industrial district and submit the same to the 
Executive Yuan for approval (Article 23).
Generally speaking, these provisions are only a legislative succession of those of 
acquisition of land for industrial use. Articles 50-81 of the 1960 SEI. However, among the 
relevant provisions, there are two new creative stipulations. Being different from Article 60 
of the 1960 SEI, the 1990 SUI provides, for development of an industrial district, the au­
The financial source of the development fund shall be the appropriations from National Treasury. In addition, the operating balance 
of the development fund, if any, may be turned over to the fund, through budgeting procedures, for use as a revolving fund (Art
The six purposes in the 1990 SUI are: (1) To participate in the investment in important enterprises or plans (projects) relating to 
industrial upgrading or improvement of industrial structure which are bevond the capability or financial ability of private investors: 
(2) To provide financial facilities to important enterprises or plans which are relating to industrial upgrading or improvement of 
industrial structure but with insufficient capital; (3) To provide loans in line with the government industrial policy for assisting the 
sound development of industries; (4J To set aside an appropriate percentage of development fund in support of the plans relating to 
providing necessary assistance to tne development of medium and/or small enterprises; (3) To take coordinating actions in the 
furtherance of the plans initiated by competent authorities concerned for acquiring of advanced technologies from abroad, promotion 
of research and development, training of personnel, pollution control, sccelcration of improvement of industrial structure and/or 
betterment of economic development; and. (6) Other purposes as specifically approved by tbs Executive Yuan (Aft. 21(1)).
172
V I. T a iw a n : L ib e ra liz a t io n  th ro u g h  F o rm a l L aw
thority in charge of industries may entrust the operations of development, sale/lease and 
administration to public or 'private owned' enterprises (Article 29). Indeed, Industrial 
Department of MoEA has entrusted Rong-min Construction Administration to build up two 
industrial areas in Chong-li City and Duo-liu Town in 1992 [CDN (IE) (11/4/92): 8]. Article 
30 for the construction o f 'an  exclusive harbour’ is the other new stipulation of the 1990 SUI 
here. However, the authority in charge of industries may terminate the lease agreements and 
repossess the land within the industrial harbour zone "on account of policy requirement" or 
failure of the leasee to make use of such land in accordance with the approved plan (Article 
30(3)). Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the phase of "policy requirement" may damage the 
interests of investors. Moreover, an interesting case occurred in the industrial district of Duo- 
liu mentioned on 27 March, 1992 has shown that the officials do not necessarily refer first to 
the statutory stipulations in practice. The business custom of casting lots for 52 enterprises to 
decide the purchase of three lands for industrial use,9 in front of the officials of Industrial 
Department, has explained that the policy of upgrading industry is not the first priority in 
decision-making.
VI.2.D. Practical Contradictions Left by the Legislation
From the mechanism within the 1990 SUI, there obviously exists a debate whether the 
encouragements could be an interference of market or an adjustment for market failure. 
However, another argument may lie on the question whether the state intervention is 
necessary for these functional encouragements, such as research and development, training 
for professional personnel, establishing internationally acceptable brands, automation of 
production, pollution control, energy saving, and adjustment of industrial restructuring [J.Q. 
Wang (1991): 123-127], After three decades of encouragements by the 1960 SEI, the fact 
that several business operations mentioned remain under the protection of state 
administration explodes the failure of upgrading industrial levels under this protectionism.
9 In addition to the problem of over-crowded Hsincfau SIP [cf Section VI.3.A.(i).(b) below], tbe difficultiee for acouieition of lande for
industrial use in Taiwan can be found from Chong-k and Duo-liu where the number of enterprises interested in investment far more 
than the number of the landa available. Cf. the same news resource under the Hsinchu SIP on CDN (IE) (11/4/92): 8.
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Furthermore, the mechanism of encouragement shall be taken into account. In feet, 
after the amendment of the 1960 SEI on 26th July, 1977, the mechanism was shifted towards 
"functional encouragement" within an encouragement policy "based on forms of business, 
supported by functions of operations" [cf. CEPD, Taipei (1987b)]. However, this move 
towards functional encouragement has not completed after the enactment of the 1990 SUI of 
which the encouragement policy only reaches the stage of encouragement "based on 
functions of operation, supported by the forms of business". Several instances can be found: 
an acceleration of assets depreciation is based on "specifically designated industries" (Article 
5); an investment credit against tax by the registered stocks depends on application of 
"important technology-based enterprises", "important invested enterprise" and "venture 
capital investment enterprise" (Article 8); a relaxation of limits of retained earnings is based 
on the "important productive enterprises" (Article 15). These discriminatory preferences 
based on the forms of business have eroded the equality of functional encouragement, in 
addition to another requirement of the company-limited-by-shares analysed before. 
Therefore, even certain enterprises that develop their operational functions for upgrading 
industries may fail to apply for the encouragement mentioned, simply because their forms of 
business are different from those in provisions.
VI.3 THE ROLE OF INFORMAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE SECTOR IN THE 
REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In this section we shall analyse how far the governmental involvement through administrative 
control on business, especially foreign investment, is, and what the reality of political- 
economy behind this administrative mechanism has been. The administrative procedure shall 
be taken into account first, then the state intervention of production and political structure 
will be under a close examination as well. Therefore, we will see how the Nationalists 
maintain their ruling since the 1949 within the legal, economic, social, and political context 
in an integrated picture.
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VI.3 .A. The Functions of Administrative Authorities in Charge of Foreign Investment
and Administrative Procedure
From the views of the bureaucracy, the regulation of foreign investment may be released 
from the general limits of the relevant statutory framework. But, from the views of foreign 
investors in Taiwan, the high degree of the governmental involvement into the business and 
investment process means, to a great content, a high degree of bureaucratic nature. Although 
there exist various authorities, general and special, at the different levels, central, local and 
special zones, we shall discuss the administrative procedure from the view of foreign 
investors, that is, approval procedure before operation of investment, and approval procedure 
thereafter. While the status of "foreign-investment-approved" (FIA) is the sine qua non for 
most foreign investment to enjoy the best treatment as analysed already, the approval 
procedure of the FIA shall be more considered here than other general description of 
administration.
Generally speaking, the major government agency deals with the approval of foreign 
investment is the Investment Commission (IC)*° in which the Vice-Minister of Economic 
Affairs holds the Chair, in addition to a number of relevant government entities thereof at 
both the national and local levels, such as Ministry of Finance; Central Bank of China (in 
Taiwan); the National Bureau of Standardization; the Board of Foreign Trade; the 
Commercial Registrar;11 and various central and local authorities12 responsible for taxation, 
registration of incorporation, business licenses, labour and land use.
111 The Investment Commission, locsicd io 8th-10th Floor, 7 Roosevelt Rood, Section 1, Tsipei, is so inter deportment commission under 
the MoEA.
These entities, which hnve different functions sod tssks. For exsmple: the MoF, which hns responsibility for foreign eschsoge control 
policy, supervises customs ssd hsndles spplicstions for Ins reduction or exemption; the Central Bsnk of Chins, which sdminislers 
foreign exchsnge control; the Nstionol Hurcsu of Stsndsrdizstion, relevent to registration sod licensing of potento sod trsdcmsrks; the 
Bosrd of Foreign Trade, responsible for issuing import snd export licenses; the Commercis! Registrar, responsible for issuing 
certifiesle* of incorporation snd for recognizing foreign branches.
12 These entities include: the nstionsl snd locsl tsx buresun; the provindnl or municipsl deportments of reconstruction, which issue 
business licenses snd register branches of foreign corporations: the sdminislrative euthonties of spedsl zones, who set together with 
snd sometimes in piece of other suthorities in supervising enlsrprisen looted within their borders; snd vnrious locsl suthorities 
responsible for fsclory licensing, Isbour, snd lend use under the direction of the central or proviocisl government*
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(i) "Policy-level" Discretion within the Approval Procedure Before Operation
For administration of the approval of a foreign investment proposals, the IC has 
prescribed a set of application forms13 which require the detailed informations of the propos­
als.14
(i).(a) General Approval Process
Five issues within the general approval procedure shall be taken into account by 
foreign investors. These are: procedure timing; preferential treatment; protection from 
domestic competition; revision of proposal; and, effects of the approval. As to the efficiency 
of the decision-making, following filing the IC will process application within two months 
and make a decision within about six weeks.15 Secondly, as to the preferential treatment, it 
depends on the parts of the foreign investors to specify each item of exemptions desired and 
preferential treatment preferred under the mechanism of the 1954 SIFN, the 1955 SIOC, and 
the 1990 SUI from 1991 (the 1960 SEI before).
Thirdly, whether this preferential treatment extends to the protection of domestic 
competition remains a bargaining question in practice. For instance, whether to open the do­
mestic competition for the "automobile" industry will benefit promotion of the national 
industrial and technological levels or damage the infant industries remains a debate. In 
Taiwan, the domestic "soft drinks" industries have been seriously humbled by the American 
investment of soft drinks industries, such as Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola; while the infants 
industries of automobile and insurance remain as the infants for four decades. In the context 
for the national development as a whole, it seems difficult for the bureaucrats themselves to
13 Except for 'technical appendices" which may be necessary in foreign languagee, the application forma of the IC must be in Chinese.
14 Especially: a) for empitmi. the total capital requirements, foreign exchange requirements, and a general outline of the proposed capital 
structure for the venture; (b) for business operation: a description of proposed products or services, output capacity of the proposed 
facility, production plana, and domestic and export sales forecasts; (c) for technology o f  production: detailed information about the 
machinery, equipment, or raw materials to be imported in connection with the project; and, (d) for benefit o f the project: asaeaament 
of the economic benefits of the project to Taiwan, including transfer of technology and training of local personnel. 1989 Manual 
(Taiwan), Ch. 1, pp. 1-12, and Appendix, pp. 283-310.
^  "Supplementary Measures for the Company Registration in respect o f Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investments" (750422) (1973
Foreign Company Registration Measures), amended on 28 July, 1982.
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explain why the competition for upgrading industries, such as automobile and insurance 
mentioned, cannot be applied for foreign investment.
Fourthly, being an inter-department entity, the IC will review the applications for FIA 
status of legislative encouragement and the technical co-operation contracts through the 
relevant assistance of other governmental agencies therein. In order to follow the "prevailing 
governmental policies", which remain unclear within the text of statutes, these governmental 
agencies have rights to suggest revisions of a plan and condition the approval "on 
implementation of such suggestions". Again, the content and the approach of such sugges­
tions remain a question in practice. For instance, the IC may use the "trade imbalance" (of 
countries from which imported machinery, equipment, or raw materials may be supplied) to 
suggest the use of local suppliers, while Japan remain as the biggest country for both 
"machinery and equipment resource" and "trade imbalanced" country to Taiwan.16 Other 
significant cases can be found easily, such as importation of apples permitted only from the 
U.S.A.; importation of ginseng, only South Korea; and importation of small automobiles, 
only the U.S.A. and Europe, while that from Japan has been prohibited [M.J. Liu (1991): 
116]. The practical difference between suggestions, revisions and operation of foreign 
investment exists as another problem.
Finally, the effects of the approval made by the IC shall be taken into account. The 
approval is valid for six months and may be renewed upon application for a further period of 
six months. In other words, the approval from the IC does not obligate the investors to 
proceed with the investment plan. However, prior to certain actions within the approved plan 
taken by the investors, such as the importation of machinery and equipment, reports to the IC 
are required17 as a close control under the administration. Nevertheless, recently the effects 
of the approval under the IC have been uncertain in the problems of the location of operation 
of the high-polluted industries, viewing the demonstration and boycott from the envi­
16 Trade imbalance between Taiwan and Japan in 1990-91 baa reached about USS 9 billion, doee to the aatna amount o t USA to 
Taiwan. Aataweek (Ya Zhou Zhou Kan) (2/JuneiVl): 44 45.
17 1989 Manual (Taiwan): 219-251.
1 7 7
V I. T a iw a n : L ib e ra liz a t io n  th ro u g h  F o rm a l L a w
ronmental protection.18 Therefore, there exists another problem between the investment 
proposals, the decision-making of bureaucracy and the demand of the society, or the right to 
development of the people.
(i).(b) Approval Process Under EPZs and SIP Authorities
As to the super-preferential treatments in the EPZs and SIPs [cf. Section IV.4.A. (ii) 
& (¡ii)], an interesting case has occurred in Spring 1992. In order to enjoy the five-year 
exemption of tax and preferences under the 1979 SIP Statute, both Overseas Chinese and 
foreign investors have to put their names on the long list and wait for the result only [CDN 
(IE) (11/4/92): 8], because the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park has been full already.
For the reasons of functions and location of administration, the authorities of the 
EPZs and the SIP in Hsinchu assume the position of the IC within their domains. In addition, 
four characters are considerable in expansion of administrative power. First of all, except for 
their own "criteria" for the screening of investments, the application procedure in each 
special zone is similar to that for investments outside the EPZs and SIP, in return more 
incentives are provided therein [cf. Section IV.2.C]. Secondly, exceptional administrative 
structure has arranged. Accordingly, the Export Processing Zone Administration under 
MoEA is empowered with the rights to examine and approve foreign investments, technical 
co-operation contracts, trademark licensing contracts (in place of the National Bureau of 
Standardization) for enterprises located within one of the three EPZs. These rights also allow 
the Administration to issue "business and factory licenses", and "import and export licenses", 
which are normally issued by various agencies connected with the IC as analysed.19 With the 
similar functions, the Science-Based Industrial Park Administration under the National 
Science Council assumes the role of administrative authority within the Hsinchu SIP.
18 Asiaweek (Ye-Zhou Zhoo-Kao) (4/Augusl/91): 20-22; aid. (19/M iyrtl): 4«.
19 cr. Art. 8 of the 1965 EPZ Statute, Art. 3 of "lAe 1975 Foratgn Company HagutroHon Measurer'; Art.7 of tha 1979 SIP Statuta.
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These administrative arrangements make the third special character of these zones, 
that is, encouragement of investment is more emphasized on "operational functions”, such as 
promoting exporting and upgrading science and technology, than on the forms of enterprises. 
For instance, the operational functions of business can be illustrated from the major 
difference between investment in the SIP and investment elsewhere: a "bond”, which is 
subject to forfeiture if the proposal plan is not completed, must be deposited with the SIP 
authority by the investor who wish to invest in the Park (Article 10, the 1979 SIP Statute).
Finally, the existence of both special administrative domains and their incentive 
mechanism constitute a "sub-exception" to the special administrative framework (based on 
the 1954 SIFN, the 1955 SIOC, the 1964 STC and the 1990 SUI replaces the 1960 SEI), 
because both foreign and domestic investments have been of itself an "exception" deviated 
from the general framework of business. Therefore, in addition to the economic inequalities, 
administrative mechanism further constitutes the legal inequalities between the various enter­
prises through a public intervention in the field of private business.
Then, what are the attractiveness of these economic inequalities for foreign investors 
in the case that the 1990 SUI meets the 1979 SIP statute in reality? Liu Kwong-rong, an Ac­
countant of Taiwan has pointed out:
"In order to set up the factory for manufacturing the computer materials, our foreign 
investing clients wish to enjoy the preferences under the 1979 SIP Statute, and ac­
cordingly to benefit not only from the encouragement under the 1990 SUI, but also 
from five-year tax exemption there. However, the reality of the overcrowded Hsinchu 
SIP makes this impossible. [CDN (IE) (11/04/92): 8]"
In addition to the difficulties of acquisition of lands for industrial use, the fact that several 
sub-statutes and procedural regulations, such as those on how to apply for purchase of 
automatic-production equipments, has been criticized as the major obstruction for foreign 
investment after the implementation of the 1990 SUI for one and half years [CDN, ibid].
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(ii) Over-flexibility o f  Discretion within the Approval Procedure After Operation
In general, after the commencement of business, the IC still has its control on three 
areas of the foreign investment: remittance of profits; the fulfilment of the proposal plan; and 
the sources of profits. As mentioned, on an annual base, foreign investors may apply to the 
IC for permission to remit profits and dividends from enterprises with foreign-investment- 
approved (FIA) status. However, this approval procedure has proved flexible in practice. 
For example, if remittance is deferred beyond six months after the tax assessment, the IC will 
require an "application for deferred remittance", which is not in practice strictly enforced. 
The famous "hot-money wave" in and out of Taiwan before and after 198720 further 
explained the ineffectiveness of administrative control on foreign exchange, which in the past 
only affected the small and medium enterprises unequally. However, in administration the 
Central Bank of China grants permission for remittance on the base of approval of the IC. As 
discussed already, repatriation of capital, as a privilege, by foreign investors in an FIA 
enterprise can be claimed one year after commencement of business. In order to preserve this 
privilege, a foreign company is required by the IC to route the remittance through the one of 
the 'designated foreign exchange banks' and 'report' to the IC for investment appraisal and 
recordation, in case of remitting capital to its 'preparatory office bank account in Taiwan'. 
For the same administrative screening, foreign investors should also submit documents 
supporting their valuation of 'non-cash capital contributions sourced abroad' to the IC. From 
a practical view of business, after 13 July, 1987 the privilege of relaxed foreign exchange 
control under the status of FIA lost its importance as before, but this administrative procedure 
remain necessary.
The 1960 SEI permitted the FIA enterprises to remit abroad all capital gains in 
foreign currency not resulting from "appreciation of capital of land values" (excluded by Ar­
ticle 19). Given the fact that the rocket-riding price of the land21 dominated by Japanese and
20 Within the proceu of appreciation of New Taiwaneae Dollar from NTS 40: USS I to NTS 27: US$ I during 1983-90, the problem for 
Taiwan ia the in-flow (of the currency speculation), not out-flow, of the money aa a financial burden. On 26 June, 1987, Statute for 
Foreign Exchange Control (481231) was amended to release the foreign exchange control, which was actually only to legalize a long 
practice of businesa only. Accordingly, from 13 July, 1987 on, remittance of lesa than US $5 million per annum and less than US $T 
million per remittance will not require prior approval. Also Cf. Clark (1989): 208.
^  Asiaweek (Ya-Zhou Zhou-kan) (01/Sept./91): 31-32. Up to April 1992, how to control the prices of housing, lands and products 
remain the crucial teak for the Nationalist government, cf. CDN (IE) (11/4^2): 7.
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American-based Overseas Chinese companies, the stipulation above is meaningless in prac­
tice; the 1990 SUI has no relevant provisions. Furthermore, as to the capital gains from 
'sales of securities' (other than those security listed on the Taipei Stock Exchange) and from 
the sale of machinery and equipment', remittance is permitted on the application to the IC 
within six months of their realization, submitting evidence of relevant tax clearance.22
VIJ.B. Administrative Practice and the Role of Bureaucracy
The legal framework of foreign investment, as we have analysed above, produces a 
discriminatory mechanism between the foreign and domestic enterprises, such as the use of 
the "directives of criteria' and "negative lists of limitation' of investment, and between the big 
and "small and medium' enterprises, such as the form of the company-limited-by-shares and 
the requirement of minimum ventures. Now, we shall analyse the role of bureaucracy and 
foreign investment in the prosperity of Taiwan, then find out their relationship in the general 
context of the regulation of foreign investment under the common interpretation of the 
development of Taiwan. However, as I will argue later, the "Taiwan Experience" provides a 
negative lesson, showing an irrational increase of administrative measures and decrease of 
foreign investment.
The government not only directly manages important public utilities and enterprises 
that affect the nation's economic well-being as a whole, (such as electric power, transporta­
tion, communications, sugar manufacturing, petroleum and fertilizer industries), and 
promotes and participates in such projects as are required for agricultural development, but 
also plans and helps to carry through the development of important industries under private 
ownership [cf. Chapters II and IV].23 In fact, the government has at various times served as 
custodian of private firms, founder o f new enterprises, prospector, supplier of raw materials,
‘2 A rt 6 of lb* ¡973 Foreign Company Registration Measures.
Tho economic policy of the Nationalist government hea been guided by Ibe Principles of People's Livelihood, whereby the 
government takes the lead and gives direction to national economic development, while encouraging the free play of private 
enterprise consistent with government policy.
181
V I. T a iw a n : L ib e ra liz a t io n  th ro u g h  F o rm a l L aw
buyer of finished products and money lender willing to accept high risks.24 The initiative and 
leadership taken by the government in this respect is generally believed to be one of the main 
reasons for the rapid economic growth of Taiwan.25
Suffice it to say here that the major strategies and considerations which over the years 
have guided the ROC government's efforts to promote economic development, and which 
constitute public policy during certain phases of development, are as follow: price stability, 
providing infrastructural facilities, incentives, foreign aid, an orderly development of 
agriculture and industry, boosting the investment climate, supporting the agriculture sector, 
transformation of industries, and market (Cf. Section II.3.C). These strategies and 
considerations are evident in the planning and implementation of the series of economic 
development plans put into effect during the last four decades (1952-90).
Planning in Taiwan mostly takes the form of 'suggestions' to the private sector, 
backed up with sympathetic fiscal, monetary and trade policies, the legislative framework, 
and maintaining the infrastructure.26 The direct role of the government has diminished over 
time but it still operates the key energy and heavy industry sectors. In addition, it takes an 
active role in priority areas—such as the establishment of the Hsinchu Science-Based 
Industrial Park in 1980 and the recently constructed World Trade Centre. Moreover, the 
government has a controlling influence over the financial sectors and over certain prices, 
notably, those of energy (Cf. Section II.3.C).
One of the by-products of the planning system has been a high degree of 
protectionism. For example, imports are fairly well regulated and foreign investment is 
screened. The argument that infant industries, such as automobile and service sectors, should
24 The reaeau why (he government participates directly in certain vital induatriea an : on the one hand, early in Taiwnn'n economic 
development durinn 1950s, there was an acute shortage of the farsighted entrepreneur or the imaginative banker like those in the ad­
vanced countries. On the other hand, many of theae stale industries were either inherited from the Japanese after the World War II or 
had large capital requirements, making them difficult for private industry to undertake. See K.T. Li (1976).
25 The trend has now been to sell to the private sector marginally profitable industries where it is not considered necessary for the 
government to retain control. In 1952 the public sector accounted for 57 per cent of industrial production. By 1985 this proportion 
nad shrunk to 16 per cent. Nearly all public industries, according to the reporta, return considerable profits. See The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Taiwan, 1987-88, (London: 1987), p.23.
24 I hid., pp. 13-16.
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be protected by the state is used as justification for protectionist measures [cf. M J. Liu 
(1991) and J.Q. Wang (1991)]. Nevertheless, the system has been challenged and as a result, 
the trend in recent years has been towards "liberalization" and "internationalization" of the 
economy, permitting more foreign competition in the form of imports and direct 
manufacturing production.27 At the same time, pressure from the USA28 in particular to 
move more rapidly towards a free trade regime has been mounting in recent years.
In short, in addition to trade and economic planning, government and bureaucracy 
also play a leading role in the regulation of foreign investment in Taiwan. In developing 
countries, the activities of foreign capital and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have been 
surrounded by considerable controversy. In Taiwan's case, these activities do not seem to 
have brought most of the problems posited by dependency theory [Clark (1989): 184-185]. 
The reasons that the GMD regime escaped the problems created by MNCs in many other 
developing countries, according to C. Clark [(1989): 185], include both the timing of 
Taiwan's industrialization surge and "the explicit efforts of the government to manage foreign 
capital".29
However, in my view there are three important and different aspects behind Clark's 
analysis which must be addressed: first, "the barriers erected as part of the import-substitution 
strategy" before the early 1960s have not disappeared (Hsing (1990): 78). Second, these 
barriers have continued to work since then, and have their effects, positive and negative, on 
Taiwan's present expanding economy. Finally, the development of 'internal resistance' 
toward foreign investment in Taiwan after the domestic industrialization since the early 
1960s have developed through these administrative barriers [Cf. M.J. Liu (1991): 116].30 The
27 Eg.. FCJ, (OQ/May/88), Taiwan's Door is Opan to Foreign Securities Firms'; FTX. (21/Apr/88), Taiwan may seek end to EC 
barriers'; and FT.L, (12/May/88), Taiwan lo relax broker rules'.
28 Eg., a crucial trade talk was started in 1988; cf. FCJ. (09/May/88). Trade Talks. Bids Bother US'. The recent Taiwnn-USA trade talk, 
focusing on the protection of intellectual property, wax in April 1992; cf. CDN (IE) (12/4/92): 1.
“ "Foreign inveatment did not really begin to flow into Taiwan until the early 1960a both becauae of the barrieri erected aa part of the 
import-substitution strategy and becauae of the poor inveatmenl climate created by the ialand'a uncertain political and economic atatua. 
Thun, domeatic industrialization waa well under way when the foreign presence alerted to eacalate, which made 'denationalization' and 
foreign domination much harder to achieve." [Clark (1989): 18S)
Furthermore, adminiatrative hern era have a I bo been the core of protectionism of international trade in Taiwan. M J. Liu has pointed 
four kinds of administrative measures that have been used in formalization of protectionism: (1) the measurea for "limiting imports-
30
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attempts of legal changes and the failure of the new policy discussed before explain these 
situations. Moreover, even accepting "the explicit efforts of the government to manage 
foreign capital", which Clark has praised, this management may be a myth only, given the 
analysis of Professor Tsiang (, a long-term participant of economic policy-adjustment in 
Taiwan,) that "after 1963 foreign capital and foreign transfer dropped sharply, and American 
aid stopped in 1965" [Tsiang (1985): 165], which contradicts Clark's statement above.
VI.4 EVALUATION ON THE REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN'S DEVELOPMENT
In this section we will evaluate the developments of three basic elements as our concluding 
remarks: the role of foreign investment in Taiwan's development; the role of the Nationalist 
Party-State intervention on business; and, interaction between formal and informal law 
therein which has been the major theme of this study.
Up to the end of the 1980s, a much greater role was given in Taiwan 'small and 
medium enterprises' within the industrial structure than in its Asian competitors such as Japan 
and South Korea, while economic denationalization and foreign domination by MNCs still 
remained less than other countries from the out-looking. On the other hand, one major 
dilemma faced by the GMD government in the early 1990s is that the current economic 
policy [Cf. Section II.3.C.(v)] to make the private sector better structured for industrial 
transformation may under cut one o f Taiwan's prime comparative advantages—the ability for 
'flexible production' by small and medium enterprises, with their willingness to change, adapt 
and meet the customers' requirements and changes in fashion or trends, and to promote 
technological diffusion by Taiwanese managers from MNCs to start their own small or 
medium enterprises. Nevertheless, in the long term, the new economic strategy and policy 
under the regime will inevitably change not only the importance of these small and medium
lion by the producing enterprises only"; (2) measures for "limiting importation by the public enterprises only”; (3) measures for 
"limiting importing areas"; and (4) measures for "application and approval" M.J. Liu (1991): 116-117.
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firms31 but also the role of foreign investment. Several cases at present shall be analysed 
accordingly.
VI.4.A. Another View on the Role of Foreign Investment in Taiwan's Development
It is commonly believed that the increase of foreign investment during the 1960s and 
the 1970s demonstrated the success of the governmental measures to stimulate and manage 
foreign capital. In fact, this is doubtful. Private foreign investment, which had averaged less 
than 1 percent of gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) during the 1950s, rose to over 4 
percent during 1960-67 and to 9 percent at the beginning of the 1970s [Clark (1989): 183]. 
Furthermore, foreign investment in Taiwan varied and changed over time considerably by 
industry.32 More precisely, within each particular industry, electronics was also the "only 
sector" with a particularly large foreign presence, that is, 19 percent in the 1960s and 34 
percent in the 1970s, although in machinery and non-metallic mineral sectors respectively 
foreign investment reached a fifth of total gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) in the 
1970s [Clark (1989): 184]. In short, in terms of the capital amounts, the facts show that 
foreign investment in Taiwan never reached high levels. However, Clark does not discuss to 
what extent the increase of foreign capital amount resulted from the government incentive 
policy.
Nevertheless, the 'sector-directing policy', praised by Clark, could be in question in 
Taiwan.33 Although I agree with Clark's analysis that Taiwan's strong domestic investment
31 See *SMEe Face New CheUcD|ea', FCJ (21 Jeouery. 1991): S.
32 During the 1960a, foreign investment was concentrated in the electronics, textile, and chemical industries, which accounted for two- 
thirds of all foreign capital. In the 1970s, the proportion in electronics rose markedly from 34 percent to 44.5 percent, while that in 
textiles decreased sharply close to zero (Clark (1989): 183-184).
33 o i .Clark has noted here. T h e  regim e.....moved to channel foreign capital into the new dynamic export sector, to ensure its integration
with the overall economy through domestic content legislation and limitations on the number of expatriate managers, and to maintain 
the monopolies of state corporations in the heavy and capital-intensive industries usually dominated by foreigners. The government's 
sbility to regulate foreign capital depended on the high profit that could be obtained in the rapidly expanding export sector, but the 
attractive economic environment meant that foreign firms could be successfully harnessed to Taiwan's developmental objectives.” 
(Clark (1989): 185) r  i
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and saving records—perhaps the highest in the world in the 1970s34 - were a principal reason 
for the country's industrial transformation and growth, the effects of Nationalist government's 
measures to stimulate and manage foreign investment remain doubtful. In fact, although the 
government policy can induce the inflow of foreign capital, foreign investors can still make 
their own decisions. Furthermore, the expansion of the "export sector" cannot be justified by 
the minimum inflow of foreign capital as a whole analysed. Moreover, the "attractive 
economic environment" praised by Clark cannot be proven by the fact that after 1963 foreign 
capital dropped sharply. At least, we shall bear in mind that in Taiwan "export-oriented FDI 
did occur during 1967-74" only [Tsai (1991): 277], while Clark has treated all FDI in Taiwan 
as export oriented under the sector-directing policy. Tsai's recent empirical study has 
explained that "most of the FDI in Taiwan" has aimed at the domestic market [Tsai (1991): 
277],
Since Taiwan already had created a strong and expanding economic base, the 
powerful external economic shock resulting from the First oil crisis in the early 1970s had 
only a fleeting impact on the country. To the GMD government and its bureaucracy during 
the global economic crisis, considerable credit must be given (Cf. Section II.3.C.(iv). above). 
Indeed, the regime successfully blended deflationary and stimulative policies and fine-tuned 
the degree of government activities to rapidly changing macro-economic conditions. But, 
this only explained the short-term "pragmatist" reactions, for instance, the controversy 
highly-controlled market and importation [cf. M.J. Liu (1991)], to reduce the impact of the 
external shock.
However, the changing policies and strategy over time have brought in considerable 
controversy on Taiwan's further development and the performance of bureaucracy in the 
regulation of foreign investment, as Taiwan was pricing itself out of the low-cost labour 
niche in the global economy. Thus, in early 1990s, the new labour issue has been the status 
of migrant workers from overseas and Chinese Mainland [e.g., CDN (IE) (11/4/92): 8]. A
34 E.g., laving aa a proportion a t ONP, 'which had avaraged 9 pcrcam in lha mid 1950a and 11 percent in the laic 1950a and early
1960a, rone dramatically aa export-led growth produced more reaourcea. from 12.4 percent in 1962 to 17.2 percent in 1963 to 25.5 
percent in 1970 and to 32.1 percent in 1972*. Hark (1989): 1S2.
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new inflationary surge occurred during the mid-1980s; and the international and domestic 
economic regressions in 1990-91. Therefore, in the whole 1980s the government had been 
guiding the economy towards a new transformation to such 'capital-intensive' industry as 
machinery, steel, petrochemicals, and non-ferrous metallurgy and to various types of 'high- 
technology' industry, especially in the electronics and information-processing fields.35 In 
short, Taiwan has been trying to establish a new 'international comparative advantage' in 
more technology, skill, and capital-intensive products, while remain certain degree of the old 
international compared advantage, such as without requirements of labour welfare under the 
international labour organization, of which Taiwan is not a member.
As directly reflected in Taiwan's production and trade statistics during 1977-86, this 
new economic strategy did bring in some achievement36 in Taiwan's international competi­
tiveness and prove that the country could move beyond assembly work by low-cost labour.37 
But again this achievement could benefit the domestic enterprises. Because of a strong need 
for technological development under this new strategy, Taiwan also started changing its 
policy to attract more foreign investment. For instance, some of the regulations governing 
foreign investment were liberalized and changed during the 1980s, with the result that foreign 
investment increased substantially from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.38 However, again 
this is only part of the global expansion of foreign investment [Tsai (1991): 276]. Therefore, 
after the successful record during the 1967-1974 when foreign capital had been concentrated 
in the export sector (already discussed), whether Taiwan has continued to attract foreign
35 For example, the Science-Based Indualrial Park in Hsinchu opened in 1980 seeming to bring together both domestic and foreign 
enterprises in high-technology industries. Furthermore, the two new sets of govern men tel programmes in the 1980s, the so-called 
Twelve and Fourteen Construction Projects respectively, provided the similar instances, cf. FCJ (17 January, 1991): 5; FCJ (21 
January. 1991): 5.
E.g., during 1977-86, according to Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1987), heavy industry grew at an annual rate of 12.2 percent, 
compared with 7.8 percent for light industry. Furthermore, the fastest annual growth rates for individual products over this period, 
were generally recorded by "sophisticated manufactures" including telephone sets (48%), electric fans (j 9%), electric calculators 
(26%), machine tools (20%) motor vehicles (20%), sound recorders (18%) and integrated circuits (17%), along with a few simpler 
consumer products. Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1987): 92-96. Also Cf. Clark (1989): 201.
37 In 1986 the principal export source in Taiwan became "electronics", combining both high technology and labour-intensive assembly, 
which rose from 12.3 percent to 22.3 percent of all exports during 1970-86. Furthermore, during the same period heavier industries, 
including rubber and plastics, metal manufactures, and machinery, also became more important as their combined share of Taiwan's 
export mix rocketed from 6.1 percent to 19.3 percent Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1987): 213, 228-229. Also Cf. Clark (1989):
38 Foreign investment inertued •ubnuntially from $164 million in 1977 (lo $4*6 million in 1980 to $770 million in 1986) to $1,223 
million in 1987, which was equivalent to about 6.3 percent of total investment during 1983-86: Clark (1989): 203; quoted from U.S. 
Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration, Investment Climate Statement: Taiwan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1988).
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investment and is able to control it in directing it into priority sectors remains a question 
during the 1980s and the 1990s. In practice, this "sector-directing policy" by the government 
has been controversial, although up to date foreign investment has continued to be 
concentrated in high technology and heavy industries, particularly machinery, electronics, 
and non-metallic minerals [FCJ (1/1/91): 3], which may not only be guided by the govern­
ment but decided by foreign investors themselves.
However, in terms of the three major contributions—funds, technology, and marketing 
networks—that foreign investment can make to the domestic industrial structure, the "Taiwan 
miracle" could be a "mirage" in the long term. First, given Taiwan's strong record of 
domestic saving and re-investment since the 1960s, the amount of foreign capital, as analysed 
above, was relatively minor; and the country is now suffering from its over-huge trade 
surpluses (e.g., $73.5 billion in 1988) and the resultant price inflation. In other words, the 
regime and its bureaucracy did not manage to "invest" its trade surpluses in a better or proper 
way. Second, because of the "over-concentration" of foreign investment in labour-intensive 
export production, technology transfer in Taiwan was probably less important than in most 
developing countries during the 1960s and the 1970s [E.g., Cf. Clark (1987): 185], and is the 
major challenge for the industrial transformation today. Finally, in 1970 about half of all 
exports in Taiwan were marketed through foreign companies [Gold (1986): 83-87]; MNCs, 
such as American and Japanese trading and retail firms, assumed a leading role in marketing 
Taiwan's exports. Since the mid-1980s, the country has also been suffering from American 
pressure on trading (as discussed already), and from a dilemma between the lacking of its 
own international marketing networks and the maintaining of the dominance of small and 
medium enterprises with their complex sub-contracting and selling relations.
VI.4.B. The Status of Foreign Enterprises in the Capitalist Quasi-fedual Production
I cannot accept the common conception that Taiwan provides a case of solely capitalist 
production. Simply speaking, capitalism has been defined as the system of free enterprise
I
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where individual profit seekers invest their capital and employ labour, although there exist 
only various forms of production, without any model, in different histories. According to the 
theorists of market economics or the theory of "invisible hand', this self-seeking behaviour is 
the best way to ensure prosperity for all. However, the term of capitalism in Taiwan serves 
as a term of abuse, because the system has not proved as individualistic as these theorists 
would like. We shall discuss this case from the transformation from agricultural economy 
towards industrialisation in Taiwan from the latter 1940s to the 1970s, taking into account of 
three factors of production: labour, land and capital.
In the aggregate, the land reform of 1948-53 had a major positive effect on income 
distribution in rural areas and feudal production therein. Landlords were compensated 70 
percent with land bonds in kind (rice for paddy land, sweet potatoes for dry land) and 30 
percent with shares of stock in four government enterprises earmarked to be transferred to 
private ownership-Taiwan Cement, Taiwan Paper and Pulp, Taiwan Agriculture and 
Forestry, and Taiwan Industry and Mining [S.M.S. Chen et al (1991): 33, and Gold (1986): 
66]. Within the process of exchange of 'land' into 'capital', the smaller landlords were the big 
losers and the largest landlords became the new "vassals" under the Nationalist regime within 
the transition of economy. Under the Nationalist policy prior to the reform, land values had 
plummeted so the valuation was set at a price much lower than its real value. Later, these 
smaller landlords regarded the government enterprise bonds skeptically and sold them off 
below par value to speculators, missing out on the later boom of industrialisation [Gold
(1986): 66]. These speculators will be analysed below. However, by contrast, through 
investment in industry and finance, those largest landlords played a more active role of 
capitalists at the early stage of Taiwan's industrialisation.
In my view, although the Nationalists dominated most industry, three reasons made 
the government devise measures to promote capitalists in certain key sectors such as cotton 
textiles, flour milling, and manufacturing and service later. In addition to the compromise 
with the landlord/gentry class after the bloody "2-28 Incident" and the pressure from the 
U.S.A., the private production was promoted under the insistence of the pro-private-sector
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bureaucrats led by K.Y. Yin (1903-63), who worked for Westinghouse in the U.S.A. earlier 
and dominated and forged the broad lines of Taiwan's economic path in the 1950s as the 
Minister of Economic Affairs. At the early stage of capitalist production under the 
Nationalists, three beneficiaries of speculators or entrepreneur grew with the necessary state 
and U.S. assistance.
Along with the parallel development of both the party and state organs in the 
regulating Taiwanese society, a trinity of political/military bureaucrats (cadres), economic 
technocrats and domestic entrepreneurs developed in an integrated connection. The first 
main beneficiaries were mainlanders from Shanghai and Shantung Province [Gold (1986): 
70-71].39 These major corporations such as Tai-yuan Textile, Far Eastern Textile, and 
Chung-hsing Textile had no risk and stood to make their fortune in a market where demand 
far outstripped supply after the war periods. Assuming the famous name of "Shanghai-bang" 
(the Gang from Shanghai), with additional state and U.S. assistance, they expended into man­
made fibres as well.
The second group of capitalists consisted of Taiwanese under the sponsorship of the 
Nationalists. One type was those Taiwanese who had spent several years serving the 
Nationalists on the Mainland before 1949. For example, the former elected Mayor of Taipei 
Wu San-lien set up, and assumed the first general-director of, the Tainan Textile Corporation 
with a group of Taiwanese businessmen from Tainan [K. Hsieh (1991): 278]. This "Tainan- 
bang” (the Gang from Tainan) has become a major manufacturing group and later a 
diversified conglomerate including the famous and liberal 'Independent Evening Post' and 
'Independent Morning Post'. The other type is represented by Y.C. Wang, a lumber-yard 
owner who agreed with a government contract to manufacture polyvinyl chloride (pvc) in a 
plant established by AID. From the mid-1950s with the government and U.S. assistance, 
Wang has built Formosa Plastics and has spinoffed companies into Taiwan's most successful 
and best integrated conglomerate [Gold (1986): 71]. Furthermore, through the intermarriage
39 As T.B. Gold hss analysed: 'Although officially anyone could apply for AID allotments, in practice tnsinlandera had an inaide track, 
being familiar with procedures and having friends or relatives in the bureaucracy. American officials complained about this to the 
Chinese." Gold (19Î6): 70-71.
190
V I. T a iw a n : L ib e ra liz a t io n  th ro u g h  F o rm a l L aw
Wang's family is connected with the top officers of the party-state.40 However, during 1989- 
91 this great 'vassal' once denied his return from the U.S.A. to Taiwan, because of his 
bargaining of further investment projects both in Mainland and Taiwan with the political and 
environmental issues.
As discussed already, the final group of main beneficiaries of the Nationalist 
industrialisation policy was the biggest landlords, the Japanese-era collaborators, who got a 
boost from the land reform mentioned. They accumulated shares in the four state enterprises, 
named already, used to compensate landlords for compulsorily purchased land. In 1954, the 
government began to transfer these firms to private ownership amidst a flurry of stock price 
manipulation [Gold (1986): 71]. The five big families concentrated on the Taiwan Cement 
Corporation, with which the sector has been the "untouchable" area for foreign investment 
even up to the date. Lin Po-shou of the 'Pan-chiao clan' became the first post-transfer 
chairman, succeeded by C.F. Koo, son of Ku Hsien-jung who was one of the members of 
Japan’s parliament before the war. Same as those sponsored by the party-state mentioned 
above, the company enjoyed state protection and contracts. "A seat on its board became a 
coveted status symbol for later generations of Taiwanese capitalists [Gold (1986): 71]".
With the rapid growth of Taiwan's economy, these capitalists bred from the guidance 
of the Nationalists become economic 'vassals' to the regime, which not only holds a party- 
state mechanism in the fields of military, political and social controls internally, but also 
dominates all the external relations. In short, with an appearance of capitalist production, the 
economic system in Taiwan has been based upon a servile relationship between the economic 
'vassals' and a 'lord', which has been a foreign sovereign power transferred from mainland 
onto Taiwanese society. The vassals have paid homage and service of the ruling stabilisation 
to the lord and the lord has provided the vassals protection and land, which in the case of 
Taiwan has been transferred into capital and market, or even the access to raw materials and 
other productive elements. Under this capitalist-feudal system of quasi-feudals, each
40 The Vice-minister of Defence in Ttiwen in 19fl0, General S.S Chen, who nerved the Nnlionnliel before the end of the wnr end in the 
first Taiwanese promoted as a General under the Nationalist. Cf. The Journalist (Hsing-hsing-wen, Taipei) (7-13/January^l): 66-78, 
"The Political Trademark in Marriage Registration”.
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industrial sector is a quasi-feud, and each corporate group is a castle, within whose 
jurisdiction there have existed several economic units, that is the majority of small and 
medium enterprises under various direct and indirect productive links. In my view, behind 
these organisations of enterprises there always exist state-contracts, contracts, sub-contracts, 
and a network of productive agencies under a close-knit hierarchy of economic authorities, or 
an aggregate of social and political institutions.
Within the system of production in Taiwan, the role of bureaucracy assumes the 
bridge between the court and the quasi-feuds, and the co-ordinator between the state and the 
market, between foreign and domestic economic forces, and between the social, political and 
economic changes. For instance,
"In 1951, leading businessmen set up an umbrella organization, the China National 
Association of Industry and Commerce. Cabinet officials charged with economic af­
fairs maintained close links with it. It functioned as a channel by which government 
policies were relayed to businessmen, unlike Japan’s Keidanren, which is an asso­
ciation for the private sector to represent its interests to the bureaucracy [Gold (1986):
From this kind of channels, bureaucracy plays the key of the capitalist-feudal system. To a 
great content, it has been long criticized in Taiwan the governmental and party administrators 
at all levels have too close links with the business circus, such as "Party-State Capitalism". 
However, it has been also difficult for the bureaucracy itself to break up this ruling and 
productive system. For instance, the chair of the Association of Industry and Commerce 
mentioned has been taken, through the all 1980s up to the date, by C.F. Koo, mentioned as 
the Chairman of Taiwan Cement, a best example of the business-political connection in 
Taiwan.41 Moreover, his family has been standing as one of the five top families in Taiwan 
since the era of Japanese colony. Again, the intermarriage makes his family connected with 
these families of top bureaucrats, big entrepreneurs and military leaders of the Nationalists.42 
An interesting case can be found from another leader of Tainan-bang mentioned, Ching-
41 Through the all 1980s up lo the date, C.F. Koo is the Chairman of Taiwan Cement, who is also the head of the China Trust Oroup 
(Chong-hsm. or Ho-Hsin corporate group); a partner of the foreign joint venturea, for example, of Taiwan Coco Cola Company; a 
member in the Central Standing Committee of the Nationalist Party; the Adviaer to the President of Taiwan since 1988 and the Senior 
Adviser from July 1991.
42 The Journalist (Hsinghsing-wen, Taipei) (7-13/January^l): 66-76.
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Yuan Kao,43 a key figure between liberal medium and the Nationalist Party-State, and 
between the labour representative and entrepreneur.
In conclusion, just as the examples of slavery in America, apartheid in South Africa, 
monopolies everywhere, the term of capitalism, or its form, has been abused in Taiwan. At 
least, the capitalist production in Taiwan takes the form of an altered quasi-feudal system as 
its basic social structure, which cannot be explained from the astir data of the rapid growth 
[E.g., the tables cited in C. Clark (1989): 157-216]. Very different from the principles of 
three former Presidents who strictly kept the businessmen far away from the power, President 
T.H. Lee, criticized by the journalists, has too many 'close friends' from the business circus.44 
Indeed, after 1988 there have increased the number of the political-business scandals, of 
which some cases were reported as connected with the President indirectly.45
VI.4.C. Contradictions between Formal and Informal Economic Regulation
The formal law in Taiwan shows its limits from business environment to administrative 
system within the Party-State capitalism.
(i) Considerations from  Foreign Investors, not only from  the Nationalists
So far, what has been less discussed in our analysis is the considerations from the 
supply-side of the foreign investment in Taiwan. For the sections on the statutory framework 
and administrative procedure regulating foreign investment, and their political-economic 
context, the analytical process have been all based on the consideration of the demand-side, 
i.e., Taiwan and its government. From the legal context itself, we have seen the counter- 
foreign-capital tendency and the mechanism used by both Nationalist bureaucracy and the
43 During 1991-92, C.Y. Kno has been the General-director of the Tttng yt (United) Corporate Group and of the Independent Poet group 
which has long been the leading medium criticizing the Nationalist government, and a member of the Central Committee (and of the 
Taiwan Provincial Committee) of the Nationalists. Furthermore, he is not only a member of the Labour Committee under the 
Executive Yuan, but also the Chairman of Taiwan Provincial Industrial Chamber.
44 The Journalist (Hsing-ksing-wcn, Taipei) (3-9/December/W): 20-21; 35-41.
4^ E.g., the case of the Land Use of Golf-Course in 1990, and the case of the establishment of Evergreen Airline in 1991. Cf. Asiaweek
(Ya-Zhott Zhou Kan) (30/June/91): 49; The Journalist (Hsing-hsing-wai) ibid; and (11-17/March^l): 10-17, especially 13.
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domestic enterprises. On the other hand, from the point of view of foreign investors, 
unfortunately:
"No clear evidence was found to support the expectation that government incentive 
policies were effective in attracting FDI to Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan's 
extraordinary economic performance in the past two decades was not a significant 
determinant of FDI. Therefore, barring possible noneconomic factors, in the case of 
Taiwan FDI is most likely to be supply-side determined [Tsai (1991): 282]".
Thus, both legal and economic environments in Taiwan, generally speaking, have not 
provided a set of good circumstances for foreign investment. Moreover, the major benefi­
ciaries of the legal and economic mechanism for encouragement of investment in Taiwan 
have been the domestic capitalists and bureaucrats.
More precisely, the growth of the foreign investment in Taiwan before 1991, as 
mentioned in the last Sections, is "very likely just part of the global expansion" of foreign di­
rect investment. This also accords with Professor Tsiang's analysis that Taiwan's economic 
development in the last three decade has depended little on foreign capital [Tsiang (1985): 
165; also cf. Section VI.3.B.]. Furthermore, with regards to considerations from the supply- 
side, in the face of "rising labour costs"46 indicates that cheap labour may not be as important 
as expected. The myth of cheap labour was already questioned even before the 1980s:
"Schive (1978a, 1978b) pointed out that in Taiwan the kind of FDI which relies on 
cheap labour for the purpose of export was apparent only during 1967-74 [Tsai
(1991): 276]".
Moreover, taking the governmental incentive policies, including the tax concessions,
into account of the motivation of foreign investors,
"Empirical evidence, however, suggests that their merits are limited (IMF, 1985;
Balasubramanyam, 1986) .......  with the exception of 1967-74, most of the FDI in
Taiwan is aimed at the domestic market [Tsai (1991): 277]".
In accordance with our analysis of protectionism produced from both law and administrative 
procedure of foreign investment in Taiwan, the statement that the domestic market is more
I
Am Tsai k u  cited is hi* study, "Wu (1983) found ihat, having adjusted (or the effect of the foreign exchange rate. Ihe increase in the 
unit labour coat in Taiwan reached 13% during 1970-82. Tnis ii higher than similar increases in the United States (7.2%), Japan 
(10.2%), South Korea (7.3%), the Philippines (3.1%) and Singapore (9.4%) in the same period". Tsai (1991): 276.
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attractive than both tax and legal incentive, such as cooperation from the public sector, shall 
be more likely a concluding remark. The formal law shows its limitation.
(ii) The Structural Informality as the Major Contradiction o f Political Economy in Taiwan
In our theme of interaction between formal and informal law, it is clear that all these 
contradictions of economic regulation have come from the Party-State structure and its 
informal and traditional ruling mechanism.
The role of government under the party-state machine provides the primary 
explanation for Taiwan's economic success story. The party-state has clearly played the 
major role in directing Taiwan's development. The several structural transformations which 
occurred - and without which significant growth could not have happened - were clearly the 
result of explicit government (or party-state) decisions and policies. However, the 
government policies, in turn, can be explained by elite interests and values within the party- 
state network -- the capitalist quasi-fedual system or the Party-State Capitalism. The initial 
Nationalist national leadership was composed of the top political and military figures who 
had come from the mainland. The key decision of the initially strongly military regime was 
to encourage development and structural change and to give substantial political power to the 
economic technocrats who would oversee the ROCs development strategy. Indeed, those 
Nationalist economic technocrats did propose a prospective role of law in Taiwan's 
development: "what we need in the way of legislation are laws of a dynamic nature, that will 
serve as a driving force in promoting social stability and progress" [K.T. Li (1976): 19]. 
However, law has more part to play in the Taiwan of tomorrow.
First, the Nationalist economic technocrats opted for an economy primarily based on 
private enterprise in which the greatest material rewards were probably reaped by 
businessmen rather than political and military leaders. This also opened the way for 
economic advancement and social mobility for former landlords and native Taiwanese. This 
development lad to the creation of a new prosperous economic elite since the 1970s. A more
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differential elite with a much broader sharing of political power and economic resources 
would be an "open-sesame" to the Nationalist's party-state rule.
Furthermore, by the end of the 1980s, the rapidly growing tension between the ruling 
government, the capitalist entrepreneur and the labour class increased the uncertainties of 
Taiwan's development. However, in my view, unless there is a restructuring of the party- 
state into a more democratic structure, the growing power of domestic entrepreneurs will 
dominate the development of Taiwan, in the way of an alliance with the bureaucracy. In our 
study, the continuing protectionism in the 1990 SUI is the best example. Instead of 
despiting' the authority of the party-state, both entrepreneurs and bureaucrats tend to use' its 
ruling machine. This tendency in 1991 becomes clearer in the change of the Statute of Elec­
tion.47 The new system of voting is based on the small administrative areas which will be 
easier for the businessmen and the secret societies to win the local election. Accordingly, the 
party-state organs, if allied with the former two, can further assume the core to co-ordinate 
and dominate the divided population.
(Hi) Interaction between Formal and Informal Law: from  "Toyota-Taiwan Automobile " to 
"McDonnell Douglas-Taiwan Aerospace Corporation "
On contrast, Taiwan's economy continues to depend heavily on foreign cooperation 
technologically and politically. In terms of upgrading industries, both capitalization and use 
of technology obviously do not realise the transfer of technology and its further research and 
development. Up to the early 1990s, Taiwan remains as an economic processing zone for the
West and Japan without any economic and technological independence. In terms of capital
\
needed for national development, the huge foreign exchange reserve as the result from the 
export surge remains in American banks, while the country has been criticized as lacking a 
proper public construction and welfare policy for its own people. The new Six-Year 
Planning as reported is depended on foreign investment and technology. Whether Taiwan
47 The Journalist nwn. Taipei) (3/Feburary/91): 21-2«.
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can withdraw its huge foreign reserve from the U.S.A. remains obviously out of question. 
Thus, in early 1992 several vice-ministers of economic affairs, trade, communication, and 
transportation from France, the United Kingdom, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden have been 
welcomed by the Nationalist government in their visitings to Taiwan for opportunities of 
investment and cooperation [CDN (IE) (14/4/92): 8].
Thus, two famous cases of foreign investment with high technology, from 1979 to 
1992, shall be examined in our study on interaction between formal and informal law. One is 
the failed proposal of joint venture of "Da-chi-cher-chang" (Big Automobile Plant), which 
has been repeatedly reviewed as the first unsuccessful precedent of governmental industrial 
policy-making.48 During 1979-84, the proposed project was negotiated between the then 
Minister of Economic Affairs in Taiwan, Yao-tung Chao (Yao-dong Zhao, the Junior Adviser 
of President during 1990-92), and Toyota Automobile Group in Japan. Chao has commented 
on the case recently:
"The purpose of the policy was to build up an automobile industry in Taiwan with 
internationally competitive capability. However, during then there already existed 
three domestic automobile companies - Yu-long, Ford-Liu-ho and San-yang. When 
national industrial policy crashed into the interests of these businesses, the project of 
the Big Automobile Plant with 300,000-vehicle production yearly was discarded 
before it got started [CDN (IE) (12/4/92): 8]"
In early 1992, given the fact that Taiwan has still been lacking the automobile high 
technology, Toyota has come back to cooperate with a Taiwanese private company, Guo-rei 
Automobile, to set up a joint venture for big-automobile manufacturing. Chao not only feels 
excited, but also is concerned with the question of "Who decides what" now?
The other is the recently disputed joint venture between McDonnell Goulas (USA)
\
and Taiwan Aerospace Corporation, 1991-92. On 6th January, 1992, the Legislative Yuan 
fired strongly on the aerospace project by ROC government, Taiwan Aerospace Corporation, 
and McDonnell Douglas. Minister of Economic Affairs was questioned the followings:
"'Feng han'yuo yi zhaiTat yuan ment (Toyota wish to complete its dream)” ia a good article for people to understand the unexpected 
termination of the Toyota investment during 1979-84. and the new project in 1992; Cf. CDN (IE) (12/4/V2): 8.
40
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(1) why can a manager of private company be appointed as the negotiating 
representative of ROC government? (2) what is the standard of the appointment of the 
government-sided Director of Taiwan Aerospace of which government has certain 
shares? (3) why can a governmental representative guarantee that there is never a 
problem of fund-supply from government? and, (4) what is the legal effects of the 
Memorandum of Understanding in negotiating joint venture? [Cf. Independent 
Evening Post (Taipei) (6/1/92): 3; China Times Express (Taipei) (6/1/92): 3; United 
Evening News (Taipei) (6/1/92): 3]
This requirement of formality within the process of setting-up a joint venture with foreign 
investment has exploded with all the internal problems of McDonnell Douglas case.49 At the 
end of April 1992, the Minister came back to the Legislative Yuan with two reports of 
assessment on risks and opportunities. The key points of McDonnell Douglas investment 
have been that the rate of risks is as high as that of opportunities for upgrading aerospace 
technology. Thus, the private Taiwanese enterprises wish the government to take the major 
part of risks, while the government holds the contrary view, in order to exchange the support 
from the Legislative Yuan [CDN (IE) (29/4/92): 7]. The major risks of the project are the 
uncertainties of marketing and the lacking of relevant technician from Taiwan. Therefore, it 
seems impossible that the Legislative Yuan will permit using public fund to take the risks for 
private enterprises [Ibid.].
From the two cases discussed above, we can find out that informal resistance from 
domestic enterprises in Taiwan paralysed the project of big automobile industry. On the 
hand, the great requirements of formal procedure and transparency of economic decision­
making have been increasing in Taiwan recently. The interaction between formal and 
informal economic regulation depend on the interrelations between the executive authorities, 
the Legislative Yuan, and domestic enterprises. However, another common fact in both cases 
has been the lacking of advanced technology and of better channels for upgrading industries 
in Taiwan from 1979 to 1992.
However, the multinational corporations continue to take advantages of: capitalization 
of technology without any capital contribution, tax benefits of technological level, selling of
*
49 O b 13th April. 1992, Ik« MoEA announced that Taiwan Aerospace has no capability to join the investment, the General Director 
reigned ne« day [CDN (IE) (17/4*2): 7).
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lower level technology and equipments, loan credits, payment and fees of intellectual 
property and technician operation, marketing fees, legal privileges of remitting profits in the 
name of development and research of new technology, and so on. Hence, in the light of 
promotion of foreign investment, the law has been countered the protectionism from the 
administrative authorities. For instance, in April 1992, the Industrial Department of MoEA 
has still announced that importation of Japanese-made automobile may be permitted in the 
coming two years [CDN (IE) (14/4/92): 8], Equally, regarding to the control of foreign 
investment, state law in Taiwan is not successful and effective in dealing with both 
technology and capital. Indeed, facing the competition from the other Southeast Asian newly 
industrial countries, what becomes serious in Taiwan in 1992 are the losing out of natural 
resources, environmental pollution, industrial inflation, outdated public utilities and social 
disorder.
VI.5 CONCLUSIONS
It is only through an examination of law in the context that we have found out the active part 
of informal sector in political economy in Taiwan even today. This Chapter has analysed that 
within the statutory framework liberalization has been confronted with protectionism behind 
the administrative measures. Furthermore, both the structure and content of the legal system 
in Taiwan has been occupied by informality. The flexibility of the legal structure and its 
great informal domains have originated from the Nationalist Party-State. Moreover, the 
content of the statutory framework has been filled with both administrative measures and
business practices and customs, such as casting lots for land-purchase.
%
All these contradictions of informal regulation discussed in this Chapter have been 
closely co-existed with the Party-State Capitalism under the GMD. The ROC was in the 
period of mobilization to suppress the rebellion, or the period of national emergency, even 
though its martial law ended in 1987. The 1948 Temporary Provisions have safeguarded the
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Nationalist's legitimacy as the ruling party and government in Taiwan until April 1991,50 51
while the Communist government has never declared that a military invasion will not be used 
to settle the China-Taiwan dispute.5* Thus, it seems in the immediate future that the 
Nationalist government will maintain this last straw of legitimacy from which its requirement 
of administrative legality stems.
Nonetheless, the legal attitude of Taiwanese society also provides many channels for 
the existence of informality. For instance, the first quarter of 1992, the out-flow of "foreign 
exchange for tour" has more than half of balance of trading [CDN (IE) (9/4/92): 8]. An 
official of Central Bank has pointed out that it is common for a Taiwanese tourist to ex­
change and send out more than one million U.S. dollars for migration, housing overseas, and 
investment "under the cover of tour" [Ibid.]. Indeed, informal rule and behaviour have pene­
trated through the whole Taiwanese society. Thus, to a certain degree, the role of informal 
law still has its essential part to play in Taiwan's development in the near future.
*
50 Aaiaweek (Yu-Zhou Zhou K .n ) (5/Mty/91): 9.10; and. (12/May/91): 10-15.
51 Aaiawaak (Yu-Zhou ZhouKun). Ibid., tad. (3/Faburary/91): 34-15.
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CHAPTER VII. FURTHER PROMOTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
PRC: PREVENTING ADMINISTRATIVE ARBITRARINESS AND EMPHASIZING 
BUSINESS FUNCTION
VII.l INTRODUCTION
Significant changes have taken place in the development of law and the administrative 
regulation of foreign investment after the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) of the PRC. Two 
new characteristics of this late development shall be taken into account. First, further 
promotion of foreign investment is necessary, once the national economy has reached beyond 
the initial open stage. After the practice and experience of the regulation of foreign 
investment, there is a greater determination to readjust the relevant legal framework closer 
towards the business practice of foreign economic co-operation [cf. UNCTC (1988): 262- 
263; 276-278]. This has been the case in the PRC since 1985, and the case of Taiwan since 
the 1970s. This trend has been the major driving force behind the changes of the laws and 
institutions of foreign-related business. Secondly, facing heavy tasks in the economic 
transition period, administrative regulation has in fact increased along with the 
transformation of economic structure, business environments and the legal frameworks.
Thus, this chapter examines some questions relating to foreign investment from the 
recent legal changes up to readjustment of administrative procedure. It first focuses on the 
legalisation of informal sector in the Second Wave of Encouragement of Foreign Investment 
through formal law since the mid-1980s. Secondly, following a close examination of the 
contradiction of informal law under the administrative procedure, the interaction of law, 
administration and business practice in the field of foreign investment becomes clearer. 
Thus, from the socio-economic viewpoint, the role of the state law and the impacts of state 
intervention in foreign-invested business in the PRC can be brought into the picture following 
the legal analysis.
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VII.2 LEGALIZATION OF INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE SECOND WAVE OF 
ENCOURAGEMENT THROUGH THE FORMAL LAW AFTER 1985
The PRC's legislation on foreign investment after the mid-1980s, in my view, is different 
from the legislation before then. Especially, since 1986-87, a series of new preferential 
treatments have been guaranteed by a better restructuring of both statutory and administrative 
frameworks regulating foreign investment. The Second Wave of Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment through the Formal Law started with the major tasks on lifting the administrative 
intervention, which produced barriers for further foreign investment, and on legalizing 
business practice. Thus, we shall take both the recent legislation, including amendment of 
laws, and improvement of administrative procedure into a closer account.
VII.2.A. Progress of Formal law by the Omnibus Legislation of the 1986 "22 Articles"
As already mentioned, the 1986 Provisions for the Encourage o f Foreign Investment 
(861011) were promulgated by the State Council to resolve the operational problems 
encountered by the foreign-invested enterprises before 1987. The importance of these "22 
Articles" also lies in the subsequent series of administrative regulations and measures 
formulated by the administrative authorities at all levels. Accordingly, on the one hand, the 
"22 Articles" try to improve the conditions of the 'existing foreign investment'. On the other, 
the provisions grant 'new special preferences', through a qualification of operational 
'functions' of business, to enterprises either manufacturing products mainly for export or 
possessing advanced technology.
Within the legislative framework, the "22 Articles" have assumed several 
significances. First, the operational problems of foreign investment before 1986 explicated 
that between the law and business practice there existed a bottleneck for promotion of 
foreign investment inside the PRC. This bottleneck came not only from the uncertainties of 
China's reform of economic system, but also from the administrative obstruction, both the 
unreasonable intervention and the lack o f a guarantee by administrative co-operation, as 
discussed in Section V.4.B. Secondly, the application of the "22 Articles" has covered all the
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foreign investments, despite their different forms, this omnibus legislation explained its co­
ordinating function in regulating both foreign-related business and administration. At least, 
the State Council realized that there existed a need for the central government to provide a 
new guideline based on legislation for promotion of foreign investment in different areas.
Thirdly, however, the enforcement and interpretation of the "22 Articles" has still 
relied heavily on the local administrative regulations and procedure. The huge number of ad­
ministrative regulations enacted by different authorities not only explains how the local 
governments' support to the policy of the central, but provides a legal guarantee for the 
encouragement of foreign investment under the "22 Articles". Finally, the interaction 
between the central legislation and local regulations clarifies that the local administration on 
regulating foreign investment plays the key part within the open policy to promote 
international economic co-operation in the PRC.
VII.2.B. Interaction between Formal and Informal Sectors under the 1990 Amendment
of Equity Joint Venture Law
On 4th April, 1990, the Third Session of the Seventh NPC approved a "Decision"1 on
"the Revision of the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment". In
practice, the Amendment provides a good example for people to understand the Chinese
attitude towards furthering international co-operation and its economic legislation. In the
light of the control of foreign investment, is it imperative that some provisions of the 1979
Equity JV Law be amended and implemented? As I have argued elsewhere:
"The answer is positive -yes- for the Chinese state authorities with emphasis on 
negotiation under the facade of international practice, legitimation of business oper­
ation through legal experimentation, and rationalization of the state regulatory 
authorities...." [C.J. Lee (1991): 288-289]
For these reasons, an expansion of administrative control of foreign investment has 
developed through the formal legalization of business practice in the past.
National People's Congress. "Decision on the Revision of the Law o f the People's Republic o f China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese 
and Foraign Investment" (04/04/90) (hereinafter cited as "the Amendment") The Amendment in English was published in Beijing 
Review (May 7-13, 1990). pp.27-28.
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(i) Emphasis on Negotiation under the Facade o f International Practice:
To the Chinese government, the Amendment is believed to be "very necessary" 
because several changes of the texts conform "to international practice and the principles 
specified in agreements on investment protection signed by Chinese and foreign 
governments" [Cf. Li Ping (1990)]. However, a flexibility within the words of the 
Amendment for further negotiation by both parties in order to reserve a leeway for the state 
regulatory authorities.
(i).(a) No Nationalization without Compensation
The Amendment provides a pledge not to nationalize or expropriate equity joint 
ventures except where necessary in the "public interest". However, according to some 
lawyers,2 a public interest can be easily found in practice. Furthermore, in addition to lacking 
reference to the term "appropriate compensation",3 there is no provision that compensation 
will be paid in "hard currency". Should a foreign investor whose joint venture is 
expropriated be compensated in Ren-min-bi (People's Dollar) the investor could be faced with 
a foreign exchange problem [CLP Editor's Notes (1990): 38-39], Thus, this provision opens 
the possibilities of further official interpretive comment, state practice, and parties' 
bargaining.
Furthermore, the new provision, as criticized by western lawyers, obviously will not 
prevent the Chinese from reversing their policy in the future by simply repealing the statutory 
promise or enacting superseding legislation [Robertson & Chen (1990): 11].
E.g., D.F. Robertson and X. Chen (1990): 11.
In cases where joint ventures must be expropriated the Amendment stipulstes that sppropriste compensation shall be paid. This 
guarantee conforms with the compensation rule applied in most Western countries for expropriation of foreign property.
I
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(i).(b) Chairmanship open to Foreign Investors*
The Amendment leaves the chairmanship of the enterprise open to both sides,* 3 *
eliminating one of the more conspicuous differences between the Equity JV Law and the 
1988 Contractual JVL [Robertson & Chen, ibid.; also, CLP Editor's Notes (1990): 39], The 
vice-chairman must come from "the side that does not take the chair". However, in both law 
and practice, the power of the chairman is still not specified, except as authorized through 
negotiation by both parties to the equity joint venture.
(i).(c) Duration o f Joint Venture may be Waived
As discussed previously, under an amendment to Article 100 of the 1983 EJVL 
Implementing Regulations (Cf. Section V.3.D.), a blanket maximum of 50 years applied to 
"all" joint ventures. The Amendment changes Article 12 to allow joint ventures in "certain 
industries" to operate without term limits. Without any detailed provision in the Amendment, 
it is not clear whether enterprises already in operation under the fixed-period scheme will be 
able to renew their contracts without term limits. In addition, more official guidelines as to 
which "types" of joint ventures may be allowed to operate without term limits are still 
required.
Furthermore, Chinese policy on the term of the business was stated as: "different lines 
of business and circumstances shall be handled differently, a principle embodying the state's 
industrial policies" [Li Ping (1990): 26]. Thus, the wording of the Amendment does not 
actually differ much from the old text because, on the one hand, both provide that the term of 
the joint venture may be determined by the parties and because, on the other hand, any 
practical length more than the original 30 years limitation may still be repealed effectively by 
the administrative authorities [Robertson & Chen (1990): 12]. "In conformity with 
international practice" is only a covering phrase. Both negotiations and administrative ap­
* The original Article guaranteed the chairmanship to the Chinese side, with the foteign party taking one or two vice chairmanships
3 The new Article 6 allows foreigners to become chairman of the board in equity joint ventures. Accordingly, the chairman may be
elected by the board of directors or appointed through negotiation between both parties.
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proval are essentially important to Chinese state economic planning in order to control the 
operation and term of business.
(ii) Legitimation o f  Business Practice through Legal Experimentation:
Over the past ten years the business circumstance of joint ventures has changed 
beyond some original provisions. Although the basic principles of the 1979 Law remain 
applicable, some business practices, adopted by both joint ventures and administrative 
authorities, need legitimation from the Chinese government itself.
(ii).(a) Banking Monopoly Relaxed
Originally, the 1979 Equity JV Law conferred authority on the Bank of China to 
handle all foreign currency deposits and remittances made by joint ventures. However, since 
1979 many banks, including the CIT1C Industrial Bank and foreign bank branches in 
Shenzhen SEZ, have received authorization to deal in foreign exchange. Joint ventures have 
gradually started dealing with such banks—first with approval granted on an ad hoc basis and 
now often without obtaining formal approval [Robertson & Chen (1990): ibid.]. The 
Amendment provides for a relaxation of the banking restrictions on foreign exchange of the 
equity joint ventures. This, in fact, only legitimates a banking reform that has taken place 
over the last several years. Although this was criticized as "not an innovation" [CLP Editor's 
Notes (1990): 39], it still shows that a legal basis is necessary for foreign exchange 
operations.
The Amendment, on the one hand, extends greater banking freedoms to equity joint 
ventures, and on the other hand, places the informal business practice under the state 
control.6 Given the current pervasiveness of the PRC's restrictive foreign exchange controls, 
the Amendment is criticized as not making much difference to foreign investors [Robertson 
& Chen (1990): 11], However, in order to eliminate foreign exchange dealings without
6 Accordingly, the Amendment removes the requirement for joint ventures to seek spprovsl to open foreign exchange sccounts with 
"banks other than the Bank of China", or to use auch banka to remit foreign exchange wages and profita outside the PRC.
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formal approval, and to move the regulatory treatment of equity joint ventures closer to that 
of contractual joint ventures, Chinese legislators adopt a necessary legal basis which is the 
same as the banking rule found in the 1988 Contractual JVL.7 8
(ii).(b) Tax Benefits Broadened
The Amendment, providing no innovative tax concessions, widens the scope of tax 
breaks applicable which again conforms with current practice. Although this is criticized as 
simply reflecting "changes in the substance or administration of other laws applicable to 
equity joint ventures" [Robertson & Chen (1990): 12], a legitimation through the Amendment 
is deemed necessary by the PRC government. In this regard, the Amendment merely 
generalizes these items in deference to preferential tax laws promulgated since 1979 [CLP 
Editor's Notes (1990):39],
(hi) Rationalization o f  the State Regulatory Authorities:
In those fields above mentioned, such as expropriation with compensation, approval 
of the term limit, and foreign exchange banking, the PRC government re-assures itself of the 
control of joint venture operations. In addition, as to the internal structures of administrative 
and legal frameworks under Chinese authority, the Amendment provides certain improve­
ments towards more rationalization of business regulation.
(iii).(a) Applicability
Since 1979, the Equity JV Law itself clearly refers to joint ventures in which a 
separate entity is created using capital contributed by the foreign and Chinese parties. Co­
operative joint ventures are the subject of a separate law, that is, the 1988 Contractual (Co­
7 The contractual joint venturer are permitted, under Article 16 of the Contractual Joint Venture Law, to open a foreign exchange 
account at any "bank or other financial inatitution” which ia authorized by the PRC government to conduct foreign exchange 
tranaactiona.
8 The original Article 7 under the 1979 Equity JV Law reatricted the scope of tax typea, time perioda. and joint ventures to which tax 
concesaions could be applied.
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operative) JVL. In practice, because the last Law was promulgated much later in time, its 
provisions and implementation provided the important references for the Amendment to the 
Equity JV Law. The Amendment is applicable only to Chinese-Foreign equity joint ventures. 
Thus, to a major degree, some lawyers have argued that the Amendment only eliminates 
several structural and functional differences between equity and contractual joint ventures, 
with little effect on attracting more investment into China.* As a whole, these eliminations 
include provisions on chairmanship and banking.
(iii).(b) Generalization o f Regulatory Authorities
The Amendment, in Paragraphs 2 and 7, generalizes the names of "the foreign 
economic and trade" and "the industry and commerce" administrative departments in Articles 
3 and 13. The names of both authorities have been changed since 1979. For some past years, 
the PRC government has been using the general term "administrative department" (xing- 
zheng guan-li zhu-guan bu-meh) to refer to a department in charge of a particular function, 
rather than referring to the department by name [CLP Editor's Notes (1990): 39]. This part 
reflects de facto changes in the contract approval process that occurred when the PRC 
government had been attempting "to decentralize its administrative function" in the decade 
after the original Law was enacted [Robertson & Chen (1990): 11]. Similar to the 
legitimation of some business practices, the Amendment merely confirms that the Foreign 
Investment Commission in the original text is no longer the sole state agency that authorizes 
and governs the operation of equity joint ventures.
» *
The Amendments, argued by Robertson ft Chen, is "not likely to give the parties to an equity joint venture significantly greater 
control over the management of their joint business". For the most part, it simply incorporates into the Equity Joint Venture Law 
"changes in other laws applicable to foreign-funded enterprises in Chins”. Robertson ft Chen, supra note 4, p.10.
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VII.2.C. Progress of Formal Law by the Omnibus Legislation of the 1991 Foreign
Income Tax Law
On 9th April, 1991, another important piece of legislation-the Income Tax Law the 
PRC for Enterprises With Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises {1991 Foreign ITL) 
(910409) was adopted by the Fourth Session of the Seventh NPC. Thus, after 1 July at the 
same year, the effective date, the 1991 Foreign ITL will replace two separate sets of income 
tax laws concerning foreign investment10 enacted in the early 1980s (Article 30). According 
to PRC authority,11 the background of the new 1991 Foreign ITL was "the practice and 
experience of the last decade" and the principle of "not increasing the tax payers' burden and 
not reducing favourable treatment".
Thus, while those provisions in the original tax laws which have proved effective and 
are universally accepted are retained in the new tax law, the content of some other provisions 
has been replaced as discussed below, referring to common international practice. The PRC's 
authority declares that the restructuring of the foreign income tax law, following the 
Amendment of Equity JV Law in 1990, indicates the PRC's continuing adherence to "the 
principle and policy of reform and opening to the outside world".12 Furthermore, the 1991 
Foreign ITL is another omnibus legislation regulating foreign investment on the issue of tax. 
Therefore, the definition of the taxpayers includes both 'the enterprises with foreign invest­
ment'13 and 'the foreign enterprises'14 which shall be within the PRC tax jurisdiction.
0 They arc: (a) the Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Joint Venturea with Chineae and Foreign Investment (EJV ITL) (801210) 
and its Implementation Rules (of EJV ITL) (801214) for the Equity joint ventures; and, (b) the Income Tax Law of the PRC 
Concerning Foreign Enterprises (FE ITL) (811213) and its Implementation Rules (of FE ITL) (820221) for both the contractual 
joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises
11 E.g., the speech by State Councillor and Minister of Finance. Wang Binqian in the Conference of the NPC. See RMJB (People's 
Daily, International Edition), April 12, 1991, p.3.
12 Ibid..
These include: (1) Sino-foreign joint venturea; (2) Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures; (3) exclusively foreign-funded enterprises.14 These are: (4) foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organizations which 'set up organizations and establishments in 
China to engage in production and business activities'; and (3) foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organizations 
which, though without organization or establishment in China, have 'dividend, interest, rent, royalties and other income sources within 
China'.
I
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The 1991 Foreign ITL stipulates a new schedule of tax rates. As to both equity and 
contractual joint ventures, the law computes their income-tax 'at a flat rate' (Article 5).15 It is 
believed by the PRC authority that the 'flat rate' is simple and clear, benefits investors "by 
making feasibility studies and calculating economic return possible" and helps "prevent the 
rise and fall o f applicable tax rate due to changes in prices and foreign exchange rate".1« 
Thus, in business practice, this benefits the Sino-foreign 'contractual' joint ventures more. 
Furthermore, the income-tax rate for all enterprises, under the 1991 Foreign ITL, is 33 
percent, the same as the rate for Sino-foreign joint ventures in the old income tax laws. This 
is also much lower than 50 percent 'progressive rate' for 'contractual' joint ventures and 
'foreign enterprises' under the old laws.17
In addition to a better restructuring of the tax rate, several preferences are granted, 
based on "functions o f production-oriented projects", by the 1991 Foreign ITL. For both 
enterprises with foreign investment and foreign enterprises 'in Special Economic Zones' and 
production-oriented enterprises with foreign investment 'in Economic and Technological 
Development Zones', the income-tax rate under the 1991 Foreign ITL is 15 percent only 
(Article 7:1). Secondly, for enterprises with foreign investment in other areas which 'fall 
within the stipulation of the State Council' and with 'energy, transport and communications, 
harbours, docks and other projects encouraged by the state', the income-tax shall also be 
charged at a rate 15 percent under those stipulations of the State Council (Article 7:3). 
Furthermore, for production-oriented enterprises with foreign investment in coastal economic 
development zones and urban areas where SEZs and ETDZs are located, the income-tax rate 
will be cut to 24 percent (Article 7:2).
Nevertheless, on the issues of exemption and reduction the 1991 Foreign ITL 
provides clearer stipulations. Production-oriented enterprises with foreign investment which
Previously, the income UK on Sioo-foreign Equity joint ventures wss computed st s 'Hst rate' while the of Sino foreign joint ventures 
was computed at 'progressive rales on amounts in excess of specified amounts of taxable income'.
16 Wsng Biqisn (12/4/1991. RMJB).
17 A progressive rale of 40 «  end s locsl income tsx 10%; cf. Arts 3 end 4 of the 1981 FE1TL (811213) sod Art.3 of the 1982 FEITL 
Implementation Rules (820221).
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are scheduled to operate 'for a period of ten years or more' shall, under the 1991 Foreign ITL, 
be 'exempt from income-tax in the first two profit-making years' and 'allowed a 50 percent 
reduction of income tax to the fifth profit-making years' (Article 8:1). However, enterprises 
engaged in tourism, commerce and service are 'excluded' from the list of businesses enjoying 
exemption and reduction of income-taxes for a fixed period of time, as listed in the old 
laws.18 On the other hand, the 1991 Foreign ITL extends the scope of businesses enjoying 
tax exemption and reduction, from Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures and foreign 
enterprises engaged in agriculture, forestry, livestock breeding and a few other low profit­
making trades19 to 'all production-oriented projects’ (Article 8). And the length for tax 
exemption and reduction has been extended.
The preferential treatment also exists in the relationship between the new and old 
laws (Article 27).20 In contrast, the new 1991 Foreign ITL stipulates some provisions to deal 
with tax evasion, with others concerning fines and punishments for violations of the law. 
These new coercive measures came from the lack of clear stipulations prohibiting tax evasion 
in the old laws and the difficulties for the tax authorities to regulate these cases.
VII.3 CONTRADICTIONS OF INFORMAL DOMAINS UNDER AD­
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In this section we will examine the most complicated part of the regulation of foreign 
investment in the PRC. However, unless we go through this growing mechanism, we cannot 
realize several important factors, including the growing powers of local authorities which 
constitute a very different picture from the administration of Taiwan. Furthermore, the 
growing local administration on foreign investment also shows the fact that the central
18 c r .  Art. 1 a t the 1980 JVITL  (801210). and Art. 2 of the 1980 JVITL Implementation Rules (801214); and. Art. 1 of the 1981 FE ITL 
(811213). and Art. 4 of the 1981 FE ITL Implemmlehon Rules (810221).
19 Cf. Arte. 1 and 4 of the 1981 FE ITU Ana. 4 and 6 of the 1982 FE ITL Implementation Rulee.
In caac that old tax laws provided more favourable treatment*, the 1991 Foreign ITL specifically provides that enterprises with 
foreign investment 'established before its promulgation' shall continue to follow the laws and relevant stipulations of the State Council 
liefore the implementation of the new tax law', 'if their new tax rate ia higher than the old tax rate' or 'their treatments concerning tax 
exemption and reduction are leas favourable than they would otherwise receive under the previous tax law' (Article 27).
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government "fang" (let bloom) or release its control on foreign economic activities, while the 
local authorities ”shou" (rein in) or grasp the key discretion on the regulation of foreign 
investment.
Moreover, through this "decentralization", both local administration and foreign 
investors benefit from the increasing autonomy and more preferences. In Spring 1992, for 
instance, even the "district" authorities in Shanghai, such as Lu-wan, Hong-kuo and Huang- 
pu, have been vested with the power of discretionary approval of foreign investment [Fa-zhi 
Ri-bao, Beijing (3/April/92): 1]. However, the contradictions that come from this trend have 
been: regionism; repetitious investments; and too many processing and assembling lines than 
the fundamental industries.21
VII.3.A Informal Sector under Procedure of Establishment Based on the Forms of
Foreign Investment
In the relative terms, the statutory framework is more formal to the administrative procedure, 
while the latter, more formal to business practice. However, even different "forms" of in­
vestment have their different requirements under the statutes, both administrative and 
business practice still remain informal to certain degree, especially in the case of contractual 
joint ventures.
(i) The Equity Joint Venture
A basic legislative framework for the procedure of establishment of the joint venture 
has been the three steps under Article 11 of the 1983 Equity JV  Implementation Regulations. 
However, the administrative examination and approval are the necessary requirements for 
"four successive steps and seven documents" ("si-ge jei-duan qi-ge wen-jian"), according to a 
Chinese book "Jin-Ji-Fa 400 An-Li-Xi" (Analysis of 400 Cases of Economic Law):
These recent contradictions of control on foreign investment include: "After the decentralization of approval powers and delegated 
administration, economic management has been disintegrated between the approval departments and the business administrative 
departments, different regions lacks a communication, the problems of Mind attractions and repetitious investments are getting 
serious. Among "Smn-Zr (three foreign investment) enterprises, processing industries are more than fundamental ones; assembling 
lines are far more than enterprises manufacturing spare parts or machines [Nb DC-II. 'Hie Nineties (May 1992): S3).”
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(i) Research: the project proposal;22 (ii) Negotiation: feasibility study report, and the 
contract with the articles of association;23 (iii) Examination and Approval: three 
documents above and application forms; (iv) Registration: the five documents above, 
the certificate of approval, and the license24 *[JJF-400-ALX (1988): 379-381].
In the same book, there are two cases cannot get through these step». One was “xie-yi" 
(initial agreement) with proposed items different from those under the provincial gov­
ernmental project proposal [JJF-400-ALX (1988): 378-379]. The other one was a joint 
venture for producing beer for the Chinese domestic market under the cover of exporting 
proposal [JJF-400-ALX (1988): 379],
(ii) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
While the 1986 WFOEL only provides the general principles of examination, 
approval, and registration to establish this type of enterprises, the detailed application 
procedure usually is supplemented and decided by local municipal or provincial provisions. 
More emphasis on 'local' administrative control can be found through the 'form' of the 
wholly foreign-owned enterprise itself. Compared with the joint venture with Chinese 
participation, the wholly foreign-owned enterprise is operated 'solely by the foreign 
investors’. It is thus, from the very beginning, the responsibility of the local authorities to 
regulate the procedure of establishment.
Moreover, the whole procedure is required by a 'double-check' administrative process.
For instance, when foreign investors start to establish their wholly owned enterprise in
Shanghai, they must entrust 'the consultative bodies or agencies'23 approved by the
22 The Chinese participant ahould have a project proposal approved by the proper authorities. Without such an approval, negotiations 
with the foreign investors may not begin.
^  On the basis of the project proposal, the Chinese participant and the foreign investor may proceed with the investigation and prepare 
the feasibility study report. Then both parties may negotiate the contract and the articles o f association. The Chinese participant must 
submit these three document to proper authorities for examination and approval. Generally, this is approved by the local Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade Commission. The local commission must submit the documents to the MOFERT for further 
examination and approval if the total amount of investment exceeds the limitation authorized by the Ministry.
^  Within one month of issuing a certificate of approval, both parties must register the joint venture with the local Administrative Bureau 
of Industry and Commerce to obtain a license for operation. The local bureau will issue a license after examining the submitted 
documents. The date on the business license is regarded as the formal establishment of the joint venture.
^  Cf. the Provisions of Shanghai Municipality on Application and Approval of Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperative Ventures, and Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital.
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Shanghai Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission with the task of application, 
submission for approval, and so on in order to facilitate the work [Cf. Shanghai OIU Manual 
(1988): 458-466 and 507-515].26 To prepare a 'project proposât is the first step for the 
establishment of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise.27 In practice, this project proposal shall 
first be submitted to the 'local bureau' or to the 'district or county people's government' for 
comments and signatures.
Secondly, the project proposal will be forwarded to the Economic Relations and 
Trade Commission for 'preliminary examination'. Then, the Commission submits the 
proposal to the MOFERT for further examination and approval. After the MOFERTs 
approval, the foreign investors shall compile a 'project feasibility study report, articles of 
association, and other relevant documents through a repeated process. These documents shall 
be commented on, and signed by the administrative bureau in charge or by the district or 
county people's government. After filing with the local Economic Relations and Trade 
Commission, the documents will be forwarded, with the application documents, to the 
MOFERT for 'final examination and approval'.
After the approval of MOFERT, a certificate of approval shall be issued. The foreign 
investors shall register with the Shanghai Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce 
within 30 days upon receipt of certificate to obtain a business license. As usual, the date on 
the business license shall be deemed the formal establishment of the enterprise.
(iii) The Contractual Joint Venture
Since the regulation of equity joint ventures provides a reference to the drafting of 
1988 Contractual JVL, the application and approval for establishing a contractual joint ven­
26 Here, the procedure can be referred to that of joint venturca. Cf. the Sections of "Content Requirements of the Project Proposal for a
Joint Venture Uiing Chinese and Foreign Investment" and "Content Requirements for the Feasibility Study Report of a Joint Venture
Using Chinese and Foreign Investmenrof Shanghai OIU Manual (188): 503-506.
|
27 The Proposal must Hie the general description of the foreign investor, the purpose of the enterprise, i.a., the necessity and possibility
of generating foreign currency as well as acquiring technology; the scope and scale of the enterprise; the investment appraisal, i.e.,
the total sum of Fixed and working capital; the form of investment and source of funds; the supply of raw materials; the infrastructure 
of the facility; the management structure; and the economic benefit, i.a., the balance of foreign exchange.
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ture, within the administrative practice, are to be handled 'like a joint venture'. The 
influence from the 'formal' law, for example, the 1979 Equity JV Law, on the emergence and 
transformation of the 'informal' economic practice into the law, for example, the 1988 
Contractual JVL, can be better explained here again. Especially, in addition to the procedure 
of establishment, a great number of 'corresponding stipulations' were inserted to make the 
new law in accordance with the then-existing foreign investment laws.28
While the administrative authorities prefer referring the Equity JV Law to the 
establishment of the contractual joint venture, a legal coercion has been imposed on the 
business practice. The 1988 Contractual JVL, for instance, requires both Chinese and foreign 
investors to fulfill their 'obligation of contributing full investment and providing the 
conditions for co-operation' during the initial establishment (Article 9). In short, the 
procedure' of establishing the contractual joint venture exists under the requirements within 
the model of 'formal' law, while the flexible organization of the business is left to be 
modelled by 'informal' business practice.
VIIJ.B Informal Sector under Procedure of Qualifications Based on 
Functional Preferences
Following the enactment of the "22 Articles" in 1986, the MOFERT and other government 
authorities have issued several regulations as supplements to the "22 Articles", including 
many administrative measures on the areas of balance of foreign exchange,29 import-export 
license,30 classification of enterprises,31 preferential taxation,32 employment,33 customs,34
These corresponding provisions widely include: the transfer of investments and conditions for co-operation; relations between 
employees and labour unions; purchases and sales on the domestic and world markets; balance of foreign exchange income and 
expenses; remittance of profits and foreign employees wage and legitimate income; the extension of the term of co-operation; and 
settlement of disputes.
Measures of the MOFERT Concerning the Purchase of Domestic Products for Export by Foreign Investment Enterprises to Balance 
(8 70 1^ 0 )ExCh*nge ^ eoe'Pl* *n<* ^»buram ents (20/01/87, by MOFERT), hereinafter cited as the MOFERT Balance Measures
Implementation Measures of the MOFERT Concerning the Application for Import and Export Licenses by Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment (24/01/87, by MOFERT); hereinafter cited as MOFERT l-E License Measures (870124).
Implementation Measures of the MOFERT Concerning the Confirmation and Assessment of Export Enterprises and Technologically- 
Advanced Enterprises with Foreign Investment (27/01/87, by MOFERT); hereinafter cited aa MOFERT Confirmation Measures 
(870127). ^
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Chinese RMB loans,* 345 foreign exchange guarantee,36 the proportion of registered capital,37 
and loans.38
Nonetheless, local governments at all levels also issued their own preferential 
measures in accordance with the "22 Articles" in order to improve their local investment 
environments. These regulations aim to assist foreign investors in achieving foreign 
exchange balances, reducing costs, and simplifying procedures. Generally speaking, the 
procedural framework of these complex administrative measures and the "22 Articles" aim to 
ensure the management autonomy of foreign investment enterprises.
(i) Classification o f Enterprises
Opening the domestic market without upgrading technological levels has been crucial 
for the PRC. For instance, in the case of "Restrictive Business Clause o f A-B Joint Venture" 
[cf. Zhang et al (1990); 245-247], Under the Restrictive Business Clause, marketing areas of 
the products were excluded from West Europe, Northern America, Central America, Aus­
tralia, Southern Africa and Middle Asia. Furthermore, 85% of products were for the 
domestic market, 15% for exporting, of which marketing was only through foreign-side 
agents [Zhang et al, ibid.].
Implementation Measures of the MOF for Putting Into Effect the Preferential Terms on Taxation Provided in the Provisions of the 
Slate Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment (31/01/87. by MOF); hereinafter cited as MOF Tax Measures (870131).
Regulations for the Autonomous Right of the Enterprises with Foreign Investment to Employ Personnel. Wages and Salaries, and the 
Expenses for Insurance and Welfare Benefits for Staff Members and Workers (861110) (10/11/86, by the Ministry of Labour and 
Personnel).
34 Provisions of the Customs Governing the Import of Materials and Paru Needed by Enterprises with Foreign Investment to Perform 
Product Export Contracu (861124) (24/11/86. by the General Customs Administration).
^  Provisional Regulations for Mortgage on Foreign Exchange for Renminbi Loans by Enterprises with Foreign Investment (26/11/86. 
by the People's Bank of China); hereinafter cited as PBC RMB Loans Regulations (861126).
36 Provisional Measures of the People's Bank of China Governing the Issue of Foreign Exchange Guarantee by Resident Institutions in 
China (20/02/87, by the People's Bank of China); hereinafter cited as PBC FE Guarantee Measures (870220).
^  Provisional Regulations for the Proportion of Registered Capitel to Total Amount of Investment of Joint Ventures Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment (01/03/87, by the Stete Administration of Industry and Commerce); hereinafter cited as SA1C Capital Regulations
Regulations o f Bank o f China on Providing Loans to Enterprises with Foreign Investment (870424) (07/04/87, approved by the State 
Council; 24/04/87, promulgated by the People's Bank of China).
38
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In order to promote both foreign trade and investment, the "22 Articles" grant a 
variety of preferential treatments to foreign investment enterprises, especially "export-ori­
ented" and "technologically advanced" enterprises, in the areas of taxation, expenses and 
fees, as well as production and operating conditions. To clarify the standards by which en­
terprises are to be judged either export-oriented or technologically advanced, the State 
Council and MOFERT have issued the ”22 Articles" and "Measures Concerning the 
Confirmation and Assessment o f Export-Oriented and Technologically Advanced Enterprises 
(870127) (Confirmation Measures)".
First of all, in order to take advantage of the preferences granted to these two special 
enterprises, foreign investment enterprises must satisfy certain regulatory requirements.39
To qualify as an 'export-oriented1 enterprise, a foreign-invested enterprise must meet 
three requirements.40 Furthermore, a qualified export-oriented enterprise whose value of 
export products in a year reaches 70 percent or more of the total value of all its products may 
be entitled to 'preferential tax treatment1 offered by Article 8 of the "22 Articles" upon the 
annual assessment.41 Thus, it is a tax credit that is most beneficial to the foreign investors to 
qualify as an export-oriented and technologically advanced enterprise status. To qualify as a 
"technologically advanced" enterprise, an enterprise must meet the four requirements,42 set 
forth in MOFERTs Confirmation Measures.
Although the "22 Articles” provide general criteria for initial classification as an export-oriented (Article 2(1)) or technologically 
advanced (Article 2(2» enterprise, these criteria are not entirely satisfactory concerning verification of the two kinds of enterprises. 
The Confirmation Measures provide further clarification.
Including: (a) the enterpriae produces products for export; ^b) the products are mainly for export and the value of annual export 
products reaches SO percent or more of the total value of all its products; and, (3) a balance of, or surplus in, the operating exchange 
receipts and expenditures is realized in that year. (Cf. Measure 2 of Confirmation Measures (870127)]
Accordingly, after the expiration of the period for production or exemption of enterprise-income-tax according to the relevant, the 
ex port-oriented whose export value that year amounts to 70 percent or more of the total value of all its products for in the same year, 
may pay enterprise-income-tax at one-half the rate of the present tax. Also, export-oriented enterprises in the SEZa and in the ETDZa, 
and other enterprises that have already paid enterprise-income-tax at a rate oi 15 percent, if they meet the requirements above, may 
pay enterprise-income-tax at a rate of 10 percent.
Including: (a) the technology, process and key equipment used by an enterprise with foreign investment are those that fall within the 
category of projects to be encouraged for investment as snnounced by the State; (b) the technology must be advanced and appropriate 
in nature; (c) the technology must be in short supply in China, it must produce newly developed products, or it must be sole to 
upgrade or replace similar domestic products; and. (d) the technology increases either exports or imports substitutes. (Cf. Measure 4 
of Confirmation Measures (870127)]
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Secondly, according to these regulatory requirements, administrative authorities, on a 
case-by-case basis, verify export-oriented and technologically advanced enterprises.43 For 
example, in the SEZs the 'Management Committees' of the People's Governments also have 
the authority to formulate 'their own measures' pursuant to the Confirmation Measures to suit 
their local circumstances, in addition to these authorities mentioned thereunder. However, 
their local measures must be submitted to the MOFERT for the record (bei-an, mentioned al­
ready),44 *in order to strengthen macro-management over increasingly growing foreign direct 
investment in the PRC.
Thirdly, a foreign-invested enterprise, during the process for classification, must 
submit the documents required to the authorities aforementioned.43 Furthermore, for the 
application for a technologically advanced enterprise, certain information is required,46 while 
that for export-oriented enterprises, the information on products for export, export ratio and 
the statement of foreign exchange receipts and expenditures.
Fourthly, administrative authorities in charge at all levels will complete the 
verification procedures and render a decision on the application within 30 days of receipt of 
the required documents mentioned. However, 'the procedure for technologically advanced 
enterprises' will be handled jointly by the authorities aforementioned with other relevant 
departments in charge, which include, in the technical field, the State Science and 
Technology Commission and the ministries charged with industry and technology. A 
certificate signed and stamped by Chinese authorities will confirm the application. The final 
end of this long administrative procedure will be 'the submission of the confirmation
The authorities, (aocording to iheae Meaaurea), in charge of verification and confirmation of export-oriented or technologically 
advanced enterprise« include 'foreign economic relations and trade departments' of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities di­
rectly administered by the central government, or municipalities that have their own Vanning authorities'.
44 The MOFERT verifies and confirms, in a uniform approach, export-oriented and technologically advanced enterprises established by 
various department or organs directly administered by the State Council.
4^ Including: (a) an application form; (b) copies of the relevant investment contracts(s) and approval documents); and, (c) a project 
feasibility study report and approval document.
^  Including: (a) the name and legal addresa of the enterprise; (b) the total amount of investment; (c) the registered capital contribution of 
the Chinese and foreign investors; and (d) the scope of business, production scale, and the nature of technology and equipment used in 
the enterprise.
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certificate, application form and other required documents'47 to the MOFERT and the State 
Economic Commission for the record (bei-an).
Fifthly, a yearly-verification of both enterprises has been set under Measures 10 and 
11 of Confirmation Measures,48 which constitute the crucial part of administrative procedure. 
Of course the primary purpose of this yearly-verification is to examine whether the particular 
enterprise is qualified to maintain preferential status. The approval authorities and other 
relevant departments, under Measure 10, hold the decision to confirm or deny the status.
Finally, the administrative authority in charge compiles a list of both types of 
preferential-treated enterprises that have passed the assessment in a yearly catalogue, and 
circulates it among relevant departments so that such enterprises can continue to enjoy 
various preferences each year (Measure 11). However, an enterprise that fails to pass the 
year-end re-assessment must, under Measure 11, repay the amount of reduced or exempted 
taxes.49
(ii) Preferences fo r  both Export-Oriented and Technologically Advanced Enterprises
In addition to the tax credit mentioned above, a variety of preferences have been 
granted to both export-oriented and technologically advanced enterprises within the 
administrative framework under the "22 Articles". First of all, 'the land-use fees' for each 
type of enterprise, under Article 4, except for these located in busy urban sectors of large 
cities, are computed and charged according to the preferential standards.30 Furthermore, the *50
The forcign-invested enterprise, under Measure 9 of ('on firm all no Measures, must regularly prepare ila own annual export plan and 
submit the statement of actual export performance, which constitute the basis for the re-assessment of an export-oriented enterprise, to 
the verification and confirmation authorities.
^  The focus of the re assessments include 'the enterprises export plans, actual annual export performances, and other aspects involving 
technical data on quality of products, localization of production materials based on Measures 2. 3, and 4 of Confirmation Measures, 
and approved contracts.
Nevertheless, if the confirmed export-oriented or technologically advanced enterprise fails to pass the re-assessment for 'three 
consecutive years', the original verification and confirmation authority will 'revoke the certificate' issued to it as a qualified enterprise. 
From both sides, these Measures not only promote but urge the success of these enterprises.
50 Including: (a) 5 to 20 RMB (yuan) per square meter per year in areas where the development fee snd the land-use fee are computed 
and charged together; and, (b) not more than 3 RMB (yuan) per square meter per year in ait areas where the development tee is 
computed and charged on a one-time basis or areas developed by the enterprises themselves.
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land-use fees mentioned above may be waived by the local government for a specific period 
of time under the same Article.
Secondly, several priorities of the services relevant to the production are granted to 
the qualified enterprises. Such priorities as in obtaining water, electricity and transportation 
services, and communication facilities needed for the production and operation have been 
listed by the "22 Articles". Therefore, one can conclude these preferences presented 
difficulties for foreign investment in the PRC before 1987: the economic social context of the 
legislation of the ”22 Articles" in 1986. Since then fees are charged according to the 
standards for 'local state enterprises' (Article 5). This priority is helpful to foreign investors, 
but it cannot resolve any cases if there were certain conflicts of supplies between the state 
and foreign-invested enterprises.
The third preference is the financial treatment. The priority of both qualified 
enterprises in obtaining short-term loans and other necessary credit from the Bank of China51 
to meet the needs of production and operation. Fourthly, an easier approach to remitting tax- 
free profits abroad is another preference offered to the qualified enterprises.52 As to the 
technologically advanced enterprises. Article 9 provides a 50 percent reduction in enterprise 
income taxes for three years, after the PRCs 'period of reduction or exemption of an enter­
prise income taxes'.
In addition, the tax treatment and 're-investment' issue53 have received the fifth 
preference under the "22 Article". However, a closer administrative control can be found, if 
the re-investment is withdrawn prior to five years, the refunded amount of enterprise income 
tax shall be returned. Sixthly, the People's Government at all levels and relevant authorities
51 As mentioned earlier, two adrainutralive regulations governing RMB and foreign exchange loana have been iaaued by the People'a 
Bank of China and Bank of China followed tne enactment of the ”22 Articles”.
^  The qualified enterprises that remit their profits abroad, under Article 8, are exempted from income tax. Also, 'export-oriented 
enterprises' whose export value in the year amounti to 70 percent or more of the value of their products for that year, after the PRC's 
'period of reduction or exemption of enterprise income tax' expires, may enjoy a 50 percent reduction in the present tax. Under the 
same Article, 'export-oriented enterprises in the SGZs and ETDZs', and other export-oriented enterprises that already 'pay enterprise 
income taxes at rate of 15 percent' are allowed to pay only 10 percent enterprise income taxes.
53 The qualified enterprises 're-invest' profits to establish or expand such enterprises 'for five years', after approval by the tax authorities, 
are refunded the total amount of enterprise income tax already paid on the re-invested proportion (Article 10).
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in charge are bound by Article 15, to guarantee the 'right o f autonomy to enterprises' with 
foreign investments and encourage enterprises to adopt internationally advanced management 
techniques. Obviously, the text of this Article54 has not taken into account the environment 
of production, the labour market, the external relations between the foreign-invested 
enterprises and Chinese State, collective and private enterprises, and their competition 
relationship with the local bureaucracy [cf. NBDC-II, The Nineties (May, 1992): 57],
Similarly, 'protection from indiscriminate charge' by local government is granted by 
Article 16 under which foreign investors may refuse to pay unreasonable charges and may 
also appeal to competent government agencies to intervene. This legal protection enables the 
foreign investors to estimate more accurately the operational costs of their investment. 
However, from the sociological point of view, the law only prohibits the 'active intervention', 
but does not regulate the 'passive co-operation' - the silent resistance—from the administrative 
authorities [cf. NBDC-II, ibid.].
Finally, access to the Chinese domestic market55 constitutes the last preference to 
foreign-invested enterprises. Indeed, the "22 Articles" have provided provisions for this 
preference for the qualified enterprises to sell their products on the Chinese domestic market. 
Of course the PRC government has set many guidelines to insure a foreign exchange balance 
for both the state and foreign investors. But, in return, the qualification of a 'technologically 
advanced enterprise' which is granted access to the domestic market demonstrates the need of 
the PRC to import advanced technology directly or indirectly through legal mechanisms. For 
instance, to sell domestically, the products must be sophisticated and manufactured with 
advanced technology provided by the foreign investors. This legislative tendency has shown 
earlier in the case of the qualification of the 'joint venture' as a technologically advanced 
enterprise, by the Regulations on Joint Venture's Balance o f Foreign Exchange Revenue and 
Expenditure (hereinafter cited as JV  Balance Regulations) (860115), by the State Council. 
Furthermore, compared with export-oriented enterprises, technologically advanced
54 Thn enterprise*, from a pure view of the legislative text, are free from interference by local governmenta and have the right to 
formulate production plana, and financial and marketing strategies, as well as set wages and carry out labour management.
^  Generally speaking, the size of China's domestic market has been most attractive to foreign investors, and a penetration into that 
market with their products has been always their dream.
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enterprises have further been permitted to market their products on the Chinese market as 
'import substitutes’ where such products are 'urgently needed' in the national economy, and 
'the quality of products is equal to existing imports’. However, this legislative difference 
exists at the level of administrative legislation only.56
(iii) Regulations Governing Debt and Equity Ratios
For nearly a decade since the late 1970s, debt and equity ratios of a foreign-invested 
enterprise, when that enterprise plans to borrow money from the Bank of China or from 
international financial institutions, have been ambiguously, in the legislative sense, managed 
by both Chinese and foreign parties. At least, any regulatory requirement was lacking before 
1987. In March 1987, in order to clarify debt and equity ratios, the SAIC promulgated the 
SAIC Capital Regulations (870301), mentioned earlier.
Following the "22 Articles", the SAIC Capital Regulations also apply to contractual 
joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and to enterprises established by partici­
pants from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (Rules 6 and 7). The legislative purpose can be 
found in Rule 2: on the one hand, to require the registered capital to be suitable to the scale of 
production and operation and, on the other, to re-emphasize that participants to joint ventures 
must share profits and bear risks and losses in proportion to registered capital. Accordingly, 
the SAIC Capital Regulations require 'a schedule of debt and equity ratios' to be complied 
under Rule 3.57 However, in a case of "Chinese-Hong Kong Shipping Joint Venture", the rate 
between the invested capital (RMB $7,200,000) and registered capital (RMB $200,000) was 
36:1 which was obviously illegal [Zhang et al (1990): 242-245].
56 Measures Relating to the Import by Products of Sino-Foreign Equity and Contractual Joint Venlurea (871019). promulgated by the 
State Council; hereinafter cited as 'Import Substitution Measures'.
(a) where the total amount of investment is less than S3 million (RMB Dollar, included), the registered capital shall be at 7:10 of the 
total amount of investment; (b) where the total amount of investment is between S3 and $10 million (included), the resistered capital 
must be at least one-half of the total amount of investment, but where the total amount of investment is less than $4.2 million, the 
registered capital must be at least $ 2.1 million; (c) where the total amount of investment is between $10 and $30 million (included), 
the registered capital must be at least 2:5 of the total amount of investment, but where the total amount of investment is leas than 
$12.5 million, the registered capital must be at least $5 million; and, (d) where the total amount of investment is more than $30 
million, the registered capital must be at least 1:3 of the total amount of investment, but where the total amount of investment is less 
than $3« million, the registered capital must be al least $12 million. (Rule 3 of the SAIC Capital Regulations)
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Nonetheless, an arguable issue only comes after the clear schedule above. The SAIC 
Capital Regulations strictly require the fixed schedule to be observed even 'in cases that 
investment is increased' later; on the other hand, certain exceptions may be allowed 'under 
special circumstances' (Rules 4 and 5). However, the claim of these special circumstances, 
which still need further clarification under the discretion of administrative authorities, only 
requires approval from the MOFERT and the SAIC. Therefore, with a considerable flexibil­
ity in granting exceptions, exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis by the authorities 
in charge.
In fact, the SAIC Capital Regulations only provide the rule for debt and equity ratios 
of investment projects of more than $3 million, while whether other projects less than that 
amount seems to be prohibited with any debt remains uncertain. Accordingly, small and 
medium enterprise with foreign invested projects may meet these difficulties in raising 
funding, in case of cash shortage. Nonetheless, from a Chinese perspective, this legislative 
framework has been consistent with the PRCs policy which is to prevent foreign investment 
without substantial capital, which might entrap the Bank of China and other Chinese 
financial institutions to issue guaranteed loans. To a major degree, this framework promotes 
the PRC policy of avoiding the debt crisis encountered by the third world. However, up to 
the end of 1990, the substantial capital arrived into the PRC (US $19 billion), only occupied 
47% of the foreign capital agreed (US $40.3 billion). Furthermore, not only some foreign 
capital, but also Chinese capital has not yet been invested into the projects approved [NBDC- 
II, The Nineties (May 1992): 57],
»
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(iv) Balance o f  Foreign Exchange Receipts and Expenditures
The foreign exchange problem has long been a most important issue for foreign 
investment in the PRC.58 For instance, the two-month ceasing operation of Beijing Jeep Ltd. 
Co. in 1986. Since foreign exchange reserves are vital to the PRC's national economic and 
modernization programme, it is not surprising at all that the primary basis of the foreign 
exchange policy is 'centralized control and 'unified national management, which are the first 
principle of the Provisional Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control (801218), 
promulgated by the State Council in 1980 (Articles 3 and 5). For the same reason, the second 
principle of the foreign exchange policy is 'self-balance by enterprises', and has been a basic 
requirement in several foreign-related economic laws since the late 1970s. To achieve a 
balance between foreign exchange receipts and expenditures by the enterprises themselves 
has been one of the common legal requirements in these laws, for instance, Article 75 of the 
1983 Equity JVL Implementing Regulations (830920), Article 18 of the 1986 WFOEL 
(860412), and the MOFERT Balance Measures (870120) mentioned earlier. Accordingly, to 
generate sufficient foreign exchange by exporting all or most products by enterprise is the 
basic method, while certain foreign enterprises, which mainly sell their products within the 
PRC domestic market, with an imbalance in foreign exchange may receive relief from either 
the local or central government.
In order to resolve the foreign exchange difficulties encountered by many foreign- 
invested enterprises, several important regulations have been promulgated since 1986, such 
as the JV  Balance Regulations (860115), Import Substitution Measures (871019), and the 
MOFERT Balance Measures (870120) mentioned.59 Despite the economic operations, these 
regulations have constituted a flexible framework for foreign investment to achieve a balance 
between foreign exchange receipts and expenditures.
8 In business practice, foreign-invested enterprises need sufficient foreign exchange to operate the project, to import equipment and raw 
materials, and to pay foreign employees' salaries. And this needs a feasibility based on the availability of foreign exchange earnings, 
which can enable the foreign participants to repatriate their dividends and eventually their originally contributed capital.
The applications of both JV Balance Regulations and Import Substitution Measures cover equity and contractual joint ventures 
only, while the application of the MOFERT Balance Measures extends further to wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
59
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In addition to the self-balance of foreign exchange from exports, a second alternative 
permitted, is to achieve a balance through the business networks within the PRC domestic 
market. Basically, foreign-invested enterprises marketing their products inside the PRC must 
be paid in RMB, not in foreign currency. However, under the recent foreign exchange 
regulations, exceptions to the general principles are available. For example, Article 8 of the 
Balance Regulations allows joint ventures, upon approval of the State Administration o f 
Exchange Control (SAC), to market their products domestically for foreign exchange to those 
enterprises which are able to pay in foreign exchange. Furthermore, in cases that the 
products, which would otherwise be imported or are urgently needed on the domestic market, 
or substitute for imports, domestic sales may also be paid in foreign currency. The Import 
Substitution Measures have set up the conditions under which a product may be regarded as 
an import substitute, and the procedures for application and approval of import substitution 
status (Measures 3, 4, and 5), of which the regulatory requirements must be satisfied.
The third alternative in balancing foreign exchange, under the MOFERT Balance 
Measures, is to "purchase domestic products for RMB and then to export them for foreign 
currency" to make up the foreign exchange balance (Measure 1). On the one hand, this 
requires the MOFERT approval in advance, and on the other, commodities under unified 
control (as stipulated by the State) have been excluded. Self-demonstration by enterprises, 
under Measure 3, is also required to explain that they are experiencing imbalance problems 
of exchange, i.e., foreign exchange deficits, and to apply annually for permission to purchase 
domestic products. On the whole, this administrative legislation with exceptions permitted 
has created a break from the general principle of 'self-balance' of enterprises through the 
export of their own products.
In the view of the aim of the MOFERT Balance Measures to solve the 'temporary 
difficulties' of foreign exchange imbalance, allowing these enterprises to purchase domestic 
products for export seems necessary. Furthermore, this privilege is only granted for positive 
purposes and is limited to a fixed period of time (Measure 2). For the same concern, several 
restrictions, imposed by the MOFERT itself, include 'limiting the quantity of domestic
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products' purchased for export to the amount required in any year to cover the foreign 
investor's profits shared or to be remitted upon the winding up and liquidation of the 
enterprise (Measure 4). Especially, this purchase of domestic products with the particular 
purpose must be shipped abroad for distribution and sale, and not be re-sold inside the PRC 
(Measure 6).
Generally speaking, the practical importance of balancing foreign exchange also 
explains the flexibility of the PRC foreign related economic legal framework. At the 
statutory level, under the "22 Articles" for instance, foreign-invested enterprises, under the 
supervision of the foreign exchange control authorities, may mutually adjust their foreign ex­
change surpluses and deficits among each other by swapping foreign exchange for RMB, and 
vice versa (Article 14). Recently, in order to aid foreign investors in buying and selling 
foreign exchange, the SAC has established several 'foreign exchange adjustment centres' in a 
number of major cities to serve as govemmental-sponsored intermediaries.
(v) Other Administrative Regulations
The importance of licensing and its application have urged the need for the relevant 
administrative regulation. Thus, the MOFERT I-E License Measures (870124) mentioned 
have been adopted to facilitate the operation. In addition, in preferential terms for taxation 
and providing loans, several regulations mentioned earlier provide both simplifying and fa­
cilitating functions. For instance, MOF Tax Measures (870127), PBC RMB Loans 
Regulations (861126), PBC FE Guarantee Measures (870220) aforementioned. These 
regulations have relaxed the major difficulties for foreign investment in the PRC before 1987, 
and also demonstrated the 'central' government's attitude towards a better investment 
environment. It is certainly not surprising that the interaction between the foreign 
investments, central administration, and local administration will be the core issue within the 
implementation of both laws and administrative regulations on foreign-related economic ac­
tivities. Especially, given the size of the PRC and present communication conditions, the
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implementation of law between the central and local administration under the requirements of 
local circumstances shall be the focus, including the issues of supplying materials and labour, 
providing consulting services, and marketing and pricing.
VII.4 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT
Seeing the detailed laws and measures in the previous Sections, both because of the 
flexibility of the wording and its implementation and because administrative approval being 
always retained as the final tool, the bureaucracy is the gatekeeper for every international 
economic activity in China, in order to protect its self-group interest under the sham of the 
national interest. Behind this legal context, there have long existed two questions related 
with the role of bureaucracy: what is the difference of state intervention between domestic 
and foreign investment, and between local and central administration? And, what is that 
between personal benefits of bureaucrats and benefits of general economy from the foreign 
investment?
VI1.4.A. The Status of Foreign Enterprises in "Zhu-Hou-Jing-Ji" under Party-State
Intervention
To Chinese authorities, the modern history China "has been proven that the nation can 
only take the socialist, not the capitalist, road"; and the utilization of capitalism "can be a 
rewarding supplement to the socialist economy" [F. Sheng (1992): 17]. Thus, the public 
ownership of the production will remain to certain major degree for the near future. Up to 
the end of 1991, the major problems in the economic performance in this socialist economy 
were: "slow progress in the structural adjustment, low economic efficiency, and severe 
difficulties in government finance" [Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau, 
Beijing Review (23-29/3/92): 36].
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Thus, three dimensions shall be examined here for an evaluation on the regulation and 
promotion of foreign investment in the PRC's development: the role of public enterprises, 
including autonomy of enterprises (the second type o f decentralization); relation between 
local and central administration (the first type of decentralization); and, the Party-State 
intervention behind the legal mechanism.
(i) The Role o f  State Enterprises
Since the 1970s, how to reform the state industrial sector has been a crucial task. 
Under the appropriate central government ministry many new "industrial corporations" have 
been established to deal with matters concerning some specific sectoral business. For 
instance, in the case of oil, the Energy Ministry, and so on. All enterprises specializing in 
these activities are automatically led by the corporation, which has more or less the same 
status as a central ministry, with more "autonomy", and takes charge of all stages of the 
complete production process in, of course, a more flexible way than before.
Secondly, for two reasons a looser organization—"qi-ye jituan" (industrial association) 
- has been established for enterprises producing similar products [cf. Riskin (1987): 351 and 
Shambaugh (1992): 26], On the one hand, this kind o f association is designed to break the 
original administrative barriers60 that were built because enterprises were subordinated to 
different administrative apparatuses. On the other hand, the regime's fear of potential social 
unrest among urban workers61 makes it unwilling to shut down unprofitable industries with 
the loss of jobs that would result" [Shambaugh (1992): 26]. In addition to the merging, or the 
formation, of various types of associated organizations mentioned, which has spread rapidly 
to other non-agricultural sectors, China has been strengthening lateral economic and
6(1 Being ■ loose and semi-governmental body, the main function of the association is to prepare plana and to formulate development 
policies and technology alternatives for the industry, on the one hand, and to report on the activities of member enterprises to the 
government on the other hand. Cf. Riskin (1987): 351.
61 In the moat cautious terms, state enterprises employ one-third of China's 150 million urban workers, yet 40% of them operated at a 
loss during the First half of 1991 (a near tripling in three years) (Shambaugh (1992): 26).
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technological co-operation among various localities, from interim to long-term stable co­
operation as well [Cf. Riskin (1987): 351-352].
Nonetheless, two kinds of the "decentralization" have been concerned with the reform 
of the state industrial sector mentioned-between local and central administration (the first 
type of decentralization in the next section), and between enterprises and the Party-State 
organs (the second type of decentralization). It is clear the PRC government plans to grant 
"greater autonomy to engage in foreign trade while reducing government quotas" in order to 
give these public enterprises "more power to sell their low-quality and uncompetitive 
products on the open market" [Shambaugh (1992): 26],
The adoption of "Law of the PRC on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole 
People" (the IEOWP Law (880423)) on 13th April 1988, effective as of 1st August 1988, has 
its historical significance in the reform of the State sector. However, up to the "Report by 
Five Departments on the Reform of Enterprises" published in February 1992, there are twelve 
problems remained in the further reform, among which the autonomy of the enterprise 
assumed the first question [Fa-zhi Ri-bao (14/2/92): 1]. It has been reported that the 1988 
IEOWP Law has its positive but limited role in the past four years. However, since the end 
of January 1992, a movement of "puo-san-tei" (smashing three irons - iron bowl, iron chair, 
and iron salary) has been popularly started by both government and the state enterprises [Cf. 
Fa-zhi Ri-bao, Feburary-April, 1992]. The "puo-san-tei” movement provides a fact that the 
1988 IEOWP Law cannot be implemented by its own. In contrast, a mass line, or a social 
movement, has its positive and supportive effects to the formal law, which is the same case of 
the 1950 Trade Union Law mentioned.
Nonetheless, in order to deepen the internal reform of enterprises, the police and 
security force has guaranteed its support and protection to the managers of these enterprises, 
for example, the Public Security Department of Luo-yang City in Henan Province [Fa-zhi Ri- 
bao (2/4/92): 1]. Furthermore, on 21st March 1992, for the first time in the PRC public ser­
229
VII. The PRC: Preventing Administrative Arbitrariness
vants were dismissed in Shengyang, where four tax agents were removed from their service 
[The Nineties (May 1992): 34].
Finally, as regards to the relationship between public and non-public sectors, a recent 
most complete investigating report, by four researchers in the State Council, has suggested 
that the ratio of non-public sector has not yet reached the reasonable degree, while the ratio 
of foreign invested enterprises has been so little that further attraction is necessary [J.Y. Guo 
et al (1992): 61].
(U) "Zhu-Hou-Jing-Ji " and its Contradictions
The dilemma facing the central and local administration of economy retain even up to 
the 1990s.62 However, even up to the 1990s, it has still been a crucial issue between central­
ization and decentralization, the first type mentioned, of economic administration.
Especially, from the locations and institutions of the SEZs and coastal economic areas, the 
lowing administrative control has been a "leaning" (qing-shei) policy63 providing the most 
priorities in the economic development within China's east coast where the local authorities 
are granted more autonomy and special administrative powers. For either purpose
mentioned, China's complicated, inefficient and closed economic administrative
organizations have to be reformed. The reform programme therefore has promoted the 
streamlining of existing administrative hierarchy, cancelling unnecessary intermediate
administrative organs between the decision-making and basic economic units, and re­
classifying and merging enterprises into new administrative organizations.64
Given the size of Chine, it is necesssry for the Beijing reformist regime to bresk ell sdministrstive bnrriem ngsinst the inter regionsl 
and inter-departmental flow of goods and services, to facilitate specialization according to local comparative advantage, and to co­
ordinate activities of various basic economic units, which have been granted greater power since 1979, so that both private and public 
interests can be better harmonized.
^ 3  Asiswnnk \Ya zhou Zhou *nn|. 14/4/1991; p.14.
^  Cf. "Decision o f the Central Committee o f the Communist Party on Reform o f the Economic Structure" adopted by the 12th Central 
Committee of the CPC as Its Third Plenary Session on 20 October, 1984; Beijing Review. Vol. 27. No. 44 (29/October/84): 
centrefold, I-XVI.
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Furthermore, in the light of the dilemma between centralization and decentralization, 
a compromise in economic administration has been made. Therefore, the most significant at­
tempt to reform China's economic administrative organization has been the experimental 
pursuance of "network o f co-ordinating administration system" with the "core cities" (zhong- 
dian-cheng-shih) regulating and co-ordinating activities of practically all economic units 
within their jurisdiction, the "economic" administrative regions [Hardy (1987): 110; Riskin
(1987): 343]. Encompassing a number of medium-sized cities, an economic administration 
region is led by one "core city".63 * For some "core cities", for instance, Shanghai, Tian-jin, 
Chong-qing, under which the economic administrative region spans different provinces. This 
reaches the requirement of both specialization and localization for a better economic 
performance. On the one hand, the central government, in order to complete the model, will 
specialize in regulating and co-ordinating the economic activities of the "core cities" together 
with their administrative regions. Nonetheless, activities of all economic units and enterprise 
within the economic regions are in general to be regulated by the leading "core city" taking 
into account of local considerations. However, there are still tensions between the local and 
central administration.
The first impact as a result from this decentralization is the decrease of the central 
control on local economy. In the economic term, the central revenue in 1989 declined into 
only 45% of the total revenue of the PRC.66 By the end of the 1980s, the new problems of 
the "blockading of local markets" and "economic fray"67 became accelerated. These 
phenomena are named as "feudalist economy [Zhu-hou-jing-ji]". In order to control the 
local economic fray, Beijing has attempted several measures, such as prohibiting by 
directives, criticizing localism and economic feudalism by the media, and, promoting and
Under this network, starting with the lowest administration, the countryside is divided into a large number of small regions based on
economic considerations, each of which will be assigned a "town" for guiding and co-ordinating economic activities within its bound­
aries. Secondly, at a higher administrative level, medium-sized cities sre suthorized to guide and co-ordinate economic activities of 
the counties (xtam , ) under their jurisdiction. Thirdly, economic activities of medium-sized cities together with their xiam, in turn, 
are to be co-ordinated by the "core cities", which are usually the provincial capitals and large cities.
66 Asiaweek [Ys-zhou-zhou-kan). 14/4/1991; p.14.
67 E.g., it was reported that is 1990 Xinjiang government prohibited 48 products imported; some local authorities of Jiling province 
prohibited imnort of beer from the neighbouring provinces. Furthermore, Kwangdong imported rice from Thailand simply because 
the food-blockade of Hunan province. To prevent purchasing msterial from outside by people, several local authorities issued some 
sorts of 'supplementary currencies'. Asiaweek [Ya-zhou-zhou-kan], 14/4/1991; p.14.
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removing the top officials of the local authorities. However, in the light of the economic 
progress as a result from the decentralization since 1979, the recentralization has been in a 
uncertainty.
Indeed, a contradiction of the economic reform has been contained within the tension 
between the central and the local administration, given the size of China's economy and the 
natural imbalance between the inner and coastal areas. For instance, on 25th April, 1986, 
both Chinese general-manager and vice-general-manager of one Sino-American joint venture 
were dismissed by "Provincial Department of Machinery" [Zhang, Wang & Sun (1990): 253- 
254]. Until American investors got the support from the State Council - central 
"intervention" (gan-yu), both Chinese managers were restored to their posts on 24th 
September at the same year [Ibid.].
(iii) Party-State Intervention
However, the legal problems of foreign investment in the PRC have not existed alone without 
extra-legal issues. In fact, even long before the massacre in Tiananmen Square, foreign in­
vestment in China was struggling to survive.68 It is important to note that all these limitations 
on business remain today.
First, for instance, individual entrepreneurs, foreigners or Chinese, must devote 
concentrated attention and energy to managing the formal supply channels for materials. 
They have to link themselves informally into a network (in Chinese, guan-xi; or connection) 
with other entrepreneurs and administrative officials, that can effectively and dependably 
supply materials within the constraints of the centralized allocation system [Foster & Tosi 
(1990): 25]. This network is also very important for Chinese bureaucrats themselves;69 for 
instance, close friends, classmates, or those from the same home town. However, this
68 rhey •urrcred from acute ehortagca of foreign exchange, raw malarial and energy. In addilion. there were labour problema. inflation, 
tight cmdit and arbitrary price contrôla. LW. Foalar A L  Toai (1990): 22-27.
69 The Economist, 16X16^0. p. 116, "Investing in ChtneShsHghei 'l Gorbechev
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difficulty and the flexibility of the legal wording (as analysed before) reveal another problem 
for foreign investment in the PRC, that is, corruption of bureaucracy, discussed below.
Secondly, the triangular relation between administration, domestic and foreign 
enterprises must also be considered. The guan-xi (connections) mentioned play the key part 
also in the relationship between the domestic, especially the public enterprises, and the 
foreign-invested ones. Given the fact that public enterprises exist under the sponsorship of 
the various administrative authorities, this close relation will in practice benefit the local 
enterprises more in case of competition from the foreign enterprises. Only two reasons may 
lead the officers to provide a better treatment to the foreign investors in practice: benefits to 
the local economy; and personal benefits. The crucial problem then lies in the uncertain line 
between these two factors: for example, can an administrative discretion, which is based on 
consideration of benefits of both local and personal economy, amount to a form of 
corruption?
Thirdly, in reality, in 1989-90 Chinese industry, both private and state-owned, was in 
danger of grinding to a halt.70 Thus, it is arguable whether the foreign enterprises will destroy 
the domestic ones, or provide a chance for upgrading management by competition. 
Furthermore, with regard to the PRCs general business environment, foreign businessmen 
have been warned that China is printing money at an alarming rate and that enterprises are so 
short of working capital that many cannot pay their debts.71 Of course, law itself cannot 
figure out that the role of foreign investment should be in this economic reality. Obviously, 
only improvements of the law and administration do not guarantee better circumstances in 
China's macro-economy to foreign investors.
Finally, since the state provides the power to the officers of the PRC, their behaviours 
and attitudes towards the present market-planning system play the key part for the success of
70 Figures for tbc Fini sis months of 1990 show thst profits of Chias's ststc owned enterprise« sre down }9% overall, end more ihsa s 
third are losing money. The Economists, 14/07/90, p.57, "Japan throws China a lifeline".
71 iHd.
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both the economic reform and general businesses. However, inside the PRC basic free- 
market concepts, such as profit, marketplace, and customer, are ill-developed and not well 
understood [Foster & Tosi (1990): 24], In the PRC's forty-one-year history, the last decade 
has been too short for the most Chinese personnel who have lived their entire adult life in a 
lesser developed country with a centralized and planned communist economy. Thus, there 
may always exist some negative elements of bureaucrats' personal activities within the state 
intervention on business.
VII.4.B Contradiction between Formal and Informal Economic Sectors
(i) The Development o f  Foreign Investment Since 1979
Since 1979 a process of policy changes over longer than a decade has witnessed the 
PRC government's elaborate attempts to attract foreign investment to China. At the initial 
stage, the policy framed by the cautious Communist leaders was to limit the scope of foreign 
investment in China to particular organizational 'forms', such as the 1979 Equity JV Law, 
and particular geographic "regions", such as the SEZs in 1980 in the coast of Southeast 
China. And the few selected "sectors" of economy designated foreign capital and technology 
in the late 1970s implied that foreign investment could be the "special" trade in China, as 
termed by Ho and Huenemann (1985).
However, through the 1980s foreign investment expanded far beyond these initial 
restrictions. Almost every local authority was proud of launching promotional schemes to 
attract foreign investment which is either established or is being induced to come in to every 
part of China now. Furthermore, the legislative development in the decade of the 1980s has 
greatly widened the range of organizational formats under which foreign investment can be 
adopted.
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In fact, before 1983 foreign direct investment in China remained at a rather low 
level.72 Nonetheless, on the one hand, the legal framework for foreign economic activities 
became more complete, and on the other, the organizational forms of foreign investment 
became more flexible and diverse, and the rate of foreign investment in the PRC rose rapidly 
during the 1983-85 period. However, neither the Beijing government nor the foreign 
investors felt satisfied with the progress of foreign investment in China during the 1980s. To 
the Chinese government the nature of the foreign business in China has been disappointing, 
as has the total amount [Riskin (1987): 326]. Before 1986 most of the projects were small 
enterprises, launched mainly by overseas Chinese via Hong Kong, with low levels of 
capitalization and fairly unsophisticated technology in the relatively short term.
This was the background of the enactment of the famous 22 Articles of October 1986. 
First, it had been difficult for foreign business to repatriate any profits not earned in hard 
currency, because before 1987 the PRC government required each foreign venture to 
maintain its own foreign exchange balance.73 This discouraged investment in business 
designed to produce for the "domestic" Chinese market, thus removing one of the major 
incentives that China could offer to potential foreign investors. Secondly, the PRC's balance 
of payments difficulties during 1985-86 further exacerbated the long term problems 
mentioned.74 Thirdly, the then devaluation of the RMB seriously increased the cost of 
imported components and accordingly raised the price of the finished product inside the Chi­
nese market. For instance, The Shanghai No. 1 Sewing Machine Plant was unable to make 
any profits [Riskin (1987): 334]. Therefore, in order to restore foreign investors confidence 
by improving the business climate in China, the State Council successfully issued a full set of
72 C f.C lw B .o u i (1986).
73 Rep.lri.lioB. with only tome exceptions, was permitted only if it wa. counter balanced by an inflow of foreign exchange through 
"export«" or "new investment”.
^  It thus become more difficult, when the PRC government tightened its control over the expenditure of foreign exchsnge, for foreign 
business to impon necessary equipment or components from sbroad. Cf. Riskin (1987): 33J-335.
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new regulation for these long-standing problems in October 1986, that is, the Provisions for 
Encouragement o f Foreign Investment75.
However, it remains highly doubtful that these legal devices, provided by the 1986 
new investment regulations and others, will solve the foreign exchange problems of foreign 
enterprises in China. In addition, the political issues and the social tensions, with the 
recently widened gap of wages and economic uncertainties, have been disappointing the for­
eign business community in the PRC. For example, the early 1989 demonstrations and mass 
movements and the tragedy of the 4th June in Beijing. Accordingly, the poor investment 
climate in the PRC remains an issue for both foreign investors and Chinese government, and 
foreign investment will increase more slowly than Chinese leaders' planning.
Out of the 29,000 foreign business of the establishment of which has been approved 
by the Chinese authorities by the end of 1990, it was officially reported that only 14,000 were 
actually in operation, of which 3,300 are wholly foreign-owned.76 The total registered capital 
(those not operating included) is 19 billion U.S. dollars. Furthermore, the total industrial 
output of these "three-foreign-investment" (San-Zi) businesses in 1990 was 70 billion RMB, 
about three percent of the national industrial output in the PRC; and the exports of these 
businesses reached 7.81 billion US dollars, about 12.6 percent of the total exports by value of 
the PRC.77 This meant a net benefit for China's balance of payments. Generally speaking, 
foreign direct investment increased during the period of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986- 
90). According to China's State Bureau of Statistics, foreign capital used in the period was 
46.09 billion US dollars in total. Among these, 30 billion US dollar was through foreign 
loans, and 14.17 billion was foreign direct investments in some 29,000 projects [R M R B , 
(14/03/1991): 3].
75 The provision« w en shortly followed by seversl provincisl end municipal regulations which offered more incentives and concessions 
to foreign investors.
76 Ren-Min Ri-bao (People's Daily), Beijing (Overseas Edition), hereinafter cited as RMJB, 19/03/1991, p.l.77 Ibid..
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Nonetheless, the recent Internal Investigating Report by three authorities mentioned 
has given the fair evaluation of the foreign investment since 1979. As regards to the "forms" 
of 29,052 foreign invested projects, up to the end of 1990, equity joint ventures have 
occupied 16,294 items (56.1% of the total); contractual joint ventures, 9,308 items (32%); 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, 3,386 items (11.7%); and, ocean petroleum cooperative- 
development, 64 items (0.2%) [NBDC-I, The Nineties (April, 1992): 36]. The functions of 
foreign investment have been highly appraised:
(a) expediting the functions of "four windows" - (si-ge-chuang-kou; windows of 
technology, management, know-how, and foreign policy), beneficiai to economy of 
the coastal areas;
(b) promoting the readjustment of industrial structure, increasing the level of 
industrial and technological management;
(c) "San Zi" (three foreign investment) enterprises has been the most active part of the 
PRCs economy, and the useful supplement to the socialist economy78 [NBDC-I, ibid., 
37-39],
(ii) Contradiction between Formal and Informal Law in Chinese Context
Most of the PRCs currently effective statutes and regulations first appeared only after 
1979. Chinese leaders and officials frequently refer to the recent "lack of perfection" of the 
legal system, but their invocation of "perfection” reflects a narrow emphasis on the quality 
and the texts of rules rather than on their application [Lubman (1991): 320]. On the legal 
application as interaction between law and administration, well examined in Sections VII.2 
and VII.3, administration has assumed a more important role than law itself. For instance, 
since both the enactment of the 1986 "22 Articles" and the Amendment to the 1979 Equity 
JV Law mean that administrative procedure has become even more important in the statutory 
framework, it is not likely that new foreign investment would be stimulated in China only by 
the promulgation of formal law with more preferences, for example, tax benefits under the 
1991 Foreign ITL discussed. This is also the case of the 1990 SUI in Taiwan.
78 Including the growth of production output in the most rapid; increase of both trading and foreign exchange expanda in the recent 
successive years; enlarging the financial income of the nation and the local government; effectively supplement the value of the fixed- 
assets of enterprises of the PRC; creating the opportunities of employment; upgrading the technological levels of the old enterprises 
by the technological "jim-jic" (combination, or marriage); and promoting and advancing the development of domestic enterprises.
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Furthermore, from the very status of law being a gongju (tool), the impacts of 
informal sector under political norms, zhengce, ought to be taken into serious account. The 
first impact of the decentralization policy on China's economy has been another "unbalance" 
between the east coast and the inner areas, which is different from the unbalance between 
industrial sectors in the Cultural Revolution era, but similar to that from the late Qing to the 
Republican era. Of course, the economic growth has been rapid, while the tension caused 
from this strategy retains the conflicts between the central and local, such as "feudalist 
economy" discussed. At the level of implementation of law, this tension between the central 
and the local authorities and different considerations therein play the crucial parts. This 
tension is the core task of economic administration which has not yet gone with the failure of 
the Cultural Revolution. The central administration has to retain final control over 
coordination of the conflicts between the various regions. Also, the PRCs legal formalism 
since 1979 has been buttressed by positivism to emphasize the legislature as the sole source 
of law and the administration as the gatekeeper of legal application, and to limit the role of 
courts. For example, Article 53 of the Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC (890404) 
has delegated the final discretion on legal disputes to the State Council, not the People's 
Supreme Court.
In practice, to Chinese officials, their own interest considerations, through their own 
discretion, can influence the business operation and the implementation of both policy and 
law. Indeed for over two thousand years, the Chinese have been administering their affairs 
through a professional civil bureaucracy which plays a more important and impregnable role 
in the post-1979 Chinese-foreign economic co-operation.
Also, the PRC state-planning economy, based on unpredictable bureaucratic 
proposals, is another serious problem for business. For instance, for the past ten years, 
foreign investors have been told that Shanghai was expanding westwards around the airport 
and they invested accordingly. Now the industrial centre is to be on swampy land to the east.
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the famous Pudong New Area. Foreign investors then ask, "If the rules change once, why not 
twice?"7’
In addition, Chinese administration has been facing another difficulty in the post-1979 
reforms, that is the counter-reform from the bureaucracy itself. Although government has 
always been a fortress for pedantry and inflexibility, it has always been a constant part of 
Chinese life. Since 1979 Chinese policies have been reflecting the beliefs of those in power 
in Beijing that continued development of the PRC depends on a unified nation and that unity 
depends on a strong central government and a strong army.79 80
Indeed, to Chinese leadership today. Western-style democracy is irrelevant to Chinese 
economic reform, what matters is the group interest of the bureaucracy under the sham of 
"national interest" or "Party interest". To a great extent, it is convinced that the massacre in 
Tiananmen Square clearly distinguished "national interest" from the "social interests", 
distinguished the "state" from "society", distinguished the "Republic" from the "People".81
Two key issues behind these distinguished facts are that Chinese law and new 
institutions have been imposed on Chinese society from the top down without a deeper 
societal root, and that the statutory framework shaped in the 1980s constitutes only the 
outline of a legal system. The content, meaningfulness and impact of these statutes are still 
unclear and depended on application in practice by administrative agencies. In our study of 
foreign investment, both a better legal application and considerable time for improvement are 
further required.
79 The Economie!. 1 6 .A.VO p. 116, ’ Investing in Chinn*.
Il is a deep question for Chinese bureaucrats themselves how far the distance from their reform "mind” to the "reality" is. It is noted: 
"For the past four years, reform-minded authorities have drawn a clear distinction between the need for economic reform and any 
'misguided' experimentation with political reform. Although Tiananmen Square may well represent a change in degree, it certainly 
represents no change in policy." Foster A Tom (1990): 26.
81 For instance, "The post-1979 economic reforms and their results are not commonly shared by all the people of China. At least, 
inflation, corruption, wanes and achieving Western democracy are the different concerns between the people and those party and state 
bureaucrats. Tne difficulties of the PRC economy and foreign business in China after the Tiananmen killing in fact come out from the 
counter-reforms of the bureaucracy, which maintain the group interests of the administrative officials at different levels in the past 
yearn and in the violence of June 1989 itself." cf. CJ. Lee (19V1).
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However, it is clear that the co-existence of and interaction between formal and 
informal law are by no means unique to China or unknown to the West. What is the 
meaningfulness of Chinese informal law in comparative perspective? To Victor H. Li 
[(1970): 110-111], legal "attitude" makes differences, to S. B. Lubman [(1991): 333-336], 
"legal culture" does; that is, the West tends to downgrade the informal law, associating it with 
the less important aspects of law. However, it is not only difference of the degree, but also of 
the very status of the law. As regards policy towards law of foreign investment in both the 
PRC and Taiwan, the most common thread has been treatment of law as "a gongju (tool) of 
state administration". No greater autonomy is likely to be granted to law without extensive 
political reform. Administration has been the core, the law as "contingent". Law, as an 
instrument, or tool, of administration, has been put in the hands of "administrative 
manipulation" (xin-zhen-bu-men-zhi-you-cao-zhong). Legality is necessarily weak, if
administration alone can implement the policy (zhengce) to a certain content. In the field of 
foreign investment, the formal law not only gives the final decision-making to the 
administration, but remains both flexible in the wording and practical in negotiation [cf. 
Section VII.2].
Furthermore, the separation of party and state, or party and government, was not 
seriously undertaken during the 1980s both in the PRC and in Taiwan, although discussed 
occasionally. On the function and purpose of legal institutions, nothing less is needed than 
changing the habits of thought of Chinese officials and the Chinese populace. In short, from 
traditional influence, political ideology, to the legal mechanism, or the very autonomy of 
formal legal institutions, the role of informal system of law in Chinese context is different 
from the West.
VII.5 CONCLUSIONS
From the analysis in this Chapter, we see the trend of corporate-related laws, especially 
foreign investment legislation, that has been moved from the various statutes based on differ­
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ent forms of business towards the stage of further unification of legal treatments and 
application. The Second Wave for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, both in 
Taiwan and the PRC, has been fluctuating between the actions and reactions of the formal 
law, administrative measures, and business practice from foreign investors.
Also, we have seen the expansion of the administrative role in the general regulation 
of foreign investment. However, from the Chinese viewpoint, the officers argue that they 
have tried hard to simplify the administrative procedure. But, from the viewpoint of foreign 
investors, there exist more administrative measures for investment now. The only difference 
is that, in contrast to the situation in Taiwan, the discretion and approval powers have been 
lowered down to the local level. However, The State Council retains its coordinating role in 
Article 53 of the 1989 Administrative Procedure Law.
Nonetheless, since the general nature of this legal regime, as analysed above, remains 
both flexible in the wording and practical in negotiation, it could be asked to what extent this 
expansion of administrative control will benefit foreign investment. In my view, the 
emphasis on business negotiation and administrative measures means that law and its 
implementation merely act as the framework within which both foreign and Chinese parties 
can carry out their business bargaining. Although this is by no means unique to China or 
unknown to the west, the major distinction between the two approaches lies in both degree 
and altitude of reliance on these codes of behaviour and personal ties in administration. The 
interrelation between state law and administrative practice is the core issue, that is, which 
will assume the role of the base, and which, the role of the contingent element. Form our 
analysis, in the cases of the PRC and Taiwan, unlike the West, administrative discretion, or 
sometimes administrative intervention or administrative arbitrariness, is more important than 
the statutory framework.
Along the 1980s, the expansion of export in the PRC did not resolve the accelerated 
domestic problems, such as inflation, debts, unemployment in the rural areas, and unbalanced 
development among areas. Above all, it remains a question of the effects of institutions for
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promoting foreign investment, both law and SEZs: who benefits more, the PRC or the foreign 
investors, or both? Especially, whether the SEZs and their preferences and privileges 
offered to foreigners have created a new "treaty ports" system similar to that in Qing times is 
arguable. In my view, unless Beijing government evolves a better legal equipment to control 
both foreign investors and bureaucracy, the activities of self-interest and the local 
protectionism may accelerate the problems of China's development.
Indeed, facing both Chinese mandarins and the multinational giants, the function of 
law is limited both in Taiwan and in the PRC. However, to the minimum degree, law does 
matter as it is the instrument which stimulates foreign investment and trade and secondly, it is 
the tool for administrative regulation and bargaining. However, at the moment, the business 
environment of the PRC lacks any other positive conditions. Without additional positive 
conditions the political economy of China cannot develop as law is not sufficient on its own. 
Both the expansion of administration within the recent legislation and the business trends 
after the Tiananmen massacre also prove that the Party-State of the PRC only deems law as a 
tool for legitimation and regulation of the current business practice, not a more positive 
mechanism to improve economic circumstances. In summary, in addition to simply changing 
a law text, more far-reaching economic reforms are needed for the PRC government to 
stimulate new foreign investment.
I
2 4 2
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, to the academics who study Chinese law in development or law in the context, 
the fact of the reliance on informal relationships remains a dominant cultural feature. Indeed, 
the importance of informal relationships predates the Party-State system in both the PRC and 
Taiwan, or the Party-State structure has not diminished their role but reinforces it. Even in 
the case of foreign investment where the statutory law has its positive and formal existence, 
all administrative operation, informal relationships and business practice have their inveterate 
and invincible parts. This is the case of the PRC, so is that of Taiwan.
However, it is not necessary that the informal sector always has negative effects on 
the national development in the PRC and Taiwan. Behind our study, at least two benefits 
from informal system of law can be taken into account. First, business and economic 
activities in the PRC and Taiwan, and foreign investment accordingly, are secured not only 
by the statutory guarantee but also by the informal networks, such as the interaction of social 
relations and personal ties, that is, "trust". From this aspect, the booming growth of the 
PRCs economy, to a certain degree, can be expected. In Spring 1992, Deng Xiao-ping's 
calling upon Guangdong Province to become Asia's fifth "Dragon" is not a dream only, but 
has its social foundation.
Secondly, from this interaction of social relation and personal ties, there exists a 
"hiding order" based on the informal channels. This will release people from the anxieties 
about the "sher-hui-tuo-xu" (social "anomie", or disorder) in the transformation period. 
Behind these waves of action-reaction-interaction between formal and informal law, or the 
propaganda calling for "fa-zhi-zhi-xu" (legal order) by both regimes, there always retains a 
hiding order through social interactions, personal ties and informal channels. Thus, it seems 
less likely for China to suffer the same disorder from the integration of the former USSR in 
the near future. It is only from our examination of the informal system of law that we see the 
tenacity of Chinese society, a case of "ruan-zhong-you-xu” (order inside the disorder).
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But, it does not necessarily mean that the formal law loses its importance. From our 
analysis, the national development and the reform programme have much benefited from the 
PRCs legal construction since 1979, which has been much positive than the legal 
development in Taiwan in the 1980s.
Indeed, there exist some common bases within social context and culture for a 
comparison of social studies between the PRC and Taiwan. But, what is the common interest 
of our comparative study on law of foreign investment between the PRC and Taiwan? In this 
final part, we shall conclude the major aspects in the following remarks, viz: corporate 
control between the company law and foreign investment law; administrative procedure as 
the key role of the regulation of foreign investment; and, the significance of the latest change 
of law. Then, a set of common characteristics, and the major differences thereof, can be 
further drawn out.
I. Common Interests of the Comparison of Law of Foreign Investment Between the 
PRC and Taiwan
If we examine the continuing development before and after the year 1949 for the 
comparison of law and economic development between the PRC and Taiwan, many 
differences in context can be drawn. First, the development of the legal system and the 
content of law have provided an interesting example. As we analysed, law under the 
Nationalist government has a longer history, since the legal reform and a professional judicial 
administration developed under the last dynasty (Qing) during the final years of the 
nineteenth century. On the other hand, through the mass involvement and popular 
participation, the legal framework in socialist China always had a major area of informal 
elements played therein before 1979. And only after then, has a professional and expert 
judicial administration found a better standing within the regime. But, the legal construction 
needs a longer period before getting to a matured stage, because law itself can not provide 
any guarantee without a sound political-economy. Thus, the degree of the westernisation of 
law accounts for the first difference. Nonetheless, the whole 1980s saw the much advance of
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the PRC's legal construction, of which the formal legal changes have taken a much faster 
speed than that in Taiwan.
Secondly, when the Nationalist bureaucracy was learning the governing experiences 
through the stage of the bureaucratic capitalism in China before 1949, the Chinese 
Communists could only attempt to develop their rural economic management outside of the 
urban-industrialised coastal cities. In the point of view of international business cooperation, 
the Nationalist administrators had brought the experiences of economic management over 
Taiwan after the expulsion of the regime from the mainland. The management experience 
and the constituent elements of the technocrat and bureaucracy have been the other major 
difference between the two regimes.
The third point of the contrast between the PRC and Taiwan has been the reaction of 
the society under the constraint or constriction of the modem state and incorporation of in­
ternational capitalism since the mid-eighteen century. The role of state and its organs of 
government faced the challenges from the continued movements of the social restructuring 
through the mass campaigns. At least, one of the results from this societal reaction is the 
total expulsion of the foreign direct investment in the PRC from the late 1950s to the late 
1970s, followed the expulsion of the Nationalist regime, labelled as the "capitalist-imperialist 
running-dogs". However, in Taiwan after the Second World War this has never been the 
case. But, without any exception, as we analysed already, the role of the state has been 
assuming a bridge between the domestic production and international capitalism. After the 
famous "2-28 Incident” in 1947, it is difficult to say there was any radical reaction from the 
society before the mid-1970s, while the only compromise between the state and society exists 
in the open of the private business. This tendency can be elaborated from the analysis of the 
"internationalisation” policy under the Nationalist economic development strategy.
Fourthly, law and foreign investment have provided different functions under the 
economic development strategy between two regimes. A better way to explain this is from 
the enactment of "1990 Statute for Upgrading Industries (901228)" as a tool of the policy of
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internationalisation of both domestic and foreign-invested businesses. Whatever the content 
of this "internationalisation", or "interdependence", may be, Taiwan has never been 
"independent". This assertion is based on three accounts: first, compared with the PRC, the 
"economic sovereignty" of Taiwan remains a great difficulty to define, given reliance on a 
single capitalist patron, the U.S.A. Thus, to a certain content "interdependence" suggests that 
through internationalisation, Taiwan's "dependence" may be on more patrons than on U.S. 
only, such as the European Community. Furthermore, the new 1990 Statute only legalize the 
long-term practice of internationalization of domestic business and the ruling regime in 
which the bureaucracy assumes the bridge role. Moreover, the internationalisation of capital 
and production in Taiwan lacks a concern for social equality, welfare policy and 
environmental protection, compared with the PRC's political, economic, and social concerns 
with foreign investment. Only from these considerations, can we see the role of law as a 
better tool of development in the PRC than in Taiwan. Therefore, in the view of foreign 
investment and policy of internationalisation, law in Taiwan does not assume the functions 
for upgrading the social equalities and economic benefits for the major working classes, but 
assume the channels for upgrading industries internationalised. This is one of the major 
difference from the law in the PRC.
Fifthly, the sizes of the economy and administration therein shall come into another 
examination. The major difference between the economy and its administration of the PRC 
and those of Taiwan is the size and international location, that is, Taiwan is only an island 
economy between the Northeast and Southeast Asia, and between the Northern America and 
Southeast Asia. At least, the tension between the central government and the local authorities 
within the PRC has been of great interest and different from the case of Taiwan.
Finally, in addition to the legal system, behaviour and experience of bureaucracy, 
relationship between the society and the state, and the functions of law under the different 
development strategies analysed, the forms of production and the ownership play the key 
parts of the later economic developmental differences. Different from the usual view which 
has simply separated Taiwan and the PRC into those production of capitalist and socialist 
ones, I believe that both systems have been developing in a kind of mongrel economy. In
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other words, Taiwan, in terms of the favouritism [cf. Chapter VI], has developed a system 
with appearance of capitalist production with the core of the remains of feudal production, 
and the PRC has developed that with an appearance of socialist transformation before 1979,' 
and with an appearance of socialist market production after 1979, as named "Zhu-hou-jing-ji" 
[Cf. Chapter VII], integrated with the remains of feudal production as its core. The major 
reason for the maintenance of the quasi-feudal system is the compromise as the acceptance of 
the ruling regime by the society exchanged with the interests of local elites. As a fact, the 
new social-economic order has to rely more or less on this compromise with the old order, 
the pre-landlord or the localism.
II. Corporate Control: Between Company Law and Foreign Investment Law
(The 'Forms' o f Foreign Investment; The Market for Corporate Control under State 
Economic Planning; Corporate Control and the Transnational Corporations)
However, the major difference between two legal frameworks of foreign investment is the 
lacking of a general company law in the PRC up to the end of 1991. From the very 
beginning, the Nationalists in Taiwan have a private-oriented company law to regulate 
investment and business activities. While the PRC started its regulation of foreign 
investment through a special legislation on the selective form of foreign investment, that is, 
the 1979 Equity JV Law, which was followed by several special statutes. Thus, the approach 
of corporate control on foreign investment in Taiwan has developed from a domain (the 
general company law) through a line (the special statutes for different sectors) to a point 
(administrative discretion on each case). In contrast, the PRCs approach has developed from 
a point, through a line, towards a domain.
The emphasis of forms of foreign business in the legal mechanism explains the 
different effects on business activities. From the equity joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, to the contractual joint ventures, the tendency of the legal harmonization explains
The alternative development models before 1979 relevant to the PRC were the socialist and statist ones. In socialist development, the 
interests of these who work for a living receive primary emphasis, and the authority of the bureaucracy is progressively restricted in 
favour of the working classes, ultimately leading to the establishment of a socialist social formation. However, this was not the case 
before 1979 in China. In regards to the statist development, the interests of the bureaucracy are preeminent, and the rule of the 
bureaucracy and the statist social formation are consolidated. Cf. Chapter III.
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that the PRC has been moving in an encouraging way from mechanisms based on the forms 
of business towards mechanisms based on operation functions of foreign investment. The 
gradual decrease of discriminatory treatments between the different forms of foreign 
investment provides a better competition between the foreign investors. While in the case of 
Taiwan, the continuing use of the requirement of the form of 'company-limited-by-shares1, 
from the 1960 SEI to the 1990 SUI, explains the discriminatory treatment imposed upon the 
small and medium enterprises. Although Taiwan tries to promote the business function into 
upgrading industries programme, the form of business unfortunately creates itself an unequal 
basis in the programme. Compared with the tendencies above, it explains that the 
development of legal mechanism of foreign investment under two legal regimes is different. 
Law in Taiwan has adopted discriminatory form of business, as a key to promote investment, 
but law in the PRC has moved towards a harmonization of different businesses based on 
functions, that is, advanced technology and export orientation.
With regards to the market for corporate control under state economic planning, our 
study has suggested that inside capitalist economy, such as Taiwan, the state intervention is 
no less than that inside the socialist economy, such as People's China. Since 1978 the PRC 
has been moving towards a economy based on both the market and the state planning, the 
development of law in our analysis explains the policy is effective in the domain of foreign 
investment, especially after the 1986 "22 Articles" attempting to release business activities 
from the administrative intervention became clearer. In contrast, the administrative 
authorities in Taiwan still retain the "Negative Lists of Investment by Overseas Chinese and 
Foreign Nationals" as a measure to protect the major sectors of heavy industries and service. 
In this case, the state intervention in market and business is in fact more crucial and active in 
Taiwan, where the term of market economy has been abused.
Therefore, from the statutes to administrative procedure, the move from a general 
company law towards the special legislation of foreign investment in Taiwan has created a 
protectionism of domestic enterprises from foreign enterprises, and a privilege of big 
entrepreneurs from the small and medium enterprises. The bureaucracy is the key of this 
protectionism behind state intervention. However, the move from several special statutes
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towards the adoption of a single legislation in the PRC, such as the 1986 "22 Articles" and 
the 1991 Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law, has expressed the government's intention to 
urge more equal treatments under the law into the more market-oriented economy.
However, the law for corporate control itself provides a standing-point for the 
multinational business giants to exercise their super economic and technological powers. In 
our study, the dangerous practice to allow the foreign companies wholly-own or to capitalize 
their technology combined with the financial preferences for technology explain the financial 
difficulties for both the PRC and Taiwan at the end of the 1980s for further development [Cf. 
Chapters VI and VII]. Hence, that law in both regimes fails to control foreign investment 
effectively because of both the legal mechanism, and technological-economic context. 
Within this context, law, or the corporate control, faces its limits. While both the PRC and 
Taiwan benefit themselves from the exporting in the short term, the transnational 
corporations take the lion's share of this profit-making.
III. Attempting to Rationalize Law and Administration
(Administrative Procedure as a Key Role in the Control o f Foreign Investment; The 
Context o f the Change o f Foreign Investment Law; The Social Costs o f  the 
Bureaucratic Counter-Reforms)
From the comparative analysis, both in the PRC and Taiwan the administrative procedure 
indeed plays the key part of the whole framework of foreign investment. In addition to 
general politic-economic context, the limits of law have been laid on the expansion of the 
administrative measures, such as the often use of the administrative legislation and the 
discretion. The contradiction, or the uncertain relation, between the formal and informal law 
has further accelerated the traditional characteristics of Chinese bureaucracy, and has 
explicated the limits of law. However, in our study not only the Communists2 but also the 
Nationalists have reinforced the informal relationships, generally based on reciprocity, for 
access to personal interests and opportunities. From a macro view, the survival of the party- 
state and group interests of bureaucracy and its related entrepreneurs as a ruling class in
'  Indeed, M M. Manion hi« analysed. 'Many who aludy Chinese politics and society consider the reliance on informal relationships a 
dominant cultural feature... Others, who agree that the importance of informal relationships predates the communist system, argue 
that communist structures have not diminished their role but reinforced it..." [Manion (1991): 2o3).
249
Conclusions
general are the cornerstones of the structure of corruption, favouritism, quasi-feudalist 
production and protectionism. The importance of the traditional informal relationship and 
administrative sector emphasized at the beginning of this study explains that human 
connections in Chinese society are the major resources of the limits of law. Unfortunately, 
from the historical-structural perspective, there is no condition for the rule of law to exist 
under the shadow of the Party-State.
The change of law tends to explain the tension between the formal law and the 
informal domain, between the statutory texts and the enforcement of law, between legal 
regulation and business practice, and, accordingly, between the social changes and state 
intervention. Of course, the business circus, domestic and foreign, has its influence on 
proposing any legal change, but the attitude of bureaucracy may distort the rationalization of 
legislation.3 In both Taiwan and the PRC, the national interest, in the sense of the ruling 
interest of the Party-State, must make a compromise with the interest of bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, from the recent change of foreign investment law, it explicates that interests of 
other social groups can only develop under the ceiling of ruling interests of the Party-State. 
Moreover, the politically and economically strong groups tend to correlate with each other 
through the mechanism of the Party-State, such as the process of proposing policy and legal 
change.
The problems of the social costs of administrative counter-reforms explain the 
contradiction in both developments of the PRC and Taiwan. As one reviews the reform 
period since 1979, the new mechanism includes market system, foreign technology, foreign 
capital, a more balanced economic growth, and a judicial order for the protection of private 
economic activities and property, and for the respect for contracts as well. These new 
institutional settings and policies help us to understand the nature of the reform and how 
these contradictions emerged. However, at the end of the tragedy of the Tiananmen massacre 
in 1989, one saw one of two old contradictions—the intensification of hierarchy and the 
economic privileges, and a new contradiction—the failure to solve out the increased
3 Thu explains why Weber's theory hes failed to analyse that the state law is not always rational. Cf. M. Rhcinslein (ed. 1966), Max
Weber on Law in Economy and Society ( Harvard Univ. Presa. 1966), Ch. II, The Economic system and the Normative Orders, pp.
11-40. especially pp. 14-15.
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unemployment and inflation, still reached a point which urged the Communists to take a 
cautious review of the reform programme.
In the view of the past decades, Taiwan, usually quoted as "a successful example of 
development", shall be challenged in the questions of the social costs. Behind the socio-eco­
nomic transformation there has been a contradiction of development, suffice it to say that the 
Party-State and a Confucianist ideological bureaucracy have not yet been abolished for the 
past four decades. Taiwan's rapid economic growth, which provided widespread mobility 
opportunities and created the full employment necessary to stimulate real wage increases, has 
been under an alliance between the domestic entrepreneurs and bureaucracy. Therefore, the 
social uncertainties and economic inequalities caused by both political and economic 
privileges recently became the major criticism on of the Nationalists bureaucrats and 
connected entrepreneurs.
Indeed, the unprecedented international context accelerates Taiwan's changing steps. 
Even the issues of labour welfare and trade unions were pushed by American trade pressure. 
Furthermore, is the farmers' demonstration in May 1988 against US pressure trade a single 
incident, in light of the dependence relationship between the US and Taiwan for forty years? 
The potential tension of China-Taiwan trade, the laboratory of "one state two systems" in 
Hong Kong, and the gradual atrophy of the ROCs official relations in international 
community, thrust many tasks on Taiwan's law and development. In the PRC, was the 1989 
Tiananmen democratic movement an individual case? Given the huge package of law and 
administrative directives on the civil rights have been published since then [Cf. Appendix A], 
law and its function assume a more obvious role in China's future development. However, 
can both the Nationalists and the Communists avoid the impacts from the collapse of the 
Party-State in the U.S.S.R. in August 1991?
A prospective legitimacy (and legality) for the future lies on both the recognition of a 
people's right to development and the distinction between the rule of law and the rule by law. 
Eventually, the ultimate institutional guarantee of legality probably bases on the structure and 
ideology of both the Nationalist and Communist Parties that both governments represent and
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on the extent to which the Nationalist's and the Communist's nerve ends retain contact with 
popular mass.
All in all, from the initial incorporation of modern capitalism to the reform 
programme in the 1990s, the modernization of China has taken a long and cumbersome road 
between capitalism and socialism, while historically the Middle Kingdom was separated into 
two Party-States—Communist China and Nationalist China. At the end o f our study, 
Taiwan's experience of dependence on the West repeatedly stirs up in people's minds the 
question of whether China can go through its "socialist road with Chinese unique 
characteristics". Between opening and closing the door, can China avoid the fate of pen­
etration by the Western political and economic powers behind the giant transnational 
corporations? Between capitalism and socialism, which offers a better tomorrow for the 
Yellow Land? Moreover, between modernity and tradition, where is the sheltering sky for 
these "Children of the Dragon" who have long been eager for the return of cosmic harmony?
I
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APPENDIX A:
STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES OF THE PRC 
RELATING TO LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT'
490929 The "Common Programme o f the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference" (the CPPCC), adopted on 29th September, 1949.
500628 The 1950 Trade Union Law of the PRC; June 28, 1950.
510226 The 1951 Labour Insurance Regulations of the PRC; February 26, 1951.
510306 Procedures of the PRC for Prohibiting the State Currency from Entering or
Leaving the Country.
520100 Interim Procedures for Structuring National Economic Plans
540506 Decision of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's
Government Concerning the Establishment of a Foreign Trade Arbitration 
Commission within the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade.
540920 The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, (Foreign Languages 
Press, Beijing (Peking): 1954)
560331 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
560525.1 1956 Decision of the State Council Concerning the Prevention of Danger from 
Silica Dust in Factories and Mining Enterprises; May 25, 1956.
560525.2 The 1956 Regulations on Factory Safety and Sanitation; May 25, 1956.
560525.3 The 1956 Regulations governing Safe Working Conditions in Building 
Construction and Installation Projects; May 25, 1956.
571116 The 1957 Provisional Regulations of the State Council Concerning the 
Retirement of Workers and Staff Members; approved on 16 November 1957 
by the SC-NPC, adopted and amended on 6 Feburary, 1958 by the State 
Council..
571116 The 1957 Provisional Regulations of the State Council Concerning the 
Granting of Home Leave to Workers and Staff Members and Wages to Them 
on such Leave (dated as the above one).
571026 Interim Rules of the State Council on the Reward and Punishment of Officials 
in State Administrative Organs.
580911 Regulations of the Industrial and Commercial Consolidated Tax of the PRC
(Draft).
Resource«: Foreign Languages Press (Beijing) (1954), The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic o f China, (Foreign Languages 
Press, Beijing (Peking): 1954) and (1961), Important Labour Laws and Regulations o f the PRC (Enlarged Edition), 1961, Beijing 
(Peking); UEA Press Ltd. and Institute of Ciunese Lew (Publishers) Ltd. (Hong Kong). Stetutes and Regulations o f the Peoplers 
Republic o f China. UEA's INDEX (1988); UEA's INDEX (1990); Tai Dao Publishing Ltd (H.K.) (1983). Commercial Laws A  
Businass Regulations o f the People's Republic of China, Vol.I (1983: Hong Kong); Vol.H (1984: Hong Kong); Beijing Review, Ren- 
Min-Jhi Bao (RMJB); East Asian Executive Reporter, and, China Law A  Practice.
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580913
581121
590108
720418
790700
790702
790708
790828
790903
790913
800226
800319
800603
800726
800726.2
800826
800830
800910.1
800910.5
800922
801017
Detailed Rules and regulations of the Industrial and Commercial Consolidated 
Tax of the PRC (Draft).
Decision of the State Council of the PRC Concerning the Establishment of a 
Maritime Arbitration Commission within the China Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade.
Provisional Procedural Rules of the Maritime Arbitration Commission of the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
State Council's Approval of the Report of the Ministry of Finance on 
Reinstating the Construction Bank.
State Council Notice on Organizing Pilot Points in Accordance with the 
Reform of Management Structure.
Criminal Law of the PRC.
Law of the PRC on Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.
Provisional Regulation on Providing Loans for Capital Construction Projects.
Procedures for the Development of Processing and Assembly Industry for 
Export and Medium and Small Compensation Trade.
Environmental Protection Law of the PRC (Provisional)
State Council Notice Concerning the Conversion of Foreign Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission.
Provisional Regulations of the Bank of China on Foreign Exchange 
Certificates.
Provisional Regulations Concerning the Export Licence System.
Regulations on Labour Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment.
Interim Provisions of the State Council on the Use of Land for Construction 
by Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures.
Regulations of Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province.
Relations for Providing Short-term Loans in Foreign Currency by the Bank of 
China.
Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and 
Foreign Investment.
Resolution of the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on 
Amending the Constitution and Setting up the Constitution Amending 
Commission.
Articles of Association of the Bank of China.
Interim Rules on the Developing and Protection of Socialistic Competition.
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801024
801030
801207
801208 
801208.1
801209
801209.1
801210
801210.1
801212
801214
801214.1
801218
801219
801224
810129.1 
810212 
810330
Circular of the Ministry of Finance Concerning the Payment of Individual 
Income Tax by Foreigners Working in China.
Interim Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Resident Offices of Foreign 
Enterprises.
Circular of the State Council on the Strict Control of Price and Price 
Negotiation.
Notice of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce of the PRC 
Concerning the Registration of Resident Offices of Foreign Enterprises.
Circular of the State Administration of Commodity Prices on the Rigourous 
Enforcement of the Circular of the State Council on the Strict Control of Price 
and Price Negotiation.
Circular of Ministry of Commerce on the Policy in the Rigourous 
Enforcement of the Circular of the State Council on the Strict Control of Price 
and Price Negotiation.
Circular of the National Supply Cooperative on the Rigourous Enforcement of 
the Circular of the State Council on the Strict Control of Price and Price 
Negotiation.
Circular of the Ministry of Food Supply on the Rigourous Enforcement of the 
Circular of the State Council on the Strict Control of Price and Price 
Negotiation.
Circular of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce on Rigourous 
Enforcement of the Circular of the State Council on the Strict Control of Price 
and Price Negotiation.
Circular of the State Metrological Commission on the Metrological 
Management in Coping with the Grand Price Inspection.
Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual 
Income Tax Law of the PRC.
Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax 
Law of the PRC Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign 
Investment.
Provisional Regulations for Exchange Control of the PRC.
Circular of the Beijing Municipal People's Government on the "Procedures for 
the Registration of Resident Office or Representative of Foreign Enterprises".
Interim Provisions for the Professional Titles of Economic Professional 
Cadres.
Decision of the State Council on the Rigourous Strengthening of Credit 
Control and Extension of Loans.
Articles on Association of the China International Economic Consultants 
Incorporated.
Interim Customs Procedures for the Collection of Fees.
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810424
Appendix A: The PRC
Procedures for Registration, Examination and Approval of Joint Ventures 
Between Chinese and Foreign Investors.
810515 Interpretation of Tax Evasion, Refusal to Pay Taxes, Tax dodges and Arrears 
in Tax Payment by the General Taxation Bureau of the Ministry of Finance.
810602 Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Certain Questions Concerning Individual 
Income Tax.
810610.3 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
Strengthening the Work of Law Interpretation.
810180 Rules for the Implementation of Controls Relating to Carrying Foreign 
Exchange, Precious Metals and Foreign Exchange Instrument into and out of 
China.
810810.1 Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Controls Relating to 
Foreign Institutions in China and Their Personnel.
810924.1 Views of the State Economic Commission on Strengthening the Leadership 
and Properly Accomplishing the Reorganization of Enterprises.
811028 Circular of the State Council on the Despatch of the Views of the State 
Economic Commission on Strengthening the Leadership and Properly 
Accomplishing the Reorganization of Enterprises.
811126 Resolution on the Authorization of the Guangdong and Fujian Provisional 
People's Congress and their Standing Committees to Formulate Various 
Specific Economic Regulations for their Special Economic Zones.
811213 Economic Contract Law of the PRC.
811213 Income Tax Law for Foreign Enterprises of the PRC.
811224 Interim Provisions for Labour and Wage Management in Enterprises in the 
Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province.
811224.1 Interim Provisions for the Registration and Administration of Enterprises in 
the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province.
811224.2 Interim Provisions of the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province for 
the Control of Personnel Entering and Leaving China.
811224.3 Interim Provisions of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone for Land 
Management.
811231 Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Controls Relating to 
Individuals.
811231.1 Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Application 
by Individuals for Foreign Exchange.
820107 Provision on the Categorisation of Export Commodities in Foreign Trade.
820122 Circular on the Export Licence System Governing Eleven Categories of 
Export Commodities.
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820202
820205
820221
820226
820304
820305 
820401
821401
820413
820428
820430
820505
820604
820605 
820610
820707
820708 
820921
821204
821210
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Interim Provisions on the Rate of Registration Fee Payable by Chinese- 
Foreign Joint Venture.
Interim Procedure for the Collection of Pollutant Discharge Fees.
Detailed Rules and Regulations of the PRC for the Implementation of the 
Income Tax Law Concerning Foreign Enterprises.
Notice Concerning the Levy of Income Tax on Revenue from the Freight of 
Foreign Vessels.
Interim Provisions of Taxation Registration on the Operation and Cessation of 
Business Transactions of Foreign Enterprises.
Procedures for Trial Implementation on the Retention of Foreign Exchange 
Earned from Export Commodities.
Provisions of the General Customs Office and the Ministry of Finance for the 
Collection or Remission of Customs Duties and Industrial and Commercial 
Consolidated Taxes on Imports and Exports for the Chinese Foreign 
Cooperation Exploitation of Off-shore Oil.
Notice of the Shanghai Municipal Administration of Industry and Commerce 
on the Registration of Resident Offices of Foreign Enterprises.
Decision of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the Crack­
down on Serious Crimes in Economic Activities.
Circular of the State Council on the Strict Prohibition of Staff of Enterprises in 
Engaging in Improper Economic Activities For Soliciting Extra Income.
Announcement of the Ministry of Finance on Taxation of the Foreign Freight 
and Passenger Ships.
State Council Circular on the Division of Labour Among State Planning 
Commission and State Science and Technology Commission.
Regulations of the PRC on the Quarantine of Imported and Exported Animals 
and Plants.
Customs Procedures of the PRC for the Supervision and Taxation of Import 
and Export Samples and Advertising Materials.
Circular of the Ministry of Finance Concerning the Adjustment of Industrial 
and Commercial Tax Rates on Certain Categories of Products and Extension 
Categories of Products and Extension of Taxable Items.
Regulations for the Administration of Registration of Industrial and 
Commercial Enterprises.
Code of Conduct for State Council Officials.
Notice of the State Council Concerning the Taxation of Chinese-Foreign Joint 
Ventures and Cooperative Projects.
Constitution of the PRC.
Organic Law of the National People's Congress of the PRC.
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821210.1
821210.4
821211
821213
821222
821227
830101
830101.1
830101.2
830101.3 
830114
830201
830209
830305
831307
830309
831310
830401
831801
830822
830826
Organic Law of the State Council of the PRC.
Resolution of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth People's Congress on the 
Number of Deputies and the Election to the Sixth National People’s Congress.
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Registrations on the Administration 
of Registration of Industrial and Commercial Enterprises.
Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance on Tax Reduction and 
Exemption on Royalties from the Use of Proprietary Technology.
Circular of the State Council on the Formation of the Office For Shanghai 
Economic Zone and Shanxi Energy Base.
Articles of Association of the People's Insurance Company of China.
Interim Provision of the Ministry of Finance Regarding the Reduction and 
Exemption of Income Tax on Interest Earned in China by Foreign Business.
Rules of the Bank of China on Foreign Exchange Deposit (Category A).
Rules of the Bank of China on Foreign Exchange Deposit (Category B)
Rules of the Bank of China on Special Renminbi Deposit.
Circular of the General Office of the State Council Concerning the 
Organizational Structures of the People's Construction Bank of China and the 
Agricultural Bank of China.
Provisional Regulations for the Establishment of Representative Offices in 
China by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Financial Institutions.
Report on the Reform of the Structure of the Construction Bank.
The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
the Approval Power to be Exercised by the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade Instead of the Former Foreign Investment Commission.
Circular of the Ministry of Finance on the Exemption of Individual Income 
Tax on the Overseas Income of Foreigners Working in China.
Reply of the Ministry of Finance on Income Tax Exemption of Products Used 
for Repaying the Cost and Interest of Equipment and Royalty of Proprietary 
Technology.
Detailed Rules for Implementation of the Trademark Law of the PRC.
Interim Regulations on State-Owned Industrial Enterprises.
Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regulations Relating to 
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with Foreign Capital 
and Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture.
Regulations of the PRC on Arbitration for Economic Contracts
Regulations Concerning Registration Procedures for Intermarriage Between 
Chinese and Foreigners.
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830900
830901
830902
830902.4
830902.5
830920
831016
831115
831119
831122
831204
831217
831228
840110 
840114
840119
840128
840131
840131.1
840201
840207
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade Rules for Foreigners 
or Foreign Enterprises Applying for Trademark Registration in China.
Regulations of the PRC on Contracts on Property Insurance.
Resolution by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
the Amendments of "The Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Joint 
Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment".
Law of the PRC on Maritime Traffic Safety.
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 
Authorizing the State Council in Amending and Supplementing Part of the 
Procedures for Staff Retirement and Registration.
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC on Joint Ventures 
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.
Report of the Ministry of Finance on the Levying of Industrial and 
Commercial Sales Tax on Wholesale Commodities.
Resolution of the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial People's 
Congress on Approval of the Rules of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
on Commodity Building Property Management.
State Council Circular on Stopping the Purchase, Sale and Leasing of Land. 
Notice of the Customs of the PRC.
Rules of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Commodity Building 
Property Management.
Regulations on Administration of Private Urban Houses.
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulation of the PRC on the 
Control of Gold and Silver.
Provisional Regulations of the PRC on Import Licence System.
Supplementary Provision of the Ministry of Finance on the Levy of Industrial 
and Commercial Tax on Commodity Retailing Business.
Provisions for the Implementation of the Regulation on Labour Management 
in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.
Regulations of the PRC on Inspection of Import and Export Commodities.
Regulations Regarding the Supervision, Levy and Exemption of Tax on Good 
Imported and Exported by Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises.
Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Tax Exemption on International Finance 
Corporation.
Regulations on Control of the Import and Export of Gold and Silver.
Regulations on Foreign Economic Contracts of Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone.
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840208
840209
840312
840420
840423
840427
840430
840511
840513
840515
840601
840714
840714.1
840714.2
840714.3
840714.4
840414
840825
840912
840917
Provisional Regulations on Technology Import to Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone.
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Registration of Enterprises in the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
Patent Law of PRC.
Regulations Concerning Import and Export of Articles by Resident Offices of 
Foreign Enterprises and Presses and Their Staff Stationed in China.
The Task and Jurisdiction of People's Courts on the Trial of Economic Cases.
Administrative Procedures of the Customs of the PRC on the Inward/Outward 
Foreign Vessels, Imported/Exported Goods, and the Baggage and Personal 
Articles of Foreign Staff Coming to PRC for Chinese-foreign Cooperation in 
Off-shore Petroleum Exploitation.
Provisions of the Customs General Administration, Ministry of Finance, and 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Regarding the Supervision 
and Levy/Exemption of Duty on Goods Imported and Exported by Chinese- 
Foreign Joint Ventures.
Law of the PRC on the Prevention of Water Pollution and Treatment of 
Polluted Water.
Fire Services Regulations of the PRC.
Rules for the Implementation of the Interim Regulations on Licensing System 
for Import Commodities of the PRC.
Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations on Inspection of Import and 
Export Commodities.
Regulations on the Registration of Enterprises in the Xiamen Special 
Economic Zone.
Regulations on the Use of Land in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone.
Regulations on Labour Administration in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone.
Regulations on Technology Imports the Xiamen Special Economic Zone.
Regulations on Economic Integration between the Xiamen Special Economic 
zone and Inland Areas of China.
Report of the Opinion on the Reform of Foreign Trade System.
Provisions of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and 
Environmental Protection on the Administration of Private House Owned by 
Foreigners.
Scientific and Technical Progress Reward Regulations of the PRC.
Views of the Supreme People's Court on Some Questions Concerning the 
Rigourous Enforcement of the "Economic Contract Law".
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840918
841008
841015
841015.1
841015.2
841015.3
841015.4 
841018
841020
841109
841114
841115 
841128 
841205.1
841220
841225
850119
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
Authorizing the State Council in Reforming the Industrial and Commercial 
Taxation System and in Promulgating the Relevant Draft of Taxation 
Regulations for Trial Implementation.
Procedures for the Trial Implementation of Labour Management in Chinese- 
Foreign Joint Ventures in the Shanghai Municipality.
Provision on Preferential Treatment in Dalian Economic and Technological 
Development Zone.
Administrative Procedures for the Registration of Enterprises in Dalian 
Economic and Technological Development Zone.
Procedures for the Administration of Foreign Economic Contract in Dalian 
Economic and Technological Development Zone.
Procedures for the Management of Labour Wages in Enterprises in Dalian 
Economic and Technological Development Zone.
Procedures for the Land Use Management in Dalian Economic and 
Technological Development Zone.
Provisions on the Signing of Certificates on Generalized Preferential Terms 
for Foreign Processing and Assembly Business, Compensation Trade, and the 
Export Goods of Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperation, and Enterprises with Exclusive Foreign Investment (Trial 
Implementation).
Decision of the CCP Central Committee on the Reform of the Economic 
Structure.
Resolution of the Standing Committee of Guangdong Provincial People's 
Congress on Delegation of Authority of Shenzhen Municipal People's 
Government to Readjust at its Discretion the Scale of Land Use Fees in 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Concerning the Establishment of Maritime Courts in China's Coastal Port 
Cities.
Provisional Tax Regulation for 14 Open cities, Special Economic Zones and 
Hainan Island.
Decision for the Supreme People's Court Concerning the Setting Up of 
Maritime Courts.
Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of the Supply 
and Marketing of Resources Undertaken by Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures 
and of Commodity Price (Trial Implementation).
Regulations for Contracts of Processing Materials.
Procedures on the Revision, Preferential Terms, Reduction and Exemption of 
Land Use Fees in Shenzhen Economic Zone.
Regulations of the Implementation of the Patent law of the PRC.
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850119.1 
850121 
850204
850216
850301
850303
850304
850313
850321
850402
850405
850409
850409.1
850409.2
850409.3
850409.4
850409.5
850409.6 
850410.1
Notice on the Rate of Patent Fees.
Accounting Law of the PRC.
Procedures for the Reduction or Postponement of Payment for Patents by 
Individual Applicants.
Circular of the Supreme People's Court on Some Questions Concerning the 
Implementation of the Adjustment of Patent Cases.
Customs Provisions on Import of Small Sized Machines of Production by 
Urban and Rural Private Industrialists and Businessmen.
Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Insurance Companies.
Accounting Regulations of the PRC for Joint Ventures Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment.
Circular of the State Council on Strengthening the Management, Supervision 
and Inspection of Commodity Price.
Foreign Economic Contract Law of the PRC.
Regulations Governing Foreign Banks and Joint Chinese Foreign Banks in 
Special Economic Zones of the PRC.
Provincial Regulations on Violation of Exchange Control of the PRC.
Interim Regulations on the Guangzhou Economic and Technological 
Development Zone.
Tentative Procedure of the Guangzhou Economic and Technological 
Development Zone for Land Management.
(Tentative) Procedures of the Implementation of Industrial and Commercial 
Taxes in the Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone.
Interim Rules on Certain Matters Relating to Inland Associated Enterprises (or 
Undertakings) in the Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development 
Zone.
Tentative Procedures for the Registration and Administration of Enterprises in 
the Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone.
Tentative Procedures for Labour and Wage Management in Enterprises in the 
Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone Concerning the 
Introduction of Technology.
Interim Rules of the Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development 
Zone Concerning the Introduction of Technology.
Decision of the Third Session of the Sixth National People's Congress of the 
PRC on the Authorization of the State Council in the Formulation of Interim 
Provisions or Regulations Concerning the Economic Structural Reform and 
Economic Opening to the External World.
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860115
860115
860412
860620
861010
861011
861011.1
861110
861124
861126
861129
861201
861201.1
861201.2
861201.3
861216
861227
The Regulations on Joint Venture's Balance of Foreign Exchange Revenue 
and Expenditure (cited as JV Balance Regulations) (860115), adopted by the 
State Council.
The Amendment of Article 100 of the 1983 Equity JV Implementation 
Regulations , on 15 January, 1986, by the State Council.
General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC.
"Provisions of Shanghai Municipality on Application and Approval of 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Chinese-Foreign Cooperative 
Ventures and Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital", adopted 
by the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth People's 
Congress of Shanghai on 20 June, 1986.
Procedures of the Guangdong Province for the Administration of Securities 
and Bonds.
Provisions of the PRC for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment.
Provisions of Shanghai Municipality for the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment.
Provisions on the Decision-making Power Regarding Employment of Staff, 
Pay Scale, and Expenditure on Insurance and Welfare for Staff and 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment.
Procedures of the Customs of the PRC Governing Import of Materials and 
Parts that Enterprises Run with Foreign Investment Need in Performing 
Product Export Contract.
Procedures of the People's Bank of China on the Loan in Renminbi to Foreign 
Investors with Foreign Exchange as Security.
Regulations of the PRC on Bankruptcy of Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
Customs Procedures for the Declaration of Goods Imported and Exported by 
Foreign Embassies in the PRC and their Embassy Staff.
Provisions of the General Administration of Customs of the PRC Regarding 
Articles Brought Into and Taken Out of the Country by Foreign Embassies in 
the PRC and their Embassy Staff.
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Highway Transportation of Goods 
Contract.
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Air Cargo Transportation Contract.
Provisions of the State Economic Commission, State Science and Technology 
Commission, Ministry of Finance, and Patent Office if the PRC on 
Strengthening the Patent Work of Enterprises.
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC for the Control 
of the Foreign Nationals Entering and Leaving the Country.
Appendix A: The PRC
263
Appendix A: The PRC
870103
870120
870122
870124
870127
870131
870203
870217
870218
870220
870301
870327
870408
870421
870424
870523
870616
870623
Circular of the State Council on the Repeal of Certain Statutes on Foreign 
Affairs and Economic Relations; Industry, Transport and Urban Construction; 
Labour and Personnel; and Education, Science, Arts and Hygiene.
Procedures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment Regarding the Balance of Foreign 
Exchange Revenue and Expenditure by Purchasing Domestic Products for 
Export.
Customs Law of the PRC.
Rules of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade for the 
Implementation of Import and Export Licensing for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment.
Implementing Procedures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade Regarding the Affirmation and Assessment of Foreign Invested Export 
Manufacturing Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises.
Procedures of the Ministry of Finance for the Implementation of the 
Preferential Tax Terms in the Rigourous Enforcement of the "Provisions of 
the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment".
Regulations of the PRC on 1987 State Treasury Bonds.
Circular of the Ministry of Finance on the Levy of Bonus and Salary 
Regulatory Tax.
Procedures for the Handling of Official Documents of State Administrative 
Departments.
Interim Procedures for the Administration of Providing Foreign Exchange 
Guaranties by Domestic Institutions.
Interim Provisions on the Proportion of Registered Capital and Gross 
Investment of Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures.
Interim Regulations on the Administration of Bounds of Enterprises.
Resolution of the State Council on the Serious Enforcement of Tax Laws and 
Disciplines and on the Strengthening of Tax Collection.
Interim Regulations on the Formulation of Administrative Statutes.
Regulations of Bank of China on Providing Loans to Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment (07/04/87, approved by the State Council; 24/04/87, promulgated 
by the People's Bank of China).
Shanghai Provisional Measures for the Administration of Enterprise Bonds; 
and Shanghai Provisional Measures for the Administration of Shares, 
promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government on May 23, 
1987, effective from July 1, 1987 ([1987] 8 Fagui Xinxi).
Interim Provisions of the State Council on the Penalty for Breach of Financial 
Statutes.
Law of the People's Republic of China on Technology Contracts, adopted by 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on June 23, 1987,
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870701
870728
870731
870731
870801
870801
870805
870823
870827
870829
870905
870905
effective from November 1, 1987 ([1987] 15 State Council Gazette (June 26, 
1987) 515).
Measures for Application for Guarantees in Respect to Import and Export 
Goods, promulgated by the Customs General Administration, effective from 
July 1, 1987.
Regulations for the Supervision of State-owned Industrial and 
Communications Enterprises Facilities, promulgated by the State Council on 
July 28, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, August 14, 1987, p.2).
Interim Provisions for the Management of Labour Disputes in State 
Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on July 31, 1987, effective {torn 
August 15, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, August 11, 1987, p.2).
Provisions for the Collection of Fines for Late Reporting of Imported 
Commodities, promulgated by the Customs General Administration, 
announced on July 31, 1987, (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, July 31, 1987, 
p.l (report)).
Provisions for the Collection of Fines for Late Reporting of Import 
Commodities, promulgated by the Jiulong Customs, effective from August 1, 
1987 (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, July 31, 1987, p.l (report)).
Interim Provisions on Reduction of Individual Income Tax on Wages and 
Salaries of Foreign Personnel Working in China, promulgated by the State 
Council, effective from August 1, 1987 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), 
August 16, 1987, p .l (report)).
Provisional Regulations for the Supervision of Urban and Rural Individual 
Industrial and Commercial Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on 
August 5, 1987, effective from September 1, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, 
August 19,1987, p.2).
Interim Provisions on Labour Management of Foreign Investment Enterprises 
in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, promulgated by the Shenzhen 
Municipal Government, announced on August 23, 1987 (Shenzhen Special 
Zone Daily, August 23, 1987, p.l (report)).
Interim Provisions for Statistics on and Monitoring of Foreign Debt, 
promulgated by the State Administration for Exchange Control on August 27, 
1987 (Renmin Ribao, August 27, 1987, p.2).
Provisional Measures for Strengthening the Administration of Commodities 
Imported by Air, promulgated by the State Council General Office on August 
29, 1987 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), August 31, 1987, p.3).
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Treatment of Air 
Pollution, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on September 5, 1987, effective from June 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao 
September 10, 1987, p.5).
The Agreement on Civil and Commercial Judicial Enforcement between 
China and France, ratified by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on September 5, 1987 (Renmin Ribao, September 6, 1987, p.4 
(report)).
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870905 The Agreement on Civil and Criminal Judicial Enforcement between China 
and Poland, ratified by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on September 5, 1987 (Renmin Ribao, September 6, 1987, p.4 
(report)).
870911 Price Control Regulations of the People's Republic of China, promulgated by 
the State Council on September 11, 1987 (Renmin Ribao, September 20, 1987, P-2)
870912 Import and Export Duty Regulations, revised by the State Council on 
September 12, 1987, effective from October 15, 1987 (Renmin Ribao, 
September 30, 1987, p.5).
870917 Provisional Regulations for the Administrative Punishment of Speculation
and Profiteering, promulgated by the State Council on September 17, 1987 
(Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, October 8, 1987, p.2).
870923 Security Administration Measures for the Hotel Industry, approved by the 
State Council on September 23, 1987, promulgated by the Ministry of Public 
Security on November 10, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, November 12, 1987, 
p2)
871001 Measures on Foreign Exchange Control for Non-Bank Financial Institutions,
promulgated by the People's Bank of China on October 1, 1987.
871001 Measures for Quality Supervision of Imported Goods, promulgated by State
Administration for Commodity Inspection, State Economic Commission, 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and Customs General 
Administration, effective from October 1, 1987 (Renmin Ribao (overseas 
edition), September 27, 1987, p.3).
871010 Interim Provisions of the Supreme People's Court Relating to Handling 
Appeals in Criminal Cases by the People's Courts at All Levels, dated October 
10, 1987,2 published on September 20, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, October 25, 1989, 
p2)
871015 Shanghai Interim Provisions on the Prevention of Improper Competition, 
promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government on October 15, 
1987, effective from January 1, 1988 ([1987]) Fagui Xinxi p.45)
871019 Measures for Import Substitution Concerning Products of Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures and Cooperative Joint Ventures, promulgated by the State 
Planning Commission on October 19, 1987 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), 
October 31, 1987, p.3).
871029 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Interim Provisions Concerning
Sanctions for Violating Public Finance Legislation, promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Auditing Office on October 29, 1987, effective 
June 16, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, November 23, 1987, p.2)
871031 Measures for Import Substitution Management of Machinery and Electrical
Products of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture and Cooperative Joint 
Ventures, promulgated by the State Economic Commission, announced on 
October 31, 1987 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition, October 31, 1987, p.3 
(report)).
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871107
871109
871124
871124
871129
871201
871215
871221
871221
871229
871230 
880101
Provisions on the Administration of Foreign Processing and Assembly 
Business, promulgated by the Customs General Administration, Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, announced on November 7, 1987, 
effective from November 1, 1987 (Ta Kung Pao, October 13-16, 1987).
Advertising Control Regulations (revised), promulgated by the State Council 
on November 9, 1987, effective from December 1, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi 
Bao, November 12, 1987, p.2)
Rules of Procedure of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on November 24, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, November 25, 1987, 
P-4)
Village Committee Organisation Law of the People's Republic of China (for 
Trial Implementation), adopted by the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress on November 24, 1987, effective from June 1, 1988 
(Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, November 25, 1987, p.4)
Measures for the Assignment of Leaseholds for Value in the Shanghai 
Municipality, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's government 
on November 29, 1987, effective from January 1, 1988 (Liberation Daily, 
December 23, 1987, p.3)
Regulations of Fujian Province for the Protection of the Lawful Rights and 
Interests of Consumers, adopted by the Fujian People's Congress, effective 
from December 1, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, September 24, 1987, p.2).
Provisional Measures on the Administration of Taxation on Business 
Transactions between Foreign Investment Enterprises and Associated 
Companies, promulgated by the Shenzhen Municipal People's Government, 
announced on December 15, 1987, effective from January 1, 1988 (Ta Kung 
Pao, December 22, 1987)
Notice on the Revision of Article 86 (iii) of the Implementing Regulations of 
the Law Concerning Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures of the People's 
republic of China, issued by the State Council on December 21, 1987 (Ta 
Kung Pao, December 31, 1987, P.2 (report))
Provisional Administrative Measures for the Development of Imported 
Materials for Processing and Assembly Business, formulated by the Fujian 
Provincial Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission, announced on 
December 21, 1987 (Wen Wei Pao, November 14, 1987, p24 (report))
Regulations on Land Administration in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 
adopted by the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial People's 
Congress on December 29, 1987, promulgated on January 4, 1988 (Wen Wei 
Pao, January 6-9, 1988, p.24)
Measures on Responsibility for Quality Control over Imported Commodities, 
promulgated by the Hunan Provincial People's Government, announced on 
December 30, 1987 (Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, December 30, 1987, p2)
Several Provisions Concerning Capital Contributions by All Parties to Sino- 
foreign Equity Joint Ventures, promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade and the State Administration for Industry and
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880109
880111 
880111 
880113
880115
880120
880121
880121
880121
880212
880223
880224
Commerce on January 1, 1988, effective from March 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao 
(overseas edition), January 15, 1988, p.3)
New Preferential Policies for Assembly and Processing Enterprises in the 
Guangzhou Municipality, promulgated by the Guangzhou Municipal People's 
Government, announced on January 9, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, January 9, 1988, 
P-24)
Interim Provisions for the Control of the Prices of Important Production 
Materials, Communications and Transportation, promulgated by the State 
Council on January 11, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, January 21, 1988, p.2).
Provisional Control Measures Regarding Nationwide Centralized Price 
Ceilings for Production Materials Outside the Plan, promulgated by the State 
Council on January 11, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, January 21, 1988, p.2).
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Trademark Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (revised) promulgated by the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce on January 13, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, January 18, 1988, P2)
Jiangsu Province Provisional Regulations for the Supervision of Rural 
Collective Industrial Enterprises, promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the Jiangsu Provincial People's Congress (Fazhi Ribao, January 15, 1988, p.l 
(report))
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations on the 
Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's Republic of 
China, approved by the State Council on December 30, 1987, promulgated by 
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on January 20, 1988 
(Renmin Ribao, January 21, 1988, p2)
Amendments to the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Individual 
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, issued by the Ministry of 
Finance on January 21, 1988, effective from January 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, 
February 24, 1988, pi)
Water Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on January 21, 1988, effective 
from July 1, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, January 23, 1988, p.2)
Supplementary Provisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress Regarding the Punishment of Corruption and Bribery, and 
Supplementary Provisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress Regarding the Punishment of Smuggling, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on January 21, 1988 (Fazhi Bao, 
November 25, 1988, p.2)
Measures for the Administration of Land on Hainan Island, promulgated by 
the Hainan Provincial Preparatory Group, announced on February 12, 1988 
(Wen Wei Pao, February 25, 1988, p24)
Urgent Circular Relating to Strictly Controlling the Purchasing Power and 
Reducing Expenses of Social Organisations, issued by the State Council on 
February 23, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, February 24, 1988, p.l (report)).
Measures for the Administration of Domestic Vehicles Carrying Foreign 
Processed and Assembled Bonded Goods and Goods Carried in Such
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880225
880227
880302
880303
880305
880309
880309
880321
880402
880412
880413 
880413 
880416
Vehicles, promulgated by the Customs General Administration, announced on 
February 24, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, February 25, 1988, p24 (report)).
Measures for the Supervision of Vehicles and Accompanying Goods Entering 
and Departing from Hong Kong and Macao, promulgated by the Customs 
General Administration, announced on February 25, 1988, effective from 
March 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, February 25, 1988, p24)
Provisional Regulations on the Contract Responsibility System for State 
Industrial Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on February 27, 
1988, effective from March 1, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, March 5, 1988, p.2).
Guangdong Provincial Measures for Encouragement of the Development of 
Foreign Processing and Assembly Business and Compensation Trade, 
promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Government on March 2, 
1988 (Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition), April 8, 1988, p.3 (report)).
Ministry of Finance Circular on Reaffirming the Requirement of Foreign 
Investment Enterprises to Appoint Registered Accountants to Verify Capital 
Contributions and to Audit Accounts, issued by the Ministry of Finance, 
announced on March 3, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, March 4, 1988, p.l (report)).
Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions Handling Spot and 
Forward Foreign Exchange Transactions on Behalf of Customers, 
promulgated by the State Administration of Exchange Control on March 5, 
1988 ([1988] 5 State Council Gazette 143).
Shaoguan Municipal Measures on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, 
promulgated by the Shaoguan Municipal People's Government, announced on 
March 9, 1988 (Ta Kung Pao, March 12, 1988, p.12 (report)).
Zhaoqing Municipal Preferential Measures Concerning Foreign Investment 
Enterprises, promulgated by the Zhaoqing Municipal People's Government, 
announced on March 9, 1988 (Ta Kung Pao, March 9, 1988, p.30 (report)).
Tentative Provisions on the Administration of Technology Contracts, 
promulgated by the State Science and Technology Commission on March 21, 
1988 (Fazhi Ribao, April 1, 1988, p.3).
Opinion on Certain Questions Relating to the Enforcement of the 'General 
Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China'(for Trial 
Implementation), issued by the Supreme People's Court on April 2, 1988 
([1988] 2 Supreme People's Court Gazette (June 20, 1988) 16
Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Amendments (Articles 10 and 
11), adopted by the National People's Congress on April 12, 1988 (Fazhi 
Ribao, April 13, 1988, p.l).
State Industrial Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by 
the National People's Congress on April 13, 1988, effective from August 1, 
1988 (Renmin Ribao, April 16, 1988, p.2).
Decision Relating to the Establishment of Hainan Province, adopted by the 
National People's Congress on April 13, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, April 14, 1988, 
p.2).
Circular on the Problem Concerning the Settlement of Exploration 
Expenditures Incurred by the Foreign Petroleum Companies for Co-operative
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880419
880422
880423 
880426
880428
880506
880507
880507
880507
880507
880513
Exploitation and Exploration of Petroleum in China, promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance General Administration of Taxation on April 16, 1988 
(Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition), April 28, 1988, p.3).
Preferential Policies of the Guangxi Zhuangzu Autonomous Region on 
Encouragement of the Development of an Export-oriented Economy, 
promulgated by the Guangxi Provincial People's Government on April 19, 
1988 (Wen Wei Pao, June 9, 1988, p.26).
Measures of the Customs of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Administration of Bonded Factories Engaged in Processing Business, 
promulgated by the Customs General Administration, announced on April 22, 
1988, effective from May 1, 1988 (China Economic News, May 9, 1988, pp.
Measures on the Administration of Technology Exports, promulgated by the 
Guangdong Provincial People's Government, announced on April 23, 1988 
(Ta Kung Pao, April 23, 1988, p.3 (report)).
Jiulong Customs Measures on the Further Simplification of Inspection Release 
Procedures Concerning a Few Urgently Needed Production Goods and 
Materials Carried by Personnel of Enterprises of the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone, promulgated by Jiulong Customs Bureau on April 26, 1988 
(Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition), April 26, 1988, p.l).
Provisional Regulations Prohibiting Appropriations on Enterprises, 
promulgated by the State Council on April 28, 1988, effective from May 20, 
1988 (Renmin Ribao, May 6, 1988, p.2).
Customs Measures on the Administration of Reliable Enterprises, promulgated 
by the Customs General Administration, announced on May 6, 1988 (Fazhi 
Ribao, May 6, 1988, p.l).
Yingkou Municipal Provisions on Encouragement of the Development of the 
Three Imports, One Compensation' (Import of Materials for Processing, 
Import of Parts for Assembly and Import of Samples for Processing; One 
Compensation Trade) Project, promulgated by the Yingkou Municipal 
People's Government (Liaoning Province), announced on May 7, 1988 
(Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition). May 7, 1988, p.3 (report)).
Yingkou Municipal Provisions on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, 
promulgated by the Yingkou Municipal People's Government (Liaoning 
Province), announced on May 7, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition), 
May 7, 1988, p.3 (report)).
Provisions on the Administration of Cadres Employed by Foreign Investment 
Enterprises, promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial Personnel and Labour 
Bureaux on May 17, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition), May 17, 1988 
(report)).
Measures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China on the 
Administration of Bonded Warehouses and Bonded Goods, promulgated by 
the Customs General Administration, announced on May 7, 1988 (Wen Wei 
Pao, May 7, 1988, p.26).
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of 
Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons, promulgated by the State Council on
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880513
880514 
880514 
880518
880518
880519 
880519
880521
880522
880522
880523 
880526
May 13, 1988, effective from July 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, June 23-25, 1988, 
P-26).
Provisions of the Customs of the People's Republic of China on the 
Administration of Import and Export Goods from Economic and 
Technological Development Zones, promulgated by the Customs and General 
Administration, announced on May 13, 1988, effective from May 15, 1988 
(Fazhi Ribao, May 13, 1988, p.l).
Provisions of the State Commodity Price Bureau Relating to Sanctions for 
Price Violations, promulgated by the State Commodity Price Bureau on May 
14, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, May 16, 1988, p.2).
Provisions on the Encouragement of Investment in and Development of 
Hainan Island, promulgated by the State Council on May 14, 1988 (China 
Economic News, May 16, 1988, p.6).
Regulations for the Prevention of Environmental Pollution from Ship- 
breaking, promulgated by the State Council on May 18, 1988, effective from 
June 1, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, June 25, 1988 p.2).
Opinion on the Further Realization of the Autonomy of Foreign Investment 
Enterprises Regarding Personnel, promulgated by the Ministries of Labour 
and Personnel, approved by the State Council and announced on May 18, 
1988 (Renmin Ribao, (overseas edition), May 19, 1988, p.l).
Gongbei Customs Provisions on the Administration of Bonded Warehouses 
and Bonded Factories, promulgated by the Gongbei Customs Bureau (Zhuhai), 
announced on May 19, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, May 19, 1988, p. 25 (report)).
Gongbei Customs Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the 
Administration of Reliable Enterprises, promulgated by the Gongbei Customs 
Bureau, announced on May 19, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, May 19, 1988, p. 25 
(report)).
Measures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China on the 
Administration of Imported and Exported Materials used in the Processing 
Industry, promulgated by the Customs General Administration, announced on 
May 21, 1988, effective from June 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, May 21, 1988, 
P-26).
Certain Provisions of Yantai Municipality on the Development of an Export- 
oriented Economy, promulgated by the Yantai Municipal People's 
Government on May 22, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, July 1, 1988, p.26).
Regulations of the Ningbo Economic and Technological Development Zone, 
adopted by the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's 
Congress on May 22, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, May 26, 1988, p.26).
Sichuan Provincial Provisions on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, 
promulgated by the Sichuan Provincial People’s Government on May 23, 1988 
(Wen Wei Pao, June 21, 1988, p.26).
Shandong Provincial Trial Measures on Carrying Out Foreign Assembly, 
Processing and Compensation Trade, promulgated by the Shandong Provincial 
People's Government, announced on May 26, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, May 26, 
1988, p.26).
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880528
880528
880603
880605
880608
880609
880615
880616 
880616
880625
880625
880625
Preferential Measures on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment in Respect 
to the Establishment of Enterprises and the Development of Processing and 
Assembly Business with Imported Materials, promulgated by the Nanning 
Municipal People's Government, announced on May 28, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, 
May 28, 1988, p. 29).
Guangdong Provincial Provisions for the Implementation and Administration 
of Foreign Investment Utilized in Capital Construction Projects, promulgated 
by the Guangdong Provincial People's Government, announced on May 28, 
1988 (Wen Wei Pao, May 28, 1988, p.26 (report)).
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of 
Enterprise Legal Persons Registration, promulgated by the State Council on 
June 3, 1988, effective from July 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, June 13, 1988, p.2).
Provisional Regulations for Leasing Management of Small-scale State 
Industrial Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on June 5, 1988, 
effective from July 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, June 16, 1988, p.2).
Shanghai Municipal Interim Provisions on Bills of Exchange, promulgated by 
the Shanghai Municipal People's Government on June 8, 1988, effective from 
October 1, 1988 (1988) Xin Fagui 44
Detailed Implementing Measures on the Import Commodity Quality Licensing 
System (trial implementation), promulgated by the State Administration for 
Inspection of Import and Export Commodities, the State Economic 
Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the 
Customs General Administration on June 9, 1988 (China Economic News, 
October 10, 1988, pp 21-22)
Interim Provisions on the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprise 
Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial; and Commercial Tax for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment in the Coastal Open Economic Zones, 
promulgated by the ministry of Finance on June 15, 1988 (China Economic 
News, July 11, 1988, pl9)
Agreement on Mutual Service of Litigation Documents between Hong Kong 
and Guangdong Province, concluded on June 16, 1988, effective from July 1, 
1988 (Economic Daily, June 17, 1988, pi (report))
Certain Provisions of Hebei Province on the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment and the Opening of Qin-Tand-Cang Bohai Gulf Open Economic 
Zone, promulgated by the Hebei Provincial People's Government on June 16, 
1988 (Wen Wei Pao, July 5, 1988, p.26).
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Private 
Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on June 25, 1988, effective 
from July 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, June 29, 1988, p.2).
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Income Taxation 
of Private Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on June 25, 1988, 
effective from July 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, June 29, 1988, p.2).
Provisions of the State Council Relating to Collection of Individual Income 
Adjustment Tax from Investors in Private Enterprises, promulgated by the 
State Council on June 25, 1988, effective from July 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, 
June 29, 1988, p.2).
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880628
880626
880630
880701
880701
880701
880703
880703
880705
880705
880711
880712
880712
Provisions of the Customs of the People's Republic of China on the Import and 
Export of Goods, Means of Transportation, Articles of Luggage and Postal 
Articles to and from the Hainan Special Economic Zone, promulgated by the 
Customs General Administration, announced on June 28, 1988, effective from 
July 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, June 28, 1988, p.26).
Measures on the Assignment and Transfer of Land Use Rights, promulgated 
by the Xiamen Municipal People's Government, announced on June 26, 1988 
(Wen Wei Pao, June 26, 1988, p.26).
Notice on the Repeal of Certain Foreign-Related Laws and Regulations, 
announced by the State Council on June 30, 1988 (Renmin Ribao (overseas 
edition), July 4, 1988, p3)
Shenzhen Tentative Provisions on the Administration of the Shatoujiao 
Bonded Industrial Zone, promulgated by the Shenzhen Municipal People's 
Government on July 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, July 1„ 1988, p26)
Hainan Provincial Measures on Tax Incentives for the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment in Hainan Province, promulgated by the Hainan Provincial 
People's Government on July 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, August 20, 1988, p26)
Interim Provisions Relating to Party Disciplinary Sanctions Against Leading 
Party Cadres Who Commit Bureaucratic Errors Involving Dereliction of Duty, 
issued by the Chinese Communist Party Central Discipline Inspection 
Committee, effective from July 1, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, July 30, 1988, p2)
Provisions on the Encouragement of Investment by Taiwan Compatriots, 
promulgated by the State Council on July 3, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, July 7, 1988, 
p2)
Decision Concerning Further Implementation of the Open Policy, issued by 
the State Council on July 3, 1988 (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, July 22, 
1988, pi)
Notice on Delegation of Authority for the Approval of Wholly Foreign- 
Owned Enterprises to Provinces, Autonomous Regions, Centrally Governed 
Municipalities, Special Economic Zones and Cities under Independent Plans, 
issued by the State Council and announced on July 5, 1988 ([1988] State 
Council Gazette (No. 15) p496)
Xinjiang Preferential Measures for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, 
promulgated by the Xinjiang Uyger Autonomous Region People's 
Government on July 5, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, July 16, 1988, p26)
Agreement between China and Australia on the Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investment, concluded on July 11, 1988 ([1988] 20 State Council 
Gazette 661-70).
Interim Measures on the Administration of Taxation of Foreign Construction 
Enterprises Contracting Construction Projects in Beijing Municipality, 
promulgated by the state Tax Bureau on July 12, 1988, effective from July 1, 
1988 (Beijing Ribao, August 7, 1988, p2)
Notice on Several Questions Concerning the Implementation of the Taxation 
Provisions in the 'State Council Provisions on the Encouragement of 
Investment in and Development of Hainan Island', promulgated by the State
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880718
880721
880801
880801
880806
880810
880812
880823
880827
880902
880905
880905
Tax Bureau on July 12, 1988, effective from July 1, 1988 ([1988] China 
Taxation (No. 9 ), p49)
Regulations on Compensation for Families of Deceased Servicemen and 
Preferential Treatment for Servicemen, promulgated by the State Council on 
July 18, 1988, effective from August 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, July 26, 1988, 
P*)
Labour Protection Provisions for Women Workers, promulgated by the state 
Council on July 21, 1988, effective from September 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, 
July 26, 1988, p4)
Several Provisions for the Acceleration of the Development and Construction 
of the Hainan Special Economic Zone, promulgated by the Hainan Provincial 
People's Government on August 1, 1988 (China Economic News, October 17, 
1988, pp 16-17)
Beijing Municipal Interim Measures on the Administration of Foreign 
Exchange in Foreign Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Beijing 
Municipal People's Government on August 1, 1988 (China Economic News, 
October 3, 1988, pl8-19)
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Stamp Duty, 
promulgated by the State Council on August 6, 1988, effective from October 
1, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, August 13, 1988, p2)
Interim Provisions Relating to Party Disciplinary Sanctions Against 
Communist Party Members Who Violate Discipline in Foreign Affairs 
Activities, issued by the Chinese Communist Party Central Discipline 
Inspection Committee on August 10, 1988, effective from July 1, 1988 
(Renmin Ribao, August 10, 1988, p4)
Labour Regulations for the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province, 
adopted by the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress on August 12, 1988, 
effective from October 1, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, September 20-24, 1988)
Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection 
Authorities on Supervision of Cases (for Trial Implementation), issued by the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Discipline Inspection Committee, 
announced on August 23, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, August 24, 1988, p4)
Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investment between 
China and Japan, concluded on August 27, 1988 (Guoji Shangbao, September 
15, 1988, p2)
Guangdong Provincial Notice on Questions Concerning Acceleration of the 
Development of an Export-oriented Economy, promulgated by the Guangdong 
Provincial People's Government on September 2, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, 
October 4-8, 1988)
Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, adopted by 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on September 5, 
1988, effective from May 1, 1989 |(Renmin Ribao, September 6, 1988, p.4)
Supplementary Provisions of the Standing Committee of National People's 
Congress Relating to Punishment for the Offence of Disclosing State Secrets, 
adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
September 5, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, September 6, 1988, p4)
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880908
880908
880912
880912
880913 
880915
880920
880920
880920
880922
880922
880925
Provisional Regulations on Cash Management, promulgated by the State 
Council on September 8, 1988, effective from October 1, 1988 (Renmin 
Ribao, September 13, 1988, p2)
Certain Provisions Relating to Handling Accusations, Charges and Appeals, 
passed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Discipline Inspection 
Committee on July 8, 1987, effective from August 1, 1987, announced on 
September 8, 1988 ( Renmin Ribao, September 8, 1988, p4)
Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission, adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade on September 12, 1988, effective from January 1, 1989 ([1988] 22 State 
Council Gazette 723-29).
Arbitration Rules of the China Maritime Arbitration Commission, adopted by 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade on September 12, 
1988; effective from January 1, 1989 ([1988] 22 State Council Gazette 729- 
36).
Interim Provisions Relating to the Administrative Punishment of Corruption 
and Bribery by State Personnel, promulgated by the State Council on 
September 13, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, September 18,1988, p3)
Dali Preferential Policies Concerning the Acceleration of Economic 
Development, promulgated by the Dali Municipal People's Government 
(Yunnan Province), announced on September 15, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, 
September 15, 1988, p38)
Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection 
Authorities on the Trial of Cases, issued by the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Discipline Inspection Committee on July 14, 1987, announced on 
September 20, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, September 21, 1988, p3)
Several Preferential Provisions of Kunming Municipality for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated by the Kunming 
Municipal People's Government on September 20, 1988 (Ta Kung Pao, 
October 22, 1988, pi 9 (report))
Rules on Trading and Administration of the Shanghai Foreign Exchange 
Adjustment Centre, issued by the Shanghai office of the State Administration 
of Exchange Control on September 20, 1988
Provisional Regulations on the Control of Building Construction, 
promulgated by the State Council on September 22, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, 
September 26, 1988, p2)
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Banquet Tax, 
promulgated by the State Council on September 22, 1988, effective from dates 
to be determined by the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities 
(Fazhi Ribao, September 29, 1988, p2)
Measures on the Levying of Customs Supervision Charges on Imported Goods 
Which Enjoy Duty Reductions and Exemptions and on Bonded Goods, 
formulated by the Customs General Administration, the Ministry of Finance 
and the State Price Bureau, effective from September 25, 1988 (Wen Wei Pao, 
September 21,1988, p34)
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880926
880927
880927
880928
881003
881103
881105
881108
881112
881121
881122
881125
881130
Circular Relating to the Severe Punishment of Serious Economic Criminal 
Elements and the Prompt Trial of Economic Crime Cases, issued by the 
Supreme People's Court on September 26, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, September 28, 
1988, pi (report))
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Land-use Tax in 
Cities and Towns, promulgated by the State Council on September 27, 1988, 
effective from November 1, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, October 6, 1988, p2)
Measures on the Administration of Foundations, promulgated by the State 
Council on September 27, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, November 13, 1988, p.4)
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Urban Land- 
use Tax, promulgated by the State Council on September 28, 1988, effective 
from November 1, 1988 (Economic Daily, October 4, 1988, p2)
Certain Provisions Relating to Problems of Resigned or Retired Cadres of 
Party and State Offices at the County Level and Above Engaging in Trade and 
Managing Enterprises, issued by the State Council and the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee on October 3, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, 
October 25, 1988, pi)
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Administration of Registration of Enterprise Legal 
Persons, promulgated by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce 
on November 3, 1988, effective from December 1, 1988 (China Economic 
News, January 23 and 30, 1989)
Hunan Provincial Supplementary Provisions on the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment, promulgated by the Hunan Provincial People's Government on 
November 5, 1988 (Wen Wei Po, December 11, 1988, p.29)
Land Reclamation Provisions, promulgated by the State Council on November 
8, 1988, effective from January 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, November 20, 1988, 
p.4)
Measures for the Administration of Import and Export Commodity Inspection 
of Samples, promulgated by the State Administration of Import and Export 
Commodity Inspection on November 12, 1988 (Renmin Ribao (overseas 
edition) December 3, 1988, p. 3)
Agreement between China and Malaysia on the Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investment, concluded on November 21, 1988 (Wen Wei Po, 
November 22, 1988, p.2 (report)).
Agreement between China and New Zealand on the Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investment, concluded on November 22, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, 
November 23, 1988 (report)).
Certain Provisions on the Reporting Work of the People's Procuratorates (for 
Trial Implementation), passed by the Investigation Committee of the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate on November 25, 1988 (Fazhi Ribao, January 12, 1989 
p.2)
Auditing Regulations of the People's Republic of China, promulgated by the 
State Council on November 30, 1988, effective from January 1, 1989 (Renmin 
Ribao, December 8, 1988, p.5)
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881201
881201
881205
881209
881215
881220
881220
881220
881222
881229
881231
890101
890101
Shaanxi Provincial Provisions on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, 
promulgated by the Shaanxi Provincial People's Government in December 1, 
1988, (China Economic News, January 16, 1989, pp. 18-19)
Provisions Prohibiting State Administrative Offices and Personnel From 
Giving and Accepting Gifts in the Course of Official Activities within the 
Country, promulgated by the State Council on December 1, 1988 (Renmin 
Ribao, December 4, 1988, p.4)
Provisions on the Payment of Royalties for the Exploitation of Off-shore 
Petroleum Resources, approved by the State Council on December 5, 1988, 
promulgated on January 1, 1989 (China Economic News February 20, 1989 
pp. 19-20)
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Measures on the Administration of 
Temporary Workers Handbooks', promulgated by the Shenzhen Municipal 
Labour Bureau on December 9, 1988 (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, January 
2, 1989, p.2).
Agreement between China and the United States on Maritime Transportation, 
concluded on December 15, 1988 (Wen Wei Po, December 17, 1988, p.2 
(report)).
Provisions on the Administration of Economising on Water Use in Cities, 
approved by the State Council and promulgated by the Ministry of 
Construction on December 20, 1988, effective from January 1, 1989 (Fazhi 
Ribao, December 31, 1988, p.2)
Shanghai Municipal Provisions on the Administration of Foreign Debt 
Information, promulgated by the Shanghai branch of the State Administration 
of Exchange Control on December 20, 1988 (China Daily, December 21, 
1988, p.2 (report))
Implementing Measures on Sanctions for Unlawful Conduct Relating to Prices 
in Purchase and Sale Operations in Cotton, issued jointly by the State Price 
Bureau and the State Technology Supervision Bureau on December 20, 1988 
(Fazhi Ribao, January 26,1989, p.2)
Provisions on the Administration of Personnel Who Obtain Legal 
Qualifications But Do Not Engage in Legal Practice, issued by the Ministry of 
Justice (Fazhi Ribao, December 22, 1988, p.2)
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Concerning Amending the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic 
of China, adopted on December 29, 1988 (Renmin Ribao, December 31, 1988, 
p.4; full text of the amended law, Renmin Ribao, January 19, 1989, p.5)
Standardisation Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 29, 
1988, effective from April 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, December 31, 1988, p.4)
Regulations of the Shanghai Economic and Technological Development 
Zones, approved by the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal 
People's Congress, effective from January 1, 1989 (China Economic News, 
January 2, 1989 pp. 17-18)
Chongqing Municipal Provisions on the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment, promulgated by the Chongqing Municipal People's Government
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890101
890103
890106
890120
890124
890125
890203
890205
890211
890211
890212
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on January 1, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, January 11, 1989, p. 35, January 12, 1989, 
p.30, and January 13, 1989, p.28).
Measures on the Collection and Application of Fishery Resources Cultivation 
and Protection Fees, issued jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry 
of Finance and the State Price Bureau, effective from January 1, 1989 (Fazhi 
Ribao, December 6, 1988, p.2)
Measures for Determining the Dutiable Value of Imports and Exports, 
promulgated by the Customs General Administration on January 3, 1989, 
effective from January 10, 1989 (Wen Wei Pao, January 6, 1989, p.30 and 
January 7 1989, p.27)
Provisions on the Establishment of Import and Export Tax Administration 
Offices by Tax Bureaux in 15 Provinces and Municipalities, promulgated by 
the Ministry of Finance, announced on January 6, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, January 
6, 1989, p. 38 (report))
Circular on the Question of Reaffirming the Levying of Tax on Receipts and 
Income of Foreign Investment Enterprises, issued by the Shanghai Municipal 
Taxation Bureau and the Shanghai branch of the State Administration of 
Exchange Control on January 20, 1989.
Shantou Special Economic Zone Provisions on Land Administration, passed 
by the Standing Committee of the Shantou Municipal People's Congress, 
announced on January 24, 1989 (Shantou Special Zone Daily, January 28, 
1989, p.2).
Provisions on Penalties for the Violation of the Import and Export Licensing 
Administration System, promulgated by the Customs General Administration 
and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on January 25, 
1989, effective from February 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, (overseas ed) February 
4, 1989. p.25)
Regulations for Handling Boundary Disputes between Administrative 
Districts, promulgated by the State Council on February 3, 1989 (Renmin 
Ribao, February 12, 1989, p.4)
Circular Concerning Clearing up Problems Relating to Party and State Office 
Cadres Holding Positions in Companies (Enterprises), issued jointly by the 
General Office of the Communist Party Central Committee and the General 
Office of the State Council on February 5, 1989 (Jingji Ribao, February 13, 
1989, p.2)
Administrative Provisions on the Laying of Submarine Electric Cables and 
Pipes, promulgated by the State Council on February 11, 1989, effective from 
March 1 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, February 22, 1989, p.2)
Implementing Measures of Guangdong Province for the Protection of Women 
Workers, adopted by the Guangdong People's Government on February 11, 
1989, effective from March 1, 1989 (Shenzhen Tequbao, March 6, 1989, p.8).
Agreement between China and Pakistan on the Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investment, concluded on February 12, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, 
March 2, 1989 p.2 (report)).
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890214
890215
890216
890220
890221 
890221 
890301 
890301
890301
890302 
890302 
890306 
890308
Notice on Strengthening Administration Over the Borrowing of International 
Commercial Loans, issued by the State Council, announced on February 14, 
1989 (Economic Daily, February 14, 1989, p.l (report)
Implementing Regulations for the Technology Contract Law of the People's 
Republic of China, approved by the State Council on February 15, 1989, 
issued by the State Science Commission on March 15, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, 
March 16, 1989, p.2).
Provisions on Jurisdiction and Procedures for Penalising Foreign Investment 
Enterprises Which Violate Administrative Regulations on Registration, 
promulgated by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, 
announced on February 16, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, February 16, 1989, p.31)
Provisions for the Administration of Payment Settlements in Foreign 
Exchange to Foreign Investment Enterprises in the People's Republic of 
China, promulgated by the State Administration of Exchange Control on 
February 20, 1989, effective from March 1, 1989 (Jingji Cankao, February 28, 
1989, p.2)
Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Concerning the Publication of the Hong Kong Basic Law Draft, adopted on 
February 21, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, February 24, 1989, p.5)
Law of the People's Republic of China on Import and Export Commodity 
Inspection, passed by the National People's Congress on February 21, 1989, 
effective from August 1, 1989 (Economic Daily February 24, 1989, p.2)
Beijing Municipal Measures on Mediation of Patent Disputes, promulgated by 
the Beijing Municipal People's Government, effective from March 1, 1989 
(Beijing Ribao, May 22, 1989, p.2).
Provisions on Exchange Control for Chinese Parties to Sino-foreign Equity 
and Co-operative Joint Ventures, promulgated by the State Administration for 
Exchange Control, effective from March 1, 1989 (China Economic News, 
March 13, 1989, p.20).
Provisions for the Control of Bank Accounts Opened Abroad by Foreign- 
funded Enterprises, promulgated by the State Administration of Exchange 
Control, effective from March 1, 1989 (China Economic News, February 27, 
1989, pp. 22-23)
1989 Special State Bonds Regulations of the People's Republic of China, 
promulgated by the State Council March 2, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, March 16, 
1989, p.6).
Interim Provisions on the Administration of Civil Aviation Transportation 
Unscheduled Flights, promulgated by the State Council on March 2, 1989 
(Renmin Ribao, March 9, 1989, p.6).
Measures on Exchange Control for Investments Abroad, promulgated by the 
State Administration of Exchange Control on March 6, 1989 (Economic 
Daily, March 7, 1989, p.2).
Circular on Sorting out and Reorganising Various Types of Foreign Trade 
Corporation, issued by the State Council, announced on March 8, 1989 
([1989] 5 State Council Gazette).
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890311
890312 
890314
890314
890315
890315
890316
890316
890321
890323
890325
890330
890331
Xian Municipal Interim Provisions on Land-use Management by Foreign 
Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Xian Municipal People's 
Government, announced on March 11, 1989 (Ta Kung Pao, March 11, 1989, 
p.19 (report)).
Regulations on Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipeline Protection, promulgated 
by the State Council on March 12, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, April 20, 1989, p.6).
Provisions Relating to the Trial of Pricing Violation Cases (for Trial 
Implementation), issued by the State Price Bureau on March 14, 1989 (Fazhi 
Ribao, May 29, 1989, p.2).
Provisions of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Imports 
into and Exports out of the Coastal Open Regions, promulgated by the 
Customs General Administration, announced on March 14, 1989, effective 
from April 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, March 16, 1989, p.2).
Decision Relating to the Important Points of Current Industrial Policy, issued 
by the State Council on March 15, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, March 18, 1989, p.5).
Provisions on Strengthening the Administration of Imported Goods and 
Materials Donated by Overseas Chinese and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
Compatriots, promulgated by the State Council, announced on March 15, 
1989, effective from March 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, March 17, 1989, p.3).
Provisions on Export Licensing Control for Special Commodities and the 
Products of Foreign Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, announced on March 16, 1989 (Guoji 
Shangbao, March 16, 1989, p.l (report)).
Provisions Concerning the Current Handling of Cases Involving Crimes of 
Speculation and Profiteering by Enterprises, Institutions, Offices and 
Associations, issued by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate on March 16, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, March 20, 1989, p.5).
Provisions of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of 
Surveying and Mapping Results, promulgated by the State Council on March 
21, 1989, effective from May 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, April 6, 1989, p.6).
Provisions Governing the Names of Some Foreign Trade Enterprises, 
promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and 
the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, announced on March 23, 
1989 (Guoji Ribao, March 23, 1989, p.l).
Provisions on Matters Related to Title Registration of Foreign-Owned Houses, 
promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the State Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, 
announced on March 25, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, March 27, 1989, p.2 (report)).
Provisions on the Problems of Foreign Investment Enterprises Acting as 
Withholding and Paying Agents of Business Tax Linked to Retail Sales, 
promulgated by the State Taxation Bureau, announced on March 30, 1989 
([1989] 5 China Taxation 42).
Agreement on Air Transportation between China and Malaysia, concluded on 
March 31, 1989 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), April 1, 1989, p.l 
(report)).
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890404
890404
890405
890406 
890417
890417
890417
890424
890428
890501
890518
\
890520
890520
Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by 
the National People's Congress on April 4, 1989, effective from October 1, 
1990 (Renmin Ribao, April 10, 1989, p.l).
Rules of Procedure for the National People's Congress of the People's 
Republic of China, adopted by the National People's Congress on April 4, 
1989 (Renmin Ribao, April 10, 1989, p.3).
Interim Provisions on Radio Administration Fees, issued by the State Radio 
Administration Commission, the State Price Bureau and the Ministry of 
Finance on April 5, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, May 22, 1989, p.2).
Shanghai Customs New Preferential Provisions for Foreign Investment 
Enterprises, promulgated by the Shanghai Customs Bureau, announced on 
April 6, 1989 (Wen Wei Pao, April 7, 1989, p.40 (report)).
Guangdong Provincial Interim Provisions on Private Enterprises Carrying On 
Foreign Processing, Assembly and Compensation Trade Business, 
promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Government, announced 
on April 17, 1989 (China Economic News, April 17, 1989, pp. 19-20 (report)).
Guangdong Provincial Interim Provisions on Private (Foreign Commercial) 
Entities Contracting to Engage in Foreign Processing, Assembly and 
Compensation Trade Business, promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial 
People's Government, announced on April 17, 1989 (China Economic News, 
April 17, 1989, p.20 (report)).
Guangdong Provincial Interim Provisions on Private Enterprises Establishing 
Sino-Foreign Equity and Co-operative Joint Ventures, promulgated by the 
Guangdong Provincial People's Government, announced on April 17, 1989 
(China Economic News, April 17, 1989, p.20 (report)).
Measures on the Granting and Assignment of Leaseholds for Value in the 
Ningbo Economic and Technological Development Zone, promulgated by the 
Ningbo Municipal People's Government, announced on April 24, 1989 (China 
Economic News, April 24, 1989, p.16 (report)).
Interim Provisions on the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce, 
promulgated by the Executive Committee of the State Council on April 28, 
1989 (Renmin Ribao, June 23, 1989, p.4).
Guangdong Provincial Provisions on Labour Management in Foreign 
Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial People's 
Government, announced on May 1, 1989 (Nanfang Ribao, May 1, 1989, p.l 
(report)).
China-Soviet Union Joint Communique, issued on May 18, 1989 (Renmin 
Ribao, May 19, 1989, p.3).
Order Relating to the Implementation of Martial Law in Parts of Beijing 
Municipality, issued by the State Council on May 20, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, 
(overseas ed.), May 22, 1989, p.l).
Beijing Municipal People's Government Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 3, issued by the 
Mayor of Beijing Municipality on May 20, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, (overseas 
ed.), May 22, 1989, p.l).
Appendix A: The PRC
890521 Notice to Residents of Beijing Municipality, issued by the Martial Law Forces
Command on May 21, 1989 (fazhi Ribao, May 22, 1989, p.l).
890523 Notice Relating to the Restoration of Normal Order in the Capital as Soon as 
Possible, issued by the Beijing Municipal People's Government and the 
Martial Law Forces Command on May 22 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, May 23 1989, 
p.l).
890525 Urgent Circular Concerning the Strict Prohibition of Students from Storming 
Railways and Forcibly Riding Trains to Enter the Capital, issued by the State 
Council on May 25, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, May 26, 1989, p.l)
890603 Urgent Notice of the Martial Law Forces Command, issued on June 3, 1989
(Renmin Ribao (overseas ed), June 5 1989, p.l)
890605 Notice to the Whole Membership of the Communist Party and the People of 
the Whole Country, issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
and the State Council on June 5, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 5 1989, p .l)
890606 Urgent Notice of the Beijing Municipal People's Government and the Martial 
Law and Forces Command No 8, issued on June 6, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 7, 
1989, p .l)
890607 Notice Concerning the Strict Prohibition of Storming of Railways and 
Ensuring the Safety and Accessibility of Railway Transportation, issued by the 
State Council on June 7, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 8, 1989, p.l)
890607 Urgent Circulars Concerning the Crack-down on the Counter-revolutionary 
Rebellion Elements and Beating, Smashing, Looting, Burning, Killing and 
Other Serious Criminal Elements, issued by the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate on June 7 and June 11, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 17, 1989, p.l).
890607 Notice Concerning the Restoration of Normal Teaching Order in Tertiary 
Institutions, issued by the State Council on June 7, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 9, 
1989, p.l).
890608 Beijing Municipal People's Government and the Martial Law Troops
Command Notices Nos. 9, 10 and 11, issued on June 8, 1989 (Renmin Ribao 
(overseas ed.), June 10, 1989, p.l).
890609 Beijing Municipal People's Government and the Martial Law Troops
Command Notice No. 12, issued on June 9, 1989 (Renmin Ribao (overseas 
ed.), June 19, 1989, p.l).
890609 Notice on Firmly Safeguarding Normal Economic Order and Ensuring Normal 
Conduct of Industrial Production, issued by the State Council on June 9, 1989 
(Fazhi Ribao, June 10, 1989, p.l).
890610 Beijing Municipal People's Government and the Martial Law Troops
Command Notice No. 13, issued on June 10, 1989 (Renmin Ribao (overseas 
ed.), June 12, 1989, p.l).
890612 Beijing Municipal People's Government and the Martial Law Troops
Command Notice No. 14, issued on June 12, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 13, 
1989, p.l).
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890612
890612
890617
890617
890619
890628
890703
890705
890706
890712
890713
890721
890725
Notice Concerning the Strict Suppression of the Counter-revolutionary 
Rebellion and Control of Social Disturbances, issued by the Ministry of Public 
Security on June 12, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, June 13, 1989, p.l).
Shanghai Municipal Measures on the Administration of Price Control for 
Foreign Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Government on June 12, 1989, effective from July 1, 1989 ([1989] 
Xin Fagui Yuekan No 8, pp56-60)
beijing Municipal People's Government and the Martial Law Troops 
Command Notice No. 15, issued on June 17, 1989 (Jingji Ribao, June 18, 
1989, p.l).
Regulations on the Organisation of People's Mediation Committees, 
promulgated by the State Council on June 17, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, July 3, 
1989, p4)
Circular Concerning the Swift Punishment of Counter-revolutionary Rebellion 
Elements According to Law, issued by the Supreme People's Court on June 
19, 1989 (Renmin Ribao (overseas ed.), June 21, 1989, p.l).
Shanghai Municipal Provisions on the Work of Foreign Investment 
Consultants and Agents, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's 
Government on June 28, 1989, effective from August 1, 1989 ([1989] Xin 
Fagui Yuekan No 9, pp63-65)
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of 
Traffic Safety in Harbour Waters, promulgated by the State Council on July 3, 
1989, effective from August 1, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, July 20, 1989, p6)
Wuhan Municipal Supplementary Provisions on the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment, promulgated by the Wuhan Municipal People's 
Government, announced on July 5, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, July 5, 1989, p 
25( report))
Resolution Relating to Curbing the Turmoil and Suppressing the Counter­
revolutionary Rebellion, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress on July 6,1989 (Renmin Ribao, July 7, 1989, pi)
Shanghai Municipal Measures on the Purchasing of Materials and Marketing 
of Products by Foreign Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Shanghai 
Municipal People's Government, announced on July 12, 1989, effective from 
July 1, 1989 ([1989] Xin Fagui Yuekan No8, pp53-56)
Interim Provisions on Strengthening the Administration of the Real Estate 
Market in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, promulgated by the 
Shenzhen Municipal People's Government on July 13, 1989 (Shenzhen 
Special Zone Daily, August 7, 1989, p8)
Interim Provisions of the Supreme People's Court Relating to Handling 
Appeals in Civil and Economic Dispute Cases by the People's Court at All 
Levels issued on July 21, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, August 26, 1989, p2)
Interim Provisions Concerning Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan Compatriots Who Donate Foreign Exchange or Participate in Foreign 
Exchange Transactions, promulgated by the State Administration of Exchange 
Control, announced on July 25, 1989 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), July 
27, 1989, p3)
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890803
890803
890812
890815
890817
890819
890901
890908
890915
890919
890922
890922
Shanghai Municipal Supplementary Provisions on the Administration of 
Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons, promulgated by the Shanghai 
Municipal People's Government, announced on August 3, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, 
August 3, 1989, p25 (report))
Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic 
of Germany on Civil and Criminal Judicial Assistance, concluded on August 
3, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, August 5, 1989 (report))
Shanghai Municipal Regulations on Trade Unions in Sino-foreign Equity Joint 
Venture Enterprises promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's 
Government on August 12, 1989, effective from October 1, 1989 ([1989] Xin 
Fagui Yuekan No 12, pp 50-53)
Notice Relating to Corruption, Bribery, Speculation and Other Criminal 
Elements Who Must Voluntarily Surrender and Make a Confession Within the 
Deadline, issued by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's 
Procuracy on August 15, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, August 16, 1989, p4)
Provisions Strictly Controlling Visits Abroad by Leading Cadres, issued by 
the Communist Party Central Committee General Office and the State Council 
General Office on August 17, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, October 8, 1989, p i)
Notice Relating to the Question of State Administrative Personnel Who Have 
Engaged in Corruption and Bribery and Must Confess Within the Deadline, 
issued by the Ministry of Supervision on August 19, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, 
August 20, 1989, p2)
Guangzhou Municipal Measures on the Administration of Real Estate 
Operations Which Utilise Foreign Investment, promulgated by the Guangzhou 
Municipal People's Government, effective from September 1, 1989
(Guangzhou Ribao, August 31, 1989, p6)
Detailed Implementing Regulations for the Interim Provisions Relating to 
Administrative Sanctions for Corruption and Bribery by State Administrative 
Personnel, issued by the Ministry of Supervision on September 8, 1989 
(Renmin Ribao, September 22, 1989, p6)
Interim Provisions on the Administration of Temporary Identity Cards, issued 
by the Ministry of Public Security on September 15, 1989, effective from 
October 15, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, September 19, 1989, p2)
Guangzhou Provisional Measures on the Transfer for Value of Portions of 
Production Rights of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises to Foreign Parties, 
promulgated by the Guangzhou Municipal People's Government, announced 
on September 19, 1989 (Guangzhou Ribao, September 19, 1989, p i)
Hainan Provincial Provisional Measures on the Administration of Export 
Licences, promulgated by the Hainan Provincial Trade Department, 
announced on September 22, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, September 22, 1989, p34 
(report))
Hainan Provincial Provisional Measures on the Administration of Import 
Licences, promulgated by the Hainan Provincial Trade Department, 
announced on September 22, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, September 22, 1989, p34 
(report))
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891005
891020
891025
891025
891030
891031 
891101
891110
891110
891118
891123
\
891206
891206
891226.1
Interim Provisions Concerning the Supervision of Temporary Workers in 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, promulgated by the State Council on 
October 5, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, November 2, 1989, p6)
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration 
of the Protection of Underwater Cultural Objects promulgated by the State 
Council on October 20, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, October 25, 1989, p2)
Measures for the Fourth National Census promulgated by the State Council on 
October 25, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, November 3, 1989, p2)
Regulations on the Administration of Registration of Social Groups, 
promulgated by the State Council on October 25, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, 
November 9, 1989, p6)
Provisions on Certain Issues of Foreign Currency Conversion, promulgated by 
the State Administration of Exchange Control, effective from October 30, 
1989 (Jinrong Shibao, November 30, 1989, p i)
Law of the People's Republic o f China on Mass Rallies and Demonstrations, 
adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
October 31, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, November 1, 1989, p2)
Measures of the People's Republic of China on Customs Inspection of 
Luggage and Articles of Tourists Entering and Exiting the Country, 
promulgated by the Customs General Administration on November 1, 1989, 
effective from December 1, 1989 ([1989] State Council Gazette No.24, pp882- 
87)
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Debt Registration, 
promulgated by the State Administration of Exchange Control on November 
10, 1989 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), November 16, 1989, p3)
Measures on the Administration of Registration of Foreign Exchange (On- 
lent) Loans, promulgated by the State Administration of Exchange Control on 
November 10, 1989 (Renmin Ribao(overseas edition), November 14, 1989,P3)
Shangdong Provincial Interim Provisions on the Administration of Foreign 
Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Shangdong Provincial People 's 
Government, announced on November 18, 1989 (Wen Wei Po, November 18, 
1989, p25 (report))
Guangdong Provisional Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Registration 
of Foreign Exchange (On-lent) Loans, promulgated by the State 
Administration of Exchange Control, announced on November 23, 1989 
(Nanfang Ribao, November 23, 1989, plO
Interim Provisions on the Screening of Technology Exports Involving State 
Secrets, promulgated by the State Science and Technology Commission on 
December 6, 1989 (Fazhi Ribao, January 12, 1990, p2)
Interim Provisions on State Secret Technology Export Review, issued on 
December 6, 1989 by the State Technology Commission and the state Secrets 
Bureau (Renmin Ribao, January 12, 1990, p2)
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Organisation of Urban 
Residents' Committees, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National
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891226.2
891226.3 
891228
891228
900110
900110
900111 
900119 
900201
900220
900224
\
900224
900302
People's Congress on December 26, 1989, effective from January 1, 1990 
(Renmin Ribao, December 28, 1989, p3)
Environment Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 26, 
1989 (Renmin Ribao, January 5, 1990, p2)
Urban Planning Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 26, 
1989, effective from April 1, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, January 4, 1990, p6)
Certain Provisions Relating to Administrative Sanctions for Communist Party 
Members Who Violate Socialist Morality and Party Discipline (Trial 
Implementation), issued by the Communist Party Central Discipline 
Commission on December 28, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, January 18, 1990, p2)
Implementing Measures of Beijing Municipality for the 'Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Mass Rallies and Demonstrations,' adopted by the 
Beijing Municipal People's Congress on December 28, 1989 (Renmin Ribao, 
April 24, 1990, p2)
Order Relating to Lifting Martial Law in Parts of Beijing Municipality, issued 
by the State Council on January 10, 1990, effective from January 11, 1990 
(Renmin Ribao, January 11, 1990, pi)
Order of the Beijing Municipal Government Relating to the Lifting of Martial 
Law, issued on January 10, 1990, effective from January 11, 1990 (Renmin 
Ribao, January 11, 1990, p i)
Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Reporters and Foreign Resident 
News Organisations, promulgated by the State Council on January 11, 1990 
(Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), January 22, 1990, p4)
Regulations on the Management of Foreign Reporters and Foreign News 
Organisations, promulgated by the State Council on January 19, 1990 
(Renmin Ribao, January 20, 1990, p2)
Provisions Relating to Implementation of a System of Clearly Marked Prices 
for Commodities and Charges, issued by the State Commodity Price Bureau 
on February 1, 1990, effective from March 1, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, February 
6, 1990, p2)
Provisions on Recording Laws and Regulations, promulgated by the State 
Council on February 20, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, February 28, 1990, p2)
Decision of the State Council Relating to the Amendment of Article 21 of the 
'Provisional Regulations on the Contract Responsibility System for State- 
owned Industrial Enterprises.' promulgated on February 24, 1990 (Renmin 
Ribao, March 2, 1990, p2)
Decision of the State Council Relating to the Amendment of Article 22 of the 
'Provisional Regulations on the Contract Responsibility System for State- 
owned Industrial Enterprises,' promulgated by the state Council on February 
24, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, March 3, 1990, p3)
Regulations on the Administration of the Salt Industry, promulgated by the 
State Council on March 2, 1990 (Renmin Ribao), March 9,1990, p2)
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900302
900309
900315
900319
900326
900404
900404
900406
900419
900427
900505
900506 
900519
Decision on the Establishment of the Haikou and Xiamen Courts, issued by 
the Supreme People's Court on March 2, 1990 ([1990] Supreme People's Court 
Gazette, Nol, p24)
Supplementary Provisions on Encouraging the Development of the External 
Economy in the Coastal Regions, promulgated by the State Council, 
announced on March 9, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, March 12, 1990, p i)
Measures on the Supervision of Internationally Linked Railway Transport 
Entering and Leaving the Country and Goods and Articles Carried by Such 
Transport, promulgated by the Customs General Administration on March 15, 
1990, effective from May 1, 1990 ([1990] China Customs, No 6, p7)
Provisions for the Administration of Secured Loans in the Special Economic 
Zones of Guangdong Province, promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 
Guangdong Provincial People's Congress on March 19, 1990 (Nanfang Ribao, 
March 19, 1990, p2)
Provisions of the Hainan Special Economic Zone on the Transfer and 
Assignment of Land Use Rights for Value, promulgated by the Hainan 
Provincial People's Government on March 26, 1990 (Renmin Ribao (overseas 
edition), March 28, 1990, p5 (report))
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
republic of China, adopted by the National People's Congress on April 4, 
1990, effective from July 1, 1997 ( Renmin Ribao, April 7, 1990, ppl,3)
Decision of the National People's Congress Concerning the Amendment of the 
'Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures,' 
adopted by the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on April 
4, 1990 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), April 7, 1990, p2)
Implementing Regulations for the Standardisation Law of the People's 
Republic of China, promulgated by the State Council on April 6, 1990 
(Renmin Ribao, May 17, 1990, p6)
Measures for Handling Disputes among the People, issued by the Ministry of 
Justice on April 19, 1990(Fazhi Ribao, July 31, 1990, p2)
Measures on the Administration of Overseas Financial Institutions, 
promulgated by the State Council on April 27, 1990 (Jinrong Shibao, April 28, 
1990)
Shantou Special Economic Zone Interim Provisions for the Encouragement of 
Investment by Taiwanese Businesses, promulgated by the Shantou Municipal 
People's Government, announced on May 5, 1990 (Wen Wei Po (Economy 
and trade Section), May 21, 1990, p3)
Agreement between the People's Republic o f China and the People's Republic 
of Mongolia on Scientific and Technological Co-operation, concluded on May 
6, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, May 7, 1990)
Provisional Measures on the Administration of Foreign Investment in 
Comprehensive Land Development and Management, promulgated by the 
State Council on May 19, 1990 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), May 26, 
1990, p3)
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900519
900525
900530
900530
900603
900622
900625
900626 
900626
900628
900712
900713
900729
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Transfer of 
State Land-use Rights in Cities and Towns, promulgated by the State Council 
on May 19, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, May 25, 1990, p2)
Implementing Measures for the State Secrets Law of the People's Republic of 
China, approved by the State Council and promulgated on May 25, 1990 
(Fazhi Ribao, May 25, 1990, p2)
Regulations on the People’s Republic of China 1990 State Treasury Bonds, 
promulgated by the state Council on May 30, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, June 9, 
1990, p2)
Regulations on the People's Republic of China 1990 Special State Obligations, 
promulgated by the State Council on May 30, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, June 9, 
1990, p2)
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Rural Collective Enterprises, 
promulgated by the State Council on June 3, 1990, effective from July 1, 1990 
(Fazhi Ribao, June 14, 1990, p2)
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Pollution 
Damage to the Marine Environment from Land Pollutants, promulgated by the 
State Council on June 22, 1990, effective from August 1, 1990 (Renmin 
Ribao, July 15, 1990, p5)
Regulations of the People's Republic of China for the Prevention of Pollution 
Damage to the Marine Environment from Coastal Engineering and 
Construction Projects, promulgated by the State Council on June 25, 1990, 
effective from August 1, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, July 15, 1990, p5)
Interim Provisions on the Administration of Receipts of Foreign Investment 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises, announced by the State Taxation Bureau 
on June 26, 1990, effective from September 1, 1990 ([1990] China Taxation, 
No 9, p42)
Provisions on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment by Taiwanese 
Compatriots, promulgated by the Hubei Provincial People's Government, 
announced on June 26, 1990 (Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), June 26, 1990, 
p5 (report))
National Flag Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on June 28, 1990, effective from 
October 1, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, June 30, 1990, p2)
Regulations on Worker Assessment, issued by the Ministry of Labour on July 
12, 1990 (Fazhi Ribao, July 27, 1990, p2)
Certain Provisions of the Shenzhen Municipality on Penalties for Violations 
by Foreign Investment Enterprises, promulgated by the Shenzhen Municipal 
People's Government, announced on July 13, 1990 (Shenzhen Special Zone 
Daily, July 13, 1990, pi (report))
Provisions on the Administration of the Editing and Publication of Collections 
of Laws, promulgated by the State Council on July 29, 1990 (Fazhi Ribao, 
August 15, 1990, p2)
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900819
900901
900906
900907 
900907
900907
900907
900908
900908
900910
900910
900910
900910
State Council Provisions for the Encouragement of Investment by Overseas 
Chinese and Hong Kong and Macau Compatriots, promulgated by the State 
Council on August 19, 1990 (Ta Kung Pao, August 28, 1990, p2)
Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of Foreign 
Debt, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government, effective 
from September 1, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, August 23, 1990, p32(report))
Provisional Measures for the Administration of Planning and Construction of 
the Pudong New Zone, approved by the Shanghai Municipal People's 
Government on September 6, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, September 27, 1990, p25; 
September 28, 1990, p35)
Railroad Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on September 7, 1990, effective 
from May 1, 1991 (Renmin Ribao, September 9, 1990, pp2, 5)
Law of the People's Republic of China for the Protection of the Rights of 
Returned Overseas Chinese and Their Relatives, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on September 7, 1990, effective 
from January 1, 1991 (Renmin Ribao, September 9, 1990, p4)
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on September 7, 1990, effective 
from June 1, 1991 (Renmin Ribao, September 8, 1990, p5)
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on September 7, 1990, 
effective from June 1, 1991 (Wen Wei Po, September 9, 1990, p3)
Provisions on Reduction of or Exemption from Enterprise Income Tax for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment in the Pudong New Zone, promulgated 
by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government, announced on September 8, 
1990, effective from October 1, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, September 11, 1990, p4)
Measures on the Administration of Foreign-owned Financial Institutions and 
Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Financial Institutions in Shanghai, 
promulgated by the People's Bank of China on September 8, 1990 (Wen Wei 
Po, September 11, 1990, p4)
Certain Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality on the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment in the Pudong New Zone, promulgated by the Shanghai 
Municipal People's Government on September 10, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, 
September 21, 1990, p27; September 22, 1990, p42; September 23, 1990, pl9)
Certain Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of 
Land in the Pudong New Zone, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal 
People's Government on September 10, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, September 14, 
1990, p34; September 15, 1990, p40)
Measures of the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of the 
Waigaogiao Bonded Zone, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's 
Government on September 10, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, September 20, 1990, p31)
Measures for the Approval of Foreign Investment Enterprises in the Pudong 
New Zone, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government on 
September 10, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, September 13, 1990, p32)
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900910
900911 
901004 
901022 
901030
901112
901119
901122
901122
901209
901224
901224
901228
Guidelines on the Direction of Productive Business and Investment in the 
Pudong New Zone, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal Planning 
Commission on September 10, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, September 25, 1990, p27; 
September 26, 1990, p27)
Measures on the Administration of Goods, Transport and Personal Articles 
Entering and Departing the Shanghai Waigaogiag Bonded Zone, promulgated 
by the Customs General Administration, announced on September 11, 1990 
(Wen Wei Po, September 11, 1990, p4)
Provisions on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures Engaged in Contracting 
Operations, promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade, announced on October 4, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, October 4, 1990, p23 
(report))
Interim Provisions on Limitation Periods for Co-operation in Sino-foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures, promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade on October 22, 1990 (Wen Wei Po, November 1, 1990, 
p30)
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Consular Privileges and 
Immunities, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh National 
People's Congress on October 30, 1990(Renmin Ribao (overseas edition), 
October 31, 1990, p4)
Detailed Implementing Rules for the Postal Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, promulgated by the State Council on November 12, 1990 (Renmin 
Ribao, November 26, 1990, p.2).
Implementing Measures for the Archives Law of the People's Republic of 
China, issued on November 19, 1990 (Fazhi Ribao, November 29, 1990, p.2).
Provisions for the Administration of Labour Employment Service Enterprises, 
promulgated by the State Council on November 22, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, 
December 11, 1990, p.2).
Decision of the State Council Relating to the Amendment of the 'Provisional 
Measures for the Administration of Registration by Mining Enterprises Owned 
by the Whole People', promulgated on November 22, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, 
December 9, 1990, p.2).
Administration Supervision Regulations of the People's Republic of China, 
promulgated by the State Council on December 9, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, 
December 25, 1990, p.3).
Administrative Reconsiderations Regulations, promulgated by the State 
Council on December 24, 1990, effective from January 1, 1991 (Renmin 
Ribao, December 28, 1990, p.3).
Regulations on the Work of the People's Militia, promulgated by the State 
Council and the Central Military Commission on December 24, 1990 (Renmin 
Ribao, December 30, 1990, p.3).
Law of the People's Republic of China for the Protection of Handicapped 
Persons, adopted by the Committee of the National People's Congress on 
December 28, 1990, effective from May 15, 1991 (Renmin Ribao, December 
29, 1990, p.3).
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901228
901228
901231
910104
910215
910409
910409
910524
910630
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Law of the People's Republic of China on the Procedures for Concluding 
Treaties, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on December 28, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, December 29, 1990, p.4).
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Relating to Banning Drugs, adopted on December 28, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, 
December 29, 1990, p.4).
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Relating to the Punishment of Criminal Elements Engaged in Smuggling, 
Manufacture, Sale and Circulation of Obscene Articles, adopted on December 
28, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, December 29, 1990, p.4).
Regulations on Chief Accountants, promulgated by the State Council on 
December 31, 1990 (Renmin Ribao, January 13, 1991, p.2).
Implementing Regulations for the Land Administration Law of the People's 
Republic of China, promulgated by the Sate Council on January 4, 1991, 
effective from February 1, 1991 (Fazhi Ribao, January 16, 1991, p.2).
Regulations on Land Requisition Compensation and Resettlement Resulting 
from Medium and Large Scale Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power 
Project Construction, promulgated by the State Council on February 15, 1991, 
effective from March 1, 1991 (Fazhi Ribao, February 24,1991, p.2).
Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprise Tax Law (passed by 
the NPC on 9 April, 1991, and effective from 1 July, 1991)
Civil Procedure Law of the PRC (promulgated by the President of the PRC on 
and effective from 9 April, 1991).
Computer Software Protection Regulations, adopted by the State Council on 
24 May, 1991, effective from 1 October, 1991.
Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises Tax Law 
Implementating Rules, promulgated by the State Council on 30 June, 1991 and 
effective from 1 July, 1991.
I
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APPENDIX B:
STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES OF TAIWAN
(ROC) RELATING TO LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT*
280514 The 1928 Copyright Law, amended on 10 July, 1985.
280514 The 1928 Enforcement Rules for the Copyright Law, amended on 16 June,
1986;
290227 Law for Encouragement Establishment of Enterprises in China by Overseas
Chinese; amended on 7 January, 1949.
290523 The Civil Code (1929).
290718 Import Tariff Provisional Rules; amended & promulgated May, 1936; 10 May
1951; 19 August, 1959.
290924 Law Governing the Application of the Book of General Principles; amended
on 4 January, 1982.
291003 The Exchange Law; amended on 27 April, 1935.
291021 Labour Union Law
291202 Regulations Governing the Registration of Juristic Persons
291226 The Company Law (1931) ,(as one the four special laws regarding Civil
Matters in the ROC)
291030 The Law of Negotiable Instruments (1929) (as one the four special laws
regarding Civil Matters in the ROC).
291230 Maritime Law (1929), (as one the four special laws regarding Civil Matters in
the ROC)
291230 Insurance Law (1929) (as one the four special laws regarding Civil Matters in
the ROC).
291230 Factory Law
300301 Enforcement Rules of the Exchange Law
300506 The 1930 Trademark Law amended on 29 November, 1985.
300630 The Land Law; amended on 29 April, 1946; 29 March, 1955; and 24 July,
1975.
300701 (Old) Law Governing Enforcement of the Law of Negotiable Instruments.
Resource«: Law Revision Planning Group (CUSA, The Executive Yuan), Laws o f the Republic o f China: First Sorias--Major Laws 
(translated and compiled in Englisn, Taipei, December 1961); Laws o f Tne Republic o f China: Second Sorias (Taipei. October 1962); 
Industrial Development A  Investment Centre (MoEA), Investor's Guide: Republic o f China (Taipei. 1985); and 'A  New Edition of 
Compiled Book of the Six Laws' (Hsin-Bian Liu-Fa-Chuan-Shu). edited by /. Lin. Y. Cheng. T. Tsai and D. Ku,( 1984, published by 
Wu-Nan Press. Taipei); Central Daily (International edition, Taipei) Free China Journal.
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301028 Collective Agreement Law
301125 (Old) Enforcement Law for the Maritime Law
301230 The 1930 Enforcement Rules for the Trademark Law, amended on 19 
October, 1987;
310210 Factory Inspection Law
310328 The Banking Law (1931)
310613 1931 Business Tax Law (amended on 15 November 1985).
311212 Lodgement Law
340619 Custom Preventive Statute
341129 1934 Martial Law (promulgated and effective on 29 Nov., 1934; amended and
effective on 19 May, 1948; and further amended on 14 Jan., 1949).
341208 Stamp Tax Law
350101 1935 Criminal Code (amended on 26 December, 1969)
350201 1935 Civil Procedure Law (Amended on 25 April, 1986)
350401 Enforcement Law of the Criminal Code
350405 Law Governing the Enforcement of the Land Law; amended 29 April, 1946.
350510 Law Governing the Enforcement of the Code of Civil Procedure
350717 Bankruptcy Law; amended on 1 May, 1937; 05 December, 1980.
350718 Law Governing the Application of the Bankruptcy Law.
360625 Mine Field Law
361225 Labour Contract Law
390608 City Planning Law
400119 Compulsory Execution Law; amended on 16 May, 1944; 21 December, 1948; 
and 22 April, 1975.
401002 Regulations Governing Land Registration
401218 Statute on Deed Tax
430126 1943 Statute on Employee Welfare Funds, amended on 16th December, 1948.
430217 The Income Tax Law (1943)
430221 Enforcement Rules of the Statute on Deed Tax
430311 Statutes on House Tax
430331 Law of Public Notarisation; amended on 29 January, 1974; 4 July, 1980.
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430531
430701
430708
430709 
430716 
430916 
431225 
440428 
440529 
450408 
450611 
460416 
460621 
460712 
461225
470924
480311
480420
480510
481231
490402
510607
510616
520723
530126
530423
Law Governing Handling Labour Disputes
Law Governing Fees for Public Notarisation; effective from 1 January, 1944.
Law Governing Banquet and Entertainment Taxes
Enforcement Rules of Income Tax Law
Enforcement Rules of the Statute on Employee Welfare Fund
Slaughter Tax Law
Enforcement Rules for the Law of Public Notarisation
Enforcement Rules of the Labour Union Law
The 1944 Patent Law, amended on 24 December, 1986.
Law of Costs of Civil Actions 
Licence Plate Tax Law 
Estate Tax Law
Enforcement Rules for the Lodgement Law 
Enforcement Rules of the Estate Tax Law
1946 Constitution (enacted on 25 Dec., 1946; promulgated on 1 Jan., 1947; 
and effective on 25 Dec., 1947).
The 1947 Enforcement Rules for the Patent Law, amended on 10 July, 1987. 
Statute for Punishment of Smuggling 
Enforcement Rules of the Stamp Tax Law
Temporary Provisions for the Duration of Mobilization to Suppress the 
Rebellion (cited as the 1948 Temporary Provisions), promulgated on 10 May, 
1948; 11 provisions in total; amended on 11 March, 1960; on 19 March, 1966; 
and on 17 March, 1972.
The 1948 Statute for Foreign Exchange Control, enacted by the Central Bank 
of China
Statute on Commodity Tax
The Statute for Reduction of Farm Rent to 37.5 Percent (1951)
Statute for Uniform Collection of Central and Local Taxes and Assessments in 
the Province of Taiwan
Rules Governing the Collection of Business Tax in Taiwan Province 
The Land-to-the Tiller Statute (1953)
Rules Governing the Enforcement in Taiwan of the Land-to-the-tiller Statute
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530606 Law Governing the Application of Laws of Civil Matters Involving Foreign
Elements
530707 Statute on Tax on Domestically Produced Tobacco Products and Alcoholic 
Liquors
540714 The Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals (the 1954 SIFN).
540826 The Statute for the Equalization of Urban Land Rights (1954)
551119 The Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese (the 1955 SIOC).
580721 Labour Insurance Statute
590819 Customs Import Tariff
600301 Enforcement Rules of the Labour Insurance Statute
600910 The Statute for Encouragement of Investment (the 1960 SEI).
601230 Rules Governing Employment and Dismissal of Workers by Factories and
Mines
610101 Regulations Governing Revaluation of Assets of Profit-seeking Enterprises
[with: Rules Governing the Conducting of Revaluation of Assets of Profit- 
seeking-enterprises (610101)].
610111 Enforcement Rules of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (1960
SEI)
610120 Commercial Arbitration Act; amended on 11 June, 1982.
610202 Criteria of Encouragement by Way of Reduction or Exemption of Profit-
seeking-enterprise Income Tax; amended on 12 January, 1962. [with: 
Categories of Enterprises Eligible for Encouragement by Way of Reduction or 
Exemption of Profit-seeking-enterprise Income Tax].
610918 Measure for Installment Payments of Import Duty and Dues on Machinery and
Equipment Imported by Productive Enterprises
611014 Rules Governing Registration of Arbitrators of Commercial Arbitration
Associations
611014 Rules Governing Charges of Commercial Arbitration Fees
620430 Statute for the Collection of Provisional National Defense Special 
Assessments
620606 Measures for Setting Up Bonded Warehouses and Factories by Bonded and
Credit Extension Agencies
620808 The 1962 Statute for Technical Co-operation (amended on 29 May, 1964; the 
1962 TCS)
621229 Statute on Income Tax Rates for 1962
650130 The 1965 Statute for the Establishment and Management of Export Processing 
Zones (the 1965 EPZ Statute)
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660412
680210
680316
680430
680603
690531
700616
700925
710201
711105
711111
730406
730529
750312
750422
760624
761006
770726
781127
790727
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Rules Governing Auditing of Final Income Tax Returns of Profit-seeking 
Enterprises
Enforcement Rules of the Insurance Law.
Minimam-wage Law
The Securities Exchange Act (1968) (or, 1968 Law of Securities Transfer), 
amended on 29 January, 1988.
"Measures for the Use of Patent Rights and Technical Know-How as Equity 
Investment” (published by MoEA on 3 June, 1968).
Minimum Capitalisation Standards for Limited Companies and Companies- 
Limited-By-Shares, amended on 15th October, 1980.
"Criteria for the Handling of Trademark Licensing by Foreign Enterprises" 
(amended on 3 June, 1985)
Criteria for Allocation of Land for Lease in the Export Processing Zones, 
promulgated on 25 September, 1970 and amended on 23 November, 1972.
The 1971 Public Highways Law, amended on 23rd January, 1984.
"Enforcement Measures Governing Payment in Installments and Exemption 
from Duties and Dues Chargeable in respect of Machinery and Equipment 
Imported by Productive Enterprises", promulgated on 5 November, 1971, and 
amended on 27 May, 1988.
"Categories and Criteria of Productive Enterprises Eligible for 
Encouragement" (amended, on 26 November, 1986) published by MoEA 
[under Article 3 of the 1960 SEI].
Organic Rules of Commercial Arbitration Association
(New) Law Governing the Application of the Law of Negotiable Instruments; 
amended on 21 January, 1974; 21 February, 1978.
"Criteria for Encouragement of Establishment or Expansion of Industrial and 
Mining Enterprises", promulgated on 12 March, 1975 and amended on 30 
November, 1987.
"Supplementary Measures for the Company Registration in respect of 
Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investments" (1975 Foreign Company 
Registration Measures), amended on 28 July, 1982.
Statute for the Enforcement of the Factory Law
Categories and Criteria for Special Encouragement of Important Productive 
Enterprises, promulgated on 6 October, 1976; amend on 27 October, 1981.
Measures for Refund of Taxes and Duties on Export Products
1946 Statute for Securities Transfer Tax, amended on 27 November, 1978.
The 1979 Statute for Establishment of Science-Based Industrial Park (the 
1979 SIP Statute)
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790727
820819
820821
831124
831230
840419
840730
850629
850918
870623
901228
910430
The Science-based Industrial Park Statute (the 1979 SIP Statute)
Key Points of the Simplified Procedure for the Importation of Machinery and 
Equipment by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Nationals in Productive 
Enterprises, promulgated on 19 August, 1982.
"Applicable Scope of Strategic Industry", promulgated on 21 August, 1982 
and amended 23 December, 1987.
Regulations Governing the Administration of Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprises, promulgated on 24 November, 1983 and amended on 26 January, 
1987.
Statute on Income Tax Rates for 1984
Criteria for Big Trading Company by Overseas Chinese and Foreign 
Nationals, promulgated on 19 April, 1984 and amended on 17 October, 1986.
Labour Standards Law
Measures Governing the Deduction for Investment in Procurement of 
Machinery and Equipment by Private Productive Enterprises, promulgated on 
29 June, 1985 and amended 29 June 1986.
Measures Governing the Deduction for Investment in Research and 
Development Expenses by Productive Enterprises, promulgated on 18 
September, 1985.
1987 National Security Law (enacted on 23 June, 1987; promulgated on 1 
July, 1987; and effective on 15 July, 1987).
1990 Statute for Upgrading Industries (the 1990 SEI)
Supplementary Amendment of the Constitution of the ROC (10 Provisions), 
passed by the National Assembly on 30 April, 1991 and effective from 1 May, 
1991.
»
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GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS
An-Li-Xi 
bao-tuo
bei-erh-bu-shen 
Chang-Cheng ^
Chen-Sher 1
Chong-hsin 
Chong-Mei-He 
Da Qing Hui Dian ;"jjr 
Da-chi-cher-chang ^  
dang-guo ^  
di-fang-bao-hu-zhu-yi MLl 
di-fang-hsin fa-gue ^
du-zi ^  
fa; fa-lu
Fan (Mr.) ^
Feng-tian (Toyota)
Fu-Ri ^  ^  
gan-yu f U
German G.S. Ltd Co. gongju i - A
guan-xi
Guangyu Chongsheng Butong Nan-Chaoxian, Yizcrlue he Nanfe Jinxin-maoyi zhi Tongzhi
<■ i f l  ^  t  ■^  f  4  i  i i  >
Guangzhou / # • * +  Guo-ji-hua J Ì [ / ^
Guomindang (Kuomingtang)
Guo-min-dang dang-yin-shih-yeh
bao-jia
bei an \ffi ^
ben-wei-zhu-yi M
Chang-yi <7£ j
chong-fu-yin-jin ■ii&lig
Chong-li Y  jjW-
Chung-hsing
Da Qing Lu Li k  tfó
Dairen (Dalian)
dang-guo yi-ti
* ^ - i t
Duo-liu .¿I- 7 ^
fa-zhi-zhi-xu ikiìAfy
fan8
\
Ford-Liuho / fK
Gu-Ji 
Guo-Rei i§l?4p
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Hainan
He-di
Hong-kou -¿X  O  
Hong-Qi 
Hsing-hsing-wen 
Hua-Jie 
jia-jie
Hai-wai i 
Ho-hsin
Hong Kong S.F. Co. £j
Hsien-Zeng-Yuan / ' j '
Hua-chiao
n
j&i&r
Huang-pu
jia-min-yin, jen-guo-yin
Jiao-yun-tung
Jing-ji-fa 
Jueding 
Kai-fang Zhengce
Jin-Zi Di-18641-Hau Han & % % l U t y  
Jing-ji Ri-Bao jj£j■1L
Kai-Da tUdt
Kong-ye Tou-zi Jan-shun _ I L a i - h u a - t o u - z i  ^  ^
lai-liao-jia-gong he-tung J ^ / i ]
« £ j
Lu-wan
Luo-Yang
Lan-i-sher 
Li Ji
liang-an-san*di X
lieu-xu-pai 
lou-kuei
luo-bao r’Tj
Mi-Han-Na
Min-zhu; Min-qung; Min-sheng i ^
Nei-Bu-Diao-Ca 
Nio-tuo-zi-cung
P“-1
Pan-Chiao 
P'eng Pai j  
Puo-san-tei
li; li-fa; li-lu i ^ > ¿ 5  f f
Lian-he-da-di 
liang-tiao-tui-zou-lu
ijkn
Neibu w
i tQing (Ching) 
qing-shei
pao ^
Ping-Shuo An-Tai-Bao 
Qin (Chin)
Qing-bang -jjj-
299
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Qiu-Shi
Ren-Min Ri-Bao 
San-fan )>Z^
San-yang S~
Shanghai; Shanghai-bang _k
Shelun
Sher
it
Shi-ta-fu - i" A A _
Shu ^
Sher-tan-chi-yu 1%J
qiye jituan 4 ^  A l i i  
ruan-zhong-you-xu ^
San-Min Zhu-i —
San Zi 
Shantou 
Shenzhen 
sher-hui-tuo-xu
shih -ir
Shou
si-ge-chuang-kou
si-ge jei-duan qi-ge wen-jian \7J/fl]|
ta-fi* A A
Ta-ZhongCo. ij
Tangwai
Tiananmen
14
tiao
Sinkiang (Xinjiang) ^
Ta-tung j p j l j l  
Tai-yuan %j 
Tainan-bang 
Tao-yuan 
Tianjin ^ J y j k  
tong-zhi
tzu-ehueh ^
Wai-kuo-jen 
Wu-fan j £  
xian
xiangxi-xuancuang-jeishi-guojia-falu-zhidu
xie-yj
xin-zhen-bu-men zhi-yuo-cao-zhong ^  j '
xing-zheng guan- li zhu-guan bu-men ^  'J  ^
Ya-zhou Zhou-kan Yao-lan
yiju wuoguo-you-guan falu-he-zhengce $ L -
yin-chang-xin gong-ying-shih-yeh jf \ . ^  ^
Tung-yi Co. ^  i j
tzu-tung ~ |r  
Wan-li 
Xiamen
xin-nan
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Yu-long 
yuan
16-FÉ
Zalan Gong-Jian-Fa £ ] j i êj Î v.  
Zhi-du-hua
zhong-dian-cheng-shih 
Zhong-guo Fa-xue 
Zhongguo-qiyeh-guanli-xuei-huei 
Zhongguo-tigaiwei-jingji-tizhi-yu-guanli-yenjioshuo
Yuan
Yuo-shieng gu-feng kong-si 
Zhengce
Zhi-shi • / !  ^  
Zhong-guo ^
Zhongguo-waishang-touzi-qiyeh-xueihuei 
Zhongguo-Wujin-Kuangchian
Zhong-hua
Zhong-yang- ling-dao j i-ti-dequan-wei 
Zhou (Chou)
Zhu-Hou-Jing-Ji
Zi i
Zhongguo Xunda
Zhou-li
Zhuhai
Zi-you-hua | ]
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